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The thesis is an exploration and assessment of the missiological writings 
of Bishop Lesslie Newbigin following his return to Britain in 1974. 
It begins by setting out the context of his subsequent work as being one of 
cultural transition from modernity to postmodernity, and draws missiological 
implications from this evolution. Against this background, it is the original thrust 
of this thesis that the work of Michael Polanyi provides the indispensable 
hermeneutical key with which to unlock Newbigin's thinking, both in its 
philosophical and missiological dimensions. The contours of this indebtedness 
are explored in detail, and the implications for Newbigin's work in the context of 
both modernity and postmodernity are examined. Polanyi's thought is shown to 
contribute positive and constructive elements to Newbigin's work, enabling him 
to engage with the need for cultural renewal upon fresh epistemological grounds, 
to challenge modernity's preoccupation with 'reason' as the only grounds for 
certainty, and to recall the Church to a renewed confidence in the gospel by 
emphasising its fiduciary foundations. Moreover, Polanyi's influence is also 
shown to strengthen Newbigin"s credentials as a 'postmodern' missiologist. 
The thesis proceeds to argue that Polanyi's influence also provides the 
key to understanding Newbigin's philosophical and missiological shortcomings. 
Two of these are developed in detail. Firstly, the importation of Polanyi's liberal- 
existential approach to epistemological method is shown to work against 
Newbigin's more robust revelational methodology. Secondly. Polanyi's 
influence is shown to contribute to Newbigin's ultimately confusing exposition of 
his programme of 'public' truth. The thesis critiques this element of Newbigin's 
programme and shows that it founders upon the importation of a secular 
Polanyian notion of `dogma' into Newbigin's overtly theological and 
missiological framework. 
The thesis concludes by assessing Newbigin's contribution to cultural 
critique and mission and suggests lines of enquiry in the light of his work. 
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Newbigin, Mission, and Cultural Change 
The question of how contemporary Christians should seek to propagate a 
religious message in a culture that knows no obvious conceptual starting point for 
one is an issue of pressing significance for the Church. The speed of cultural 
change in the West, which has heralded an era now increasingly characterised by 
the adjective `post modern', simply serves to raise this missiological question in 
new and sometimes unexpected forms. How, for example, may a message which 
is believed to contain certain unchanging and unchangeable truths about God and 
his world, be communicated when the setting in which such communication takes 
place is characterised by an increasing pluralism and relativism? Or how may 
Christians presume to proclaim that the gospel in which they believe is `true' 
when what appears to characterise `postmodern" society is a new form of `truism' 
- summed up by John Caputo in his 1987 book Radical Hermeneutics with the 
words. The truth is that there is no truth'? ' 
Has the Church to face the fact that it now operates in a wholly different 
cultural and philosophical context to the one occupied under `modernity', and 
therefore must forfeit any supposed claims to notions of `truth' in the ideological 
market-place? Have Christians to reject altogether any associations with the 
language and discourse of 'metanarrative'. and settle for an altogether more 
Caputo 1987: 156. The 'absolute' nature of the truth claim being made by Caputo in this 
statement is, of course, glaringly contradictory under postmodern assumptions. 
modest mode of discourse? Or may there still exist some form of valid 
presuppositional base from which they may continue to stand for `Truth'? 
In order to explore these questions, the writings of the late Bishop Lesslie 
Newbigin will provide the basis for analysis and discussion. We shall 
concentrate upon those writings published since Newbigin's return to England 
from missionary service in India in 1974. as these relate most directly to the 
theme, and have not been given the kind of sustained treatment that has been 
recently given to his earlier writings. ' The reasons for examining the work of 
Newbigin in particular are threefold. 
(i) Newbigin and the debate about `post-Enlightenment' mission in the 
West 
The first is Newbigin's unique contribution to the development of a 
specifically `missionary' theology for an increasingly secularised, post- 
Enlightenment West. Even without this, his position within Christendom would 
already be assured, largely as a result of his impact on the formation of the 
ecumenical Church of South India (in which he served as a founding bishop), and 
also because of his influence on the development of the International Missionary 
Hunsberger's recent major study of Newbigin (Hunsberger I998a) concentrates upon 
Newbigin's pre-1986 material, and does not deal with the texts that are directly pertinent to 
our theme. His stated aim is not to address the 'Gospel and Western Culture' material 
directly, but to write 'about the theology of cultural plurality that lies beneath it and must 
continue to inform and guide it. It is a book about what is behind those first ten pages in 
Newbigin's Foolishness to the Greeks' (6). Later, he writes: `In all of this, the accent will be 
upon materials written prior to Newbigin's major works on the encounter with Western 
culture, showing the ground from which that encounter arises and the framework within 
which it is engaged (44). In the light of this, Kirk's comment (1999: 271) that Hunsberger's 
book is a 'weighty, comprehensive and sympathetic interpretation of Newbigin's mission 
engagement with conieinporarv culture' (emphasis added) is misplaced. Wainwright's recent 
major work (Wainwright 2000) begins to redress the balance, but deals with Newbigin's later 
writings in the context of his life as a whole, and is not a systematic treatment as such. His 
views also differ from those presented in this thesis in the sense that he gives comparatively 
little space and no sustained analysis to the influence of Polanyi on Newbigin's thought. 
Council and its re-constitution as the World Council of Churches. 3 Putting 
together these different strands of his life work, the Times obituary described him 
as one of the foremost missionary statesmen of his generation', and one of the 
outstanding figures on the world Christian stage in the second half of the 
century. '4 In a similar vein, the Fuller Seminary missiologist Wilbert Shenk 
describes him as 'one of the outstanding Christian leaders of the twentieth 
century'. ' Recently and in the most august terms - Geoffrey Wainwright has 
likened him to one of the `Fathers of the Church'. 6 and has sought to draw out 
the similarities and continuities' between Newbigin and the great bishop- 
theologians in early ecclesiastical history'. 
But it is in the context of the debate about what he came to describe as the 
pressing need for a `mission to modern Western culture", 8 that Newbigin's 
particular contribution has been made over the last twenty-five years. On his 
return from India, he swiftly came to the realisation that, `England is a pagan 
society and the development of a truly missionary encounter with this very tough 
Newbigin worked as a missionary in India from 1936 and became one of the first Bishops of 
the Church of India serving the Diocese of Madura and Ramnad (1947-59). In 1959 he 
became Secretary of the International Missionary Council (1959-1961) leading up to its 
integration into the World Council of Churches, an organisation with which he worked in 
Geneva (1961-1965). During this time he was Editor of the International Review of Mission. 
He returned to India in 1965 for a second term as Bishop (this time of Madras) until his 
`retirement' in 1974. He came back to England in 1974 to teach at the Selly Oak Colleges in 
Birmingham and later took up the post of Presbyterian minister in the United Reformed 
Church in Winson Green. an Urban Priority Area in Birmingham. He became moderator of 
the URC in 1978-9. For his own account see the 2° edition of his autobiography (Newbigin 
I993g). For a briefer biography, cf. Yates 1994: 237-44. For a much fuller treatment see 
now: Wainwright 2000. 
4 The Times. 31" January. 1998. 
Shenk 2000: 59. This article is a revision of his earlier piece for the Bible Society's tribute to 
Newbigin in its magazine, The Bible in TransMrssion (Shenk 1998). 
Wainwright 2000: v. 
Wainwright 2000: 390. 
Cf. e. g., the title of Newbigin I 990i. His first use of such language is in I 983b: 31: 'What I 
am pleading for is a genuinely missionary encounter with post-Enlightenment culture': or. 
1991 b: 6: 'We need a theological clarification of the issues involved in a global missionary 
encounter with modernity. ' For similar material. cf. also: 1986b: 1,3,15,42, etc.. 1987a: 
355. 
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form of paganism is the greatest intellectual and practical task facing the 
Church. '9 It was upon this project that the labours of Newbigin's `retirement' 
years were concentrated, and within this sphere there can have been few more 
powerful or influential thinkers -a fact made even more remarkable when one 
considers that all his writings in this area came from a man already seventy-four 
years old. 
This process of reflection started formally in 1983 with the publication of 
The Other Side of 19 -I. It was published by the World Council of Churches and 
was subtitled `Questions for the Churches'. 10 This short book, commissioned by 
the WCC as a preparatory document for a proposed conference for British 
Church leaders, was offered by Newbigin with some hesitation, and its 
subsequent impact greatly surprised him. '' But the material contained in its 
seventy-five pages set out the essential framework for his subsequent work. 
Since then his published output has been considerable as has been his wider 
impact on missionary thinking on both sides of the Atlantic and further afield. 
It has seen the publication of nine books and over seventy articles specifically 
relating to the subject of mission in the West, and led directly to the foundation of 
the `Gospel and Our Culture' network in Britain in 1984, whose aim was to begin 
to address the questions he was raising. His book, The Gospel in a Pluralist 
Culture, 12 was one of two reading texts recommended by the Church of 
England's 'Board of Mission' in preparation for the `Decade of Evangelism' in 
Newbigin 19938: 236. 
For details of the circumstances which led to its publication. see Newbigin 1985c: also, 
1992k: 22; 1993g: 250ff, and 'A Note from the Author' in 1983b: vii. 
He was 'quite astonished at the volume and range of correspondence' that 'descended' on 
him following its publication (Newbigin 19938: 252. 
ýý Newbigin 1989f. 
the 1990s, 13 whilst two regional conferences (jointly sponsored by the `Gospel 
and Our Culture' movement and the Bible Society) followed in 1990 and 1991.14 
These culminated in a `National Consultation' at Swanwick in July 1992.1 
Meanwhile, a `Gospel and Culture' network similar to the one formed in Britain 
was founded in the United States under the leadership of George Hunsberger in 
1988.16 
Within the context of these developments, Newbigin's influence may 
understandably be described as `pivotal'. From a North American perspective, 
for example, Hunsberger himself considers him to be a `potent catalyst for 
focusing our attention on what must become a primary agenda for Western 
churches. " 7 But outside the more specific context of this movement, Newbigin's 
significance has also been widely recognised. For example. Lamin Sanneh (a 
Gambian who is presently Professor of Missions and World Christianity at Yale), 
writes in his major 1993 study, Encountering the West Christianity and the 
Global Cultural Process, that: 
There is no doubt of the enormous influence of Newbigin and his significance 
for a cross cultural critique of the West. He has broken wide open the shell of 
Western cultural exclusiveness by insisting that from the religious point of view 
Western societies are to be confronted with the gospel no less relentlessly than 
1' The other being Abraham 1989. 
14 The first was held at High Leigh, Hoddesdon, Hertfordshire in October 1990 entitled 
'Mission to our culture in the light of Scripture and the Christian Tradition'. Newbigin's 
plenary address at the conference was called 'What is the Culture? ' (I990s). The second was 
held at Swanwick. Derbyshire in April 1991 and was entitled `Freedom and Truth in a 
Pluralist Society'. Newbigin's contribution was called 'Pluralism and the Church' (199lc). 
For his reflections on the Swanwick conference see Newbigin 1992i. 
Entitled The Gospel as Public Truth', it was convened as a result of the previous 
conferences. Cf. Newbhgin's 'Conference Call' for this gathering (1992b). A volume of 
essays was written partly in preparation for the discussions (Montefiore I992). 
For the background to the American movement, along with references to the wider network 
inspired by Newbigin's writings, see HunsberIler 1998a: dff.. 
Hunsber, -, er 1991: 
393. See also Hunsberger and Van Gelder 1996, in which a number of 
North American scholars take up issues raised by Newbigin's work. 
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Third World societies, the only difference being that the West may be a 'darker 
continent' for having reneged on its religious heritage. Is 
More recently, in a major study on mission, the Sri Lankan scholar Vinoth 
Ramachandra suggests dramatically that Newbigin's, `galvanising summons to a 
slumbering, divided and tragically compromised church in the West invites 
comparison with the challenge of the early Barth'. " 
There is little doubt then that Newbigin's influence on missionary 
thinking in the West over the last twenty years has been of central importance. 
Sanneh sums up his impact in the following words: 
With great force of intellect and moral courage, ... Newbigin 
has forced upon 
the churches and upon Christians generally an issue they cannot now ignore even 
if they do not agree with the terms in which he frames the debate. An important 
intellectual ferment is going on in numerous circles on both sides of the Atlantic, 
thanks largely to his initiative and leadership. 20 
(ii) Newbigin and the `cross-cultural' critique 
A second reason for choosing to concentrate on Newbigin's work is that 
the perspective he brings is itself consciously informed by a cross-cultural 
analysis, and can therefore lay claim to an unusual degree of originality in the 
field of mission studies particularly as they relate to the culture of the West. As 
Sanneh puts it: `Newbigin brings a comparative missionary perspective to bear on 
the situation in the West. " 21 In this context. Hunsberger has shown how the 
Sanneh 1993: 162-3. 
Ramachandra 1996: 144. 
20 Sanneh 1993: 163-4. 
'I Sanneh 1993: 163. 
13 
framework of what he calls Newbigin's `Theology of Cultural Plurality'22 is built 
upon presuppositions that nuance the classic works of the likes of Richard 
Niebuhr. `' and Paul Tillich. 24 Hunsberger argues that by taking the `pluriform' 
nature of culture seriously - not least in its impact upon the Church 
itself - 
Newbigin's work as a whole displays a truly `integrative force, bringing into 
intimate relationship discussions which have tended to remain too much in 
isolation from each other. '2 
The background to this `inter-cultural' perspective arose inevitably out of 
Newbigin's own missionary experience in India which began in 1936. This 
forced him to face the issues which arose out of his concern to communicate the 
Christian gospel in a culture which was not his own. As he attempted to share the 
gospel with Hindus. his own inherited European assumptions were gradually 
thrown into sharp relief. As he put it: `I often confused the gospel with my 
assumptions as a "modern" European. ' 
26 In corresponding fashion a similar 
process took place when Newbigin returned to Britain from India in the 1970s. 
More than a decade later, he was to write that: 
Having spent most of my working life in India and then come back, I have 
discovered - in a way, to my own astonishment - that one faces the same 
problem here, and that one is again in a culture where, when you attempt to '' 
communicate the gospel, you are going completely against the stream. 
Around the same time, he expressed a similar thought in the following words: 
Cf. Hunsberger's discussion (Hunsber-er 1998a: 3-44). 
Niebuhr 1952. 
24 Tillich 1959. Note Newbigin's references to these writers in: Newbigin I986b: 1: 
1987a: 356: 1993c: 99-100: 1995c: 145. 
11 Hunsberoer 1998a: 277. 
26 Newbigin 1985c: 8. Cf. also: 1978a: 5: 1986b: 21: 1988e: 98-9: 1989g: 1-2: 1994b: 68: 
1996b: 9. 
27 Newbigin 1988b: 30: also, 1983b: 5. See also the first two chapters of 1986b. where he 
explores this issue in more detail. 
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During the twelve years since I came back to England, and especially since I 
had a pastoral charge in Birmingham, I have come more and more to feel that 25 England is as much a foreign mission field as India was for me in 1936. 
This awareness of the cross-cultural dimension of missionary engagement 
lies at the heart of Newbigin's writings, and brings unique perspectives to bear 
upon the missionary issues facing the Church in the West. As a result, he writes 
at the outset of Foolishness to the Greeks that: `The angle from which I am 
approaching the study is that of a foreign missionary. '29 He goes on to speak of 
the 'succession of roles' he had occupied within his lifetime which had `forced' 
him to ask the question posed as the theme of the book: `What would be involved 
in a missionary encounter between the gospel and this whole way of perceiving, 
thinking, and living that we call "modern Western culture"? 30 
This perspective brings with it not only an awareness of the cross-cultural 
dimension to the particular task of missionary proclamation, but also an ability to 
articulate the `ambivalent' nature of the Church's relationship with the wider 
culture of which it is a part - not least in an awareness of the invasive nature of 
culture's influence upon the Church itself as it seeks to `incarnate' the gospel. 
The resulting `critique' of the Church from the point of view of its potential 
accommodation to the prevailing assumptions of the surrounding culture had 
been an element of Newbigin's writings from early on, but it takes a much more 
central role in Newbigin"s later missiology, as we will see. 31 The fact that by the 
Newbigin l988e: 99-100. For a similar sentiment, cf. l980b: 154: 'After a lifetime spent in 
India I now struggle with the problem of communicating the gospel in the comfortable 
suburb of an English city. ' 
Newbi-in I986b: 1. 
Newbicin 1986b: 1. 
For his earlier material, cf. e. g., Newbigin 1953: 11-18: 1961: esp. 9-29.106-26: 1963: 31-2: 
1966: e.,,., 103: the Church had become the religious department of European society rather 
than the task force selected and appointed for a world mission. ' 
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mid-seventies his perspective had become largely attuned to a non-Western 
culture suggests that he is well-placed through long experience of such questions 
to analyse the challenges facing the Church in the West in the context of cultural 
crisis and transition. 
(iii) Newbigin and the challenge of cultural change 
A third reason for choosing to concentrate on Newbigin's work is that 
though the importance of his writing is sometimes perceived as relating entirely 
to the concerns of `modernity' - an emphasis which might now be considered 
rather passe, the case will be made that his writing is thoroughly contemporary in 
its significance. There is no doubt that he wrote primarily with the challenges of 
`modernity' as the focus of his attention - at least in terms of the diagnosis and 
critique that he articulated. But it is noteworthy that he did so with an acute 
consciousness that the culture that he was criticizing was now drawing to a close. 
His description of a missionary agenda is therefore written with a distinct view 
towards what might happen when the fuel of the Enlightenment programme was 
exhausted. In this respect, although his specific attention to the questions 
surrounding the onset of `postmodernity' were less fully developed than his 
interaction with the challenges of `modernity', it is important nonetheless to keep 
in mind that his vision is 'future-orientated'. 
In addition. where he does begin in his later writings to address the issue 
of postmodernity more specifically, the method of his engagement does not differ 
in substance from that which he had employed in relation to modernity. This 
suggests a belief on his part that what he had been saying all along had relevance 
not only in the context of modernity, but also in the more contemporary 
16 
environment ofpost-modernity. As a consequence of these considerations, it is 
appropriate to raise the possibility that his approach far from being passe - 
warrants serious attention on its own terms in a postmodern context. 
The scope of the thesis 
In the light of these perspectives, therefore, the thesis will seek to take a 
fresh look at Newbigin's work, and will argue that he cannot be dismissed simply 
as `yesterday's man' so far as the significance of his thought to the contemporary 
Church is concerned. On the contrary, we shall argue that in some central aspects 
he both anticipates and begins to address some of the central missiological 
questions which have emerged in the wake of the contemporary transition into an 
increasingly postmodern era. It may be argued, therefore, that Newbigin is both 
peculiarly well-placed and uniquely equipped to analyse the contemporary 
challenges facing the Church in the West, and to provide a framework within 
which to explore some of the central features of contemporary missiological 
significance. 
The thesis will begin in chapter 1 by setting out the agenda with which the 
Church must grapple if it is to address the questions raised by the cultural 
transition from modernity to postmodernity. 
It proceeds in the first part of chapter 2 to outline Newbigin's diagnosis of 
Western culture. Then in the second part of chapter 2- the central thrust of the 
thesis - it argues that it is Newbigin's renewed reading of Michael Polanyi's 
book Personal Knowledge which provides the hermeneutical `key', not only to 
his diagnostic analysis of contemporary culture. but also to the conceptual and 
17 
pragmatic framework within which he approaches the themes of mission and 
cultural reconstruction. 
On the basis of this analysis, and its implications for a renewed reading of 
Newbigin, chapters 3 and 4 explore the strengths and weaknesses of Newbigin's 
missionary programme in the context of contemporary cultural change. Chapter 
3 offers an appraisal of his `postmodern' contribution, whilst chapter 4 mounts a 
sustained critique of his proposals on methodological and missiological grounds. 
Finally, chapter 5 draws conclusions from the foregoing analysis, and 
highlights the implications of the thesis as a whole both for the study of 
Newbigin's thought, as well as for future missionary thinking. 
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Chapter One 
The Cultural Challenge to Mission 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the cultural and missiological 
framework within which the following analysis of Lesslie Newbigin's work will 
be undertaken. It will highlight some of the central features of the transition from 
modernity to postmodernity. and draw out the resulting challenges for the Church 
in its missionary calling. It will conclude by examining three possible theological 
responses to the changes taking place. 
1.2 Questions of `legitimacy' in modernity and postmodernity 
By way of introduction we shall propose that at the heart of the 
contemporary challenge facing the Church as it seeks to reach an increasingly 
secularised and pluralistic society lies the question of `legitimacy'. Since 
Christians believe that `truth" has been uniquely revealed and made known in the 
person of Jesus Christ, and that such `truth' must therefore be declared to others. 
upon what grounds may such claims be legitimated? This central question may 
be articulated in further supplementary ways. How, for example. in a pluralistic 
context can a claim to the uniqueness of such a revelation be sustained; and upon 
19 
what grounds can dialogue and apologetics take place with adherents of other 
views or faiths? 
That these were central issues for Newbigin in his later writing is clear 
from the briefest of surveys. Not only is the question of `dialogue' frequently at 
the forefront of his concerns, ' but at the heart of his engagement with the culture 
of the West is precisely the contention that the idea of 'truth' both can and must 
be upheld. Accordingly he wrote in 1994: 
Like others who have returned to the West after a lifetime as a foreign 
missionary, I am moved to ask, Who will be the missionaries to this culture? 
Who will confront this culture of ours with the claim of absolute truth, the claim 
that Jesus Christ is the truth? Who will be bold enough to say, not that the 
Christian message can be explained in terms of the facts as we know them, but 
rather that all so-called knowledge must be tested against the supreme reality: 
God incarnate in Jesus Christ, present yesterday, today, until the end, in the 
power of the Spirit? 2 
But these questions had been forming in Newbigin's mind ever since his 
return from India twenty years before. He had quickly realised that any appraisal 
of the cultural challenge facing the Church of the West in the 1970s and 80s had 
to come to terms with the threat posed by the reality of pluralism and the wider 
implications for mission of the cultural movement of `modernity'. In terms of 
legitimacy' these changes had radically challenged the way in which traditional 
notions of `truth" had been understood and formulated. He writes 
characteristically of the implications of this in his major 1989 book, The Gospel 
in a Pluralist Culture, as follows: 
As Ion- as the church is content to offer its beliefs modestly as simply one of the 
many brands available in the ideological supermarket. no offense is taken. But 
See e. g.. Newbigin 1977a: 1977b: 1983a: 1988a; 1988c: 1989i; 1989b: 1990j: 1991c; 1993f: 
1994a. 
Newbigin 1994b: 72. 
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the affirmation that the truth revealed in the gospel ought to govern public life is 
offensive. 3 
Despite these challenges, however, Newbigin's missiology is consistently 
driven by a belief that Christians have nevertheless been entrusted with `truth' 
which they are obliged to declare. The church has to bear witness', as he puts it, 
to the truth which unmasks the illusions and falsehoods of modernity'. 
At the heart of Newbigin's programme therefore lies the quest for a valid 
epistemology (a `legitimating foundation') on the basis of which believers may 
witness to the unique revelation entrusted to them, and with which they may 
make their appeal in the marketplace of ideas. Central to his case is precisely the 
failure of the Enlightenment itself to provide such an epistemology. Firstly, the 
Enlightenment's elevation of the faculty of human reasoning proved to be a false 
dawn to the hopes of finding a universally accepted basis for legitimate knowing. 
Secondly. its preoccupation with `Reason' as the only grounds for certainty had 
effectively subverted the Christian concept of 'Revelation' from its position as 
the authoritative epistemological basis for true knowledge. In developing his 
counter-argument, therefore, Newbigin's epistemology is built squarely upon the 
defence that it is upon the foundation of biblical revelation alone that a secure 
basis for knowledge is acquired -a basis upon which both assured and authentic 
judgements about truth may legitimately be made. 
The advent of `post"- modernity has served to refocus this central question 
of legitimacy in a variety of ways. and though these emerge with intricate and 
interrelated differences of nuance and emphasis, the central issue nonetheless 
Newbi-in 1989f: 7. 
Newbigin 1991 b: 9. 
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remains. This is clear for example from Jean-Francois Lyotard's seminal book 
The Posrniodern Condi/ion. ' Being subtitled `A Report on Knowledge', it 
amounts to a sustained attempt to relocate the concept of legitimacy in 
postmodern terms. His argument dismisses modernity's concept of 
`metanarrative' as the location for such legitimacy simply because it has been 
shown not to work. It also effectively deconstructs the Enlightenment's notions 
of how legitimacy is to be achieved. But his goal nonetheless is to re-locate 
legitimacy albeit in more diffused and localised contexts. 
How the Church responds to such a challenge is clearly crucial for its 
survival. Indeed some writers, like John Reader, argue that it is the key issue to 
face under postmodern conditions - not only for missiology, but also for the 
wider discipline of theology. As he puts it: 
This is surely the real challenge for theology to face if it is determined to take 
seriously the philosophical arguments surrounding Post-Modernity. It is not that 
Modernity has somehow come to an end or that the challenges of reason have 
been driven from the field. It is how Christianity is to fit into a situation of 
6 
plural rationalities where no one discourse can claim dominance over the rest. 
By way of prolegomena, Reader's comment opens up the question of the 
meaning of the term `postmodern' and its relationship to that which preceded it. 
Clearly, any interpretation of contemporary mission which concentrates so 
closely on the impact of 'modernity' and the `Enlightenment' programme as 
Newbigin's does. will define its present role in the light of a set of perceptions 
taken from the past. Any contemporary appraisal of Newbigin's work must come 
to conclusions. therefore. about the extent to which his vision survives intact in 
Leotard 1984b. 
Reader 1997: 63. 
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the cultural transition (however we describe it) from `modernity" to `post- 
modernity'. As a prelude to the examination of his work in this context therefore, 
we need to begin to analyse the nature of this transition more closely. 
1.3 From `modern' to `postmodern' 
Anthony Giddens wrote in 1990 that whereas the idea of a `post- 
industrial' society had been well explicated, the concepts of `post-modernity' and 
`post-modernism' had not. 7 Partly as a result of this, a lack of precision persists 
over its definition. Charles Jencks states, for example. that The term is now 
almost as ubiquitous, disliked and misunderstood as its parent, the modern. '8 
Others despair at the lack of focus apparent within the postmodern `milieu". 
Ernest Gellner writes for example, that `clarity is not conspicuous amongst its 
marked attributes', 9 whilst Os Guinness notes that it often feels as if it is 
everywhere and nowhere. ' 10 
Partly for these reasons. the task of defining the relationship between the 
terms `modern' and `postmodern" is notoriously difficult. Moreover, distinctions 
between the nouns postmodern-ity and postmodern-ism (or modernity and 
modernism) are far from clear-cut either. Many theorists distinguish between 
`modernity' and `postmodernity' as historical epochs, and `modernism' and 
postmodernism' as descriptions of the cultural, philosophical and aesthetic 
movements or intellectual outlooks associated with each. ' 1 But others tend to use 
Giddens 1990: 45. For the concept of'post-industrialism' he refers to Bell 1973. 
Jencks 1996: 14. 
Gellner 1992: 22. 
10 Guinness 2000: 56. 
11 E. g.. Ea-leton 1996: vii: The word postmodernism generally refers to a form of 
contemporary culture, whereas the term posnnoderifit. v alludes to a specific historical period'; 
(Note continued on next page. ) 
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the terms `modernism' and `postmodernism' in broader categories to include both 
historical and cultural referents. '2 
At a basic level, we may gain widest agreement by defining the 
`postmodern' as that set of attitudes which is borne out of the consciousness of 
coming after the 'modern' - whether as a reaction against it, or as a progression 
on from it. The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, for example. argues that the term 
`postmodernity' is accurate in the sense that it: 
draws attention to the continuity and discontinuity as two faces of the intricate 
relationship between the present social condition and the formation that preceded 
and gestated it. It brings into relief the intimate, genetic bond that ties the new, 
postmodern social condition to modernity ... while at the same time 
indicating 
the passing of certain crucial characteristics in whose absence one can no longer 
adequately describe the social condition as modern in the sense given to the 
concept by orthodox (modern) social theory. '-' 
A more precise definition of the relationship between postmodernity and 
modernity is much harder to articulate. Nonetheless, building on Bauman's 
identification of the elements of both continuity and discontinuity one can begin 
to define the relationships a little more clearly particularly in relation to specific 
also, Best and Kellner 1991: 2-5: Bauman 1992: vii-xxviii (with 28-9): Giddens 1990: 45-6: 
Harvey 1990: 99,327-8: Jencks 1996: 8: Lernert 1997: 62: Lyon 1994: 6-7 (with 
reservations): Spencer 1997: 159. 
E. g.. Gellner 1992: Jameson (1983 and 1984c): also Lyotard 1984a: 79 (though see Eagleton 
1987 for the view that Lyotard's use of the phrase 'le postmoderne' in Lyotard and Thebaud 
1985 and Lyotard 1992 is really to be understood as a reference to a philosophical reaction 
against metanarrative, rather than to an 'aesthetic' movement in the broader sense). Lyotard 
himself gives two definitions of 'postmodern' in the introduction to Lyotard 1984b. The first 
is broad ('The word postino(lern designates the state of our culture following the 
transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules 
for science. literature, and the arts' - xxiii). The second is narrower and better known 
('Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives' - 
xxiv). Perversely lie sees some aspects of the postmodern as being 'premodern': e. g., 'A 
work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is 
not modernism at its end but in the nascent state. and this state is constant' (Lyotard 1984a: 
79). 
Bauman 1992: 187. Cf. also, Winter 1989: 471. 
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theorists. Fredric Jameson (in his article The Politics of Theory' 
14) enumerates 
four ways of describing this relationship, two of which imply some sort of radical 
break between `modernism' and `postmodernism' (what he calls `anti-modern' as 
opposed to 'pro-postmodern', and `promodern' as opposed to `antipostmodern'), 
and two of which imply that `postmodernism' is really to be re-assimilated back 
into the `high' modernist tradition. Jameson cites Ihab Hassan and Jürgen 
Habermas as representatives of the first two positions respectively, and Jean- 
Francois Lyotard and Manfredo Tafuri as representatives of the view that 
postmodernism is really part of `high' modernism. '' 
Jameson's article is helpful in setting out the terrain, or at least in giving a 
possible grid for further definition, but it tends to polarise the perspectives 
discussed. To argue, for example, that Lyotard's work is in reality a return to a 
`high modernist' position tends to oversimplify his complex relationship with the 
modernist tradition of the past. 16 To be sure, his view of postmodernity as 
somehow `premodern' seems to suggest that Jameson is right. Similarly, 
Lyotard's solution to the reality of the breakdown of the older metanarratives 
(that the world's computer data banks be opened up and made universally 
available'7) suggests a somewhat 'totalising' response from one who says that he 
14 Jameson 1984b. 
15 But see Jencks 1996: 46, who argues that what Lyotard identifies as 'Post' modern is in fact 
'Late' modern. 
16 See e. g., Lyon's comment that 'Lyotard's account of things leaves us in a philosophical and 
linguistic maelstrom' (Lyon 1994: 45). 
Lyotard 1984b: 67. Lvotard's argument is that the prevalence of computers creates in effect 
a new kind of universal logic in which knowledge is increasing=ly 'commodified'. In this 
context, not only does the nature of metalanguage change, but power becomes connected to 
whether or not people have access to this 'commodity'. 'By reinforcing technology, one 
"reinforces" reality and one's chances of being just and right increase accordingly. 
Reciprocally. technology is reinforced all the more effectively if one has access to scientific 
knowledge and decision-making authority' (Lyotard I984b: 47). 
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doesn't believe in `metanarratives'. 18 Nonetheless, Lyotard's insistence that the 
older 'hierarchies' of knowledge have now dissolved, along with his espousal of 
the late-Wittgensteinian notion of `language games" as a way of representing and 
analysing the dissolution of the discourse of modernity - make him a rather 
unlikely `high modernist'. He sits more comfortably with those who 
acknowledge a decisive break with the past, and who accept postmodern 
assumptions about the non-referential nature of language and the role of 
communities in the shaping of their beliefs. 
As a consequence, Jameson's article - whilst stimulating as one possible 
approach to the question of relationships - is ultimately confusing. On the one 
hand he seeks to identify how theorists assess the relationship between modernity 
and postmodernity without making reference to their own views. At the same 
time. however, he tries also to define how they position themselves (as either 
'modernists' or `postmodernists') irrespective of their differing views about the 
possible relationships between the two `movements". As a result, his work 
suffers from a confusion of categories. 
As an alternative, distinguishing between these two types of analysis may 
help to provide greater clarity. In terms of the first type (that which interprets 
differing views about the relationship between `modern' and `postmodern'), two 
opposing positions may be described: one which argues for a fundamental 
18 The effects of such access are not discussed by Lyotard. One could argue that because not 
everyone has access to computers, such a development would in the end produce another 
oppressive regime! On the other hand, Lyon (1994: 2-3) argues that the logical result of such 
global access to 'information' would be a further distancing from older concepts of 'reality'. 
(When he makes this point, Lyon is discussing the film Blade Runner rather than Lyotard, but 
the point still stands. ) Lyotard's own conclusion emerges as a pessimistic acceptance of the 
inevitable globalisation of 'information'. Perhaps this - as much as anything - makes 
Lyotard 'postmodern' - in the sense that the new globalisation of technology is not seen by 
him as 'progress'. Whatever view one takes, Lyotard's work is potentially self-contradictory. 
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continuity, the other for a discontinuity. In the former category, for example, one 
could place writers such as the social theorist David Harvey (writing from a 
Marxist perspective) who argue that though there may be differences of 
emphasis, there is nonetheless a fundamental continuity between `modernity" and 
`postmodernity'. The best way to approach the phenomenon of `postmodernity' 
therefore is to assess it as integrally linked to the movement of modernity. He 
writes accordingly that though `postmodernism sees itself ... 
for the most part as 
a wilful and rather chaotic movement to overcome all the supposed ills of 
modernism'. nonetheless: 
... there 
is much more continuity than difference between the broad history of 
modernism and the movement called postmodernism. It seems more sensible to 
me to see the latter as a particular kind of crisis within the former, one that 
emphasizes the fragmentary, the ephemeral, and the chaotic ... while expressing 
a deep scepticism as to any particular prescriptions as to how the eternal and 
2° immutable should be conceived of, represented, or expressed. 
A second approach views postmodernity as a reaction against what went 
before, and tends to stress its discontinuity, with `modernity. One could cite the 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas as an example of this interpretation. He 
stresses postmodernity's rejection of modernity as the fundamental characteristic 
of its advocates. In his article 'Modernity versus Postmodernity', he quotes one 
such critic (a columnist of the German newspaper F-ankfierier Allgemeine 
Zeitung) as saying that, `Postmodernity definitely presents itself as 
Harvey 1990: 115. 
ýb Harvey 1990: 116. For the Marxist element in this diagnosis. see e. g., Gunton 1993: 69-70. 
A similar view about the integral relationship between modernity and postmodernity is held 
by theorists across the field: e. (-,., literary critics Terry Eagleton (1996: 21), and Eric Jameson 
(1983: I23f. ): architect Charles Jencks (1996: 1 5): theologians like the liberal-catholic Hans 
Kün- (1991: 22-23). or conservative-evangelical David Wells (1994: 216): and even 
philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984b: 79ff. ), who (as noted above) implies that what is 
described as 'postmodern' is in certain respects 'premodern'. 
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Antimodernity', and goes on to comment that, This statement describes an 
emotional current of our times which has penetrated all spheres of intellectual 
Iife. '`1 Habermas's own view is that postmodernity represents an irrational 
reaction against an overemphasis upon a particular aspect of modernity and 
therefore is to be rejected as misguided. 22 Similar interpretations of 
postmodernity as a radical discontinuity from modernity are also espoused by 
theologians such as John Milbank, Christopher Lash and Diogenes Allen 
though with differing motivations from those of Habermas. 
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With this brief survey in mind. the related question naturally arises as to 
whether the postmodern `movement" can be said to be worthy of study in its own 
right, or whether it merely represents a `hotchpotch' of ideas loosely connected 
and without credible shape. Again, as in the previous discussions, there remains 
far from anything approaching consensus. Writers like social anthropologist 
Ernest Gellner are emphatically dismissive. In his opinion: 
Postmodernism ... 
is a tortuous, somewhat affected fad, practised by at most 
some academics living fairly sheltered lives; large parts of it are intelligible only 
and at most (and often with difficulty) to those who are fully masters of the 
nuances of three or four abstruse academic disciplines, and much of it is not 
intelligible to anyone at al 1.14 
Habermas 1981: 3. 
22 Note Jameson's comment that, We are indebted to Jürgen Habermas for ... the affirmation 
of the supreme value of the Modern and the repudiation of the theory, as well as the practice, 
of postmodernism' (Jameson 1984b: 58). Habermas's article was later republished in 
translation (as Habermas 1983) entitled 'Modernity - An Incomplete Project'. As the new 
title suggests. he is convinced that modernity, whilst needing to be revised, is far from having 
run its course. He writes accordingly: '1 think that instead of giving up modernity and its 
project as a lost cause, we should learn from the mistakes of those extravagant programs 
which have tried to negate modernity' (1983: 12). See also Habermas 1987a: esp. 336ff. for 
similar sentiments. For a useful introductory overview of Habermas's major work (trans. as 
Habermas 1984 and 1987b), see Giddens 1985. 
Milbank 1997a, esp. 265-6 ('Responses' I and 4): Lash 1996: e. g., 199-201.246: and Allen 
1989: e. g.. 2ff.. 
ýý Gellner 1992: 72. 
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On the other hand. theorists like Zygmunt Bauman argue that - whatever 
its relationship to `modernity, `postmodernity' is a `movement' that does merit 
examination on its own terms. He writes accordingly that: 
Postmodernity is not a transitory departure from the `normal state' of 
modernity, neither is it a diseased state of modernity, an ailment likely to be 
rectified, a case of 'modernity in crisis'. It is, instead, a self-reproducing, 
pragmatically self-sustainable and logically self-contained social condition 
defined by distinctive features of its own. A theory of postmodernity therefore 
cannot be a modified theory of modernity, a theory of modernity with a set of 
negative markers. An adequate theory of postmodernity may be only 
constructed in a cognitive space organized by a different set of assumptions; it 
needs its own vocabulary., 
From a similar perspective. Best and Kellner argue that the emerging 
postmodern discourses and problematics raise issues which resist easy dismissal 
or facile incorporation into already established paradigms'. 26 
Despite the complexity of the terrain, however, it remains possible to 
identify certain major assumptions within the postmodern `matrix' which have 
far-reaching implications for mission. 
1.3.1 Postmodernity and the rejection of'metanarratives' 
A central characteristic of postmodernity is the rejection of the grandiose 
claims made by modernity's supposed `metanarratives': those `interpretive 
frameworks or ways of understanding the world that are claimed to have a truth 
or validity that crosses all spatial and temporal boundaries. '27 In reaction against 
them. Terry Eagleton writes that `postmodernity is a style of thought which is 
suspicious of classical notions of truth. reason, identity and objectivity, of the 
11 - Bauman 1992: 188. 
'° Best and Kellner 1991: 1. Cf. also, Lyon 1994,4ff.. 
As defined by Reader 1997: 21. 
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idea of universal progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, grand 
narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation. ' 28 Elsewhere he writes: 
Post-modernism signals the death of such `metanarratives' whose secretly 
terroristic function was to ground and legitimate the illusion of a `universal' 
human history. We are now in the process of wakening from the nightmare of 
modernity, with its manipulative reason and fetish of the totality, into the 
laid-back pluralism of the post-modern, that heterogeneous range of life-styles 
and language games which has renounced the nostalgic urge to totalize and 
legitimate itself.... Science and philosophy must jettison their grandiose 
metaphysical claims and view themselves more modestly as just another set of 
narratives. 29 
For the origins of this aspect of the postmodern critique of the 
Enlightenment programme. we might turn to the French writers Michel Foucault 
and Jean-Francois Lyotard. With differing emphases both argue (in line with the 
thesis of Adorno and Horkheimer30) that the claims of the so-called 
`metanarratives' of the Enlightenment were fundamentally 'totalizing" concepts 
which led in the end to some form of ideological oppression. Whether these were 
the ideals of `Education' and `Progress' with which Western Imperialism sought 
to subjugate the colonies; whether they were theories about class and society with 
which Marxism effectively side-lined the free role of science; or whether they 
were the sinister beliefs about racial superiority and domination with which 
Nazism sought to eliminate the Jews, such `grand narratives' tended to subjugate 
and oppress minority groups. 
In the light of the failure of modernity's `metanarratives' to advance the 
cause of freedom, both Foucault and Lyotard turn away from the oppressive 
captivity of such narratives and argue instead that what actually exists as an 
28 Eagleton 1996: 7. 
1' Eagleton 1987: 194. 
ý0 Horkheirner and Adorno 1972. 
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explanation of the world and its history is not one `grand' narrative, but many 
lesser narratives, none of which can claim to be ultimately true for everybody. 
(i) Foucault 
From Foucault's point of view, this perspective arises out of a complex 
discussion of the way in which the notion of `power' is to be understood within 
cultures and societies. 31 Foucault"s discussion rejects the approach which sees 
power as a centralised function of the state, and analyses it in its effects away 
from the centre. In this context, the interplay of 'power' structures is a far more 
complex phenomenon, arising out of the way in which `discourses' function 
within particular societies. `(I)n any given society, ' he writes, `there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, 
these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning 
of a discourse. '3'` Within this complex: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its `general politics' of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth: the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true. " 
The most accessible discussion of this theme (in the form of an autobiographical essay) is 
found in Foucault 1980: esp. 78-108 ('The Two Lectures'), and 109-133 ('Truth and Power') 
The latter piece is also found in Rabinow 1984: 51-75. 
Foucault 1980: 93. 
Foucault 1980: 131. Cf. 133: "*Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power 
which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. ' 
For a discussion of Foucault's analysis of 'power' and its relation to 'truth', see Taylor 1986: 
esp. 90ff.. Cf. also, Bernstein 1991: 142-171 (esp. 164f), who argues against the view that 
Foucault's analysis of power is basically deterministic (one regime of truth supplanting 
another, and so on). suggesting instead that Foucault is much more positive about the 
possibility of "counter-resistance" against the dominance of certain discourses. 
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Foucault's aim therefore is to reverse the older methodology which 
analysed power as a centralised function, and to study instead the function and 
effects of `power' starting from the periphery. 34 In this way. one of the central 
components of Foucault's project is to re-establish the legitimacy of voices 
arising from the margins of society (what he calls `local knowledges') and 
establish them over against the coercion of more centralised forms of discourse. 
It is, lie says: 
... a 
kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, 
to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion 
of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a 
reactivation of local knowledges ... 
in opposition to the scientific 
hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power: this, then, 
is the project of these disordered and fragmentary genealogies. 
(ii) Lyotard 
If Foucault"s approach is to destabilise the centralised power of unifying 
discourses by highlighting the voices of the minorities. Lyotard's is simply that 
`metanarratives don't work". This is summarised in his celebrated and oft-quoted 
statement: `Simplifying to the extreme I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
34 As he puts it: 'the important thing is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting 
from its centre.... One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, 
from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, 
their own techniques and tactics. and then see how these mechanisms of power have been - 
and continue to be - invested colonised. utilised. involuted. transformed, displaced, extended 
etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination' (Foucault 1980: 
99). 
5 Foucault 1980: 85. Foucault distinguishes between 'archaeology' and 'genealogy'. The 
former is the methodology required for the analysis of such local 'discursivities', and the 
latter the means whereby their voice can be 'released' and 'brought into play'. The 
centralised discourse that Foucault identifies most often is that of 'science': e. g., 'Our task .. 
will be to expose and specify the issue at stake in this opposition, this struggle, this 
insurrection of knowledges against the institutions and against the effects of the knowledge 
and power that invests scientific discourse' (Foucault 1980: 87). 
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metanarratives. '36 The particular `metanarrative' Lyotard refers to is that of 
scientific knowledge, and his book. The Postmodern Condition (subtitled `A 
Report on Knowledge'), is an examination of the changed way in which such 
`knowledge' functions under postmodern conditions. 37 Gone is the belief of 
modernity that scientific discourse held the power to sustain a universal 
legitimising agency. By contrast, contemporary legitimation is expressing itself 
in a variety of variegated and `splintered' contexts. One of the by-products of 
this evolution is that the understanding of knowledge as an end in itself is now 
being replaced by the idea of knowledge as a `commodity' - as information 
which can be transferred and exchanged. 38 
The older scheme was sustained by two great `myths' (or 'narratives'): 
namely the myth of `humanity as the hero of liberty' (represented by post- 
revolutionary French thought) in which knowledge was held to be a Wright' - to 
be won if necessary by force, 39 and the myth of the `unification of knowledge' 
(represented by the German speculative idealism of the Hegelian tradition) which 
effectively made the pursuit of knowledge a passport to the self-fulfilment and 
spiritual wellbeing of individuals. 40 By contrast, he argues: 
In contemporary society and culture - postindustrial society, postmodern 
culture - the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different 
terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of 
unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a 
1 narrative of emancipation. ' 
Leotard 1984b: xxiv. 
Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is 
known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age' 
(Lyotard 1984b: 3). 
Lyotard speaks in this context of the 'computerization of society' (1984b: 3.7,47). 
Lyotard 1984b: 3 If.. 
40 Leotard I984b: 32ff.. 
41 Lyotard 1984b: 37. 
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In preference to such unifying narratives, Lyotard utilises the late- 
Wittgensteinian concept of `language games' to articulate the contemporary way 
in which `knowledge' functions. 42 In this context, legitimation is acquired at a 
more localised level by the way in which the language of `customs' and 
`performative utterances' operates amongst the groups of people who use them. 
43 
In this scenario, any emerging concept of `truth" must be radically reconceived. 
and becomes increasingly difficult to define. 'Truth' is effectively localised 
because individual communities envisage and articulate it in different ways 
according to background, culture and custom. Each operates - in Wittgenstein's 
terminology with its own `language game'. As an example of the resulting 
`boundaries' within which this idea of `truth' operates, Lyotard describes the way 
in which they function within the scientific community. He writes: 
It is recognized that the conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of the game 
of science, are immanent in that game, that they can only be established within 
the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature, and that there is no 
proof that the rules are good than the consensus extended to them by the 
experts. 44 
Outside this context, the understanding of `truth' may be different, in the 
sense that elsewhere a different `language game' operates. The result may often 
be a that a radical `incommensurability' exists between such `local' narratives, 
with no external legitimating referent. If this "delegitimation" is pursued in the 
Lyotard 1984b: 9-10. Cf. Wittgenstein 1963: # 19,23,241. 
E. g., Lvotard 1984b: 19: 'What is a "good" prescriptive or evaluative utterance, a "good" 
performance in denotative or technical matters? They are all, judged to be "good" because 
they conform to the relevant criteria (of justice, beauty, truth, and efficiency respectively) 
accepted in the social circle of the "knower's" interlocutors.... The consensus that permits 
such knowledge to be circumscribed and makes it possible to distinguish one who knows 
from one who doesn't (the foreigner. the child) is what constitutes the culture of a people. ' 
Cf. also 65. For a further description of his 'non-functionalist' nature of'language' see 
Lvotard 1992: 52f.. 
44 Leotard l984b: 29. 
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slightest and if its scope is widened", he comments, the road is then open for an 
important current of postmodernity: science plays it own game; it is incapable of 
legitimating the other language games. ' 45 He continues: 
The social subject itself seems to dissolve in this dissemination of language 
games. The social bond is linguistic, but is not woven with a single thread. It is 
a fabric formed by the intersection of at least two (and in reality an indeterminate 
number) of language games, obeying different rules. 46 
`Truth' in this context is a notion defined by the language of those who 
`manufacture' it. It is not something imposed from without. Rather - to use 
Lyotard"s words - it is 'immanent" within whatever `game' is specified. 
One of the profound implications of this is the threat that it poses to those 
who view `truth' in less relativised ways not least to writers and thinkers such 
as Newbigin himself. Central to this challenge is its questioning of how differing 
`narratives' or `discourses' can relate to one another under postmodern conditions 
if in essence they do not understand one another's `language'. In apologetic 
terms, for example, it raises the question as to whether Christians are able to 
communicate with non-Christians if there is no perceived framework within 
which to agree or disagree? Does 'dialogue' come to an end? And if not. on 
what basis is it allowed to continue? 
In more general terms, such an analysis evokes a sense of cultural 
`fluidity*. and an accompanying sense of `truth chaos' which takes us near to the 
heart of much postmodern thinking. Part of the reason for this is that Foucault in 
particular (and to a lesser extent Leotard) is indebted to the fundamental insights 
of Friedrich Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century. Nietzsche argued that 
Leotard I 984b: 40. 
46 Lyotard 1984b: 40. 
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the epistemological methods of the `Enlightenment' could not in the end make 
sense of the evident chaos and fragmentation of life, but would lead ultimately - 
if its premises were followed - only to despair, and even to nihilism. With this 
background in mind, David Harvey has written that 
... the most startling 
fact about postmodernism [is] its total acceptance of the 
ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic.... It does not try to 
transcend it, counteract it, or even to define the `eternal and immutable' elements 
that might lie within it. Postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the 
fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all there is. 4 
This general line of interpretation represents postmodernity as a 
movement characterized by a fundamental reaction against what has gone before 
- particularly in its dealings with concepts like `tradition' and `authority'. 
Indeed, as Harvey puts it: `Fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of 
all universal or "totalizing" discourses (to use the favoured phrase) are the 
hallmark of postmodern thought. '49 
If the rejection of such universalizing narratives implies a distancing from 
monolithic concepts like `history', `tradition' and its implied relative `authority'. 
then Fredric Jameson's term `pastiche' emerges as a useful word to describe the 
postmodern predilection to `play" with what has gone before. 49 In architectural 
and artistic terms, this leads to a `random cannibalization of all the styles of the 
past', 50 whilst in terms of the more general relationship between present and past, 
he writes that: 
4' Harvey 1990: 44. 
48 Harvey 1990: 9. 
4) Jameson 1983: 1 13f.. Cf. also Jameson 1984c: 64-65. 
Jameson I 984c: 65-66. For the classic work on postmodern influences within the field of 
architecture see Jencks 1978. Although the use of the term -postmodern' can be traced back 
to writers such as Frederico de Oniz who coined the term postmodernisino in 1934, and used 
it to describe a reaction from uvi/hin modernism rather than a movement that would transcend 
it, and to Arnold Toynbee who in 1939 suggested that the modern age had ended in 1914 and 
(Note continued on next page. 
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what was once ... the organic genealogy of the 
bourgeois collective project ... 
has meanwhile itself become a vast collection of images, a multitudinous 
photographic simulacrum.... In faithful conformity to poststructuralist 
linguistic theory, the past as `referent' finds itself gradually bracketed, and then 
effaced altogether, leaving us with nothing but texts. '' 
The missiological implication of these general trends is profound. For 
once any conception of `metanarrative' (or `ultimate' truth) is removed from the 
sphere of legitimate ideological possibilities, Christian truth-claims evaporate 
from all but a `localised' sphere. In a postmodern context therefore, it raises once 
more the question of how an idea for which 'truth' claims are being made is to be 
upheld outside of a narrow and localised frame of reference - particularly when 
the ideas carry within their own presuppositional framework a claim that `truth" 
transcends the `local'. 
1.3.2 Postmodernity and the exercise of `reason' 
Alongside the postmodern rejection of `metanarrative, it is commonplace 
to associate postmodernity with a radical scepticism about the Enlightenment 
view (closely bound up with the development of the scientific method) that 
reason' could supply firm grounds for deciding between what is `true" and what 
is `false'. Whether this confidence was founded upon the `intuitions' of 
Descartes, the `sense-impressions' of Hume, or the scientific 'certainties' of the 
twentieth-century positivists, classical 'foundational 1st' epistemology has all but 
that the era which emerged out of the ruins of the Ist world war should be described as 'Post- 
Modern', it was Jencks who first made widespread use of the term. For an analysis of the 
origins of the term in philosophical and social contexts, see Best and Kellner 1991: 1-33: 
Sampson 1994: and more generally. Rose 1991: 3-20. For its use in primarily architectural 
and artistic contexts, see Jencks 1978: 6-8: and Jencks 1996: 17ff., and 14-15 where he lists 
the major works on 'Postmodernism'. dividing them into three phases: 1870-1950.1950- 
1980. and 1980 to the present. 
51 Jameson 1984c: 66. 
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collapsed under postmodern conditions, and its demise has been noted by writers 
across various disciplines. ý2 As a result, the Christian philosopher Nicholas 
Wolterstorff concludes that in a most fundamental way traditional epistemology 
has come unstuck in recent years with the result that the field of epistemology 
is now filled with fascinating turmoil and chaos, and with new probes in many 
directions. 
As part of this `turmoil', debates about the function of `rationality' itself 
add a further dimension to interpretations of the transition between modernity and 
postmodernity. These debates may be seen to function at a number of levels. It 
is characteristic amongst some analysts, for example, to accuse postmodern 
writers of `irrationalism'. or of having effectively turned their backs on the 
efficacy of Enlightenment notions of reason altogether. '` But even if there is a 
dimension of truth to this position. it is clear that the picture is much more 
complex and nuanced than some seem to suppose. 
As it is generally developed by postmodern writers, the contemporary 
reaction against modernity may be characterised as a critique of the form and 
function of reason central to the Enlightenment project. Kant referred to this as 
technical-practical' reason - the way of arriving at the most efficient means of 
achieving a given end. 5 The cultural elevation of this particular function of 
reason may indeed be liable to the postmodern critique that it tends to work itself 
For useful surveys, cf. Harvey 1990: 10-39 who explores diverse cultural dimensions of this 
collapse: or Reader 1997. who concentrates on theological and philosophical perspectives. 
Cf. also Stout 1981. 
53 Wolterstorff 1983: 4. 
54 E. «., Habermas 1981: 13 (referring to Foucault as an 'irrationalist'): also, more generally 
Gellner 1992. 
Kant 1993: 241. His other two categories of rationality are the 'theoretical-speculative' and 
the 'moral-practical'. 
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out in an inherently amoral way and is therefore prone to modes of expression 
that are potentially oppressive. Indeed, in this context the spectre of the 
Holocaust is paraded as the paradigm of what Enlightenment reason at its worst 
can eventually lead to. '6 
But notwithstanding such a potentiality, it is clear that the continuing 
exercise of reason itself 'is not being rejected by leading thinkers of the 
postmodern era. The work of Jürgen Habermas is clearly significant in this 
regard in representing a viewpoint which disavows the dismissal of rational 
discourse altogether. arguing as he does that modernity - as it is now constituted 
- is the end-product of the over-emphasis upon one particular aspect of 
'reason'. 57 The concept of rationality itself is not the problem, he argues, but 
rather its inner dislocation. As a result, it is vital not to jettison the concept of 
reason altogether, but rather to recover its more `holistic' conception that has 
been lost as a result of the Enlightenment. ý8 
But even amongst those writers most centrally associated with 
postmodern thinking - Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques 
Derrida there is no suggestion that the role of reason is being rejected 
altogether. Foucault, for example. is much more interested in the uses to which 
reason is put than in any notion of its being abandoned totally. In one interview, 
for example, he was asked the question: `How do you see post-modernism ... 
in 
See e. g.. Bauman 1989. Cf. Horkheirner and Adorno 1972: 6: 'Enlightenment is totalitarian'; 
and 9: 'Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men. He knows them in so 
far as he can manipulate them. ' Cf. also more generally, 168-208. 
What I labermas calls 'cognitive-instrumental' rationality (e. g., Habermas 1981: 8: 1984: 
10 ff ). 
Habermas's project is essentially to complement the idea of a 'cognitive-instrumental 
rationality' with a more all-encompassing conception which he describes as 'communicative 
rationality-. 
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terms of the historical and philosophical questions that are posed by itT He 
replied in the following words: 
I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the 
eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: 
What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its 
limits, and what are its dangers? 
He continued: 
if philosophy was a function within critical thought, it is precisely to accept 
this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its 
necessity, to its indispensability, and at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers. 
Likewise, Lyotard's programme has more to do with the inability of the 
metanarrative' of reason to produce a context in which emancipatory political 
action is feasible than it has to do with the dismissal of reason itsel fas a 
constituent part of the makeup of a viable contemporary discourse. His general 
view about the relationship between modernity and postmodernity is well 
represented by the following statement made in an interview in 1988: 'I have said 
and will say again that ``postmodernism'signifies not the end of modernism. but 
another relation to modernism. ' 60 But it is clear that what he describes as 
'another relation to modernism' refers to the different way in which he believes 
reason must now operate in a non-metanarrative. post-Enlightenment world. This 
becomes clear for example in the way in which he uncovers and identifies the 
different 'language games" that operate even within a supposedly unified 
discourse such as that of the scientific community. Such communities he argues. 
5,9 Undated interview (entitled 'Space, Knowledge, and Power") in Rabinow 1984: 249. This 
statement is interesting not least in the context of Habermas' criticism that Foucault is guilty 
of contradiction in appearing to discard the normative role of reason, yet at the same 
employing it. 
60 Quoted (from a 1988 interview) in Reader 1997: 61-2. 
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are characterised not by one language system alone, but by a `plurality of 
languages'. As a result of this he comments that: 
Obviously a major shift in the notion of reason accompanies this new 
arrangement. The principle of a universal metalanguage is replaced by the 
principle of a plurality of formal and axiomatic systems capable of arguing the 
truth of denotative statements. 61 
Lyotard argues therefore that it is inappropriate to speak of the `demise' 
of reason under postmodern conditions (except of course as a `metanarrative'), 
but rather that its function needs to be reassessed and refocused within a more 
disseminated and localised context. As he puts it: 
Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in no way follows 
that they are reduced to barbarity. What saves them from it is their knowledge 
that legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic practice and 
communicational interaction. 02 
In this newer postmodern context, therefore. the role of reason is not 
dismissed by Lyotard as being no longer relevant, even if it must now attain to 
less exalted ends than it once did. As Zygmunt Bauman argues, its role is no 
longer to sustain metanarratives, but rather to distinguish between the rival 
conceptions of reality which are sustained within local communities. He states 
accordingly that: The task of philosophical reason seems to he shifting from 
legislating about the correct way of separating truth from untruth to legislating 
about the correct way of translating between separate languages, each generating 
and sustaining its own truths. ' 633 
`'i Leotard 1984b: 43. 
`'' Leotard 1984b: 41. 
Bauman 1997: 116-7 
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In a similar vein, Jacques Derrida, in developing his `deconstructionist' 
notions of language, also does not abandon the role of reason in postmodern 
discourse. He says, for example: 
If there is here and there in France a critique of reason, e. g., by me ... then that 
doesn't at all mean a rejection of reason, a tendency towards irrationalism, but, 
on the contrary ... a responsibility and a consciousness of the responsibility of 
the philosopher before reason.... Therefore, the opposition between 
rationalism and irrationalism, as it solidifies from time to time these days in 
Germany and France, seems supremely crude. `'` 
He goes on: `I maintain that deconstruction isn't irrational. But it also doesn't 
aim at producing a new reason or order of reason. For all of that, it's a symptom 
of the change in the order of rationality within which we live. ' 65 As with 
Foucault and Lyotard. therefore, what is under discussion for Derrida is not the 
abandonment of rationality altogether but rather a debate about the refocusing of 
its role within the context of a newer postmodern paradigm. 
As a result, though postmodernity has resulted in the `demise of 
foundational ism'. 66 there still exists an uncertainty about the kind of discourse 
that can now legitimately exist. Richard Bernstein describes this in terms of a 
`Cartesian Anxiety' that `hovers in the background of the controversies waged by 
objectivists and relativists. ' As he puts it: 
With a chilling clarity Descartes leads its with an apparent and ineluctable 
necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is some support for 
64 Rotzer 1995: 43. 
Rötzer 1995: 45. See also his comment (quoted from a 1985 lecture in Graham and Walton 
1991: I: 'We have to deconstruct, to take time to deconstruct the Enlightenment. But when I 
say deconstruct a thin(,. I do not say we are against it, or that in any situation I will fight it, be 
on the other side. '). 
66 The title of Grenz 2000. 
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our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces 
of of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos. 
As far as Newbigin's own analysis of this development is concerned, it is 
clear that an emphasis upon modernity's elevation of the role of `reason' in the 
wider context of the Enlightenment `programme" is central to his own thesis, as 
indeed is his interpretation of its subsequent demise. As a result of this, the 
missiological conclusions that he draws are integrally related to such an analysis. 
This in itself raises important questions: not least whether such an identification 
of the inflated prominence of the place of reason within modernity's worldview 
represents an accurate or adequate portrayal of the facts. But it also leads to 
some interesting questions about his view of the place reason should occupy in 
the continuing missiological enterprise. By way of anticipation, here as an 
example are words from The Other Side of'I984: 
... 
if the immense achievements of autonomous reason seem to have produced a 
world which is at best meaningless and at worst full of demons, then it could be 
... that we shall not 
find renewal within the framework of the assumptions 
which the Enlightenment held to be `self-evident', that there is needed a radical 
conversion, a new starting point which begins as an act of trust in divine grace as 
something simply given to be received in faith and gratitude 68 
This new `starting-point' that Newbigin refers to is that of `revelation'. 
But his desire to re-establish revelation as a `Barthian' a priori upon which all 
else must be built raises the question of how this assertion is to be related to any 
ongoing exercise of 'reason", and to the part that reason now plays in establishing 
such an a priori. How, for example, is revelation to be accepted as the ground of 
the missiological enterprise if not by the prior exercise of reason: even simply at 
6' Bernstein 1983: 18 (emphasis or(Onal). 
`'S Newbi-in 1983b: 25. 
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the level of distinguishing such a starting point from other competing 
alternatives? Or at another level, how is revelation once it has been accepted as 
the a priori - to be interpreted by the reader except by some exercise of reasoning 
powers? 
If Newbigin's interpretation of modernity is therefore characterised by a 
rejection of its preoccupation with a `foundationalist' approach to reason, the 
continuing status and role of rationality under pos/modern conditions emerges as 
an issue of central importance. We shall return to this question as the thesis 
develops. 
1.4 Postmodernity, legitimacy and theology 
Contemporary theological responses to the issues raised by the 
postmodern challenge to `legitimacy' are understandably diverse. This is 
unsurprising, given the fact that individual writers are always influenced by 
different aspects of the question at issue, as well as being variously affected by 
the interplay and inter-relationships between presupposition and interpretation. 
In turn the various `disciplines" of theology (including that of missiology) are 
influenced and moulded by the presuppositions on which they are based, whether 
these presuppositions are openly acknowledged by their proponents or not. 
A further reason for the variety of responses arises out of the nature of 
'postmodernity' itself. For even to write about 'postmodernity' implies some 
sense of order to its outlook, some agenda. or programme. But as has already 
become clear, it is impossible to describe this contemporary 'movement" in 
anything approaching monolithic terms. As Jameson puts it: '... it seems to me 
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essential to grasp "postmodernism*' not as a style, but rather as a cultural 
dominant: a conception which allows for the presence and coexistence of a range 
of very different, yet subordinate features. '69 If anything therefore can be 
identified as central to its concerns, it is precisely the existence of a `conceptual' 
outlook which celebrates a `plurality' of meanings. As Bauman puts it: 
`Postmodernity is marked by a view of the human world as irreducibly and 
irrevocably pluralistic, split into a multitude of sovereign units and sites of 
authority, with no horizontal or vertical order, either in actuality or in potency. '70 
As a result. The postmodern condition is a site of constant mobility and change, 
but no clear direction of development. ' 71 
Accordingly, because theologians are both responding to, whilst at the 
same time being influenced by such pluralities, there is an added complexity to 
the discussion in hand. This will impinge upon our discussion of Newbigin's 
own writings of course. What, for example, are his own presuppositions, and can 
these be sustained on the grounds that he himself puts forward? Could it be the 
case that his own response to the demise of modernity is itself `modern' (or even 
`postmodern') in its method and construction, or is it one which can genuinely be 
said to transcend the terms of the `modern'/`postmodern' debate? 
By way of an introduction to this debate, we shall briefly review three 
contemporary theological `positions' which have been adopted by writers seeking 
to engage with the postmodern debate about `legitimacy'. This will help to set 
Newbigin's own contribution to the debate in its wider context. 
(19 Jameson 1984c: 56. 
70 Bauman 1992: 35. 
11 Bauman 1992: 189. 
45 
1.4.1 `Postmodernity embraced': there is no such thing as `truth' anymore 
The first position might be illustrated by the work of Don Cupitt, who 
takes the view that since postmodernity has in effect swept away all possibility of 
`metanarratives', the concept of `truth' no longer serves any useful purpose. The 
following words from his 1990 book Creation (gut of'Nothing are characteristic: 
We have lost the ability to make and hold on to the great distinctions by which, 
historically, capital-P Philosophy put down fancy, exalted Reason, and set the 
intellectual world in place. One may be cheerful or pessimistic about the 
resulting cultural situation, but at any rate it is a rather novel one. ... 
its crucial 
feature is the disappearance of the real, our growing incapacity our lack, even, 
of the will - to separate truth from fiction, the objectively real from the flux of 
human interpretations. ' 
One could argue (as does Anthony Thiselton73) that Cupitt's own grounds 
for making such a case have shifted from an earlier (`modernist') Kantian 
defence of the `non-realism' of human conceptions and constructions of `God' to 
one in which (increasingly influenced by the French postmodern writers Barthes, 
Derrida, and Foucault), he mounts a similar attack on the grounds of the 
`differed" nature of language. To quote again from his 1990 book - which was 
written when his attack had become increasingly influenced by such postmodern 
critiques - Cupitt makes the point that: 
Since Kant the world has increasingly come to be seen as just the product of 
the interactions of a lot of finite human viewpoints. For social interactions 
generate meanings and therefore language, and therefore knowledge which is 
carried within language, and therefore the world which is produced within our 
knowledge (because we have no way of separating the way the world really is 
from the way it is presented within our own knowledge if it). So the world has 
gradually turned into a changing human cultural construction.... We can 
compare different human 'perceptions' of reality with each other, of course, but 
we cannot compare them with reality-as-such. Our own new provisional 
Cupitt 1990: 77-8. 
Thiselton 1995: 81-92. 
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language-generated world just isn't quite as real and solid as the old God-made 
Cosmos used to be. 74 
He later concludes that: 
As language shifts, flows and changes all the time, so it carries our own identity 
and that of everything else with it. Everything undergoes continual reinvention 
and transformation. We don't hold on, we are mobile, wanderers.... Rather, 
we float along with language, reimagining and recreating ourselves and our 
world all the time. ' 
Whatever the grounds of the attack (and one could argue that whichever 
route is taken, the conclusion he arrives at is the same), the advent of 
postmodernity has served to buttress Cupitt's non-realist conception of `God'. In 
his opinion: `Truth is human, socially-produced, historically developed, plural 
and changing. " 76 On this understanding any suggestion that there is something 
`real out there' to which theological language might `refer' is ultimately a rather 
meaningless question. `Postmodernity' he writes is a flux of images and 
fictions. '77 The resulting view of `truth' constitutes a firm rejection of older 
foundationalist conceptions. Don Cupitt is anti-foundationalist, and proud of it. 
In this context, to speak of `mission' in any one of a number of traditional 
understandings of the term becomes both futile and even offensive. For to invite 
another to consider the `claims' of Christianity, let alone to be `converted' into 
that faith (or into any other faith for that matter) would immediately imply that a 
believer was operating with some sort of external `truth-referent" on the basis of 
which others are being invited to believe. Not surprisingly. therefore, the notion 
'' Cupitt 1990: 68. 
Cupitt 1990: 201. 
Cupitt 1990: 45. 
Cupitt 1990: 77. 
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of `mission' is totally absent from Cupitt's writings. 
1.4.2 `Postmodernity rejected': the nature of `truth' hasn't changed 
At the other end of the `spectrum' from Cupitt is the view that the status 
of epistemological enquiry - as well as the methods by which it is to be pursued - 
have not fundamentally altered with the advent of postmodernity, and therefore 
that access to `truth' is to be pursued in essentially the same ways in which it has 
been in the past. 
This, broadly speaking, is the position adopted by writers such as Harold 
Netland. Although he is responding more specifically to the questions raised by 
contemporary developments within the debate about religious pluralism rather 
than to the issue of `postmodernity' as such, he nonetheless represents this 
perspective well, and his approach will be discussed briefly at this point for three 
reasons. 
In the first place one can argue that the very notion of `pluralism' which 
he addresses (one which he identifies as being represented by the writers of the 
symposium The My/h of'Christian Uniqueness 78) is characteristically 
`postmodern'. For the contemporary 'pluralist' paradigm (of which the 
`exclusivist' and `inclusivist° approaches were progenitors) represents a 
disavowal (or at least a radical redefinition) of what Gordon Kaufman describes 
in the opening chapter of the book as the absolutistic claims about divine 
revelation and ultimate truth that have often been regarded as central to faith". 79 
78 Hick and Knitter 1987. 
Kaufman 1988: 3. 
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Secondly. the position from which Netland seeks to combat this challenge 
is one which adopts a mode of apologetic that is clearly (if not self-consciously) 
`modernist" in its methodology. By implication, the adoption of such an 
apologetic demonstrates that whatever the nature of the contemporary threat to 
the concept of `truth' which writers such as Knitter and Hick espouse. this threat 
is to be countered - in Netland's view - along 'traditional' lines which could be 
argued to be reliant upon certain central `Enlightenment' assumptions. 
Thirdly, not only does Netland's approach provide an illuminating 
parallel to Newbigin's own response to the questions of pluralism and truth, but 
Newbigin's approach has come under criticism from Netland himself. " 
Briefly stated. Netland is deeply concerned to establish what he calls 
`objective, non-arbitrary criteria' with which to evaluate the truth-claims of the 
different religious worldviews. He writes accordingly: 
I will argue that, contrary to the emerging consensus in certain theological and 
missiological circles, some nonarbitrary criteria exist to evaluate various 
religious traditions, and that it is indeed legitimate for a Christian to conclude 
that other religions which embrace basic beliefs incompatible with central tenets 
of Christian faith are false. 8' 
What follows is an intricately developed ten-point checklist designed to 
enable the `neutral' observer to assess on rational grounds whether a given 
religious system is truthful or not. Two comments are in order at this point. 
Firstly, Netland's approach is put forward as a-cultural: that is to say it is 
designed to supply criteria sufficiently `objective' and 'exterior' to individual 
SO He argues. for example, that Newbigin's stance effectively 'forfeits the right to reject 
competing perspectives as false, but it too faces the charge of self-refutation' (Netland 1991: 
180). Elsewhere he argues that 'Newbigin's statements make unnecessary and problematic 
concessions to presuppositionism' (sic) (Netland 1994: 106). Newbigin only directly refers 
to Netland's specific work in an extended footnote to his essay. 1994d: 85f.. 
81 Netland 1991: 152. 
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cultures that they provide a neutral point of reference. And secondly, in seeking 
such 'neutral' ground, Netland's methodology is actually wedded to a particular 
view about the epistemic status of beliefs. He clashes with Newbigin at precisely 
this point, claiming that Newbigin must necessarily be a `fideist' in arguing from 
within the framework of revelation that his faith is 'true'. 82 `Obviously, ' he 
writes, `simply appealing to what is held to be the self-certifying nature of one's 
own faith commitments as the proper criterion by which to evaluate other 
perspectives is inadequate for settling the question of truth. '83 In contrast to this 
approach, therefore, Netland espouses an epistemological method which weighs 
`truth' on grounds which he believes to be epistemically prior to those of faith. 
He writes as follows: 
Epistemic justification has to do with the justification or warrant for one's 
beliefs - the question whether there are sufficient grounds for one's beliefs. 
Ultimately, the question of the justification for making judgements about 
alternative religious beliefs on the basis of one's own religious commitments 
hangs upon the logically prior question of the justification for accepting one's 
basic religious beliefs in the first place. 84 
It has been argued that Netland's own proposals fail to be as `neutral' as 
he himself would like them to be. After all, they are wedded to a philosophical 
approach which is grounded in some very characteristically `Enlightenment' 
assumptions about truth and logic, rationality and verification. 85 As a result 
therefore, one can say that Netland's approach represents an attempt to defend the 
'truthfulness" of Christian faith on grounds with which any sane-minded and 
neutral observer would concur (an approach which implicitly carries within itself 
s, See e. ý Netland 1991: 178f.. s' Netland 1991: 179. 
x' Netland 1991: 194-5. 
See for example the critique in D'Costa 1993, or Perry 1996. (Netland replies to Perry in 




the ability to withstand the onslaught of cultural change). At the same time (and 
for the same reason), it represents a methodology whose vulnerability is 
accentuated in the wake of the postmodern transition, precisely because of its 
commitment to an Enlightenment foundationalism now believed by many to have 
disappeared. 
1.4.3 `Postmodernity nuanced': the nature of `truth' is now different 
A third option covers a range of approaches, all of which may be located 
somewhere between the two outlined above. Implicitly, each of these is 
sympathetic with the view expressed in the title of a recent book: Truth is 
Stranger than it Used to Be. 86 For whilst drawing back from the radical relativist 
conclusions represented by writers like Cupitt, many theologians nonetheless 
want to move away from the classical and foundationalist traditions of previous 
generations. They recognise that with the advent of postmodernity, it is no longer 
possible to speak of the defence of theological and philosophical legitimacy in 
terms that imply, and then appeal to, some `neutral' point of reference or external 
notion of `truth" - whether this is mediated by tradition or by individuals. As a 
result, whatever the gains and losses under postmodernity, they argue that 
contemporary theology has to recognise that for 'truth' to be legitimated at any 
level, it has to accept the fact that this is now more 'localised' than some 
traditional approaches might be prepared to concede. This may not necessarily 
destroy the concept of 'truth' altogether, but - if accepted - must alter the way in 
which such `truth' is articulated and understood. Rather than fighting against 
86 Middleton and Walsh 1995b. 
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postmodernity' therefore, theologians would do better to welcome it and develop 
apologetic strategies accordingly. 
With certain differences in emphasis, writers like George Lindbeck, 
Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank have all adopted this more `moderate' 
position. Each comes to the conclusion that within the postmodern paradigm, 
theology has to come to terms with the necessity of a new sense of 
'accommodation" to the spirit of the age, and with the challenge and opportunity 
that it is seen to afford. 
(i) George Lindbeck 
In many ways, George Lindbeck may be regarded as the pioneer of this 
position. 8 7 He argues in his short but seminal book, The Nature of Doctrine 
(subtitled `Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age') 88 that given 
contemporary assumptions - particularly about the `deobjectification' of religion 
under modernity89 - the function of religious language is not so much to propose 
truth claims for wider legitimation, but rather to supply adherents of belief 
systems with the language to express what he calls their own collection of 
communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action. '9° This way of 
R' Though his views about the need to understand beliefs in the context of the communities in 
which they operate is by no means an insight peculiar to him. See e. g. the earlier work of 
Winch (1958: esp. 10- 15,86-91), who was amongst the first to draw social and 
communitarian conclusions from the later insights of Wittgenstein. Lindbeck is also indebted 
to the work of" Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in particular their perception of the way 
in which the social setting of individuals and communities affects understandings of reality. 
(Lindbeck acknowledges this indebtedness in 1990: 493, where he states that in the '60s he 
gained a great deal from the 'Witt, -, ensteinians": T. S. Kuhn, Peter Berger, Clifford Geertz, 
and other contemporary non-foundationalists. ) 
88 Lindbeck 1984. 
8) A term he takes from the work of Berger and Luckmann (Berger and Luckmann 1967: e. g.. 
49ff., 78ff. ). 
90 Lindbeck 1984: 18. 
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conceptualising religion in terms of the language of self-referentiality is one that 
he describes as `cultural-linguistic', and its implied view of ecclesiastical doctrine 
is developed in terms of what he defines as `regulative' or 'rule' theory. 9 I 
Lindbeck utilises this `cultural-linguistic' model as a means of describing 
and articulating the belief systems and practices of religious traditions via the 
language that they use. As he puts it: `a religion can be viewed as a kind of 
cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life 
and thought. 92 In other words, it can be said both to describe the manner in 
which beliefs and religious practices function within a given community, but also 
to `regulate' and determine that manner. 93 
From this foundation, Lindbeck proceeds to develop his ideas in at least 
two significant directions. Firstly, once agreement is reached that this is how 
language functions within religious communities, it becomes clear that it can only 
do so effectively for members of the community in question. This is because, in 
line with the views of Lyotard, such languages are inherently and necessarily 
peculiar to the traditions in which they are formulated. Secondly, and as a direct 
result of this, it becomes impossible for an outsider to assess the `reality' or 
authenticity of any given set of religious expressions and experiences, unless they 
already share the appropriate linguistic framework of the particular community in 
question. As he puts it, `religions, like languages, can be understood only in their 
Lindbeck 1984: 18. 
Lindbeck 1984: 33. 
Questions about the 'truth' of doctrines when viewed in this way cannot be answered from 
'outside' the system in which they operate. Rather, they are 'intrasystemic' or 'intratextual' 
(Lindbeck 1984: 64-66). For the view that this aspect of Lindbeck's proposals establishes 
hing firmly as 'through and through postmodern', see Murphy and McClendon 1989: 205- 
207. 
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own terms, not by transposing them into an alien speech. 94 In other words, an 
outsider must first be `apprenticed' or inaugurated into the language structure of 
the community before being able to judge whether its members are demonstrating 
an authentic and genuine faith or not. 
Such an approach clearly has inevitable and far-reaching implications for 
the question of whether religious communities are able to legitimate their own 
practices and beliefs in the minds of outsiders. This is due primarily to 
Lindbeck"s commitment to the `intratextual' nature of religious language which 
establishes Christian truth as both `unique', but also `untranslatable'. `' As a 
result, he writes that: 
genuine bilingualism (not to mention mastery of many religious languages) is so 
rare and difficult as to leave basically intact the barrier to extramural 
communication posed by untranslatability in religious matters. Those for whom 
conversation is the key to solving interreligious problems are likely to be 
disappointed.. 9" 
In missiological terms, therefore, Lindbeck's outlook is best described as 
doubtful'. `Postliberals', he writes, `are bound to be skeptical, not about 
missions, but about apologetics and foundations. ' 97 The `translatability' of the 
Christian message is limited in his view entirely to the ability of believers to live 
out authentic Christian lives and so to demonstrate the power of the gospel. 
Accordingly, he writes that. the reasonableness of a religion is largely a function 
of its assimilative powers, of its ability to provide an intelligible interpretation in 
its own terms of the varied situations and realities adherents encounter. ' 98 
94 Lindbeck 1984: 129. 
9 E. g.. 'the uniqueness of the -gospel in relation to pluralism ... concerns the untranslatability 
of the message and the uniqueness of the elect community' (Lindbeck 1997: 424-5). 
96 Lindbeck 1997: 427. 
`'- Lindbeck 1984: 129. 
98 Lindbeck 1984: 131. 
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Having stated this as a possibility, however, he nonetheless remains 
sceptical about whether the Christian community has the resources to prove itself 
successful in the business of attracting outsiders into its membership. The 
`catechetical" models of church growth (whereby outsiders are attracted by 
Christian churches to learn about the faith) are largely fruitless for the simple 
reason that the Church has generally failed genuinely to live out its alternative 
agenda in the face of religious decline, and has been influenced by the views and 
beliefs of the majority within the surrounding secularised culture. And even 
when outsiders to the Christian faith have picked up what he describes as `tag 
ends' of ideas about Christianity, these have been enough to convince them that 
they have sufficient data upon which to reject the idea of Christian faith. 99 In the 
face of this, invitations on the part of Christians to `further exploration" are 
rejected on the assumption by outsiders that whatever there is to know about 
Christianity is already sufficiently known. He concludes that until such time as 
continuing decline results in a Christian community small enough to be 
compelled to own its narrative and to live accordingly, the Church will continue 
to limp along by means of a third option, which he describes as follows: 
The experience and self-identity of even the unchurched masses remain deeply 
influenced by the religious past.... They are immunized against catechesis, but 
are sometimes interested in translations of the gospel in existential, 
depth-psychological, or liberationist language that articulates their latent 
Christianity. ""' 
Lindbeck is not altogether clear on what is meant by such `translations" 
but he clearly perceives that they fall short of the ideal in terms of producing true 
disciples. The future of Christian mission (indeed for Christianity ilselfas a 
99 Lindbeck 1984: 133. 
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cultural force) is indissolubly tied therefore to the nature of the Church and its 
effectiveness to demonstrate authentic Christian community-life. He writes that, 
It is above all by the character of its communal life that it witnesses, that it 
proclaims the gospel and serves the world. "'()' He continues, The primary 
Christian mission, in short, is not to save souls but to be a faithfully witnessing 
people. ' 10` For the reasons stated, the missiological prospects to be drawn from 
Lindbeck's work are less than sanguine. 103 
(ü) Stanley Hauerwas 
Stanley Hauerwas, whose work is much influenced by Lindbeck, proceeds 
along similar lines to those of his mentor. 104 As an ethicist, he is deeply 
concerned with the fact that the Christian community must develop its own 
ethical values. His conviction is that the Church has become too sympathetic 
with certain characteristic Enlightenment emphases and has thus compromised 
her calling as a witness to the gospel. In particular. he argues that the 
Enlightenment tradition has afflicted the Christian tradition with some of the 
more cynical aspects of `liberal democracy'. He therefore sets out the parameters 
100 Lindbeck 1984: 133. 
101 Lindbeck 1989a: 193. 
10' Lindbeck I989a: 194. 
"'' For his most developed comments on the missiological implications of his work, see 
Lindbeck 1989b. For his understanding of ecclesiology (founded very clearly on a developed 
notion of election'), which leads him to a 'passive' understanding of mission, see Lindbeck 
1989a, and 1990. It is noteworthy that Newbigin's similar commitment to the notion of 
'election' leads him in a much more positive missiological direction (see e. g., Newbigin's 
comments on election in 1982c: 133: and the chapter ('The Logic of Election') in 1989f: 80- 
88). For a critique of Lindbeck's position in missiological and apologetic terms, cf. 
Gustafson's article (Gustafson 1985), who concludes that: 'lt seems that the future of 
Christianity lies, for Lindbeck, in being a cognitively dissonant sectarian movement: its 
identity and authenticity demand this' (86). For a more general critique, see McGrath 1990: 
14-34. 
104 For his indebtedness to Lindbeck. see e. ýTý Hauerwas 1985: 1-9. 
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within which the Christian community must now develop its own social, 
theological, and ethical identity. His foundational premise - as set out, for 
example, in his 1991 book After Christendom? is that `Christian discourse must 
first be written by Christians for Christians'. 
105 He goes on to summarise his 
argument as follows: 
In brief, I argue that Christian adherence to foundationalist epistemologies - that 
is, the kind of position we find exemplified in thinkers such as Kant - was 
commensurate with social strategies of Christendom. Such social strategies were 
the attempt by Christians to create societies in which it would be possible to 
think that Christians believed what anyone would believe upon reflection. 
Ironically, this strategy turned Christianity into a set of beliefs to legitimate the 
false universalism of liberalism. In this book I challenge that strategy by 
reasserting the significance of the church as the embodiment of the necessary 
practices to sustain Christian affirmation of God as Trinity. 
106 
In pursuing such a programme. Hauerwas aims to sever the link with 
liberal democracy and seeks to reconstruct and validate a viable Christian 
narrative tradition that is ultimately bounded and legitimated solely by its own 
assumptions. Jettisoned in the process is the notion that the Enlightenment 
programme was able to supply some such neutral ground across the different 
traditions which could furnish the possibility of meaningful ethical interaction 
and discussion between them. In the contemporary context, he argues, the 
Christian community must revert to a legitimation of ethical positions which is 
supplied solely by an understanding and affirmation of its own narrative, and 
should accordingly seek to develop its sense of identity without recourse to other 
starting points. As a result he writes: 'I have learned that there is simply nothing 
Hauerwas 1991: 13. The book's subtitle ('How the Church is to behave if freedom, justice. 
and a Christian nation are bad ideas') is significant. 
106 Hauerwas 1991: 15-16. 
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I can do to prevent my position from being characterized as fideistic and/or 
sectarian. ' 
1 07 
As this position is developed, Hauerwas implicitly acknowledges that 
postmodernity has forced the Church into the recognition that it is the Christian 
community alone that is able to legitimate its beliefs and actions. This has to be 
the starting point for any possible 'engagement' with other narratives. Inevitably, 
the nature of such dialogue has to be analysed and then put into practice in the 
light of this presupposition about independence. Hauerwas remains ultimately 
unclear as to the level at which any such dialogue can be maintained. In his 
earlier book Against the Nations (1985), he insists that he has no interest in 
legitimating and/or recommending a withdrawal of Christians or the Church from 
social or political affairs'. 108 
But he is aware that the development of his position is potentially 
problematic when it comes to explicating the precise nature of the `dialogue" 
between Church and society. Indeed, the opening pages of After Christendom 
describe astutely the dimensions of this dilemma. He concedes the fact that on 
the one hand the book's framework is couched in the very terms of 
Enlightenment rationalism which assumes some common framework between 
Church and society. But on the other he argues that the substance of the book is 
nonetheless an attempt to undermine this connection by proposing that the 
Church must understand itself first of all on its own terms rather than those of the 
culture surrounding it. He admits: 
' Hauerwas 1991: 16. See the rebuttal of his position in Gustafson 1985: 88f.: also Stiver 
1994: 98. 
10 `S Hauerwas 1985: I. 
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I simply have to acknowledge that in fact there is no way of avoiding this 
awkward position, I do not want to avoid it. The call to acknowledge the 
significance of the church that is the hallmark of this book does not require an 
intellectual or social retreat. Rather the awkward position in which I believe the 
church and, thus I am in, requires that we serve liberal societies by challenging 
their alleged universalism and cosmopolitanism. '" 
But how is this to be done when there is no common conceptual 
framework between `Church' and `society' to facilitate the process? For 
Hauerwas, the manner in which the Church is to legitimate its truth-claims in this 
context is one which appears to operate at different levels. Fundamentally, it 
represents a call to the ecclesial community to become a `witness' to its own 
sense of divine calling. and by so doing to shine as a light in a dark world. 
Hauerwas's elaboration of this notion of 'witness' reveals that what he has in 
mind is not that Christians should adopt an aggressive evangelistic stance, nor 
even that they should engage in verbal apologetics as a primary task. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how such proactive methods could have a place in Hauerwas's 
scheme - given his disgust at the Church's sense of self-importance which he 
sees as one of the major identity problems inflicted by modernity. He himself 
raises the question in this way: `How can we be witnesses, how can we be 
educators, how can we communicate the gospel without explicitly or implicitly 
underwriting patterns of domination and violence antithetical to the Kingdom 
brought by Christ? " 110 
In contrast to this, Hauerwas's line of argument - very similar in essence 
to that of Lindbeck - is that the Church's `witness" has to operate at an ethical 
and behavioural level, and that this in itself will constitute its only legitimate and 
109 Hauerwas 1991: 14. 
10 Hauerwas 1991: 152. 
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authentic form of evangelism. Such witness will happen only as Christians 
acknowledge that the gospel is a story and as they begin more consistently and 
effectively to live out their lives in the power of that story. 111 In terms of intent, 
Christians cannot force others to allegiance, but can only pray. 112 
(iii) John Milbank 
Finally, John Milbank is similarly influenced by the assumption that 
narratives become inevitably `localised' by the advent of postmodernity. Like 
Hauerwas, he is concerned to defend Christianity's credentials on the framework 
of its own inherited tradition rather than by borrowing legitimising frameworks 
from other traditions. Furthermore, his too is a rejection of `alien' narratives 
which in the past have cornered Christianity into a sense of self-perception which 
is not its own. The pathos of modern theology' he writes is its false humility'. 
He continues: 
For theology, this must be a fatal disease, because once theology surrenders its 
claim to he a meta discourse, it cannot any longer articulate the word of the 
creator God, but is bound to turn into the oracular voice of some finite idol, such 
as historical scholarship, humanist psychology, or transcendental philosophy. ' 13 
E. g.. Hauerwas 1981: 52,96-7: 1991: 152. In taking this line. Hauerwas also adopts a 
communitarian view of the Bible, and a deconstructionist approach to texts more generally. 
For example, he argues that the meaning of Scripture cannot exist independently of a 
community's 'interpretative strategies'. 'There is simply no "real meaning" of Paul's letters 
to the Corinthians once we understand that they are no longer Paul's letters but the Church's 
Scripture' (Hauerwas 1993: 20). On this basis, the Bible's only valid interpretation arises 
therefore out of a prior apprenticeship within the community of faith (cf. 9). It is by 
definition impossible to show how on this basis the Bible can be used to communicate 
beyond the Church except through a community's witness to its own tradition. Cf. his earlier 
book (Hauerwas 1981): e. g.. 52-55.96-97. 
See esp. chapter 6 ('The Politics of Witness'. 133-152) in Hauerwas 1991. 
ýý' Milbank 1990b: 1. 
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`What follows" he argues, is intended to overcome the pathos of modern 
theology, and to restore in postmodern terms, the possibility of theology as a 
meta discourse. ' 
114 
The following eleven chapters of his book are concerned therefore to 
distance theological narrative from descriptive self-definitions that are built upon 
alien presuppositions - whether sociological, psychological or philosophical. 
Christianity must be reconstructed on its own terms within the legitimating 
process supplied by the divine Word. He writes accordingly that: 
Theology has frequently sought to borrow from elsewhere a fundamental 
account of society or history, and then see what theological insights will cohere 
with it. But it has been shown that no such fundamental account, in the sense of 
something neutral, rational and universal, is really available. It is theology itself 
that will have to provide its own account of the final causes at work in human 
history, on the basis of its own particular, and historically specific faith. '' 
What emerges is a redefinition of Christianity along lines suggestive of 
Lindbeck's `cultural linguistic' model, but Milbank seeks to develop his thesis 
without falling prey to what he describes as Lindbeck's tendency to present the 
Christian narrative in a way that is `artificially insulated ... 
from its historical 
genesis'. 1 16 Instead, Milbank puts forward a model of understanding Christianity 
which is marked by what he describes as `metanarrative realism' 117 based on 
Augustine's model of the Two Cities" set forward in his Civitaüs Dei. Rather 
than being defined in terms of `another' narrative such as the social sciences. 
Milbank argues that theology is 'itself a social science, and the queen of the 
'" Milbank 1990b: I. 
Milbank 1990b: 380. 
Milbank 1990b: 386. 
Milbank 1990b: 382ff.. 
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sciences for the inhabitants of the altera civilus, on pilgrimage through this 
temporary world. " 18 He continues: 
In this fashion a gigantic claim to be able to read, criticize, say what is going 
on in other human societies, is absolutely integral to the Christian Church, which 
itself claims to exhibit the exemplary form of human community. For theology 
to surrender this claim, to allow that other discourses `the social sciences, - 
carry out yet more fundamental readings, would therefore amount to a denial of 
theological truth. The logic of Christianity involves the claim that the 
`interruption' of history by Christ and his bride, the Church, is the most 
fundamental of events, interpreting all other events. ''`' 
Thus, he writes that: `A re-reading of the C'ivitas Dei will allow us to realize that 
political theology can take its critique, both of secular society and of the Church, 
directly out of the developing Biblical tradition, without recourse to any external 
supplementation. " 120 
Whereas Lindbeck's aim could be described as an attempt to understand 
the Church in terms of its linguistic self-description, both Hauerwas and Milbank 
have developed particular applications of Lindbeck's approach: Hauerwas in 
terms of ethics. and Milbank in terms of the Church's societal and political 
dimensions. Nonetheless. as with Hauerwas. our particular interest at this point is 
the basis upon which Milbank is able to articulate the possibility of dialogue 
between the theological narrative of the Church and that of 'traditions' other than 
its own. Given his presuppositions, is such dialogue possible? Though Milbank 
never develops his thinking in strictly missiological terms, one would have to 
conclude that such strategies are at best `passive". In this respect he resembles 
both Lindbeck and Hauerwas. So. for example, he writes that: 
Milbank 1990b: 380. 
Milbank 1990b: 388. 
ý'0 Milbank 1990b: 389. 
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The task of such a theology is not apologetic, nor even argument. Rather it is to 
tell again the Christian invlhos, pronounce again the Christian logos and call 
again for Christian praxis in a manner that restores their freshness and 
originality. It 111ust articulate Christian difference in such a fashion as to make it 
strange. 
This sort of statement is unsurprising, given his articulation of a desire to 
establish the Christian narrative as the narrative par excellence from whose 
vantage point all other traditions must be judged. At the same time, it is unclear 
exactly what he has in mind when he uses words such as `pronounce' or the 
expression `call again'. Precisely who is being addressed by such exhortations`? 
Or in what sense would the 'strangeness' of the Church's witness be something 
that would attract others? Even given this ambiguity, the weight of Milbank's 
words suggests that the possibility of fruitful engagement with other traditions 
remains somewhat limited. Despite his desire therefore to distance himself from 
what he sees as Lindbeck"s inability to deal adequately with Christianity's 
`historical' moorings, it is difficult to see how Christians can engage with 
outsiders, or outsiders engage with Christian claims except on the basis of 
Christianity's own language and self-understanding. As a result, there exists for 
Milbank - as for Lindbeck and Hauerwas - no universal language on offer to 
facilitate the process of apologetics and dialogue. 
1.5 Conclusion: postmodernity, `legitimacy' and mission 
We have written more on Lindbeck, Hauerwas_ and Milbank in the 
previous sections because Newbigin's work lies roughly within their `terrain'. A 
Milbank 1990b: 381. Note the title of his later book (Milbank 1997b) - The Word Made 
Strange. 
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prima, facie reading of him suggests that he lays out his stall in a position which 
rejects postmodern disavowal of all notions of `truth', but which also argues 
strongly against the `Enlightenment" view that there remains a neutral and 
external vantage point from which to judge religious systems of thought by a 
series of universal and rational `axioms'. 
The thesis will seek to explore the extent to which Newbigin's position is 
itself sustainable within such an implied framework. For the issues raised by this 
preliminary survey are crucial for him - as for any would-be missiologist who is 
concerned not simply with the survival of Christianity but also with its growth 
and expansion. Therefore the conclusions of those who advocate that `truth' can 
be publicly known and owned need to be founded upon presuppositions which 
are `transportable" across the postmodern boundaries surrounding `local' 
communities and independent `narrative-traditions'. In an era in which, as 
Richard Rorty puts it, we need ... to throw out the last residues of the notion of 
"trans-cultural rationality"', ' 22 the question about the `commensurability' of 
narratives is crucial for mission. Is the Christian tradition inspite of Lindbeck's 
self-descriptive analysis and Milbank's emphasis on recovery and `meta- 
narrative' essentially now `marooned" within its own linguistic boundaries? 
We turn now to the work of Lesslie Newbigin for an analysis of his 
contribution to these questions. We will begin by outlining his diagnosis of 
Western culture. 
I" Rortv 1985: 15. 
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Chapter Two 
Newbigin and Western Culture: Diagnosis and Analysis 
Introduction 
The aims of the present chapter will be pursued in two `Parts'. In Part 1. 
we will outline the main contours of the diagnosis and critique of Western culture 
which Newbigin developed from the mid-seventies. Then in Part 2, we will 
proceed to suggest that the interpretative framework within which this diagnosis 
and critique are best understood is one which was inspired by Newbigin's reading 
of the Hungarian philosopher Michael Polanyi. 
In order to establish this thesis, we will begin by outlining Newbigin's 
earlier use of Polanyi's thought in the 1960s. This will form the background to a 
detailed exploration of Polanyi's more extensive influence upon Newbigin's later 
work with special reference to Polanyi's 1958 book Personal Knowledge. The 
argument about the particular indebtedness of Newbigin's later missiology to the 
thought of Polanyi will be developed by means of a detailed analysis of 
Newbigin's missiology - both in terms of its response to modernity, and also in 
terms of its consequent reconstruction of the task of mission. 
As the thesis progresses. the argument about the influence of Polanyi will 
provide the interpretative context with which to commence an analysis of 
Newbigin's work in relation to the issues raised in chapter 1. This discussion will 
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begin to emerge in the present chapter, but will become the more particular focus 
of the following two chapters. 
Part 1- Diagnosis: Newbigin and the Critique of the West 
2.1 Introduction 
Newbigin's thinking on the question of the `crisis' facing both Church 
and Society in the West begins to take on a coherent shape with his 1983 book 
The Other Side of'/984. and is given further development in his two subsequent 
books Foolishness to the Greeks, and The Gospel in a Pluralist Society 
(published in 1986 and 1989 respectively). Three factors seem to have been 
catalysts in stimulating Newbigin's thought on the subject. 
The first was a profound sense of `culture shock' which he experienced 
on returning to England in 1974 after thirty-six years of missionary service in 
India. ' In the years that followed. he was frequently asked what was the greatest 
change that he noticed in the culture to which he was returning? In reply, the 
phrase he came to use was: The disappearance of hope. '2 He continued: `I 
believe that everyone who has made the same move will bear me out. Even in 
the most squalid slums of Madras there was always the belief that things could be 
improved 
... there was still the 
belief in a better future ahead. ' By contrast: 
Newbigin records that the first impact of this began to strike home at 5.30am in Munich on 
10 May 1974 following his land journey across Eastern Europe (1985e: 240). 




it is hard to find any such hope. Apart from those whose Lives 
are shaped by the Christian hope founded on the resurrection of Jesus as the 
pledge of a new creation, there is little sign among the citizens of this country of 
the sort of confidence in the future which was certainly present in the earlier 
years of this century. ' 
Secondly, in an article explaining how The Other Side of 1984 came to be 
written, 4 Newbigin refers to a remark made by General Simatoupong of 
Indonesia at a plenary session of the WCC"s `Salvation Today' conference held 
at Bangkok back in 1973. ' After making a contribution to one of the debates, the 
General (who was sitting next to Newbigin at the time) had whispered in his 
hearing: `Of course the big question is, Can the West be converted: ' '6 Clearly, 
this comment lodged deeply in Newbigin"s mind. Not only was it the thing he 
remembered most from the conference, 7 but it clearly came to encapsulate in the 
form of a question the critical point of challenge for his later thinking. Not only 
was he subsequently to write an article with the General's question as its title, 8 
but in his other writings he makes explicit reference to the General's comment on 
no less than eleven occasions. () 
Thirdly, the immediate precursor to the writing of The Other Side of 1984 
was the initiation in 1981 of a `study process' initiated by the British Council of 
Churches with a view to a conference to be held in 1984.10 This process arose 
out of the sense that 1984 would be a year of symbolic significance in raising 
Newbigin I983b: 1. 
Newbigin I985c. 
The conference was sponsored by the WCC's 'Commission on World Mission and 
Evangelism'. Newbigin occasionally mistakes its date as either 1971 (1990i: 162: Newbigin 
I978b: 11 [also in 214 edition - I995c: 9]). or 1972 (1977e: 263: 1985e: 231 [also in 2°', 
edition - 1993g: 218-9]). 
Newbiain I985c: 6. 
Newbigin 19901: 162-3. 
Newbigin 1987a. 
Newbigin 1988e: 98,108: 1989g: 1.7.14: 1990i: 162-3: 1990m: 136.138.145: 1994b: 66, 
67. 
° For the background, see Newbiýgin I985c. 
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questions about the future of society. It also coincided with Newbigin's own 
reflections on the need to work at the task of relating and applying the gospel to 
the various issues of public life. The questions that this perspective began to 
raise led him in turn to investigate the central dilemma which underlay them. As 
he was later to phrase the question: `How can one find a perspective on one's 
own culture? ... 
Could there he an Archimedean point, so to speak, from which 
one could look critically at one's own intellectual and spiritual formation? " 
It was during this period of reflection in the early 1980s that Newbigin 
spent some time studying at the library of St. Deiniol's in Hawarden, North 
Wales. Here quite by chance, he came across the original French version of Paul 
Hazard's book The European Mind: 1680-1715.1' Recalling the experience in 
his autobiography, he wrote: 
The title was striking. It was a study of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, a 
subject about which I had never thought.... It seemed to provide the 
perspective I was looking for. Here was the critical ºnoment in which one could 
say that, after a very long period of gestation, modern Europe came to birth and 
to consciousness of its own unique character. " 
2.1.1 The influence of the Enlightenment 
As a result of this, and the reading of `other books on the period', 14 
Newbigin's sense of the Enlightenment as a cultural 'movement' begins to 
dominate his thinking. and also his cultural critique. Indeed, at the heart of his 
Newbiain 19938: 250-I. 
Hazard 1973. The French original was published in 1935. 
Newbigin 1993g: 251. 
14 Referred to unspecifically in 1993g: 251. 
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thesis is a sustained critique of this culture - which he tends increasingly to 
describe as that of `modernity'. 15 
Newbigin traces the cultural malaise of this movement to certain critical 
assumptions which came to birth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the 
`golden' era of the `Enlightenment'. Here, he argues, are to be found the chronic 
flaws that have led to the crisis at the heart of our contemporary culture. The 
philosophers Rene Descartes and John Locke turn out to be the `villains' of the 
piece. Together, argues Newbigin, they helped to establish a philosophical 
foundation for post-Enlightenment society in which the only propositions which 
could be regarded as properly `true' were those which could be shown to be 
scientifically `provable'. In a 1988 article entitled Our Missionary 
Responsibility in the Crisis of Western Culture' he writes for example that: 
Since Descartes, our culture has been dominated by the ... search 
for a kind of 
knowledge that could not be doubted, a kind of knowledge that involved no risk, 
no faith commitment. The unquestionable and lucid certainties of mathematics 
were to provide the paradigm of real knowledge. In the English speaking world 
this was powerfully reinforced by the work of John Locke ... who 
defined belief 
as what we fall back on when we do not have knowledge. Thus `1 believe' 
means 'I do not know. " 6 
This attempt to establish as `true' only those things which could be shown 
to be beyond doubt lies at the heart of what Newbigin understands to be the crisis 
confronting the culture of the West. From this foundation, he proceeds to 
illustrate what this means in contemporary society by drawing three distinctions 
Newbigin's first use of this term (to my knowledge) is in 1977e: 264. He frequently uses it in 
his post-1983 writings, often as a way of describing contemporary culture - e. g.. 19891: 54: 
'it is part of the drift of contemporary Western culture (of what in every part of the world is 
called "modernity")': also. 1983b: 6: 1985d: 33: 1986b: 130: 1989e: 213: 19921: 31 1 etc.: or 
as a means of highlighting its negative impact (often quoting Walter Lippmann's phrase 'the 
acids of modernity'): e. g., 1983b: 48: 1985c: 6: 1987a: 355: 1991b: 5: 1992h: 185: 1993e: 3: 
1997a: 99. 
16 Newbigin 1988e: 103. 
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or `dichotomies' - which he traces back to this original fault-line. 
(i) The dichotomy between facts' and `values' 
In Foolishness to the Greeks he writes that a `strange fissure ... runs right 
through the consciousness of modern Western man. ' 17 He continues: 
... this fissure 
becomes visible in two ways: in the dichotomy (one of the 
outstanding marks of a 'modern' society) between the public and the private 
worlds, and in the dichotomy in thought between what are commonly called 
`facts' and what are called `values. ' The public world is a world of facts that are 
the same for everyone, whatever his values may be. the private world is a world 
of values where all are free to choose their own values and therefore to pursue 
such courses of action as will correspond with them. '8 
The epistemological foundations originally established by Descartes and 
others have thus been successfully maintained in our post-Enlightenment culture. 
`Facts' comprise those pieces of information and knowledge which are deemed 
worthy of inclusion in the sphere of `truth' since they can be established by the 
methods of 'scientific" enquiry. All other claimants to this status must pass 
muster at the same bar of judgement if they are to be included in the realm of true 
`knowledge'. If successful, they achieve a universal status. If not, they remain at 
the level of personal choice, involving - in theory at least -a supposed liberty of 
conscience. 
He enlarges on this point in the context of a discussion of `pluralism' in 
The Gospel in a Pluralist Society. as follows: 
The principle of pluralism is not universally accepted in our culture. It is one of 
the key features of our culture, and one that we shall have to examine in some 
depth, that we make a sharp distinction between a world of what we call `values' 
and a world of what we call 'facts. ' In the former world we are pluralists; values 
I- Newbigin 1986b: 35. 
Is Newbi<gin 1986b: 35-36. 
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are a matter of personal choice. In the latter we are not, facts are facts, whether 
you like them or not. 19 
Newbigin develops this point elsewhere. For example, in relation to the 
educational curriculum, he writes that: 
... 
in our society the things we affirm in the Christian creed are not regarded as 
`facts'. They do not belong to the core curriculum in the public schools. They 
belong to the private world of `values'. That every human being is shaped by 
the programme encoded in the DNA molecule is a `fact' which every student is 
expected to know; it is part of the public education by which citizens are 
equipped to enter public life. But that every human being is made to glorify God 
and enjoy him for ever, and that every human being must in the end appear 
before the judgement seat of God is not a `fact' which forms part of the 
curriculum. It belongs in the private sector. '() 
The problem, as Newbigin outlines it, is that such a conception of `truth' 
is severely limited. It may be able to establish the structure of DNA molecules, 
or to provide answers to a wide variety of mathematical problems, but in the end 
it will always remain unable to deal with the most significant questions of human 
identity and purpose: Who am IT, `Why am I here? ", or For what purpose was I 
created? 21 
The resulting 'rationalistic' stranglehold on the nature and content of truth 
has enormous consequences argues Newbigin. In the first place. once ultimate 
questions of `purpose" are excluded, the only conceivable answers to the 
questions posed by the reality of human existence (which were once set within a 
religious framework) inevitably become conceived and answered in purely 
19 Newbigin 1989f: 7 (cf. 15). For similar statements. cf.: 1988e: 100-1; I989g: 3: I993a: 82: 
1995d: 26. 
Newbi-in I 986a: 61. He develops a similar point in e. g., I 986b: 38-39.67,76: I987a: 362: 
1988e: 105: 1989f: 15, etc.: and at greater length in 1988f. 
In this connection, he is fond ofquotin" with approval Einstein's saying, that. 'Insofar as the 
statements of mathematics are certain, they make no contact with reality: insofar as they 
make contact with reality, they are not certain' (e. g., Newbigin 1988e: 103-4. Also, 1990s: 7: 
1991c: 5-, 1993b: 346: 1995d: 75). 
71 
humanistic terms. Likewise, a purely scientific approach to the question of 
`truth' tends to come to conclusions as to `how' things operate, rather than `why' 
they may do so. Once more. Newbigin traces this malaise to the foundations of 
the revolution in science which Isaac Newton and others laid in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. He writes that: 
At the risk of drastic oversimplification, one can say that the crucial decision 
was the decision to turn fron asking questions about purpose to asking questions 
about cause; ... 
from asking, `What purpose does this serve? ' to asking, `How 
does it work? " Ancient Greek and medieval science asked about purpose; the 
new science asked about what makes things move. And, needless to say, the 
asking of that question has opened up enormous new vistas of both knowledge 
and power. But there is a price to pay. If one eliminates questions about 
purpose, then there is no way of finding a factual basis for values, no way of 
moving from the statement This is' to This is good. 
Once the idea of purpose is removed from the discussion, facts remain 
value-free, and it is at this level, argues Newbigin, that the scientific world-view 
operates. 23 
(ii) The dichotomy between `knowing' and `believing' 
Closely connected with the division between `facts' and `values' lies 
Newbigin's correlative distinction between the ideas of `knowing' and 
`believing". Newbigin makes the connection between the two in the following 
Newbigin 1988e: 101 (emphasis original). This analysis is significant not least because 
Newbigin combines two favourite themes of his: 'purpose' and 'epistemology'. In doing so 
he is influenced by Arend van Leeuwen's thesis (van Leeuwen 1964) that the Enlightenment 
has in effect replaced what he calls 'ontocracy' with 'technocracy'. Consequently. when 
individuals grapple with questions of'identity' and 'purpose', they deal with them outside a 
framework of religious belief, and inevitably pursue humanistic answers. This inevitably 
leads the individual back to himself as the locus for any possible solution to the issues of life. 
The whole discipline of *Science' has likewise tended to proceed along this 'technological' 
path - argues Newbigin -- and has dealt only with questions and formulations whose very 
nature are evidence of the implicit assumption that the world in which we live is a -man- 
made universe' (van Leeuwen's phrase, quoted in Newbigin 1966: 29). 
2 Newbigin 1986b: 36-7. Also 1987a: 362: 1988e: 102: 1990s: 3: 1995d: 56-7. 
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extract from a 1986 paper on `Conversion": 
When the Christian vision that had controlled the public life of Europe for 1,000 
years was shattered in the religious wars of the seventeenth century, Europe 
sought another kind of security for the human mind than that which had been 
offered in the gospel. It sought it in a kind of knowledge which should be clear, 
exact and not open to doubt. From Descartes onwards, through many twists and 
turns, there has been this quest - to find a kind of certainty which cannot be 
doubted, a kind of knowledge about which one does not say `I believe' (as the 
Christian says when he affirms the basis of his certainty), but, in the cool 
impersonal language of the scientific text-book: 'These are the facts. '24 
But such `factual' knowledge intrinsically excludes any sense of human 
involvement. Though `certainty' may be its prized fruit, it is severely limited 
epistemologically, for it proceeds from what Newbigin describes as a `breakdown 
of the unity between the subjective and the objective poles of human knowing'. 
`' 
Newbigin develops this analysis in order to demonstrate the essential 
disjunction produced at the heart of both individual and corporate life. It is 
characterised by the dichotomy between the epistemology of the scientific 
community under whose influence it is commonly perceived that one can know 
certain things to be true beyond doubt, and the epistemology of religious belief, 
which is perceived by wider society to fall well short of certainty. Expressions of 
`faith' are therefore considered to be indicative of subjective preference rather 
than objective fact. `What is claimed to be knowledge but cannot be expressed in 
such "objective" terms is a matter of personal opinion', he writes. it is belief 
rather than knowledge. and, as Locke has taught us, belief is what we fall back 
upon when knowledge is not available.. 26 What results from this is an 
Newbigin 1986a: 63. 
Newbigin 1994d: 72. 
ý`' Newbi<gin 1994d: 72. Also. 1993a: 82.1996c: 33. 
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epistemological duality at the heart of our `pluralist' society which he describes 
as follows: 
We are pluralist in respect of what we call beliefs but we are not pluralist in 
respect of what we call facts. The former are a matter of personal decision; the 
latter are a matter of public knowledge. The difficulty of maintaining this 
absolute distinction between knowing and believing has been illustrated in a 
number of recent cases which have been going through the United States courts 
up to the Supreme Court. In one case the proposal to teach creation along with 
evolution in the public schools has been declared illegal. One view of the origin, 
nature, and destiny of human beings may be taught in the public schools, another 
may not. 
Whatever the results of this duality in the health of cultural life more 
generally, 18 Newbigin is clear that such a dichotomy leaves the would-be 
missionary in a fragile and seemingly helpless situation. For in attempting to 
engage in any form of gospel communication. he or she is held captive to the 
assumptions inherent in what Newbigin calls (following Peter Berger) a culture's 
`reigning plausibility structure'. 29 Newbigin defines this concept as `a social 
structure of ideas and practices that create the conditions determining what 
beliefs are plausible within the society in question. '30 The `reigning plausibility 
structure' that has dominated contemporary Western culture since the 
Enlightenment denies that religious knowledge can be anything other than a 
private opinion, and as a result, that it has no validity as public truth. 
Accordingly, he writes as follows: 
Newbicin 1989f: 27. 
Newbigin explores this with specific reference to education (1977f: 1988f). to politics 
(1981 c), as well as to the idea of a 'Christian Society' (cf. the last chapter of 1986b. 1995b 
and 1995a). For an overview of these aspects of Newbigin's thought, see Wainwright 2000: 
256-269. 
E. g., Newbi-in 1989f: 8 (also 10.1 I. 12 etc. ). See also the use of this phrase at: I990c: 337: 
1990m: 143: 1991 f: 28: 1994d: 81.1995d: 101. The influence of Peter Berger's thinking on 
Newbigin at this point is explored in greater detail in chapter 3. 
'0 Newbigin l986b: 10 (note I). 
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lt follows that, in this culture, the Church and its preaching belong to the world 
of `values'.... The Church is not generally perceived as concerned with facts, 
with the realities which finally govern the world and which we shall in the end 
have to acknowledge whether we like them or not. In this cultural milieu, the 
confident announcement of the Christian faith sounds like an arrogant attempt of 
some people to impose their values on others. 
If the gospel is therefore to be re-established as a rightful claimant to the 
status of `truth', an urgent critique has to be mounted against the prevailing 
notion of epistemology endemic within contemporary culture. As he puts it: 
The dichotomy between a world of so-called objective facts that can be 
`scientifically' known apart from any faith commitment on the part of the 
knower and a world of beliefs that are solely the personal responsibility of the 
believer is precisely what has to be questioned in the light of the gospel. '2 
(iii) The dichotomy between `reason' and `revelation' 
The dichotomies between `facts' and `values', and between `knowledge' 
and `belief- are ultimately for Newbigin symptomatic of the deepest malaise that 
has been brought to birth by the Enlightenment project: the displacement of the 
primacy of `revelation" by the elevation of the human faculty of `reason". This 
diagnostic perspective emerges clearly in the following quotation from The Other 
Side of'1981 where Newbigin writes that: 
At the centre of the movement which created our modern culture was a shift in 
the balance between faith and doubt. After a very long period in which the 
European perception of how things are was controlled by a dogma based on 
divine revelation, the principle of doubt reasserted itself in the famous phrase 
'Dare to know'. 
Newbigin 1989f: 7. 
Newbiýgin 1986b: 50. 
Newbigin 1983b: 20. 
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Moreover, the reference here to Kant"s famous dictum `Dare to know' 
(sapere aude)34 as the defining characteristic of this tendency established that at 
the heart of the Enlightenment project was a rejection of revelation as the 
ultimate source of authority. This was partly seen as a necessary stage in 
humanity's `coming of age'. The `Age of Reason'. writes Newbigin: 
... saw reason and revelation as mutually opposed and called upon 
human 
beings to be bold enough to use their reason, to put away a childish dependence 
on divine revelation, and to use the God-given gift of reason to establish the facts 
for themselves. ' 
But in addition, the certainties of reason were thought to be superior to 
truth claims that were tied to revelation in the past. As he puts it elsewhere, if the 
quest is that of Descartes for a final certitude that admits of no possibility of 
doubt, for "eternal truths of reason" that are independent of contingent 
happenings in history then the Bible is not the place to look. '36 
As a result of the change in relationship between `revelation' and 
`reason'. the previously authoritative status of revelation was itself now brought 
under the judgement of reason, and found to be wanting. Newbigin develops the 
point as follows, arguing that: 
The `Age of Reason' supposed that there was available to human beings a kind 
of indubitable knowledge, capable of being grasped by all human beings which 
was more reliable than any alleged revelation, and which could therefore provide 
the criteria by which any alleged divine revelation could be assessed. 
'' From his 1784 essay An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? ' (Kant 1983). 
Newbi-in 1995d: 55. 
Cf. Newbigin 1996c: 70. The use of the concept of 'doubt' here is significant in locating his 
articulation of this theme within Polanyi's overall interpretative framework - as we will see - 
and refers to the tendency of Enlightenment thinkers to employ the faculty of 'reason' in 
order to establish truth claims that were thought to be immune from the possibility of doubt. 
37 Newbigin 1993f: 233. 
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Reason is hereby set over against revelation becoming in effect its `judge'. 
In Newbigin's programme the discussion of the relationship between 
these two `authorities' is developed in an attempt to restore their proper 
relationship in a manner that does justice to the validity of both. The faculty of 
human reason is not to be jettisoned altogether. Nonetheless its role is to be re- 
established as an agency not superior to. but subordinate to that of revelation. 
Newbigin refers repeatedly in this context to the revolution in the conception of 
knowledge brought about by Augustine in the fifth century. 38 Accordingly. 
Newbigin argues that instead of understanding reason as the autonomous starting 
point for truth-discovery, post-Enlightenment culture must rediscover 
Augustine's presupposition of `faith' as the only legitimate basis from which to 
find truth. `Faith' he argues is therefore not a terminus but a starting point from 
which understanding can begin. This model is offered for acceptance by faith as 
the way to understanding. Its motto is Credo tit intelligam, I believe in order that 
I may understand. 39 
2.1.2 The question of epistemology 
It will be clear from the foregoing analysis that the issue of 
`epistemology" is of critical importance to Newbigin's analysis of contemporary 
culture. This concern derives ultimately from his fundamental commitment to 
Newbigin returns to this theme repeatedly. Cf. e. g.. 1986a: 62: 1986b: 70-1.102-3: 1988c: 
161,19891' : 48: 1990s: 6.1991 f: 30-1 : 1993b: 340; 1994d: 61: 1995d: 9. 
Newbigin 1983b: 24. He also uses the biblical text of Proverbs 9: 10 ('the fear of the Lord is 
the beginning of wisdom') in a similar way to the phrase Credo ut intelligarrm in his later 
writings. E., -,., I996c: 10 where. referring to the Proverbs text, he says that 'If 
fully 
understood ... this small sentence would 
be seen to be subversive of the central thrust of 
modernity'. Cf. also, 1995d: 96. 
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the gospel as `public' truth: that is, that the Christian account of the human story 
matters because it carries universal validity and significance. He states this 
position in the following words from The Gospel in a Pluralist Society: 
We believe that the truth about the human story has been disclosed in the events 
which form the substance of the gospel. We believe, therefore, that these events 
are the real clue to the story of every person, for every human life is part of the 
whole human story and cannot be understood apart from that story. 40 
It is therefore a matter of prime importance to Newbigin how people 
come to know that the gospel is true, for unless a solid epistemological 
foundation can be established for religious knowledge. the future of the gospel 
within the belief structure of Western society is seriously jeopardised. He writes 
characteristically as follows: 
How then can we know what is real, how do we come to know the truth? If 
'truth' is not confined to the world of 'facts' alone, or of `values' alone, how do 
the two relate and how can we know anyway? How can we put both sides of the 
brain together? These are questions of epistemology. 41 
In the light of this, he writes as follows: 
At the most basic level there is need for critical examination from a Christian 
standpoint of the reigning assumptions in epistemology (How do we know what 
we claim to know? ) and in history (How do we understand the story of which we 
42 are parts? ). 
Newbigin traces the `fault-lines' within contemporary culture to this 
epistemological diagnosis from a wide variety of starting points: whether it be 
discussions of the legal wrangling over the presuppositions of the American 
40 Newbigin 1989f: 127. 
+1 Newbigin 1989-: 5. 
4' Newbigin 1989e: 214. 
78 
education system, 43 questions about the Welfare State. 
44 the possibility of a `free' 
society, `' the dilemma of pluralism. 
46 or the challenge of inter-religious 
`dialogue'. 7 
Moreover, it is significant that he sees this epistemological crisis as 
existing not only within the wider culture, but also within the Church itself, 
evidenced by the opposition between fundamentalists' and `liberals' as a result 
of their respective approaches to the Bible. He refers to this as the `tragic split 
within Christendom", 8 but reiterates elsewhere that: this split is merely a surface 
manifestation of this more fundamental split, namely the split between fact and 
value.... the most distinctive feature of this peculiar culture of ours. ' 
49 As is the 
case within the wider culture, the fundamental cause of this is once more to be 
diagnosed as essentially 'epistemic'. For it is only through a resolute assault on 
the fundamental problem which is epistemology, the way we formulate an answer 
to the question: "How do you know? ", that healing between the two parties may 
hope to be achieved. ''° 
Moreover, it is evident that the particular emphasis upon `epistemology' 
becomes central only within Newbigin's later missiology, as compared to a 
comparative neglect within his earlier work. For example, his use of the 
4; Newbigin 1988f: 192: '1 am concerned to suggest that these legal battles are not a laughing 
matter, but are a symptom of breakdown in our culture, a breakdown at the fundamental point 
of epistemology, of the answer we must give to the question: "How do you know? "' Cf. also 
1977f. 
'a Newbigin 1985f, esp. 175-76.180. 
'S Newbigin 1990e. 
"' Newbigin 1988c: 159: 'it is one of the marks of contemporary European thought that there is 
a profound skepticism about the possibility of knowing the truth. Indeed pluralism is 
celebrated as the proper social implication of the fact that truth is unknowable. ' 
Newbigin I993f: esp. 51: 'I make this point ... to 
illuminate what seems to me to be the 
central issue in this whole debate: it is the abandonment of the belief that it is possible to 
know the truth. 
Newbi-in 1989f: 24-5. 
49 Newbigin 1991c: 8. 
' Newbigin 1989f: 24-5. 
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`epistem-' word-group occurs fifty-three times after 1974 as opposed to only once 
prior to this time. ' Three questions therefore naturally present themselves. 
Firstly, where does the emphasis upon epistemology come from? Secondly, how 
does it fit into the wider context of Newbigin's thought? Thirdly, why does it 
become so significant at this period in Newbigin's life? These questions call for 
greater analysis than has previously been given, and it is to them that we now 
turn. 
Part 2- Analysis: Polanyi as the Hermeneutical `Key' to 
Newbigin's Thought 
2.2 Introduction 
There have been a number of assessments of Newbigin's work that have 
sought to analyse his engagement with Western culture in similar form to that 
presented in Part I of this chapter. Many of these have made reference to the 
influence of Michael Polanyi's thought but - as yet - there has been no sustained 
analysis of this influence. 
George Hunsberger, for example. mentions Polanyi only twice in his 
recent major study of Newbigin's work. ý2 This is surprising even given the fact 
Newbigin 1966: 60. where he refers to the 'solipsist epistemology' that denies the reality of 
the outside world. Of course. this observation does not take into account the more general 
discussions of epistemological 'themes' in earlier works where the word is not specifically 
used (e. g., his discussion about the knowledge of God in 1966: 77-99), but the increasing 
incidence of the 'epislem-' word-group does indicate a more specific attention to the issue of 
epistemology per se in the later writings. 
Hunsberger I998a: 56.64. 
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that Hunsberger's work concentrates on Newbigin's writings in the period up to 
the publication of Foolishness to the Greeks in 1986. For it is clear that Polanyi's 
thought had by then already become highly significant in the formulation of 
Newbigin"s ideas. 53 
Similarly, Geoffrey Wainwright makes a number of references to 
Polanyi's influence upon Newbigin in his recent magisterial book Lesslie 
New bigin: A Theological Life, 54 but does not offer a sustained development of 
these, nor draw conclusions from them with regard to the shaping of Newbigin's 
thought. The same neglect may be noted in various articles giving an overview 
of his thought. Wilbert Shenk, for example. in a retrospective article setting out 
the characteristics that distinguish his work'. makes no mention at all of 
Polanyi's influence. " 
We will argue in the remainder of this chapter that Polanyi's influence 
upon Newbigin is much greater than has previously been estimated. We will 
explore this in three ways. 
Firstly, we will establish the early impact of Polanyi's thought on 
Newbigin's ideas in the sixties. 
Secondly. we will carry out a detailed examination of Polanyi's 1958 
book Personal Knowledge in order to demonstrate that from the mid-seventies 
Newbigin"s later missiology shows a more substantial reliance upon Polanyi's 
53, Newbiuin refers to Polanyi seven times in Foolishness to the Creeks, and Polanyi's work is 
highly significant in his earlier book The Other Side 0/'1984 (where he is quoted at length six 
times, and referred to sixteen times). See also Newbiýgin's acknowledgement of his impact at 
this period in l985c: 8: 1985d: 33-34. Moreover, as the thesis will show, Polanyi is also 
highly significant to the development of Newbigin's thought at two earlier stages: in the mid- 
sixties (see 1966: 77-99): and again (following fresh study) from the mid-seventies (see e. g.. 
1977f: 84-87: 1977a: 253: 1979c: 112). 
Wainwright 2000. 
Shenk 2000: 59-64 (quotation from 59). 
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framework of thought. 
Thirdly. in order to establish this thesis, we will develop an analysis of 
Newbigin's material which incorporates two interlocking arguments. On the one 
hand, we will argue that in addition to the influence of Polanyi's thinking upon 
Newbigin's philosophical thought, Polanyi's cultural diagnosis of the West also 
becomes critically central to Newbigin's material. In tandem with this, we will 
argue that Newbigin's later missiological agenda is indebted not only to Polanyi's 
`deconstructive' approach. but also that Newbigin's re-appraisal of a missionary 
engagement with the West is similarly informed by a `reconstructive" application 
of Polanyi's ideas. 
In the two following chapters, Polanyi"s influence will be further explored 
in order to establish both its positive and negative impact upon Newbigin's 
engagement with modernity and postmodernity 
2.2.1 Michael Polanyi 
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was Hungarian by birth and was much 
influenced by the suppression of free scientific enquiry that he had encountered 
under the communist regime there. 5 He came to Britain as Professor of Physical 
Chemistry at Manchester University in 1933 and devoted much of his life 
thereafter to the investigation of the nature of scientific enquiry and to the 
epistemic status of its 'truth claims. This enquiry into areas of `philosophical' - 
See e. g. his 1966 essay. 'The Messare of the Hungarian Revolution' (in Polanyi 1969: 24- 
39). For an analysis of this background under communism, see Prosch 1986: chapters 1 and 
2. For further biographical details see Scott 1985: 1-13. Scott's book was later republished 
by SPCK under the title Alichae/ Polamt i (Scott 1996) and is a helpful general overview to 
Polanyi's thought. For a more thorough critical appraisal see Prosch 1986. 
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rather than strictly `scientific' - notions of truth began 
increasingly to dominate 
his published output from the mid-1940s. '7 This new phase in his career was 
launched by the publication of Science, Faith and Society in 1946, '8 after which 
Manchester University created a special `Chair of Social Studies' for him. 
With no formal teaching responsibilities attached to this post, Polanyi 
took the opportunity to enter more fully into these philosophical interests, and 
they culminated in the Gifford Lectures in 1951-2, which were later published as 
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy in 1958.59 This is the 
book most often referred to by Newbigin, 
6i0 although he also makes occasional 
reference to other works by Polanyi. 6' Polanyi's published output, mainly in the 
area of scientific research, was nothing short of prolific. 
62 His wider influence 
has been profound, leading Harry Prosch (the co-author of Polanyi's last book 
Meaning) to describe him as, `a man whose breadth and depth of mind leave one 
with a sense of respect approaching awe and whose work must certainly be 
destined to leave an indelible mark upon the direction thought will take as it 
moves on toward the twenty-first century'. 
63 
57 He was later to write: `I believe that I came into my true vocation in 1946 when I set out on 
the pursuit of a new philosophy to meet the needs of our arge' (Quoted in Scott 1985: 4). 
Republished as Polanyi 1964. 
'`' Polanyi 1958. 
60 Some forty-three times specifically, amongst a total of some 222 references to Polanyi's 
thought. 
61 E. g., he refers specifically to Polanyi 1966 (in Newbigin 1995d: 62): Polanyi 1969 (in 
Newbigin 1988c: 168. and 1989f: 43). and Polanyi 1965 (in a footnote in Newbigin 1988g: 
153) though in this last case it is not clear to which part of the article the footnote refers. 
62 For a bibliography of his social and philosophical writings up to 1968. see the list drawn up 
by Richard Gelwick in Langford and Poteat 1968: 432-446: for a more recent listing. 
covering scientific publications as well as his philosophical and social writings, see Prosch 
1986: 319-346. Most important for our purposes are his books in the area of epistemology: 
Polanyi 1958: 1959: 1964: 1966: 1967. See also the articles: 1961 and 1967: and the 
collection edited by Marjorie Grene (1969). His last published book was a collaboration with 
Harry Prosch based on lectures which Polanyi had given in Chicago in 1969 (Polanyi and 
Prosch 1975). 
Prosch's preface to Polanyi and Prosch 1975: xi. 
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Newbigin had first come across Polanyi's writings after the publication of 
Polanyi's major treatise. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Posi-Crilical 
Philosophy, in 1958. His friend J. H. Oldham had been encouraging him for 
many years to engage with the thought of the Hungarian philosopher. 
64 and 
Newbigin was immediately impressed with the book. Indeed, he resolved 
thereafter to reread it every ten years, and commented in the 1990s that he had 
certainly `read it several times since'. 65 
(i) Early influence 
Newbigin's first published engagement with Polanyi's ideas came in his 
1966 book Honest Religion for Secular Mon. 66 We will outline this engagement 
at this point in the argument for two reasons. Firstly, it will indicate the 
dimensions of Newbigin's indebtedness to Polanyi in the sixties, well before 
Newbigin's return from India. Secondly, it will provide the background against 
which to interpret Newbigin's later and more substantial engagement with 
Polanyi from the mid-seventies, which we explore in the following sections. 
Newbigin's 1966 book addresses the impact of the spreading reality of 
`secularisation' in the early sixties. Within this increasingly secularised context 
he devotes the whole of the third chapter to the question. `What does it mean to 
6' Oldham had first met Polanyi in 1944 and corresponded with him until Oldham's death in 
1969. Polanyi also participated in Oldham's intellectual discussik r groups (originally called 
'The Moot') for about sixteen years. This is doubtless the background to Oldham's 
recommendation of Polanvi to Newbigin. Note Polanvi's dedication of Polanyi 1959 to 
Oldham. In a 1962 interview Polanyi said that, other than his experience as a scientist, his 
participation in 'The Moot' was the most significant influence upon his thought (Gelwick 
1965: 11, note 8). For a history of 'The Moot', see Clements 1993. For Newbigin's own 
contribution of a paper to the gathering see Turner 1998,8. 
Quoted in Wainwright 2000: 22. 
66 Newbigin 1966. 
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speak of knowing God? ' 67 He prefaces his discussion with the statement: 
`Readers of Personal Knowledge by Michael Polanyi ... will recognize 
in what 
follows my debt to this book. '68 
Newbigin proceeds to make a total of seven points in his discussion about 
'knowing God'. These are (1) that `all knowing is a skill' ; 
69 (2) that `knowing is 
an activity of persons in community'; 70 (3) that `(k)nowing involves a risk and a 
commitment', (4) that `neither in ordinary speech nor in the speech of the Bible 
are "faith" and "knowledge" synonymous'; 
72 (5) that `there are realities which we 
know by faith" and that knowledge of other people is a clear example of this; 
73 
(6) that our language about knowing God is to be interpreted in terms of what we 
have described as personal knowledge'; 74 and (7) that `(p)ersonal knowledge 
depends upon mutual trust'. 75 
Points 1-3 are more generalised statements about the nature of knowing, 
whilst point 4 forms a connecting bridge to the specific question of religious 
knowing which he addresses in points 5-7. 
In analysing this material, two observations may be made. Firstly, there is 
a measure of continuity to be found with Newbigin"s previous thinking on the 
subject of knowledge. For example, the `personal' dimension to religious 
knowing had been a central component in Newbigin's approach to the question 
since his days as a theological student in Cambridge in the thirties. For example, 
`'' Newbi<gin 1966. 
68 Newbiýzin 1966: 80 (note I ). 
`'' Newbi-in 1966: 80. 
° Newbi, -, 
in 1966: 80. 
Newbi<gin 1966: 81. 
Newbi-in 1966: 84. 
Newbigin 1966: 86 (emphasis original). 
74 Newbigin 1966: 87. 
Newbigin 1966: 93. 
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in the introduction to a 1936 essay on `Revelation', he had written: 
In a preliminary consideration of the subject we may fairly say that the central 
importance ascribed to revelation in Christianity depends upon two beliefs about 
the nature of the world and of man. Firstly the belief that the meaning of the 
world is personal. For if the final meaning of the world is less than personal, 
then it [is] best understood by those methods of scepticism and experiment 
which are the requisites of scientific enquiry, but which would be the complete 
destruction of any personal understanding. For we know a person only as he 
chooses to reveal himself, and only as our own spirit is sensitive and trustful to 
respond to his revelation, and if the meaning of the world is personal then 
revelation is the only path by which it can be made known to us. Th 
These words demonstrate that the epistemological convictions he was later to 
encounter in Polanyi's writings were conducive to a way of thinking that he had 
already espoused. 
Nonetheless. Newbigin's reading of Personal Knowledge can be shown to 
have introduced new elements into his thinking as expressed in Hones/ Religion. 
When Newbigin therefore writes that readers of Polanyi"s Personal Knowledge 
will recognize his `debt to this book", it becomes evident that each of Newbigin's 
points can be shown to have been either directly inspired by Polanyi's book, or at 
least have been influenced by its arguments. One can briefly sketch these 
connections in the following ways. 
In Newbigin's first point for example, the understanding that `a11 knowing 
is a skill' forms one part of Newbigin's case that knowledge is rightly to be 
understood as 'personal". He writes accordingly that: `Knowledge does not 
impose itself upon us - at any stage. It is acquired by being learned, and it is 
learned by acquiring the skills necessary to carry through the mental operations 
involved in learning. '77 This finds direct derivation from Polanyi's view that 
Quoted in Hunsberger 1998a: 57. 
Newbi<gin 1966: 80. 
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knowing is a `skill' dependent upon a set of `learned' and `inarticulate' elements 
which become internalized in the personality as part of the process of human 
development. 78 As Polanyi puts it: `... skilful performance is achieved by the 
observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following 
them. ' 79 
Newbigin's second point - that `knowing is an activity of persons in 
community' - is a direct application of Polanyi's notion of 'conviviality'. 
80 So 
when Newbigin states for example that, `All progress in knowledge depends 
upon the existence of a community of persons who share their experience and 
who mutually trust one another to accept certain standards'; 81 or that, One 
cannot even speak a sentence without accepting provisionally the framework of 
thought which this language expresses and which is itself the result of the 
particular history of the people who speak it', 82 he is adopting central Polanyian 
notions about the `generational' transmission of human cultural traditions via 
language. Polanyi summarises this process in his statement that: The combined 
action of authority and trust which underlies both the learning of language and its 
use for carrying messages, is a simplified instance of a process which enters into 
the whole transmission of culture to succeeding generations. " 83 
Newbigin's third point is similarly indebted to Polanyi's thought. First of 
all, Newbigin's propositional statement that `Knowing involves a risk and a 
commitment' is a direct adoption of Polanyi's idea of a personal commitment to 
Cf. e. g.. Polanyi 1958: esp. 49-63: also, 70-1.88.90. 
Polanyi 1958: 49 (emphasis original). Newbigin uses Polanyi's example of riding a bicycle 
as an example of such a learnt skill (Newbi-in 1966: 80 = Polanyi 1958: 49-50.88). 
Polanyi 1958: esp. 203-245. 
Newbigin 1966: 81. 
Newbigin 1966: 81. 
Polanyi 1958: 207, in the context of the chapter on 'Conviviality' (203-245). 
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the kind of knowledge one acquires. He notes, for example, that all seemingly 
objective statements require to be accompanied by the utterance of a personal 
commitment in order that they may become the content of an assertion. '94 
In addition Newbigin follows his own initial proposition about knowledge 
as `commitment' with the statement, that: 
It involves the acceptance, at least provisionally, of beliefs which might be 
mistaken. One cannot even speak a sentence without accepting provisionally the 
framework of thought which this language expresses and which is itself the 
result of the particular history of the people who speak it. 
8` 
This mirrors Polanyi's convictions about the conceptual and traditional context in 
which knowledge is acquired. For example. he writes as follows: 
In learning to speak, every child accepts a culture constructed on the premises of 
the traditional interpretation of the universe, rooted in the idiom of the group to 
which it was born, and every intellectual effort of the educated mind will be 
made within this frame of reference. 
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Newbigin's fourth point (that 'neither in ordinary speech nor in the speech 
of the Bible are "faith" and "knowledge" synonymous') is developed in terms of 
the specific example of the scientist's findings. In this context. he writes that: 
The result of our scientist's research may be such that in due course it becomes 
part of what is regarded as assured knowledge. It goes into the textbooks and 
becomes the basis for further research. Yet, in spite of the fact that it is in this 
sense regarded as `knowledge'. our scientist knows that it is perfectly possible 
that in a few years" time it will be superseded as the result of further research. '' 
S4 Polanyi 1958: 29. Also 59-62. 
"v, 5 Newbi; in 1966: 81. 
x`' Polanyi 1958: 112. 
ý7 Newbigin 1966: 85. 
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Again, the influence of Polanyi's discussions which are consistently 
built around the practices of scientists, and more generally around what he calls 
the `Republic of Science' is clear. 99 
Points five to seven of Newbigin's discussion can be said to build on his 
own pre-existing approach to the conception of `personal knowing'. Yet here, it 
is significant that he now begins to use Polanyi's characteristic catch-phrase, 
`personal knowledge' in developing his own ideas. As he characteristically puts 
it at one point in the discussion: '. .. our 
language about knowing God is to be 
interpreted in terms of what we have described as personal knowledge'. 
89 In fact 
Newbigin uses this phrase ten times in the section under review. 
90 Moreover, 
within this context there is now a more robust perspective on the epistemological 
surety of knowledge that is acquired by faith. He expresses this in point five, 
where he states that: `It is difficult to deny there are realities which we knoll, by 
faith. "` 1 
From this brief survey of Newbigin's 1966 book. Honest Religion /br 
Secular Man. it is clear that his references to Polanyi's ideas demonstrate two 
things. Firstly, Polanyi's thinking was conducive to Newbigin's own ideas about 
the `personal' nature of religious knowledge and the mutual trust involved in 
89 Note in particular the similarities between Newbigin's example (1966: 85) and the discussion 
in Polanyi about relativity theory (1958: 9-14). Newbigin had earlier referred to this part of 
Polanyi's book in connection with point three (1966: 83). For Polanyi's concept of the 
'Republic of Science', see e. g., the essay of this title in Polanyi 1969 (49-72). For 
Newbigin's later references to it. cf. Newbigin 1988c: 168: l989d: 1: l991f: 57-58: l99lc: 4. 
89 Newbigin 1966: e. g., 87. Newbigin had not used the phrase in this context prior to his 
reading of Polanyi. s book. 
`'0 Newbigin 1966: 86,87(x2), 88(x3), 93(x3). 98 (cf. also 74). 
91 Newbigin 1966: 86 (emphasis original). Cf. Newbigin's `Foreword' to the republication of 
Drusilla Scott's book on Polanvi (Newbi-in 1996a), where he emphasises this aspect of 
Polanyi's contribution. and writes: 'After speaking of the personal participation of the 
knower in the act of knowing, [Polanyi] goes on: But this does not make our understanding 
subjective. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience but a 
responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of 
establishing contact with a hidden reality"' (quoting from Polanyi 1958: vii-viii). 
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coming to an appreciation of God which he had first articulated years earlier as a 
theological student. `` At the same time they show, secondly, that Newbigin's 
reading of Polanyi had now added further dimensions to this perspective. Not 
only is there a stronger sense of the `objectivity" of the knowledge acquired by 
faith, but Newbigin has also added three related notions: that the acquiring of 
knowledge involves the acknowledgement of `apprenticeship" within a tradition 
of knowing, that it involves both personal `commitment' and `risk'; and that it is 
only within a living community that the legitimation and transmission of such 
knowledge can take place. 
(ii) Later influence 
If the writings of Michael Polanyi were already significant in Newbigin"s 
thinking by the mid-sixties, we will proceed now to argue that their subsequent 
influence upon Newbigin's writings resulted from Newbigin's critical re-reading 
of Polanyi's Personal Knowledge around the mid-seventies. 
Characteristic of this newer `reading' is his 1977 article, 'Teaching 
Religion in a Secular Plural Society'. 93 which represents both an early attempt to 
address the urgent cultural questions that confronted Newbigin on his return from 
India in 1974, but also shows the earliest evidence of what we might call the 
newer reading' of Polanyi. Here Newbigin makes the critical Polanyian 
connection between the need for an `epistemological' renewal, and the fact that 
the edifice of the entire Enlightenment project is on the point of collapse. The 
ý)2 The most influential in his days as a student was John Oman (see 1966: 10; and I989f: 40). 
Cf. also the anecdote in Hunsberger 1998a: 57-58. 
3 Newbigin 1977f. 
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significance of the resulting `alliance' between epistemological' and `cultural' 
critiques in Newbigin's later missiological work is hard to overestimate. 
In the article itself, Newbigin discusses the meaning of the term `secular' 
and its relationship to questions of religious education. Whilst the word `secular' 
implies that the teaching of religion is pursued from the vantage point of a 
detached objectivity. Newbigin argues that that this cannot be the case. He 
continues: 
We in this part of the world have been living for so long on the inherited capital 
of a thousand years of Christendom that we do not really know, and can hardly 
imagine what would happen if the process of burning this up was carried right 
through to its logical conclusion, if we had a society which did not accept any of 
94 the values which we have inherited from this past. 
It is in this context that he first refers to Polanyi's cultural analysis. He 
writes: `I am haunted by a paragraph from Michael Polanyi which I think has 
much relevance to our subject. '9 The paragraph he proceeds to quote 
extensively is from the Part Three of Personal Knowledge, and is as follows: 
The critical movement, which seems to be nearing the end of its course today, 
was perhaps the most fruitful effort ever sustained by the human mind. The past 
four or five centuries. which have gradually destroyed or overshadowed the 
whole mediaeval cosmos, have enriched us mentally and morally to an extent 
unrivalled in any period of similar duration. But its incandescence has fed on the 
combustion of Christian heritage in the oxygen of Greek rationalism, and when 
this fuel was exhausted the critical framework itself burnt away. 96 
Newbigin later describes this passage as a `crucial point in the long 
argument' of the book, `'? and finds in it a new perspective on the nature of the 
cultural crisis facing the West which begins to influence his subsequent 
`" Newbigin I977f: 84. 
`'' Newbi-in 1977f: 84. 
6 Newbigin 1977f: 85, the entire quotation coming from Polanyi 1958: 265-6. 
97 Newbi-in 1993b: 347. 
91 
missiological writing. 98 Indeed, in many of his major works after the mid- 
seventies, this same passage recurs, occupying a position of central importance in 
the exposition, either being quoted directly (sometimes in full"). or else 
specifically referred to at a significant point in the argument. 
' 00 This new insight 
into Polanyi's material becomes crucial to Newbigin's subsequent writing. 
2.3 Polanyi's Personal Knowledge and Newbigin's later missiology 
We turn therefore to examine in more detail the influence of Polanyi's 
book Personal Knowledge upon Newbigin's later thought. Newbigin was to 
write in 1996 that although it `... is not easy reading', nonetheless, `I believe that 
Polanyi's work is of great importance, not least to those who are trying to 
commend the Christian faith to a sceptical generation. '101 As we chart the course 
of Newbigin's later indebtedness to this book, we will argue that Polanyi's 
thought not only influences Newbigin as he engages more specifically with the 
missiological questions facing Western culture from the mid-1970s, but is also 
intrinsically related to the way in which he responds to them. 
The book itself is divided into four parts. each of which contributes 
complementary perspectives to Polanyi"s `post-critical' reconstruction of 
epistemology. `Part One' outlines a basic approach to The Art of Knowing' 102 
98 In tracing the contours of this evaluation of the Enlightenment, it was Polanyi's book which 
critically helped Newbigin to interpret its demise, just as it was Paul Hazard's book (Hazard 
1973), along with that of Basil Willey (Willey 1962) which , ave him insights into its 
beginning (see the references in Newbigin 1983b: 8-9: 1985c: 7: and 19938: 250-1). 
E. <(., I 983b: 21: I995c: 28,1 995d: 48. 
100 E. -., 1988e: 106: 1989-: 6: 1991 f: 20: 1993b: 347: 1995d: 52. Z101 
Newbizzin 1996a: iv. 
01 Polanyi 1958: 1-65. 
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'Part Two' deals with the `Tacit Component' of such knowledge; 103 `Part Three' 
deals with what Polanyi calls The Justification of Personal Knowledge', 104 and 
Tart Four' ('Knowing and Being') draws out concluding themes from the 
substance of the book and applies them to related areas of human life. 10ý 
As we saw earlier, it was during the period of the 1970s that a 
concentration upon material in `Part Three' of Polanyi's book becomes crucial to 
Newbigin's thinking. Our analysis of Newbigin's engagement with the book will 
start here, therefore, because it helps to locate the `sparking point' in Polanyi"s 
writing so far as Newbigin's analysis of the West is concerned. Later we shall 
return to the earlier material in the book in order to argue not only that Polanyi's 
diagnosis, but also his response to the diagnosis is significant for the development 
of Newbigin"s later missiology. 
2.3.1 The crisis of Western culture 
Polanyi's thesis in `Part Three' of Personal Knowledge is that the demise 
of the Enlightenment `movement' is integrally linked to its central weakness: that 
it `offers no scope for our most vital beliefs', but rather `forces us to disguise 
them in farcically inadequate terms. ' 1°6 In responding to this, Polanyi argues that 
in order to restore what he describes as the balance of our cognitive powers', it is 
to the example of Augustine in the fourth century that we should now be 
looking. 107 By emphasising Augustiners dictum: nisi credideritis, non inlelligitis 
I`)I Polanvi 1958: 67-245. 
104 Polanyi 1958: 247-324. 
'°' Polanyi 1958: 325-405. 
106 Polanyi 1958: 265. 
10' Polanvi 1958: 266. 
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(`unless you believe, you will not understand'), 108 Polanyi argues that he `brought 
the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first time a 
post-critical philosophy. He taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace. for 
which we must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief.... " 109 
On the basis of such a renewal, Polanyi sets out to establish the inter- 
relationship between the `objective" and `subjective' poles of knowing in order to 
show that all such knowing functions within what he calls a `fiduciary 
framework'. We must now recognise belief once more as the source of all 
knowledge', he argues: 
Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural 
heritage, affiliation to a like-minded community: such are the impulses which 
shape our vision of the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of 
things. No intelligence, however critical or original, can operate outside such a 
fiduciary framework. 1 10 
He continues: 
Innocently, we had trusted that we could be relieved of all personal 
responsibility for our beliefs by objective criteria of validity - and our own 
critical powers have shattered this hope. Struck by our sudden nakedness, we 
may try to brazen it out by flaunting it in a profession of nihilism.... The 
alternative to this, which I am seeking to establish here, is to restore to us once 
more the power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs. We should be 
able to profess now knowingly and openly those beliefs which could be tacitly 
taken for granted in the days before modern philosophic criticism reached its 
present incisiveness. Such powers may appear dangerous. But a dogmatic 
orthodoxy can be kept in check both internally and externally, while a creed 
inverted into a science is both blind and deceptive. ''' 
That such an epistemological renewal of a dying culture is at the heart of 
Polanyi"s intentions is explained a few pages earlier when he writes: When I 
108 From Au,, ustine's De Iihero orb//rio. 1.4 (also 2.6). 
10) Polanyi 1958: 266. 
110 Polanvi 1958: 266. 
... Polanyi 1958: 268. 
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gave this book the sub-title "Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy" I had this 
turning point in mind. " 12 
This section of Polanyi's book represents for Newbigin the key section 
around which so much of his own missiological thinking subsequently hinges. 
To be sure, he still draws significant epistemological insights from Polanyi as we 
will see, but these philosophical insights are now clearly focused within a broader 
Polanyian structure of cultural interpretation. This newer understanding has two 
aspects: first, that Western culture has now reached a terminal crisis point in its 
perception of the framework of knowledge; and secondly, that in response to this 
crisis, a new cultural `starting point' for a renewed appreciation of the process of 
knowing' is urgently required. 
Both of these aspects are illustrated from Newbigin's seminal 1983 book 
The Other Side of 1984. Here at the outset of the book, he writes of Western 
culture that: 
lt is, no doubt, easy in every age to point to its obvious weaknesses. What is 
in question here, however, is something more precise. It is the dramatic 
suddenness with which, in the space of one lifetime, our civilization has so 
completely lost confidence in its own validity. ' 
He continues: 
The question now is whether our present self-criticism is merely the normal 
self-questioning of a healthy culture, or whether we are at the point where a 
culture is approaching death. It seems to me, and I know that I am not alone, 
that the truth of our present situation is nearer to the second of these alternatives 
than to the first. ' 14 
Polanyi 1958: 265. 
Newbizin I983b: 3. 
Newbigin I983b: 3. 
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Later in the book this analysis of cultural demise is specifically developed 
in relation to Polanyi's thought, as follows: 
At the centre of the movement which created our modern culture was a shift in 
the balance between faith and doubt. After a very long period in which the 
European perception of how things are was controlled by a dogma based on 
divine revelation. the principle of doubt reasserted itself in the famous phrase 
'Dare to know'. And who can deny that the result has been fruitful beyond the 
dreams of those who first used this slogan? Why, then, do we now find 
ourselves at what feels like a dead-end? Why has life become meaningless for 
so many in our culture? In a vivid parable Michael Polanyi has suggested the 
answer:.. . 
At this point, Newbigin again quotes at length the Polanyi passage he had 
cited in the 1977 article referred to above, and adds: `I intend to follow Polanyi in 
the next stage of his argument when he calls for a "post-critical philosophy" as 
the necessary starting point for the renewal of our culture. ' 116 Polanyi's thought 
dominates the ensuing discussion. ''7 Similarly, one can trace the same influence 
of Polanyi's cultural diagnosis at the corresponding points in Newbigin's 
writing. 118 
Returning to Polanyi's own development of his thesis in the ensuing 
pages of `Part Three' of Personal Knowledge, we now suggest that the similarity 
between Newbigin's analysis and that of Polanyi intensifies. In order to establish 
this, we will follow Polanyi's argument further and then compare it with 
Newbigin"s treatment. 
To begin with, Polanyi's appraisal of the dilemma in Enlightenment 
epistemology is traced back to the intended objectivism of Rene Descartes. The 
'lý Newbigin 1983b: 20. 
116 Newbigin 1983b: 21. 
F Newbigin 1983b: e. i!., 23,25-6,28-30. 
is E. g., Newbi-in 1986b: 102-3: 1988e: 105-6: 1989g: 5-6: 1991f: 19-20: 1993b: 347; 1995c: 
28ff.: 1995d: 47-52. 
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French philosopher-scientist had attempted to rid all judgements of their inherited 
assumptions. and - by the use of `universal doubt' - had tried to `purge his mind 
of all opinions held merely on trust and open it to knowledge firmly grounded in 
reason'. 119 By this means Descartes (along with Kant, who had argued that there 
was no room for opinion in the matter of making right judgements120) hoped to 
leave `unassailed a residue of knowledge that is completely determined by the 
objective evidence. ' 121 
But this enterprise was bound to fail, argues Polanyi, because the nature 
of doubt itself - upon which the whole Cartesian quest for objectivity seems to 
rest - was itsel fbound up with antecedent faith-commitments on the part of the 
doubter. To establish this, Polanyi identifies two reasons why any statement 
(`A') might be doubted. The first is because another statement (`B') is believed 
to be true in preference to 'A'; the second because there are deemed to be 
insufficient grounds for accepting the truth of `A*. The first reason is described 
by Polanyi as `contradictory' doubt; the second as `agnostic' doubt. 122 
Leaving aside the further development of `agnostic' doubt which Polanyi 
outlines, his point is that neither of these positions is devoid of `fiduciary" 
commitments on the part of the doubter. If a statement is doubted on the basis of 
another statement which is held to be true, then the doubting arises from a prior 
'faith' commitment (i. e.. to the supposed truth-status of the statement from which 
the doubt arises). Similarly. argues Polanyi, `agnostic' doubt functions on the 
basis of a similar antecedent belief- either that statement `B" might be proven at 
Polanyi 1958: 269. 
12 Polanyi 1958: 269, referring to Kants Critique of Pure Reason, B85 1. 
Polanyi 1958: 269. 
ýýý Polanyi 1958: 272-3. 
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some future date, or else that it could never be proven. As such, this too 'implies 
the acceptance of certain beliefs concerning the possibilities of proof. ' 123 Kant's 
programmatic statement that only undoubtable statements are certain must 
therefore, argues Polanyi, be mistaken. ' 24 On the contrary, all statements of so- 
called `fact' contain `fiduciary' elements: elements which may not be strictly 
`provable', but which nonetheless cannot be denied. 
In Newbigin's analysis of the epistemological crisis we find that Rene 
Descartes is also central. He argues that it was the French thinker's `false idea 
that there is or there should be available to us a certitude which does not depend 
upon faith' which was - in Newbigin words - the crucial false step, I am more 
and more sure. " 12 It is significant therefore that references to Descartes begin to 
appear in Newbigin's writings at the same time as the emergence of what we 
might call the new perspective' on Polanyi: a fact which more than suggests that 
Newbigin's `Cartesian' perspective is derived from Polanyi. '26 To be sure, 
Newbigin writes that it is Descartes `who usually gets the blame for these 
things', '`? but it is significant that when the French philosopher appears in 
Newbigin's discussions it is usually in connection either with a specific reference 
to Polanyi's portrayal of him. 128 or else with reference to the Polanyian 
reconstruction of epistemology needed because of Descartes. 129 
Polanyi 1958: 273. 
Polanvi 1958: 273, referring to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, B766. 
Newbigin 1990s: 5. 
° The first reference to Descartes in Newbi-in's work is in the article referred to earlier (I977f: 
83), in which Polanyi's cultural analysis first becomes significant. 
12' Newbi«in 1988f: 192. 
128 E. -., Newbigin 1986a: 63: 1989f: 33: 1990s: 5: the 'faux pus of Descartes has led into a false 
ideal of objectivity' which 'is the issue which the scientist Michael Polanyi is wrestling with 
in all his writings': 1991f: 29: 1993b: 345: 1995d: 47-48,62,75. 
111' E. g., Newbiain 1990s: 6-7: 199If: 35: 1993b: 345-348. 
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Moreover, the Polanyian analysis of the flaw in Descartes' critical 
programme is also directly reflected in Newbigin's later analyses. At these 
points, Newbigin acknowledges his debt to the insight of Allan Bloom that it was 
Nietzsche who first saw the fallacy of the Cartesian method. '3° But it is 
significant that the way in which Newbigin proceeds to articulate the grounds of 
this fallacy that the Cartesian programme is `inherently self-destructive' 
because of the `faith' position needed to doubt any proposition of truth is pure 
Polanyi. 13 
From this analysis of Polanyi's diagnosis of the critical moment faced by 
the West, and its influence upon Newbigin's thought, we turn now to the wider 
themes of Personal Knowledge, and trace their influence upon Newbigin's 
missiological reconstruction. These themes comprise Polanyi"s foundational 
notion of `personal knowledge', and its related conceptions of `tacit' knowing, 
and `heuristic passion'. 
2.3.2 `Personal Knowledge' 
In `Part One' of Personal Knowledge, Polanyi's basic concern is with the 
epistemological implications of assigning watertight categories to different 
`types' of knowledge. He writes, for example, that: 
... modern man 
has set up as the ideal of knowledge the conception of natural 
science as a set of statements which is 'objective' in the sense that its substance 
is entirely determined by observation, even while its presentation may be shaped 
by convention. ' 
° E. g., Newbi«in 1987d: 129. referring to Bloom 1987. 
C. f. e. g.. 1995d: 23: 'If you make the assertion "I believe P, " I may say "I doubt P because I 
believe Q, R, and T, " which are incompatible with P. In other words, my doubt rests upon a 
faith commitment': also 1994d: 63: 1996c: 7-9. Interestingly, Newbigin makes no 
acknowledgement of Polanyi's influence at these points. 
ý'ý Polanyi 1958: 16. 
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In this context. the so-called `scientific method' regulated by its own 
methodology sought to establish which propositions could be described as 
`objective", and which should be relegated to the realm of the `subjective'. He 
continues: This conception, stemming from a craving rooted in the very depths 
of our culture, would be shattered if the intuition of rationality in nature had to be 
acknowledged as a justifiable and indeed essential part of scientific theory. " 133 
Polanyi's specific purpose in writing Personal Knowledge, therefore, is 
to show', as he puts it, that complete objectivity as usually attributed to the 
exact sciences is a delusion and is in fact a false ideal. " 134 By contrast. in rattling 
all the skeletons in the cupboard of the current scientific outlook', 135 he sets out 
to establish that even within the scientific community what is usually understood 
as `objective" knowledge - established through experiment and the accumulation 
of evidence -- is in fact deeply `personal'. Indeed this 'personal' involvement can 
be described as the scientist's `originality'. As he writes later in the book: 
Originality entails a distinctively personal initiative and is invariably 
impassioned, sometimes to the point of obsessiveness. From the first intimation 
of a hidden problem and throughout its pursuit to the point of its solution, the 
process of discovery is guided by a personal vision and sustained by a personal 
conviction. 13ý' 
This `subjective' and `personal' involvement, argues Polanyi, is intrinsic 
to the pursuit of scientific progress. For without it. no experiments would be 
Polanyi 1958: 16. 
' Polanyi 1958: 18. 
Polanyi 1958: 18. 
Polanvi 1958: 301. Cf. the later description in Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 60: it seems 
plausible to assume ... that two 
functions of the mind are jointly at work from the beginning 
to the end of an inquiry. One is the deliberately active powers of the imagination; the other is 
a spontaneous process of integration which we may call hituition. It is the intuition that 
senses the presence of hidden resources for solving a problem and that launches the 
imagination in its pursuit. It is also intuition that forms our surmises in the course of this 
(Note continued on next page. ) 
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undertaken, and no advances in knowledge would be achievable. As a result, he 
concludes that all seemingly objective statements require: 
... to 
be accompanied by the utterance of a personal commitment in order that 
they may become the content of an assertion. But the act by which I set my seal 
to any statement - be it an unambiguous statement or a statement of probability 
- is a personal act of my own. 
"' 
Yet, in acknowledging the `personal participation of the knower in all 
acts of understanding'. Polanyi argues that this does not `make our understanding 
subjective. ' 138 On the contrary, he writes that: 
Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience but a 
responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective in 
the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality, contact that is defined as 
the condition for anticipating an indefinite range of as yet unknown (and perhaps 
yet inconceivable) true implications. It seems reasonable to describe this fusion 
of the personal and the objective as `Personal Knowledge'. 139 
As we have seen, Newbigin's own use of Polanyi's notion of `personal 
knowledge' is much earlier than the period of his specific engagement with the 
problems facing Western culture. In Honest Religion for Secular Man, for 
example, it occurs in a more general epistemological context in which - in 
response to John Robinson's book Honest to God, 140 and the challenge of what 
appeared to be a de-personalising conception of God -Newbigin felt the need 
both to develop a defence of God's nature as truly personal, and of our 
knowledge of him as one of personal response. '41 
pursuit and eventually selects from the material mobilized by the imagination the relevant 
pieces of evidence and integrates them into the solution of the problem' (emphasis original). 
Polanyi 1958: 29. 
Polanyi 1958: vii (emphases original). 
Polanyi 1958: vii-viii (emphasis original). 
X40 Robinson 1963. 
I See the discussion of Robinson's book in Newbigin 1966: 88-93. 
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In his later work, however, a change in his appropriation of Polanyi's 
insights about `personal knowledge' is evident. He writes for example in his 
article, `How I arrived at The Other Side of 1984', that in his quest for answers to 
the question: `What would be involved in a really missionary encounter of the 
gospel with this European culture of which I am a part? ", he had found `great 
help in Michael Polanyi's Post-Critical Philosophy' - specifically at the level at 
which Polanyi `exposed the fallacies underlying that dichotomy which is so 
pervasive in our "modern culture between "scientific knowledge" which is 
supposed to be "objective" and faith or belief, which is supposed to be 
"subjective". ' 14 2 
As a result of this, Newbigin's material about `personal knowledge' in his 
later works (The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, for example) becomes more 
`aggressive' in its apologetic - in line more strictly with the original tone of 
Polanyi's book. To be sure. Newbigin still uses the older perspective to urge 
upon his readers the appropriateness of the language of `personal knowledge' to 
describe the epistemological possibilities opened up by divine revelation. 143 But 
alongside this, he now deploys the argument about the `personal' component of 
the scientific enterprise in order to highlight the more `subjective' element in all 
that the Enlightenment project (by means of its 'scientific method') took to be 
purely 'objective'. He writes for example that: 
I have emphasized the character of scientific knowledge as - in Polanyi's phrase 
- 'personal knowledge. ' It is knowledge to which the scientist commits herself 
personally and on which she stakes her professional reputation. She accepts the 
''4 risk that she might be wrong. 
142 Newbigin 1985c: 8. 
It" E. g.. Newbi-in 1989f: 61 If.. 
141 Newbi<gin 1989f: 48. 
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Then he continues: 
If this is so, must we not say that it is part of the deep sickness of our culture 
that, ever since Descartes, we have been seduced by the idea of a kind of 
knowledge which could not be doubted, in which we would be absolutely secure 
from personal risk? I4' 
Similarly, in a paper given to the Tyndale House Ethics Group in 1993, he 
states that part of the `consequence of the Cartesian method' is that our culture 
has become accustomed to the idea that "science" represents a different kind of 
knowing from the rest of our knowing of the world. ' 
Science has been popularly understood to deliver a kind of indisputable and 
-objective' array of 'facts" in contrast to the `beliefs and values' which depend 
upon subjective factors. It is from within science itself that this 
misunderstanding is being corrected. Einstein has often been quoted as saying 
that `what you call "facts" depends on the theory that you bring to them'. So far 
as I know, the most comprehensive rebuttal of this view of science has come 
from the Hungarian scientist Michael Polanyi. '46 
The thrust of this newer apologetic is summed up by Newbigin in a later 
`Preface' he wrote for the republication of Drusilla Scott's book on Polanyi. 
Here he writes that, `Polanyi unmasks the illusion that science is a separate kind 
of knowledge, sharply distinguished from the vast areas of our everyday knowing 
which we do not call "scientific". ' His message', he continues, is that, we do 
not need to be intimidated by the claims of some populariser of "science" to 
represent a superior kind of knowledge by which all the rest of our knowing is to 
be tested and judged. ' 147 Once more, therefore, the apologetic dimension to the 
conception of 'personal knowledge" is drawn out and given a harder and more 
'4ý Newbigin 1989f. 48-49. 
141, Newbigin 1993b: 345. 
'4' Newbigin 1996a: v. 
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aggressive edge. 
We now return to the analysis of Polanyi's book in order to show how 
from the foundational premise about the `personal' component of knowing. 
Polanyi develops a coherent post-critical' picture both of the nature of truth and 
of the status of knowledge. He does this by means of an elaboration of a number 
of themes which undergird and develop the `personal" conception of knowing. 
We will explore these in turn in order to demonstrate how each of them has 
further influenced Newbigin's thinking as he develops his missionary 
engagement with Western culture. By doing so we will develop the argument 
that Newbigin's indebtedness to Polanyi lies not only in the `deconstructive' and 
`critical' dimensions of Polanyi's thought, but also in its more positive and 
reconstructive aspects as well. 
2.3.3 `Tacit' knowledge. 
The first of the themes developed by Polanyi to expand the concept of 
`personal knowledge' is found in `Part Two' of Personal Knowledge and is 
summed up by its overall title: `The Tacit Component". 148 In this section Polanyi 
argues that the reason why all knowing is `personal' is that one of its major 
components is the `indwelling" of assumptions and skills which are for the 
moment subconscious to a person"s specific actions or thinking, but which are 
nonetheless real. To affirm anything'. he writes. `implies ... an appraisal of our 
own art of knowing, and the establishment of truth becomes decisively dependent 
' Polanvi 1958: 67-245. 
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on a set of personal criteria of our own which cannot be formally defined. ' 149 
Polanyi proceeds to develop this line of argument in both its individual and 
corporate dimensions. 
At an individual level, Polanyi uses the example of language to show how 
the articulation of concepts and ideas is integrally related to a `latent knowledge' 
within humans which `gropes' towards clarity of expression. As he puts it: 
`Languages are the product of man's groping for words in the process of making 
new conceptual decisions, to be conveyed by words. ' b0 Polanyi makes the link 
between this example and the wider thesis about the `personal" nature of knowing 
by showing how even at the most basic level, there is a `personal coefficient' in 
the very act of `uttering speech'. ý' Consequently. speech emerges out of an 
active shaping of knowledge' which is part and parcel of the most basic 
exploratory activity characteristic of human beings an activity that 
differentiates humans from the animal kingdom. 152 
In addition to the example of language used here, Polanyi develops his 
conception of `tacit' knowledge with further examples elsewhere in the book. In 
defining these elements, he frequently makes the distinction between the concepts 
of 'subsidiary' and `focal" awareness. 153 For example, he notes that when 
reading a book in order to gain its overall meaning or sense, the reader exercises 
only a 'subsidiary' awareness of the actual words on the page. His `focal" 
1+' Polanyi 1958: 71. Polanyi summed up this aspect of knowing in his phrase We know more 
than we can tell' (Polanyi 1969: 172 [from a 1962 essay], and 1966: 4). 
Polanyi 1958: 112. 
Polanyi 1958: 132. 
Polanvi 1958: 132. 
See the discussion in Polanyi 1958: 55-65. Also, elsewhere in his writings: 1959: 30-32: 
1961: 239-340: 1969: 123-129,140ff.: 1975: 33-37,44-45. Cf. the useful summary 
discussion of these aspects of Polanyi's thought in Manno 1974: 46-52. 
105 
attention is on the sense being conveyed rather than on the words themselves. On 
the other hand, when proof-reading a book, the reader's `focal' attention is 
concentrated upon the actual words and syllables rather than upon their wider 
sensual and contextual meaning. 154 Similarly, when using a hammer to drive a 
nail into wood, a person maintains a `subsidiary" awareness of the feeling of the 
hammer being held in the palm of the hand, but a `focal' awareness upon the 
activity of actually hammering the nail. It is at the point of impact that `focal' 
awareness is concentrated. ' This leads Polanyi to the summary statement, that: 
When we accept a certain set of pre-suppositions and use them as our 
interpretative framework, we may be said to dwell in them as we do in our own 
body. Their uncritical acceptance for the time being consists in a process of 
assimilation by which we identify ourselves with them. They are not asserted 
and cannot be asserted, for assertion can be made only within a framework with 
which we have identified ourselves for the time being; as they are themselves 
our ultimate framework, they are essentially inarticulable. ''' 
Polanyi"s point is that an acceptance of the `inarticulable' element in the 
process of knowing - what he elsewhere describes in terms of `tacit acts', 
1 57 or 
the `a-critical act of acceptance" 58 - is intrinsic to a true understanding of 
epistemology. This is true not least in the case of the scientist. When a new 
discovery is made, for example, it is not made in an epistemological vacuum, 
where only an abstract and isolated rationality might operate, unconnected to 
other forms and influences. Rather, the discovery itself is the result of an 
1'` Polanyi 1958: 87-95. 
' Polanvi 1958: 55-6. 
' Polanyi 1958: 60 (emphasis original). Cf. 1961: 242: 'I have said that when we rely on our 
awareness of some things for attending to something else, we assimilate these things to our 
body. In this sense. then. subsidiary knowledge is held by indwelling. We comprehend the 
particulars of a whole in terms of the whole by dwelling in the particulars: or. in other words, 
we grasp the joint meaning of the particulars by dwelling in them. ' For a further 
development of this conception of knowing elsewhere in Polanyi's writings. see 1959: 1-26: 
1966: esp. ch. l: 1975: 33-36. 
Polanyi 1958: 264. 
ý' Polanyi 1958: 305. 
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'indwelling" of various `tacit', or `a-critical' assumptions and is nearly always 
preceded by an intuitive `hunch' which seeks formal confirmation in 
experimentation. 
Polanyi moves on from here to develop the `corporate' dimension to this 
conception of `indwelling'. For the framework of a-critical assumptions is not 
only operative within the mindset of the individual but is also in operation within 
the wider community of which the individual is a part. So, in his conclusion to 
the section on the 'Tacit Component', Polanyi develops a communal perspective 
to the notion of `personal' participation, and introduces the idea that learning is 
the submission of the learner to an `authoritative tradition'. 160 This `grounding' 
of the idea of knowledge within the conceptual framework of a community 
within which such knowledge is held is central to Polanyi's articulation of how 
such communities both survive, and expand. The idea of 'apprenticeship' is an 
extension of the concept of `indwelling", and Polanyi again uses the example of 
language to illustrate its operation: 
All arts are learned by intelligently imitating the way they are practised by 
other persons in whom the learner places his confidence. To know a language is 
an art, carried on by tacit judgements and the practice of unspecifiable skills.... 
Spoken communication is the successful application by two persons of the 
linguistic knowledge and skill acquired by such apprenticeship, one person 
wishing to transmit, the other to receive, information. '' 
"' See e. -., Polanyi 1958: 130-13 I where lie uses the example of the mathematician: 'The 
manner in which the mathematician works his way towards discovery, by shifting his 
confidence from intuition to computation and back again from computation to intuition, while 
never releasing his hold on either of the two, represents in miniature the whole range of 
operations by which articulation disciplines and expands the reasoning powers of man ... 
The alternation between the intuitive and the formal depends on tacit affirmations, both at the 
beginning and at the end of each chain of formal reasoning' (131). 
ý`0 Polanyi 1958: 203ff.. 
"c" Polanyi 1958: 206. 
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From this foundational example, Polanyi proposes that the same kind of 
apprenticeship exists within every kind of community and is exhibited in its 
pursuit of further knowledge. Thus, to make progress within such a community 
requires a `previous act of affiliation. by which the novice accepts apprenticeship 
to a community which cultivates this lore. appreciates its values and strives to act 
by its standards. ' ('- But such progression depends upon both a recognition of, 
and an adherence to, 'the framework of interpersonal obligations imposed by the 
social lore of the group. ' 163 As a result, he can say that the `combined action of 
authority and trust which underlies both the learning of language and its use for 
carrying messages. is a simplified instance of a process which enters into the 
whole transmission of culture to succeeding generations. ' 164 
Once again, Polanyi characteristically draws upon the example of the 
scientific community, not simply because his own expertise lies within this realm. 
but because it represents the kind of community most committed to the 
`objective" understanding of truth that he is attempting to counter. 16 Scientists 
no less than others are dependent upon the assumptions of the tradition of which 
they are a part, but at the same time. they seek to transcend that tradition by 
suggesting new theories and thereby adding to the tradition. in this sense', he 
writes, `science embraces a consistent pursuit of gradually changing, and -I 
believe - on the whole. ever more enlightened and elevated intellectual 
aspirations. " 166 From this foundation, Polanyi develops both an individual and a 
, `2 Polanyi 1958: 207 (emphasis original). 
16' Polanyi 1958: 212. See pages 150-160 for examples in which proposals of new theories 
predated their acceptance within the scientific community. despite the evidence. 
64 Polanyi 1958: 207. 
ý`' See e. g.. Polanyi 1958: 163-164,216-219,221. 
w`' Polanyi 1958: 165. 
108 
corporate dimension to the conception of tacit `indwelling. This helps him to 
explain how individuals progress in knowledge and how communities maintain 
and pass on such knowledge. It also enables him to articulate how this process 
serves to strengthen and enhance the vitality of communities, both in their 
individual and corporate dimensions. Moreover, these observations are 
intrinsically connected by Polanyi to his wider quest, which is to demonstrate that 
this `a-critical' indwelling is at the heart of the epistemological quest, and 
requires communities - as well as individuals to exercise an appropriate 
epistemological responsibility. 
167 
Returning now to Newbigin's writings, it emerges that he not only draws 
upon Polanyi's conception of `tacit' or `a-critical' knowledge and its related 
notion of 'indwelling'. but that he adopts and deploys these concepts in highly 
significant ways in his later missiology. For example, he frequently alludes to 
Polanyi's picture of the surgeon `using a probe to investigate a cavity into which 
it is not possible to look', 168 and at one point draws out the implications of the 
example in the following manner: 
Polanyi takes this as a way of entry into the whole enterprise of knowing, of 
probing reality. Like the surgeon using the probe, we explore reality by 
indwelling a whole range of instruments - words, concepts, images, ideas. We 
have to learn to use them, and while we are learning we attend to the new words, 
the new concepts. But when we have become familiar with their use, we no 
longer attend to them. We are tacitly aware of them, but focally aware of the 
reality they enable us to probe. We indwell them. '69 
This analytical framework is applied by Newbigin in significant ways 
E. g.. Polanyi 1958: 222f.. 378. 
Newbi, -, 
in 1988e: 106-7; 1989a: 7-8: 1989f: 33-34.46. Newbigin takes the reference in 
Polanyi's example to refer to a surgeon, though Polanyi himself is not so specific (cf. Polanyi 
1958: 55). 
ý`'`' Newbi«in 1988e: 106 (emphasis original). 
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which - whilst conceptually in line with the way in which Polanyi uses them 
exceed the scope of their original application. We noted earlier Newbigin's 
adoption of Polanyi's idea that a new starting point' for our culture is urgently 
needed. In Polanyi's analysis, this `liberation from objectivism" itself involves an 
aspect of -a-critical indwelling'. It is the realisation that we can voice our 
ultimate convictions only from within our convictions - from within the whole 
system of acceptances that are logically prior to any particular assertion of our 
own, prior to the holding of any particular piece of knowledge. ' 170 Newbigin's 
adoption of this position is overtly parallel to that of Polanyi. As he puts it in The 
Other Side of 1984: `If we follow Polanyi in asking for a "post-critical 
philosophy" as the pre-condition for the renewal of our culture', this will 
inevitably mean being ready 'to stake our whole future on consciously a-critical 
statements. ' 
171 
But Newbigin's use of Polanyi's notion of `a-critical', or `tacit' 
`indwelling' is also central to a second aspect of his missiological programme. 
At this level, Newbigin appropriates the language of `indwelling' and applies it to 
the relationship between Christians and biblical revelation. By means of this 
`tacit' knowledge believers are enabled to `attend' focally not only to the 
business of maturing as Christian disciples. but also to an engagement with the 
wider world. Just as the experienced reader `indwells' the knowledge of word- 
forms and sentence-structures in order to understand what the writer is seeking to 
communicate, so - in a corresponding manner - believers are called to become so 
steeped in the Scriptures that the Christian story becomes the framework that is 
170 Polanvi 1958: 267. 
171 Newbigin 1983b: 25. Cf. also 1988e: 107-8. 
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indwelt `a-critically' so to speak (like the words on the reader's page). 172 As this 
happens, so Christians become increasingly able to make sense of the world 
around them in the light of revelation. He describes this process in The Gospel in 
a Pluralist Society in the following manner: 
... we get a picture of the 
Christian life as one in which we live in the biblical 
story as part of the community whose story it is, find in the story the clues to 
knowing God as his character becomes manifest in the story, and from within 
that indwelling try to understand and cope with the events of our time and the 
world about us and so carry the story forward. At the heart of the story, as the 
key to the whole, is the incarnation of the Word, the life, ministry, death, and 
X73 resurrection of Jesus. 
He continues, drawing on the imagery in chapter 15 of John's Gospel, and argues 
that: 
... Jesus 
defines for his disciples what is to be their relation to him. They are to 
`dwell in" him. He is not to be the object of their observation, but the body of 
which they are a part. As they 'indwell' him in his body, they will both be led 
into fuller and fuller apprehension of the truth and also become the means 
through which God's will is done in the life of the world. ' 74 
Newbigin hereby takes one of Polanyi's insights into the `tacit' element of 
knowing. and proceeds to apply it both ecclesiologically and missiologically. On 
the one hand, by developing the notion of `indwelling' in terms of the Church's 
appropriation of revelation, he develops a dynamic concept of discipleship in 
which Christians grow in faith, gain a greater understanding of the world, and 
grasp the wider meaning of reality. On the other hand, by applying the same 
concept of `indwelling' to the Church in its outward witness, Newbigin is able to 
articulate a missionary ecclesiology in which the local congregation becomes the 
"2 Cf. Newbigin's reference to this example in 1986b: 79-80. 
Newbirin 1989f: 99. 
1" Newbi-in 1989f: 99. 
means whereby outsiders are enabled to come to faith. Both aspects are 
`hermeneutical' in perspective: the first in terms of interpreting revelational 
reality to the Church in its developing discipleship; the second in terms of 
interpreting the revealed gospel to the outsider -a dynamic in which the 
congregation becomes the hermeneutic of the gospel' to unbelievers. We shall 
look at these in turn. 
(i) `Indwelling' the Christian story 
At the level of discipleship, Newbigin combines the Polanyian insight 
about `indwelling' with an image drawn from George Lindbeck's, The Nature of 
Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-Liberal Age. 17 As we noted in 
chapter 1. the substance of Lindbeck's `cultural-linguistic' approach to doctrine is 
that the Bible functions as the interpretative framework within which believers 
seek to live their lives and understand reality. ' 176 Elsewhere, using the image of 
reading glasses, he describes the Bible as the lenses through which human 
beings see and respond to their changing worlds, or the media in which they 
formulate their descriptions. ' 177 
In this context, the Bible is to be understood not so much as a set of 
documents that a reader looks at in order to gain meaning or receive instruction, 
but one that he looks through in order to make sense of a wider reality. 
Lindbeck 1984. 
Lindbeck 1984: 117. 
'' Lindbeck 1984: 83. Wainwright (2000: 449-450) argues that Newbigin derived his image of 
the 'lenses' through which we view culture from Calvin (Institutes I. 14. I ). But though 
Lindbeck himself makes this connection (Lindbeck 1984: 83), Newbigin does not, deriving it 
instead (as here) from Lindbeck, or employing it (as below) with reference to the broader 
Polanvian framework of 'a-critical indwelling'. 
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Lindbeck"s use of the descriptive term `cultural-linguistic' therefore reflects his 
belief that the religious discourse of the Bible functions for the Christian in 
similar terms to the way in which language functions in daily life. In his words, 
`It comprises a vocabulary of discursive and nondiscursive symbols together with 
a distinctive logic or grammar in terms of which this vocabulary can be 
meaningfully deployed. ' 178 
Newbigin sees the value of Lindbeck's comparison between the religious 
discourse of the Bible and the use of language. For example, in his essay `Truth 
and Authority in Modernity', he writes that: 
When Lindbeck uses the term `cultural-linguistic' to describe his model for 
doctrine, he is rightly drawing attention to the fact that knowledge requires the 
ability to use a language and an accepted framework of understanding about 
'how things are and how things behave' which enables us to make sense of 
experience. When we use language to communicate information or to share a 
vision, we do not attend to the words we are using, we attend through the words 
to the matter in hand. ''9 
This adoption of Lindbeck's `intratextual' analysis of the Bible enables 
Newbigin to articulate an understanding of revelation by means of the framework 
of `tacit" knowledge that he had already found in Polanyi's thought. ' so As a 
result, what emerges in Newbigin's writings is a dynamic conception of the way 
in which biblical authority should properly function within the life of the 
Christian community. This understanding works itself out primarily in terms of 
the framework within which Christians alone find ultimate meaning to their lives. 
So, for example, in The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, he can write about the 
Lindbeck 1984: 33. 
Newbiuin 1994d: 73 (emphasis original). 
180 Cf. Newbi(On 1993a: 83: 1996c: 35 where he interprets Lindbeck's 'cultural-linguistic' 
approach to the Bible within a Polanyian framework of 'tacit knowing'. 
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character of the biblical narrative as one which provides Christians with a true 
understanding of who they are: 
This is our story, and it defines who we are. Just as character can only be truly 
rendered in narrative form, so the answer to the question Who am I? ' can only 
be given if we ask `What is my story? ' and that can only be answered if there is 
an answer to the further question, `What is the whole story of which my story is 
a part? ' To indwell the Bible is to live with an answer to those questions, to 
know who I am and who is the One to whom I am finally accountable»' 
But it also functions as the framework through which to comprehend the 
wider world: 
... the 
Christian story provides us with such a set of lenses, not something for us 
to look at, but for us to look through. Using Polanyi's terminology, I shall 
suggest that the Christian community is invited to indwell the story, tacitly aware 
of it as shaping the way we understand, but focally attending to the world we live 
in so that we are able confidently, though not infallibly, to increase our 
understanding of it and our ability to cope with it. 18-' 
Alongside this deployment, Newbigin also uses the `corporate' aspect of 
`tacit indwelling" in a manner which finds direct parallels with Polanyi's 
development of the idea of `apprenticeship within the tradition'. Once more, 
however. he re-deploys Polanyi's notion in order to apply it to an understanding 
of the Christian `tradition' indwelt by the Church. In a similar way to 
Newbigin's use of the Polanyian notion of `tacit knowing", this re-interpretation 
of the concept of `apprenticeship' also functions at two levels. 
Firstly. Newbigin uses the idea to re-affirm the strength of the Christian 
Newbi<gin 1989f: 100. Note the way in which this notion of revelation also addresses the 
failure of post-Enlightenment thought to reach an answer to the question of 'purpose'. For an 
analysis of this. cf. e. g. I986b: 27-37.1990s: 2f.; I990q: 2: 199lf: 21-22: 1996c: 76. 
Newbi-in 1989f: 38 (emphases original). Also: 227: 'Insofar as it is true to its calling. it 
becomes the place where men and women and children find that the gospel gives them the 
framework of understanding. the "lenses" through which they are able to understand and 
cope with the world. ' In this sense. Newbigin's deployment is less self-descriptive than 
L. indbeck's. being developed in terns of active and outward-orientated discipleship. 
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`tradition' of knowledge and experience in which the believing community has 
been nurtured, and upon which it must continue to draw if it is to grow in 
maturity. Indeed, part of the Church's incapacity for effective mission is 
explained by its refusal to espouse and live in the strength of this `tradition'. 
One of the conditions for the Church's faithful participation in ... a pluralist 
society', he argues, `would be that the Church would have the same kind of 
respect for its tradition as the scientific community has for its scientific 
tradition. ' He continues: 
While recognizing that all traditions are open to correction and development, it 
must ensure that those who undertake these tasks have first had a thorough 
apprenticeship in the tradition.... Science has become the most dynamic 
element in our culture because the scientific community has continued to believe 
that truth is knowable and that, insofar as it is known, it has authority. Science 
thrusts powerfully forward because it has strong traditions. 184 
He argues strongly that the Church must follow this example, and lays the 
blame for the `relatively anaemic state of theological studies' on the fact that 
Christians have `lost their roots and are drifting with the current of contemporary 
fashion. 
At a second level also, Polanyi's notion of an `apprenticeship within the 
tradition' is incorporated by Newbigin as an intrinsic element in his 
understanding of how true disciples are developed. `Like the scientist, ' he 
argues. the Christian believer has to learn to indwell the tradition.... He has to 
trust the tradition and trust the teacher as an authorized interpreter of it... 
is' Newbi«in 1988c: 170. 
18' Newbigin 1988c: 170 (emphasis added). Note once more the immediate connection with the 
scientific community. 
Newbigin 1988c: 170. 
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There is no alternative to this.... It is a personal and practical discipleship 
within the tradition. ' 186 
At both levels then. Newbigin builds on Polanyi's insights about 
apprenticeship' within the scientific community and applies them to the 
Christian Church. Not surprisingly perhaps, he also finds no difficulty in 
drawing parallels between what Polanyi calls the `Republic of Science' (the 
community of scientists within which the enterprise of science is carried on)1 7 
and the body of Christ. In a manner corresponding to the behaviour appropriate 
to the scientific community, the Church must act as a community of responsible 
investigators, located in a tradition of shared knowledge, and engaged in 
exploring the reality of the created world by means of an inherited and `indwelt' 
tradition. Only as a result of this may Christians be in a position to declare (or in 
Polanyi's word. `publish') what they know. '88 
Newbigin is aware of course that Polanyi's analysis of the scientific 
community differs in one important respect from his own descriptions of the 
Church. In the former. the tradition is one of human learning, writing, and 
speaking. ' 189 On the other hand: `In the case of the Christian community the 
tradition is that of witness to the action of God in history. action which reveals 
and effects the purpose of the Creator. ' X9° This is a different kind of `reality' 
from that which characterises the quest of the scientific community. He 
Newbigin 1989f: 49-50. 
The phrase is used by Polanvi in the title of a 1962 essay (in Polanyi 1969: 49-72). 
iss See e. g., Newbigin 1989f: 43-5I, or 1995d: e. g., 39-44 for Newbigin's comparison of the 
Church with Polanyi's description of the scientific community. He refers specifically to 
Polanvi's phrase The Republic of Science' in 1988c: 168,1989d: 1: 199 If: 57-8: 1991c: 4. 
For Polanyi's idea of 'publishing'. see below, section 2.3.4 (ii). 
Newbigin 1989f: 50. 
X90 Newbigin 1989f: 50. 
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continues: 
Thus the Christian understanding of the world is not only a matter of `dwelling 
in' a tradition of understanding; it is a matter of dwelling in a story of God's 
activity, activity which is still continuing. The knowledge which Christian faith 
seeks is knowledge of God who has acted and is acting. '9I 
Nonetheless, despite the difference in emphasis within the traditions of 
the two communities, it is still Polanyi's conceptual framework that has 
influenced not only the basic structure, but also the development, of Newbigin's 
understanding of the Church in its integration of the various aspects of 
knowledge intrinsic to discipleship. 
(ii) The `hermeneutic of the gospel' 
The integration of these dimensions of `knowing' within the Church leads 
Newbigin in turn to a description of the missionary aspect of ecclesial 
`indwelling'. This is that by means of such an `indwelling', the gospel might not 
only he `interpreted' with increasing clarity to those who are already Christians 
(and so strengthen the ongoing life of the Christian tradition itself), but might 
also be made known to those outside the church community as well. This further 
dimension to the notion of `indwelling' is encapsulated by Newbigin by means of 
his reference to the local congregation as the `hermeneutic of the gospel'. 
Newbigin had first used the phrase in his 1980 booklet Your Kingdom 
('ome where he had applied it to the `Church as a whole' in its witness to the 
Kingdom. 192 The actual phrase is not used again until the late 1980s when it re- 
"" Newbi, -, 
in I989f: 51. 
19, Newbigin 1980c: 38: it is the Church as a whole which has to be the hermeneutic of the 
Gospel'. 
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emerges as a key expression in Newbigin's articulation of the missiological 
significance of the local church congregation. This `re-emergence" is first seen in 
his 1987 article, `Evangelism in the City' where he addresses the profound 
missionary need of the hour by posing the following question: 
How can this strange story of God made flesh, of a crucified Savior, of 
resurrection and new creation become credible for those whose entire mental 
training has conditioned them to believe that the real world is the world which 
can be satisfactorily explained and managed without the hypothesis of God? '9; 
His response is that: 'I know of only one clue to the answering of that question, 
only one real hermeneutic of the gospel: a congregation which believes it. ' 194 
And he concludes by insisting that: `There is no other hermeneutic of the 
gospel. '19 
Two years later in The Gospel in a Pluralist Society Newbigin devotes a 
whole chapter to the concept. 196 Here, he argues that a critical problem for the 
development of a missionary engagement with the West is that the Church itself 
has submitted itself to the dominant cultural assumptions of the Enlightenment. 
This `domestication of the gospel' 197 to the `reigning plausibility structure' of the 
West must be rejected in favour of another, more radical, approach. In this 
context, Newbigin calls for nothing less than a fundamental re-orientation of 
cultural assumptions within the Church in order that it might demonstrate once 
more in its life and worship an alternative `plausibility structure' to the one that 
presently dominates Western culture. 
Newbi-in 1987b: 4. 
`" Newbigin 1987b: 4. 
"' Newbigin 1987b: 5. For other references to the congregation as the 'hermeneutic of the 
gospel' outside the two works specifically referred to in the text. see I988c: 175: 1990d: 153; 
and 1990c: 339. 
Chapter 8: 222-233. 
j0' A phrase used in Newbi(Yin 1989f: 10-11. 
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He addresses this challenge at a number of points in the book, of which 
the following is characteristic: 
... 
it is only as we are truly 'indwelling' the gospel story, only as we are so 
deeply involved in the life of the community which is shaped by this story that it 
becomes our real `plausibility structure, ' that we are able steadily and 
confidently to live in this attitude of eager hope. Almost everything in the 
'plausibility structure' which is the habitation of our society seems to contradict 
this Christian hope. Everything suggests that it is absurd to believe that the true 
authority over all things is represented in a crucified man. No amount of 
brilliant argument can make it sound reasonable to the inhabitants of the reigning 
plausibility structure. That is why I am suggesting that the only possible 
hermeneutic of the gospel is a congregation which believes it. '98 
Indeed, only in this way can secular society be reached, for the `reigning 
plausibility structure can only be effectively challenged by people who are fully 
integrated inhabitants of another. " 
199 
The understanding of the Church as a `missionary' community is not in 
itself a new idea for Newbigin. From his earliest writings, he had articulated an 
essentially `missionary' ecclesiology which had found classic expression in such 
books as The Household of God published in 1953,200 and in later studies which 
emphasised the Trinitarian aspects of mission and their implications for 
ecclesiology. 201 Nonetheless, with Newbigin's more specific reflections on the 
question of what would be involved in a `missionary engagement' with Western 
culture, the development of this missionary ecclesiology is now brought much 
more closely into line with what - in his reading of Polanyi - Newbigin had come 
to consider as the need of the hour. 
"R Newbigin 1989f: 232. 
Newbigin 1989f: 228. 
Newbi-in 1953. Here lie develops the missionary nature of the Church in terms of its 
existence as a 'foretaste' of heaven. (E. -., 147-8: 'Precisely because the Church is here and 
now a real foretaste of heaven. she can be the witness and instrument of the kingdom of 
heaven'). 
701 E.,,., Newbi(-, in 1958; 1963: 1978b (revised as I995c). 
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This - as we have seen - needed to address two issues in particular: 
firstly, the need for a radical renewal of culture by means of a fresh 
epistemological `starting point'; and secondly. the need for such a renewal to be 
demonstrated and to take root within contemporary culture, so that its reality 
might be seen by others. 
Newbigin's response to this dual challenge is that it is through the 
Church's `indwelling' of the gospel as its only possible 'hermeneutic" - that 
both needs are addressed. On the one hand, by `indwelling' the Bible's story, the 
Church meets the crisis of the hour by providing the epistemological starting 
point for cultural renewal. At the same time, by providing such a starting point 
within contemporary culture it incarnates the true life that derives from such 
foundations. 
By this means, therefore, the Polanyian notion of `indwelling", which had 
previously been employed to develop a dynamic concept of discipleship. is now 
also deployed as the foundation for Newbigin's missionary doctrine of the 
Church. By doing so, Newbigin brilliantly incorporates into a missionary context 
both the epistemological aspect of cultural `crisis' and that of cultural 
`opportunity' that he had derived from his Hungarian mentor. 
2.3.4 `Heuristic passion' 
If the previous section demonstrates Newbigin"s indebtedness to 
Polanyi's concept of `indwelling' for his development of a missionary 
ecclesiology. this final section deals with Polanyi"s material on the more `overt" 
forms of public proclamation and assesses their influence on Newbigin"s thought. 
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One of the fundamental premises undergirding Polanyi's notion of 
knowledge is as he states in the Preface to Personal Knowledge - that it is 
'objective' in the sense of `establishing contact with a hidden reality" and 
therefore claims `universal validity'. 202 Once again, this notion is developed as 
an intrinsic aspect of the `personal' nature of all knowing. for it involves an 
`originality' 203 on the part of the `discoverer' which may not appear to be 
integrated with other knowledge at the point of discovery. It therefore represents 
a personal `intuition' involving `risk". 'Personal knowledge' he writes is an 
intellectual commitment, and as such is inherently hazardous. ' 204 Polanyi refers 
to Copernicus' anticipation of the later discoveries of Kepler and Newton as an 
example of what he refers to as the 'oddity of our thoughts in being much deeper 
than we know and in disclosing their major import unexpectedly to later 
minds. ' 205 But by the same token, he argues, it can be said that when a scientific 
theory is accepted, its original `rationality' can be seen to be `accredited with 
prophetic powers. ' We accept it in the hope of making contact with reality; so 
that, being really true, our theory may yet show forth its truth through future 
centuries in ways undreamed of by its authors. ' 206 For Polanyi, therefore, the 
`triumph' of the discoverer lies precisely in what he calls the `yet hidden 
implications" which his discovery will reveal in later days to other eyes. -207 The 
phrase `heuristic passion'208 refers then to the way in which Polanyi describes 
and develops this aspect of the fiduciary programme. He writes that: 
, 0, Polanyi 1958: vii. 
10" See e. g.. the use of this word in Polanyi 1958: 301,311. 
104 Polanyi 1958: viii. 
-0` Polanyi 1958: 104. 
'06 Polanyi 1958: 5. 
X07 Polanvi 1958: 64. 
108 See the section heading for Polanyi 1958: 142-145. 
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Intellectual passions do not merely affirm the existence of harmonies which 
foreshadow an indeterminate range of future discoveries, but can also evoke 
intimations of specific discoveries and sustain their persistent pursuit through 
years of labour.... Such is the heuristic function of scientific passion. 
209 
Polanyi develops this notion at various points throughout the book, 
integrating it once more within both individual and corporate settings. 
210 In the 
individual context, for example, it is this `passion' (later described as a `heuristic 
impulse' 211 ) that drives and motivates the scientist towards further discovery. 
But the assimilation of such discoveries is simultaneously `regulated' within the 
corporate community setting. As he puts it: The science of today serves as a 
heuristic guide for its own further development. " 
212 This has its outworking not 
only in terms of providing the context and parameters within which further lines 
of research and enquiry are fuelled, but also by supplying the framework of 
acceptance within which knowledge is regulated and transmitted to future 
generations. 
Nonetheless, this `heuristic passion' carries within its self-understanding 
an inevitably `public' side. Discoveries demand by their very nature to be 
'published' because they bear upon an aspect of reality, a reality largely hidden 
to us ... ''13 As a result 
he asserts in a significant statement, that: By trying to 
say something that is true about a reality believed to be existing independently of 
our knowing it, all assertions of fact necessarily carry universal intent. ' 
214 
Consequently. Polanyi's plea is that although a scientist's `intimations of a 
I09 Polanyi 1958: 143 (emphasis original). 
I10 See esp. vii-viii, 64.104,130,311. 
PoIanyi 1958: 366. Cf. 1961: 246: '1 have described it as a passionate pursuit of a hidden 
meaning, guided by intensely personal intimations of this yet unexposed reality. 
Polanyi 1958: 311. 
Polanyi 1958: 311. 
Polanyi 1958: 31 1 (emphasis original). 
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hidden reality are personal' and constitute beliefs `which - owing to his 
originality as yet he alone holds': 
Yet they are not a subjective state of ºnind, but convictions held with universal 
intent, and heavy with arduous projects. It was lie who decided what to believe, 
yet there is no arbitrariness in his decision. For lie arrived at his conclusions by 
the utmost exercise of responsibility. He has reached responsible beliefs, born of 
necessity, and not changeable at will. In a heuristic commitment, affirmation, 
surrender and legislation are fused into a single thought, bearing on a hidden 
real ity. 21' 
It follows from this that the scientist will of necessity want to place his 
findings in the public arena not only because he believes that he has made contact 
with `reality'. but also because to do so will be to test whether the results of his 
findings can be borne out in practice, leading himself and others to fresh 
discoveries and to further truth. Polanyi therefore states that in spite of the 
hazards involved, I am called upon to search for the truth and state my 
findings. '216 Indeed, the knower can do no more, and he would evade his calling 
by doing less. The possibility of error is a necessary element of any belief 
bearing on reality, and to withhold belief on the grounds of such a hazard is to 
break off all contact with reality. '217 He concludes therefore that: 
The outcome of a competent fiduciary act may, admittedly, vary from one 
person to another, but since the differences are not due to any arbitrariness on the 
part of the individuals, each retains justifiably his universal intent. As each 
hopes to capture an aspect of reality, they may all hope that their findings will 
eventually coincide or supplement each other. 219 
Returning now to Newbigin's writings, we will see that both aspects of 
this `heuristic passion" (its `hazardous' commitment in the present which seeks 
2I Polanyi 1958: 311. 
'"' Polanyi 1958: 315 (the phrase is repeated exactly on p. 299). 
'j Polanvi 1958: 315. 
, is Polanyi 1958: 315. 
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future confirmation through experience, as well as its related obligation to 
`publish') have strongly influenced his later missiological thinking. This may be 
seen firstly in the way that Newbigin articulates a conception of `truth'; secondly, 
in the way that he uses the idea of `publishing with universal intent'; and finally 
in the way that his concept of the gospel as `public truth' brings both of these 
concepts together into a single vision. We shall consider each of these in turn. 
(i) The conception of truth 
In the first place, we have seen that central to Newbigin's challenge to the 
Church in the West is that it has become subject to the dominant cultural 
assumptions of modernity. In particular Christians have adopted the modernist 
notion that faith is `subjective' and therefore finds no connection with the 
concrete reality of 'facts'. As we have seen, Newbigin's late missiology is 
characterised by the attempt to counter this view, and to restore confidence to the 
Church in the validity of its foundations of belief. We will now argue that in 
attempting to articulate a notion of truth that is both `personal' (and therefore 
must admit to an essential element of subjectivity) and yet at the same time 
properly `objective", he has adopted Polanyi's notion that a claim to truth 
demonstrates its `objectivity" by the fact that it leads the enquirer to further truth. 
In his 1991 book Truth to Tell for example, Newbigin defends the idea 
that Christian faith `is a matter of personal commitment'. But this is now 
couched in recognisably Polanyian terms: it is a commitment to the 
understanding of a reality which is not in my mind but out there. " And the proof 
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of this is in my willingness to publish it and to test it in all relevant situations. ' 
He dismisses the false objectivism of post-Enlightenment West with its `illusion 
that we can evade personal responsibility for our assertions of truth 
220 by directly 
quoting the passage from Polanyi's `Preface' to Personal Knowledge quoted 
earlier. 221 He proceeds by defending Polanyi's position and arguing that: 
There is no knowing without the willingness to search, to explore, to take 
risks. Only affirmations which could be false, ' [Polanyi] says, `can be said to 
convey objective knowledge of this kind' - that is to say, knowledge which 
proves to be objective by the fact that it leads on to further knowledge. The ideal 
of a kind of objectivity which eliminates personal responsibility is false and 
deceptive. - 
But the point to notice here is the way in which the concept of `truth' for 
Newbigin is now articulated within a Polanyian framework of `heuristic' 
discovery. It will demonstrate its truthfulness by the way in which it leads to 
further truth. Newbigin makes this same point in his 1995 book Proper 
Confidence where he explicitly defends Polanyi's view as follows: 
Polanyi says that the truth of the claim either will or will not be validated 
depending on whether or not it leads to further truth. A valid truth claim will 
lead to new discovery - often to discoveries undreamt of by the scientist 
themselves. The truth claims of scientists are thus not irreformable and 
indubitable claims to possess the truth; rather they are claims to be on the way to 
the fullness of truth. -- 
I') Newbigin 1991 f: 33. 
220 Newbigin 1991 f: 51. 
221 'Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act 
claiming universal validity. Such knowledge is indeed oh! ectivc in the sense of establishing 
contact with a hidden reality: a contact that can be defined as the condition for establishing an 
indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps yet inconceivable) true implications' 
(Newbigin 1991f: 51-2. quoting Polanyi 1958: vii-viii). In all. Newbigin quotes Polanyi's 
'Preface' at this point four times in his writings and proceeds to build the same case from it 
(1991 c: 5: 1991 f: 51-52: 1995d: 43-44: 1996a: v). 
--2 Newbigin 1991 f: 52 (quoting Polanyi 1958: viii). 
Newbigin 1995d: 43. 
125 
In further defending this view of knowledge from the charge of 
subjectivism, Newbigin develops the case (once more in parallel to Polanyi's 
own defence) for a knowledge that requires us to make costly and risky 
commitments'. 224 These `risky commitments' are part of the personal investment 
in the art of knowing, and yet they confirm their contact with reality by means of 
the further truths that they lead to. 
That this understanding of truth is central to Newbigin's later missiology 
may be seen in a quotation from Newbigin's `Conference Call' for the `Gospel 
and Culture' conference in July 1992. Here, without specific reference to 
Polanyi. we find both the Polanyian call for a new starting point' alongside a 
Polanyian conception of truth. Newbigin argues that: 
To affirm the Gospel as public truth is to invite acceptance of a new starting 
point for thought, the truth of which will be proved only in the course of a life of 
reflection and action which proves itself more adequate to the totality of human 
" experience than its rivals. ' 
(ii) Publication `with universal intent' 
As another aspect of his indebtedness to Polanyi's notion of `heuristic 
passion' Newbigin also employs Polanyi's idea that a personal commitment to 
the discovery of aspects of a -hidden reality" is by its nature a commitment that is 
carried out with universal intent". 
-4 Newbi<ain I995d: 46: also. I996c: 36. 
Newbigin l992b: 2 (also l992e: 1. This latter article is essentially a reprint of the original 
'Call'. ) Cf. also Newbigin I989f: 77: where he argues that the Church's obligation is to 
seek to show in the practice of life today that (the gospel) is the rational tradition which is 
capable of giving greater coherence and intelligibility to all experience than any other 
tradition. ' 
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Newbigin uses the phrase `universal intent' eleven times in all (eight of 
which are in The Gospel in a Pluralist Society), 226 and does so in a way that - 
like his mentor closely connects it to the future testing and establishing of truth. 
The following quotation from Newbigin's 1988 article Our Missionary 
Responsibility in the Crisis of Western Culture' illustrates these interrelated 
aspects: 
... this personal commitment 
is, as Polanyi says, `with universal intent'. It is 
firmly anchored to the objective pole. It is made in the belief that this is the way 
to grasp reality more truly, not just that it is what I personally prefer. It is made 
in the faith that what is shown as truth is truth for all. And if it is indeed what I 
believe, it will prove itself so by opening the way to fresh discoveries and fresh 
coherences and fresh clarities. "? 7 
Here - like Polanyi - Newbigin uses the concept of `universal intent' to 
establish the `objective" core of that which is believed. Firstly, it is held as being 
a true account of reality%228 and therefore as in the above quotation - is `firmly 
anchored to the objective pole'. Secondly, because of this `objectivity', the use 
of the phrase with universal intent' underscores the fact that such commitment is 
a commitment to a truth which is `true for all', and is therefore qualitatively 
distinguishable from the category of `subjective personal preference'. It is - he 
argues `a true account of reality which all people ought to accept'; 229 it is 'truth 
which is true for all'. 230 Moreover, it is precisely because faith claims have 
'universal intent' that they must be published. We must seek to show others that 
they are valid' he argue s; '31 and we express that intent by publishing them and 
2 Newbiain 19888: 151; 1988e: 108: 1989f: 35,47,48,50,77,92.126.192: 1995d: 43. 
Newbi-in 1988e: 108. 
Newbigin 1989f: 48. 
Newbigin 1989f. 48. 
Newbigin I989f: 50. 
ý'ý Newbi<gin 1989f: 192. 
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inviting all people to consider and accept them' . 
232 By the same means (and here 
we note the connection with the previous section) such publication will provide 
the grounds upon which these claims are tested for their ability to lead the 
enquirer to what Newbigin describes variously as `confirmation by further 
experience', 233 or `experimental verification', 
234 or to what he summarises 
elsewhere as `fresh discoveries and fresh coherences and fresh clarities. 
`3i 
This framework may be seen to be quintessentially `Polanyian' in its 
linking of the concepts of 'personal commitment'. `objectivity', 'testing' and 
`publication'. In terms of Newbigin's particular application of the framework of 
`universal intent' to the Church's missionary engagement with the West, three 
perspectives emerge. Firstly, the idea occasionally takes on an overtly 
`evangelistic' dimension. Secondly. it enables Newbigin to develop two 
dimensions to his conception of `dialogue'. Thirdly, it undergirds his late 
emphasis on the gospel as `public truth". We will discuss each of these aspects in 
turn. 
(a) Evangelism 
The most straightforward application of Polanyi's notion of `publication' for 
Newbigin is to the realm of `evangelism". This application is to be distinguished 
from that of Polanyi's of course, where `publication with universal intent' is 
epitomised by the production of scientific theories. Yet in Newbigin's thought, 
the `publication' of the gospel is naturally seen as its equivalent. In this context 
Newbi-in I989f: 192. 
Newbigin 1989f: 35. 
24 Newbigin 1989f: 48. 
E. <g.. Newbigin 1988e: 108. 
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therefore, he appropriates Polanyi's understanding of the `fiduciary' 
commitments involved in scientific `publishing' and appropriates them to refer 
specifically to the gospel held in 'faith" which believers are called upon to 
declare. '3ý' As he puts it: 
If I am committed to seeking to understand what happened from within this 
Christian tradition, that is a decision for which I am responsible. But this 
decision and commitment is delivered from mere subjectivity by being made - as 
Polanyi would say - with universal intent. In other words, I cannot treat it as 
simply a personal decision, I am bound to publish it, to commend it to others, 
and to seek to show in the practice of life today that it is the rational tradition 
which is capable of giving greater coherence and intelligibility to all experience 
'3 than any other tradition. ' 
At another point, he refers to the faith' as that which is held with universal 
intent', and proceeds with the following statement: 
... as the command of 
Jesus tells us, it is to be made known to all the nations, to 
all human communities of whatever race or creed or culture. It is public truth. 
We commend it to all people in the hope that, by the witness of the Holy Spirit 
in the hearts of others, it will come to be seen by them for themselves as the 
'"8 truth. - 
(b) 'Dialogue' 
Secondly. alongside the more overtly `proclamatory' dimension to the 
idea of `publication', the notion of `universal intent' (with the connected sense of 
testing') also enables Newbigin to sustain a creative understanding of `dialogue" 
as a fundamental aspect of missionary engagement in the context of late 
modernity. This dialogue is intrinsically linked to the idea of universality in the 
The ramifications of this 'appropriation' will be explored in more detail in chapter 4 
Newbi, -, 
in I989f: 77. 
2 Newbigin I989f: 50 (also 22). Cf. also I990n: 141: 1990s: 6; 1991 f: 33; 1991c: 9. 
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sense that it represents part of the `public interrogation and debate'239 that must 
ensue when the gospel is `published'. and by which it must be tested in order that 
its validity be demonstrated. It is also founded inescapably upon fiduciary 
presuppositions which are - for the moment - unquestioned. In this context, 
there are two levels at which the notion of `dialogue' operates in Newbigin's later 
work: the first is in the interface between Christianity and other religions, the 
second in the Church's dialogue with the culture of which it is itself a part. 
'inter-religious' dialogue 
With regard to Newbigin"s discussions about the interface between 
Christianity and other religions, it is possible to argue that his thought takes a 
fresh direction from around the mid-1970s. This has been pointed out by 
Hunsberger, 240 who argues that his earlier discussions were marked by attempts 
to derive a `reasonable typology' in the approach to a number of interrelated 
issues: for example, the examination of various proposals for a universal faith , 
241 
alternative approaches to the claim that Christ is unique, 242 models for inter- 
religious dialogue, 243 proposed structures for religious unity, 244 or approaches to 
the concept of `religion'. 245 
Hunsberger argues that a change in Newbigin's treatment of the theme of 
inter-religious dialogue emerges with the publication of the lst edition of The 
, "' Newbigin I989f: 50. 
'40 Hunsber-er I 998a: 215ff.. 
E. u.. Newbigin 1961. 
'' Newbiýgin 1969. 
24 Newbi, -, 
in 1977a. 
, `' Newbi, -, 
in I977b. 
'4' Newbi<gin I977f. 
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Open Secret in 1978.246 Here, in a discussion about the implications of a 
contemporary faith-commitment to the unique authority of Christ, Newbigin 
states that: `It is now necessary to face the difficult questions which arise when 
this commitment is brought into contact with other unconditional commitments 
of the same kind.. 247 It is the realisation that Christians are increasingly 
surrounded by other `ultimate commitments' which forms the basis upon which 
this newer understanding of 'dialogue' must now take place. As Hunsberger 
points out, it is a 'dialogue of the religions'248 rather than a dialogue with the 
religions, and it calls for an attitude on the part of Christians which Newbigin 
describes as one of `obedient witness'. 249 Hunsberger also notes that the relevant 
chapter in The Open Secret is itself a revision of Newbigin's earlier article on 
inter-faith dialogue. 20 and that the newer phrase `dialogue of the religions" had 
been incorporated as part of the revision process. 
The conclusions Hunsberger draws from this derive from his view that 
Newbigin was facing up to the fact that inter-religious dialogue was a more 
immediate and pressing reality than had been the case hitherto. As Hunsberger 
puts it: The discussion with adherents to other commitments is going on every 
day. It is at the gate [and] had only recently become a living fact for residents of 
the United 251 
There may be an element of truth in this suggestion. though Newbigin's 
awareness of `other' faiths had always been part of his life as a missionary to a 
'46 lt was later republished with minor changes as Newbigin 1995c. 
'4' Newbigin I 978b: 180, noted in Hunsberger I 998a: 2 16. 
X48 Hunsber-er 1998a: 216 (quoting Newaýbi(Yin 1978b: 210 and adding emphasis). 
X49 Newbigin 1978b: 205-206. 
I'0 Newbi<gin 1977a. 
''ý Hunsberger 1998a: 216. 
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degree that would not warrant by itself such a sudden change of emphasis at this 
point. Rather, what is clear is that both the earlier article and the chapter in The 
Open Secret can be shown to share a dependency upon the newer reading of 
Polanyi that we have been defending. The change in perspective apparent in 
Newbigin's language derives not so much from an awareness of a changed 
cultural context, as from a fresh approach to the question of `ultimate 
commitments' derived from Polanyi. 
For example, in The Open Secret Newbigin points out that in the new 
`pluralist' context the only grounds upon which an answer can be given to the 
question 'Why mission? ' are the grounds that the authority for mission resides `In 
the name of Jesus. 252 He continues by arguing that the consequence of this is 
that: 
... we shall 
be offering a model for understanding human life -a model that 
cannot be verified by reference to the axioms of our culture but that is offered on 
the authority of revelation and with the claim that it does provide the possibility Si 
of a practical wisdom to grasp and deal with human life as it really is. 2 
He adds: `1 have been encouraged to think that this is a fruitful approach to the 
subject of this book by reading the parallel that Michael Polanyi has drawn 
between our time and the time for which Augustine wrote'. He then proceeds to 
quote again in full the passage about the `critical framework" burning away. 
24 
In other words the foundation for missionary activity defended by 
Newbigin in this context is specifically now articulated within a Polanyian 
perspective which takes as its starting point a 'fiduciary" commitment to a reality 
Newbigin 1978b: 16,20ff.. 
Newbigin I978b: 30. 
ý'ý Newbigin 1978b: 30-31 (quoting Polanvi 1958: 265). 
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which cannot be proved by the axioms of contemporary culture, but which 
through open dialogue and debate - will prove itself best able to deal with the 
complexities of human existence. 
Moreover this reading of Polanyi also specifically undergirds the earlier 
article on which the chapter in The Open Secret is based. Here the opening 
words of that article are worth quoting at length: 
All intellectual activity implies some presuppositions. Thoughts can only be 
formulated in words and these words have been formed by the previous thought 
of the community whose language they are. Even the most radical scepticism 
can only be formulated in terms of presuppositions which are - for the moment - 
unquestioned. (See Michael Polanyi: Personal Knowledge, chap. 9, 'The 
Critique of Doubt', pp. 269-98. ) In dialogue between representatives of different 
faiths the participants are called upon to submit their most fundamental 
presuppositions, the very grammar and syntax of their thought, to critical 
questioning. -5 
What signals the transition to a newer perspective in Newbigin's 
discussions about dialogue is therefore not so much his admission of the changed 
circumstances in which contemporary Christians find themselves, but rather his 
recapitulation of the task of apologetics within a Polanyian framework. Here 
`universal intent" is based upon the founding of witness on fiduciary 
`presuppositions which are - for the moment - unquestioned". Dialogue (with its 
implication of `testing') is the process whereby different `ultimate commitments' 
are brought face to face with one another. It is in this context, we suggest, that 
Newbigin"s material about inter-religious dialogue in The Open Secret (with its 
statements like The Christian partner in the dialogue will certainly put his 
2ý` Newbi-in 1977a: 253. 
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Christianity" at risk '2 6) is best interpreted. Hunsberger notes the transition in 
Newbigin's thinking at this point but fails to identify the reason. 
Cultural ' dialogue 
What is also evident in Newbigin's later missiology, however, is a new 
dimension to the concept of `dialogue' which also owes its articulation to the 
Polanyian concept of `publication with universal intent'. This emerges first in 
The Other Side o//984 where, in the context of a discussion of Polanyi's notion 
of `fiduciary frameworks', he writes with reference to the Church that: 
... the supremely critical 
dialogue which it must now face is not the dialogue 
with other religions (important as that certainly is) but the dialogue with the 
culture which took its shape at the Enlightenment and with which the European 
churches have lived in an illegitimate syncretism ever since. Such a dialogue 
will always mean that our own basic presuppositions are called in question by 
the other party. Because of what I believe about Jesus Christ I believe that this 
open encounter can only lead both the Church and the other partners in the 
dialogue into a fuller apprehension of the truth. This is not `dialogue insured 
against risk'; it is part of the ultimate commitment of faith -a commitment 
which always means risking everything. '' 
In developing this point lie later writes: 
A truly missionary approach ... would recognize 
frankly the fact that the 
Christian dogma offers a 'fiduciary framework' quite different from and (in 
some respects) incompatible with the framework within which modern European 
culture has developed, and would be quite bold and uncompromising in setting 
forth the Christian 'dogma', but also very humble and teachable in engaging in 
' dialogue with those who live by other fundamental beliefs. ' 
Here, dialogue is conceived as taking place between the Church and the 
culture of which the Christian community is a part. Newbigin states that this 
Newbigin 1978b: 210 (quoted in Hunsberger 1998a: 216). 
Newbigin 1983b: 31, in the context of 28-32. 
, 'ý Newbigin 1983b: 32. 
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dialogue with other patterns of thought is `a further step which Polanyi does not 
take'. 2 9 By this, Newbigin is not saying that he is going beyond Polanyi in the 
sense of arguing against him. After all, the rich `Polanyian' language of the 
above quotations indicates once more that Newbigin is taking a similar `line'. 
Rather, he is applying a Polanyian structure to an issue that Polanyi does not 
himself specifically address. 260 
(c) The gospel as public ' truth 
Newbigin's use of Polanyi's notion of `heuristic passion' is summed up in 
his conception that the gospel constitutes `public truth'. This phrase has come to 
represent Newbigin's programme in parvo, no doubt because of the way in which 
he uses it so often261 but also because of the late prominence he gives to it. 262 We 
shall explore the significance of the term for Newbigin's programme in more 
detail in chapter 4, but will here seek to show simply that the conception behind it 
is Polanyian in derivation. As with other elements in Newbigin's programme. 
this connection has not been given the attention it warrants. 263 
It first occurs in The Other Side of 1981, in the context of a discussion 
about the cultural dichotomy between the `private option' of religious faith and 
"9 Newbigin 1983b: 29. 
X60 We discuss this aspect of Newbigin's thought in chapter 4. 
'`" In all, Newbigin uses the phrase 126 times in his published writings. 
262 Note, for example, the use of the phrase as the subtitle to 1991 f, as the article titles for 1991 a; 
1992e: and in the title of Newbigin's contribution in 1997d. Cf. also the title of the 
Swanwick Conference (July 1992) 'The Gospel as Public Truth' (for which 1992b is the 
'Conference Call'). 
26 E. <Tý Williams (1993) makes a connection between Newbigin's epistemology and the work of 
Polanyi in its distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief (14-15), and also in the debate 
about the 'liberal/fundamentalist' divide (19), but does not make the connection between 
Polanyi and the 'public truth' dimension of Newbi, in's programme (20-24). Hunsberger 
(1998a) does not mention the concept. 
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those generally accepted 'facts' which are established by what he calls the 
`principles which govern public life'. 264 He continues: 
These `principles' belong to the realm of 'public truth', that is to say to the area 
which is governed by the truths which are either held to be self-evident or can be 
' shown to be true to any person who is willing to consider all the evidence. 
This statement occurs within the first prolonged discussion in Newbigin's 
writings of Polanyi's ideas - in particular his view that what contemporary 
culture needs is an `alternative' to the `objectivist' stranglehold that is suffocating 
the quest for true knowledge, and his proposal to restore to us once more the 
power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs. '266 It is in this context that 
Newbigin poses the question: In what sense, then, is Polanyi asking for anything 
new? ' After all, faith has always been `unproven'. Nonetheless, the `newness' 
of Polanyi's proposal - argues Newbigin - is that it calls for nothing less than a 
cultural renewal upon a radically new understanding of what the process of 
`knowing" is all about. It is within this context that Newbigin's phrase `public 
truth' corresponds most closely to Polanyi's conception of `heuristic passion'. 267 
As he puts it: 
What is now being proposed is that not just in the private world but also in the 
public world another model for understanding is needed: that this in turn requires 
the acknowledgment that our most fundamental beliefs cannot be demonstrated 
but are held by faith: that it is the responsibility of the Church to offer this new 
model for understanding as the basis for a radical renewal of our culture: and 
that without such radical renewal our culture has no future. '6s 
'64 Newbkgin 1983b: 26. 
26" Newbkgin 1983b: 26. 
266 Newbigin 1983b: 26 (quoting Polanyi 1958: 268). 
For the connection between the phrase and the wider Polanyian framework, see e. g.. 
Newbigin 19888: 151-153: 1988e: 105-106: 1989g: 6; 1989f: 35,48: 1990s: 7; 1991 f: 53; 
1995d: 39.47.50. 
268 Newbiuin 198, b: 27. 
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What this amounts to therefore is: 
... an 
invitation to the Church to be bold in offering to the men and women of 
our culture a way of understanding which makes no claim to be demonstrable in 
the terms of `modern' thought, which is not 'scientific' in the popular use of that 
word, which is based unashamedly on the revelation of God made in Jesus Christ 
and attested in scripture and the tradition of the Church, and which is offered as 
a fresh starting point for the exploration of the mystery of human existence and 
for coping with its practical tasks not only in the private and domestic life of the 
believers but also in the public life of the citizen. '69 
In conclusion, therefore, we may state that Newbigin's notion of `public 
truth' is one which captures Polanyi's idea of `heuristic passion' and frames it 
within a missiological and proclamatory context. As with Polanyi, it is 
impossible to isolate the `public' aspects of this passionate commitment from the 
`fiduciary' foundations upon which it is built. Both aspects are integrally 
connected. 
2.4 Conclusion: Newbigin and the Polanyi thesis 
The influence that Polanyi's writings have had on Newbigin is clearly 
considerable, as we have tried to demonstrate, and may be summarised in the 
following points. 
Firstly, Newbigin adopts Polanyi's critical diagnosis of Western culture 
that the `fuel" of Greek rationalism is now exhausted, and that the `critical 
framework' has all but `burnt away'. 
Secondly. he assimilates Polanyi"s basic critique of the Enlightenment 
programme with its sharp distinction - attributed to such thinkers as Descartes 
ý``' Newbigin 1983b: 27. 
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and Locke - between the world of `facts' and the world of `values'; between 
knowledge that is held to be 'public' and that which is restricted as `private'. 
Thirdly, he follows Polanyi in arguing that what is needed in this context 
is nothing less than a renewal of culture characterised by an epistemological 
return to the Augustinian insight enshrined in the catch-phrase: Credo ut 
intelligar. 
Fourthly, he adopts Polanyi"s understanding of 'tacit' knowledge and 
develops this as a way of addressing the missiological question of how the 
Church is to engage the culture of the West. By `indwelling' the Christian story, 
the Church both grows in its own understanding, and arrives at a fuller grasp of 
reality. By the same 'indwelling", the Church is enabled to become the 
`hermeneutic of the gospel', as a result of which outsiders to the Christian faith 
may come to grasp the gospel's meaning as they see it authenticated in the life of 
believers. 
Fifthly, he assimilates Polanyi's connection between `commitment" and 
'publication". By doing so he articulates an understanding of 'truth' which must 
be declared publicly, though momentarily unproven. In this declaration as 
`public truth", the veracity of faith-claims is placed in the public domain so that it 
may be `tested' by a process of 'dialogue' and shown to be more adequate than 
other claims to deal with the complexities of life. 
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Chapter Three 
Newbigin and the Challenge of Postmodernity 
3.1 Introduction 
Our analysis of Newbigin's thought in the previous chapter was 
developed on the basis that it is best interpreted within a `Polanyian' framework. 
The present chapter takes this analysis a stage further and argues that because 
Polanyi's thought is conducive to central streams of postmodern thinking - for 
example, his conviction about the role of local communities in the shaping and 
passing on of the `traditions' of knowledge - Newbigin's own thought may 
profitably be interpreted not simply in terms of its reaction to modernity, but also 
in relation to the questions confronting the Church in the cultural transition to 
postmodernity. Such an analysis of Newbigin's work is itself almost unknown, 
but if the case put forward in the last chapter is established it is long overdue. I 
Although Newbigin's formal interaction with the questions of 
`postmodernity' is limited to his latest writings, nonetheless, he may be said to 
contribute to the debate about the meaning and practice of mission in a 
`postmodern' context at two significant levels. Firstly, he can be shown to have 
developed a missionary methodology which effectively anticipates many of the 
The only article to my knowledge that begins to address the issue in any formal sense - albeit 
briefly - is Hunsberger 1998c. 
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questions raised by contemporary postmodern perspectives; and secondly, the 
way in which he harnesses this methodology to the practice of mission can be 
said to be both appropriate and applicable within the postmodern environment. 
In exploring these issues, the methodology of the chapter will be as 
follows. Firstly, we shall investigate Newbigin's own assessment of 
postmodernity, and map out his specific engagement with it. Secondly, we will 
use the framework put forward by Murphy and McClendon in order to draw some 
preliminary conclusions about the extent to which Newbigin may be considered a 
`postmodern' thinker. Thirdly, we will address the question of the extent to 
which Newbigin's missiological programme may be said to `anticipate' the 
postmodern paradigm. In order to explore this thesis, we will use Newbigin's 
discussions of Peter Berger's `plausibility structures' and Alasdair Maclntyre's 
'traditions of rationality' as `test cases'. Finally, we will draw conclusions about 
the value and contribution of his work when viewed and interpreted in a 
postmodern context. 
3.2 Newbigin's engagement with postmodernity 
Newbigin's formal contribution to the debates about postmodernity were 
necessarily limited by the fact that they began to take centre stage in theological 
and missiological circles when he had already reached an advanced age. 2 But 
inasmuch as he does refer to this new movement, it is important first to address 
His interaction with modernity (let alone postmodernity) began only after he had `retired'. 
He was 74 when The Other Side of 1984 was published in 1983. Dating the advent of the 
debates within theological and missiological circles about the implications ofpostmodernity 
is difficult to pinpoint with any accuracy. Formally, the work of Dio, ýenes Allen (Allen 
1989) would have to be a significant marker point: also Griffin 1988. For an overview of the 
development of 'postmodern' theologies, cf. Tilley 1995, and Ward 1997. 
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the question of how Newbigin understood its `mood' and `mindset', and then to 
assess the conclusions he drew with regard to the challenges that it presented. 
All Newbigin's references to `postmodernity' occur in his post-1991 
writings. ' In essence he sees it as a movement that is fundamentally opposed to 
the `metanarratives' of 'modernity'. The post-modernists tell us', he writes in a 
1992 edition of The Gospel and Our Culture Newsletter, that the days of the 
great "metanarrative" are over. They reject the story which sees the world-wide 
expansion of the civilization developed in Europe as the master-thread of 
history. '4 Newbigin develops this perspective in a 1992 paper entitled `Mission 
Agenda" where he writes that: 
Beginning from Nietzsche, the postmodernists are telling us that the so-called 
eternal truths are simply products of particular histories. There are no absolute 
eternal truths. there are only stories - ºnetanarratives that make rival claims to 
authority in human affairs. The European narrative is only one among many, 
and as the recent responses to the five hundredth anniversary of the painful 
discovery of Christopher Columbus by the peoples of the Americas have 
reminded us, this narrative is now widely contested. ' 
In these places, Newbigin"s basic understanding of the postmodern 
viewpoint as a rejection of the concept of `metanarratives' is further defined in 
two ways. Both of them may be described as `Nietzschean' in the sense that they 
represent Nietzsche's thought as it has been developed by postmodern writers 
like Foucault. The first is that postmodernity understands `eternal truths' to be 
simply `products of particular histories'. and the second is that the advocacy of 
Purely as a matter of linguistic usage, he uses the word-group 'postmodern' (with various 
suffixes) twenty times in his writings, and the word-group 'post-modern' (with various 
suffixes) thirty times. The phrase 'post modern' (without hyphen) occurs once. 
Newbiain I 992c: 1. For the idea of postmodernity as the rejection of metanarrative, see also 
Newbi-in 1993b: 343: 1995d: 27: 1997c: 4: 1998: 151. 
Newbi<gin 1992h: 187. 
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`master" narratives opens up the likely charge that they represent an abuse of 
power. 
This interpretative framework is further clarified in his 1993 article, 
`Religious Pluralism: a Missiological Approach'. ' Here he describes the term 
`post-modernism' as `somewhat slippery', but argues that it is `easy to identify 
the movement of thought which it denotes'. 7 In what follows, the same features 
are outlined as before, but they are now articulated in a more narrowly 
epistemological framework. Accordingly. he writes of `post-modernism' that: 
Its main feature is the abandonment of any claim to know the truth in an absolute 
sense. Ultimate reality is not single but diverse and chaotic. Truth-claims are 
really concealed claims to power, and this applies as much to the claims of 
science as to those of religion. ' 
Claiming Nietzsche as the founding father of the postmodern movement, 
he continues that: 
What Nietzsche and his modern disciples have done is to demonstrate that the so 
called `eternal truths of reason* are in fact products of particular histories. There 
is no such thing as a supra-historical `reason' standing above all actual human 
reasoning, which is always the reasoning of human beings in a particular cultural 
and historical situation. So we do not have any 'eternal truths'; we have only 
narratives of how beliefs and ideas have been born and developed. There is no 
overarching `reason' by which all particular claims to truth might be tested, there 
is only a vast variety of stories. No story can claim `truth' in an exclusive sense. 
Ultimate reality (if such a phrase means anything) is incoherent. This is the 
radical pluralism with which we now have to deal. `' 
Newbigin's interpretation of postmodernity therefore is characterized by 
its identification of the epistemological implications of the rejection of 
Newbigin 1993f. 
Newbigin I993f: 231. 
Newbigin I993f: 231. For the influence of Foucault in this analysis. see Newbigin 1991 d: 2; 
1992d: 1.4,6: 1993b: 343: 1994d: 63: 1995d: 27.73: and 1996c: 9. 
Newbigin 1993f: 232. 
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metanarrative. Newbigin's concerns about the transition to postmodernity 
emerge accordingly along two connected lines of questioning. Firstly, in the light 
of this rejection, is the claim to exclusive truth which Christians espouse any 
longer possible in a radically pluralised context? Secondly, assuming that such 
confession is still possible, how do Christians counter the argument that their 
proclamation amounts to an abuse of power (and therefore is suspect on moral as 
well as ideological grounds)? 
It is these twin themes which effectively dominate Newbigin's 
engagement with postmodernity. In the light of our discussion so far, it is no 
surprise to find that both of them are `epistemologically' focussed - the first 
obviously so. and the second by implication. In order to assess his contribution 
in a postmodern context, it is important to see how he develops arguments in 
response to these questions. 
3.2.1 Knowledge and `radical pluralism' 
The `radical pluralism' that Newbigin describes challenges the epistemic 
status of any truth claim in the postmodern world whether Christian or not. But 
in terms of Christianity itself, if there are no `eternal truths' but only `narratives 
of how beliefs and ideas have been born and developed', '() where does this leave 
religious faith? Is it simply another `localised' narrative with no warrant outside 
the Church, simply one 'story" amongst many? Furthermore, if knowledge really 
is `local', how is the contemporary experience of Christian communities 
10 Newbiwin I993f: 232. 
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epistemically related to the truth status of the historical events witnessed to in the 
Bible? In responding to these questions, Newbigin addresses both the 
`intramural' Christian debate about the relationship between contemporary 
experience and past event, as well as to the wider 'extramural' question about the 
legitimacy of faith within society at large. 
As an example of his response to the former issue, we may refer to his 
argument in a 1991 edition of The Gospel and Our Culture Newsletter, where he 
makes his first published reference to the challenge of postmodernity. 11 Here, the 
issue of relativism is raised by a query from certain `puzzled theologians' as to 
`which of the various brands' of Christianity he is referring to when he describes 
the Christian faith as `public truth'. 12 This question contributes to the danger of 
relativism in Newbigin's view by implying that there is a radical dislocation 
between the variety of contemporary expressions of Christian `faith' and the 
`historical' gospel events that gave rise to them. His reply is that whereas 
`Christianity is constantly changing ... there 
is a Gospel which does not change 
and which provides the bench-mark against which varying brands of Christianity 
have to be assessed. ' 13 
The way in which the Church as part and parcel of a wider culture 
understands its relationship to the gospel as a set of historical events is therefore 
an issue of crucial importance. He proceeds to develop a case which embraces 
both what we might call a `normative', but also a `developing' view of the 
Newbi,, in 1991 a: 1: One of the obvious features of "modern" (as distinct from -post- 
modern") culture is the belief that there is available to us a body of "objective facts", a 
knowledge which is disinfected of all subjectivity. a kind of knowledge from which the 
knowing subject has been eliminated. ' 
Newbioin 199Ia: 1. 
Newbiein 1991a: 1. 
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relationship between culture and history. In this context, Newbigin does not want 
to deny the fact that a culture is constantly developing in its understanding of past 
events through its evolving experiences and ways of thinking - in contrast to the 
`modernist' view that removes the process of knowledge from the realm of 
personal experience. At the same time, he does not want to jettison the belief that 
the gospel events really happened and that - though culturally bound - the 
Christian community can have a real access to them. What emerges in 
Newbigin"s account, therefore, is a way of `knowing" that is bounded on the one 
hand by an adherence to the testimony of the early Christians in the Scriptures 
(which provides the grounds for the historical assurance of belief), and on the 
other by a contemporary community that is continually interpreting and re- 
interpreting those words and events in the context of its present life . 
14 
In defining his response. Newbigin charts familiar territory when he seeks 
to distinguish this approach to knowledge from its Enlightenment alternative. In 
doing so he writes that: 
One of the obvious features of `modern' (as distinct from `post-modern') culture 
is the belief that there is available to us a body of `objective facts', a knowledge 
which is disinfected of all subjectivity, a kind of knowledge from which the 
knowing subject has been eliminated. ' 
These comments about 'post-modernity" and its central tenets, are 
interesting for three reasons. Firstly, they imply that he is more than happy to 
embrace the more 'subjective' approach to 'knowledge' associated with `post- 
14 Newbi-in 1991 a: I: The Church 'cannot merely repeat the words of creed or Scripture; that 
would be to negate the intention of Jesus who did not write a Qur'an but formed a community 
of fallible men and women. It cannot float away from the testimony of those first disciples to 
follow wherever the wind is blowing. It has to bring all the powers which contemporary 
culture may have equipped it to bear on the understanding of "what really happened". And it 
has the promise of Jesus that the Spirit will lead us into the fullness of the truth. ' 
Newbi<gin 1991 a: 1. 
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modern' thinking over against the unrealistic `objectification' of knowledge 
characteristic of modernity. Secondly. they show that `post-modern' assumptions 
about the impossibility of a `detached' form of reason provide Newbigin with yet 
more ammunition with which to attack the basic Enlightenment assumptions 
about concepts like `objectivity' and `neutrality'. In writing therefore that One 
of the obvious features of "modern" (as distinct from "post-modern") culture is 
the belief that there is available to us a body of "objective facts"'. 
"' Newbigin is 
presenting his position as already sympathetic with both the postmodern critique 
of modernity's supposed neutral objectivity and also with postmodernity's 
acknowledgement of the `subjectivity' which should characterize true knowing. 
'7 
Thirdly, it is telling that both viewpoints are fundamentally Polanyian in 
outlook. 18 Significantly therefore, Newbigin"s existing framework which had 
already been in place for some years makes his thinking conducive to certain 
central postmodern assumptions when first he meets them. 
16 Newbigin 1991a: 1. 
17 Newbigin 1991a: I. 
is Polanyi's rejection of 'neutral' standpoints stems from his reaction against the mindset of the 
communist regime in Hungary (from which he had fled) which distanced truth claims from 
the moral responsibilities attached to them. See his essays 'Beyond Nihilism' and 'The 
Message of the Hungarian Revolution' in Polanyi 1969: also 1958: 238-9: 1964: 78-79. Cf. 
also the discussion in Prosch 1986: 13-34. Likewise, his 'subjective' approach to truth and 
his advocacy of the concept of 'personal knowledge' can also be said to have grown out of 
this rejection. It is the outworking of the view that to claim truth involves a personal and 
moral responsibility. Newbigin's reading of Polanyi therefore makes him not only 
sympathetic with postmodernity's 'anti-Enlightenment' reaction toward such neutrality, but 
in addition sympathetic to the postmodern reaction against the abuse of power that often 
accompanies such claims. See Newbigin's discussion of Polanyi's background in Newbigin 
I 995c: 115-6. It is also suggestive that Polanyi. though chronologically prior to the 
contemporary postmodern era, comes from a background of communist oppression whose 
evils also motivated postmodern writers like Foucault or Lyotard in the France of the 1960s. 
This similarity of origin results in an intense suspicion of unifying discourses' in all three 
writers, though each develops his case in different ways. 
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3.2.2 Knowledge as culturally and socially embodied 
If Newbigin's approach to epistemology opens him up sympathetically to 
the force of postmodern insights about the subjectivity of knowledge, he also 
appears to go a step further in accepting the postmodern assumption that all truth 
is- in his own phrase `socially and historically embodied'. 
'9 This concession to 
the postmodern mindset tends to characterize his discussions about the 
legitimising of faith claims within society more generally (what we have called 
the `extramural' aspects of postmodernity's pluralism). 
In this context, the stress on the cultural location of knowledge is an 
insight about the nature of truth that Newbigin subsequently returns to on more 
than one occasion - and with open approval. For example, in a paper delivered in 
Dublin in 1992. he says that when `... postmodernists are telling us that the 
so-called eternal truths are simply products of particular histories', he expresses 
his approval of what is - in effect a reversal of Lessing's dictum. He continues 
by asserting that: 'There is no exercise of human reason that is not socially 
embodied, rooted in a tradition that is carried by a language. * 20 
The `dictum' of Lessing quoted here is his statement that: 'accidental 
truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason. ' 21 By 
it Lessing intended to show that historical witness to past events (such as the 
resurrection) could never be used to establish the truth of Christian faith, so long 
as they were uncorroborated by present experience. 'Faith' and `history' were 
Newbigin I992d: 2. 
Newbi-in I992h: 187. Note again the reference to Polanyi's notion of the fundamental link 
between communal traditions and the vehicle of'lan,, uage' (cf. Polanyi 1958: 269-298). Cf. 
Newbigin's use of this idea elsewhere (e. g., 1977a: 253: 1990s: 6: 1995d: 47). 
From his essay. 'On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power' (reproduced in Chadwick 1956): 
53. 
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separated therefore by an `ugly broad ditch'22 which was necessitated by the need 
for a rational approach to questions about the validity and viability of Christian 
belief. Newbigin's point in quoting Lessing (and `reversing' his dictum) is that 
whereas the outlook of `modernity' established reason as an autonomous arbiter 
of truth, `post-modernity' takes the position that the exercise of `rationality' is 
itself simply the product of a particular way of thinking which has now been 
effectively relativised. All such `truths' are the social and historical product of 
local `narratives', and therefore cannot claim to be universal in their 
truthfulness' . 
This point of agreement with the thinking and assumptions of 
postmodernity is one that Newbigin frequently reiterates. For example, in a 1992 
issue of The Gospel and Our Culture Newsletter he replies to criticisms made 
against an earlier article (entitled The Gospel as Public Truth" 
23) in which he had 
attacked the modernist idea of truths as `timeless statements'. Here he states that, 
In the post-modernist revolt against the Enlightenment Lessing's logic is 
reversed: the so-called eternal truths of reason are in fact products of contingent 
facts of history. ' He then adds significantly: `I cannot help thinking that at this 
point Christians are on the side of the post-modernists. '24 Or, more recently, he 
writes in Proper Confidence, `I have argued (in agreement with the 
postmodernists) that all truth claims are culturally and historically embodied. '2 
Chadwick 1956: 55. The German phrase is 'garstiger breiter Graben'. 
2 Newbigin 1991a. 
Newbi<gin 1992d: 2-3. 
2 Newbigin I995d: 97 (also 73). For further references to Newbigin's concession to the 'post- 
modern' assumptions about knowledge being, socially and historically emnouied, see e. g. 
I 992d: 6: 'The post-modernists, if I understand rightly, have neatly stood Lessing on his 
head. The so-called "eternal truths of reason" are in fact products of particular histories.... 
It seems to me that. at this point, the Christian has to side with the post-modernists against the 
Enlightenment': and 1993f: 233: 'We accept the post-modernist position that all human 
reasoning is socially, culturally, historically embodied. ' 
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This understanding of knowledge owes more to the postmodern idea of 
`localised truth' than it does to the Enlightenment notion about truth's 
timelessness'. What is significant for an understanding of Newbigin's 
positioning is that as far as the cultural transition to posimodernity is concerned, 
he is once more siding with the newer position against the older. In other words. 
he takes the postmodern assault against the assumptions of modernity and adopts 
it as his own. To this extent. therefore. Newbigin not only recognizes the change 
in perspective but identifies himself with it. 
But this acknowledgement by Newbigin of the postmodern insight about 
the localised nature of knowledge raises the question of `relativism' in a more 
acute form. Radical postmodernists argue that it inevitably leads to scepticism 
about any claim to universality in the realm of truth. 26 Newbigin is aware of this 
possible conclusion and addresses it in his lecture on the theme of `Pluralism and 
the Church' at the 2°6 `Gospel and Our Culture Conference' in 1991.27 Here 
again we will follow his argument through before returning to a wider 
assessment. 
In the lecture itself. Newbigin explains that as far as he is concerned, the 
reality of cultural pluralism (that of different cultures living alongside each other 
and claiming authenticity for their actions) raises two related problems. The first 
(the lesser in Newbigin"s eyes) is the issue of ethical behaviour. Can there be 
2( Lyon quotes Foucault's comment that he prefers 'what is positive and multiple, difference 
over uniformity. flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems' (Lyon 1994: 76 
citing Rabinow 1984 without page reference). For a theological espousal of this perspective 
(consciously following Derrida and Foucault), cf. Graham and Walton 1991: 5. who conclude 
their 1991 critique of Newbigin and the 'Gospel and our Culture' movement with the 
judgement: 'Better the sound of many voices than the single and authoritarian voice of the 
Father. It is possible to see exciting new forms of Christian theology emerging from such 
hetero«lossalia and local knowled«es. ' 
2 Held at Swanwick Conference Centre in April of that year. 
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criteria for behaviour beyond those that are provided within each culture? "2 The 
second is more fundamental in Newbigin's opinion and underlies questions about 
the possible cultural relativity of ethics. It is that of epistemology. This he 
frames in the following terms: 
... can there 
be any criterion of truth, or is all claim to knowledge so culturally 
conditioned that we have to live in a world of total relativism? In other words, is 
pluralism fatal to the claim to know the truth? Can there be affirmation of truth 
in a pluralist world, in a world where we have to acknowledge pluralism? '9 
In developing his response to these questions, Newbigin (again relying 
significantly upon the insights of Polanyi) points to the example of the scientific 
community as an appropriate paradigm of an organization `which is pluralist 
without falling into relativism'. 30 The scientific community is pluralist, ' 
Newbigin argues, in the sense that `there is no central control determining who 
shall research into what questions and on what lines. '31 For this reason, he 
argues, it is `pluralist', or `multi-centered. ' He continues: 
But it is not pluralist in the relative sense. If scientists in Tokyo and Cambridge 
come up with different views about the structure of the atom, the Cambridge 
dons do not say well that may be true for them in Tokyo but it is not true for 
us'. There is a struggle. There is a continuous battle to test. The findings of the 
different scholars are published, they are open to criticism. 32 
Newbigin then proceeds to defend this notion against the charge that the 
`truth' established by this method is finally subjective: 
... 
how are the findings of science saved from subjectivity? Not because their 
truth can be demonstrated from some centre outside the culture of science. Their 
truth is established, if it is, firstly, by the fact that the findings are published, are 
Newbi-in 1991c: 2. 
Newbizin 1991c: 2-3. 
Newbi, -, 
in 1991c: 4. 
Newbigin 1991c: 4. 
Newbigin 1991c: 4. 
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made available to everyone with the belief that if they are true they are true for 
everyone and therefore ... must 
be published; and secondly that the scientist 
takes the responsibility by publishing.... (F)inally the affirmation is tested in 
all kinds of situations. There is no other basis for the claim that science gives us 
true knowledge of what is the case apart from this. " 
The basis for this kind of knowledge is further distinguished from the 
foundationalism offered by the Enlightenment by its rootedness not in a series of 
neutral propositions or `facts', but in a `story', the story of God's dealings with 
the world, recorded in the Bible: 
Now that is a different kind of coherence from the one offered by the 
Enlightenment. lt's a coherence which is centered in a story, and a person, and 
which as we know from our experience in the life of the church makes it possible 
for an immense variety of different cultures and, therefore, different ways of 
understanding the world to live together in mutual trust and confidence. So the 
church is a plural society, but it is not a clueless pluralism. It is not a relativistic 
pluralism. '4 
Newbigin"s use of this Polanyian notion of knowledge as a way through 
the impasse of modernity leads him, therefore, into territory which appears to be 
`postmodern' in that it accepts the principle of `local' knowledge as espoused by 
writers such as Foucault. 35 Newbigin is happy to make this concession as we 
have seen and even counts 'postmoderns' as 'allies' in the argument against the 
`modernist' stress on objectivism. 'Ironically. ' he writes accordingly. `the post- 
modernists could be our allies in protesting against the rationalist impasse. " 36 
Newbigin specifically defends this alliance, for example. as he addresses the 
question of apologetics in a postmodern context. The following words are taken 
Newbigin 1991 c: 5. The available transcript of the lecture leaves some infelicities of style! 
,4 Newbi(-lin 1991c: 7. 
Newbigin refers to Foucault with approval in this context (e. g., Newbigin 1992d: 6. where, 
having, written of postmodernity's belief that: 'The so-called "eternal truths of reason" are in 
fact products of particular histories' he comments that -- as a result '. .. we 
have The 
Genealoge of tiara/s (Nietzsche) and the Archaeology of the Social Screiaces (Foucault). ' He 
concludes that: 'It seems to me that, at this point, the Christian has to side with the post- 
modernists against the Enlightenment'). Cf. also Newbi-in 1995d: 73. 
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from a 1992 paper, given at the Congress of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Missionarischer Arbeit in Hanover. which are indicative of his approach: 
I want to suggest that in our concern to communicate the gospel to our 
European home, we can regard the postmodernists as allies up to a certain point. 
It is the simple truth that all human beliefs about the world are rooted in 
particular histories. Human thought is not disembodied; it is part of human 
history. All of it is historically and culturally conditioned. There is no 
supracultural truth. 37 
In this context: 
Among all the stories that human beings tell about themselves and the world, 
there could be a true story. No logic requires us to deny this possibility. And 
this, of course, is what the Christian Church confesses. We believe and confess 
that there is a true story that gives the clue to the meaning of the whole human 
and cosmic story, because God has chosen a people to be the bearer of the 
meaning of the whole story. This is the story the Bible tells, with its center in 
the incarnation, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Our task is to 
tell this story3ý . 
He makes a similar point in his 1993 article, `Religious Pluralism: a 
Missiological Approach' where once more, he views the postmodern turn as 
supportive in the continuing task of evangelism and apologetics. 39 Here. having 
agreed with the postmodernist position about the cultural embodiment of `all 
human reasoning" and rejecting the Enlightenment illusion that `... there is 
available some kind of neutral stand-point from which one could judge the 
different stories and decide which is true'. 40 he goes on to advocate that in this 
context. the Christian response is one in which. We tell our story, ' even though 
it is only one among the many stories. '41 
'` Newbigin 1992k: 23. 
Newbi(, in 1992k: 202. 
Newbi,, in 1992k: 203. 
Newbigin 1993f. 
40 Newbigin 1993f: 233. 
41 Newbigin 1993f: 233. 
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Newbigin is aware that this position opens him up to the possible charge 
of fideism, 42 but insists that to tell the story is simply a response to a divine 
commission. He writes accordingly that: 
We are commissioned to bring good news, to tell the story of God's marvellous 
and mighty acts for the salvation of the world. We must not withhold this story 
from anyone. To keep it to ourselves, as though it were a private 'in-house' 
story of the Church, as though Jesus were the lord of Christians but not the lord 
of all, would be intolerable sectarianism. We have no right to keep silent about 
4' it, and if we try to do so we deny its truth. 
3.2.3 Knowledge as the `will to power' 
The other aspect of the epistemological question that Newbigin deals with 
as part of the postmodern turn, concerns the use of power. This discussion is 
connected both to his analysis of pluralism. and to his advocacy of the scientific 
community as a prime example of what he describes as a `committed pluralism'. 
By this he refers to its `commitment to search for the truth, a commitment that 
implies the belief that the truth can be known - not fully and completely, but in 
part and with increasing depth and range and coherence'. 44 But the logic of this 
point of view leads inevitably to a position in which the truth claims of the story 
that Christians present are considered to be potentially oppressive by a culture 
42 Newbigin 1993f: 236. 
4 ', Newbigin 1993f: 241. Also, 1992h: 187: 'We stand among all other human beings with their 
different stories to bear witness to what God has done. We do so because we have been laid 
hold of and commissioned to do so. ' 
44 Newbigin 199If: 168. He contrasts this notion with that of'agnostic pluralism' ('a situation 
in which it is assumed that ultimate truth is unknowable and that there are therefore no 
criteria by which different beliefs and different patterns of behavior may be judged. In this 
situation one belief is as good as another and one lifestyle is as good as another. No 
judgments are to be made. for there are no given criteria, no truth by which error could be 
recognized. There is to be no discrimination between better and worse. All beliefs and all 
lifestyles are to be equally respected. ') For a development of these notions see e. g., 1988c: 
168, and 1991 f: 56f., 60f., 85f.. 
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that is deeply suspicious about the abuse of power. If Newbigin wants to uphold 
the idea of the story as public truth' , 
4' does this not amount to an imposition of a 
`regime of truth' (to use Foucault's phrase)? Or as Newbigin himself expresses 
it: 
lt is characteristic of the `post-modern' situation that claims to truth are 
regarded as concealed assertions of power. In this perspective, evangelism is 
seen as an expression of the will to dominate, and dialogue is seen as the 
renunciation of this desire. 46 
Newbigin is sensitive to this aspect of the postmodern critique, not least 
because it so directly challenges his thesis at the point where he wishes to 
establish the `public' nature of truth. and to encourage Christians to publish the 
good news with universal intent'. Indeed, not to do so would represent a denial 
of its intrinsic nature as truth. As he puts it: We have no right to keep silent 
about it. and if we try to do so we deny its truth. '47 So the force of the critique is 
real, and Newbigin understands the nature of it. The `typically post-modern 
situation' he writes, is one in which any statement of truth is examined, not with 
the question, Is it true? " but with the question "whose interests is it serving? " 
"Whose power is it trying to assert? " 48 
There are three stages in Newbigin"s response to this challenge. In the 
first place. he argues that every assertion of 'truth" is actually an expression of 
'power'. 49 As a result. one cannot escape the claim to truth of any and every 
public utterance. In this sense, all narratives carry within themselves the 
45 Newbi-in 1991c: 9. 
"' Newbiýein 1993f: 240. 
" See e. c>., Newbi2in 1993f: 241. 
'x Newbigin 1991 c: 4 (also 3). For further references to the idea of 'truth' statements as 
assertions of power, cf. I988c: 161,170: 1990s: 4; 1991f: 3.29-30: 1996c: 77. 
49 Newbigin 1991 c: 3: 'Affirmations of truth ... are merely assertions of power. 
' 
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potential for oppression, and must therefore be intrinsically and characteristically 
narratives of `power'. 'There are only stories. ' he writes. and the Christian story 
is one among them. These stories are, as the post-modernists correctly perceive, 
also claims to power. ' 50 
But, secondly, Newbigin argues that the relationships involved in the 
process of knowing do not in fact set up the kinds of 'power structures' attacked 
by the postmodernists. The relationship of the Christian `knower' to the object of 
his `knowledge' is not to be characterised as one of `possession'. The Christian 
disciple is by contrast a `seeker' after truth: one who is `invited' or `drawn' into 
further truth, rather than one who takes `possession' of it. Accordingly. the true 
Christian is not a `captor' of truth but one who is taken captive by it. He is on the 
way to an ever-deeper appreciation of the truth through a process of self-giving 
and `indwelling. Newbigin expresses this concept in the following way: 
I find the locus of truth in a story of which I am a part. I see my relation to truth 
as being not that of a possessor but of a seeker who trusts that he is on a path that 
leads to further understanding, but who knows that full understanding of the 
truth is something promised only at the final consummation of the story. ' 
He uses similar language elsewhere: `Truth is a future assurance which beckons, ' 
he writes, not a possession of our own'. 52 Or again: 
Christian discipleship is an exploration - spiritual, intellectual, practical - of the 
real world from this starting point. The `certainty' of a Christian is not (or ought 
not to be) a claim to possess full and unrevisable truth. It is a personal trust in 
one who has proved trustworthy. " 
"' Newbigin 1993f. 233. 
'1 Newbigin 1992d: 7. 
52 Newbigin 1991 e: 2. 
Newbigin 1992a: 2. 
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The concept of `personal' trust in God is therefore irreconcilable with the 
idea of `possession', but involves the altogether different ideas of `relatedness' 
and `fellowship'. Moreover, the claim to `possess' the truth is tantamount to 
godlessness, for it denies the priority of faith as the only grounds for certainty. 
and thereby falls back into a false Enlightenment belief in some kind of neutrally 
objective truth. As he puts it: 
Here is the heart of the matter. A kind of `indubitable certainty' which claims 
to possess knowledge is all part of our alienation from God. The reality is a 
gracious God who leads us into a knowledge of Him by a love which calls forth 
the commitment of faith. Faith is not a claim to indubitable and irreformable 
certainty. It is a personal and total personal commitment to the One who is able 
to lead us into truth in its fullness. '4 
The third level of Newbigin's response to the charge about `power' is to 
argue that although Christianity may rightly be numbered amongst what he calls 
the `master-narratives', it is nonetheless in one vital respect unique'. " 
Its uniqueness can most simply be indicated by saying that from start to finish 
it is marked by the sign of the cross. Every `master-narrative' has an in-built 
tendency to imperialism, because it looks for an intra-historical triumph of the 
truth for which it stands. Christians (God forgive us) have frequently been 
seduced into thinking and acting in precisely this way. But when they are so 
seduced, and we still are, they deny the true story. At the centre of the Christian 
story stands the fact that the incarnate Lord, by whom and for whom all things 
exist, suffered rejection and death. That fact precludes any expectation that there 
can be a total union of truth and power within history. ý6 
3.2.4 Summary 
In the context of the episternological implications of postmodernity"s 
- 54 Newbi<ain 1993b: 350. 
Newbigin 1992d: 8. 
NewbiOn 1992d: 8. also 1993f: 234f.. 
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rejection of metanarrative, therefore, it is by the appeal to the Christian `story' 
that Newbigin seeks to circumvent the challenges posed by the onset of 
postmodern relativism. By doing so, he seeks to maintain the connection 
between the witness of the apostles to the historical gospel events with the 
contemporary witness of Christians today. Moreover, his appeal to the `story' 
also represents a rebuttal of the challenge that such proclamation is an abuse of 
power. For such witness is to be marked by the intrinsic nature of the story itself 
a story of a rejected and crucified Lord, who nonetheless is the only Lord. He 
writes accordingly: 
As I understand it, the Christian claim to be on the way to truth does not rest on 
supposedly infallible `eternal truths' which are indubitable and therefore leave 
no place for the risky exercise of faith, but on the essential reliability of a story, a 
story involving fallible human beings in their response to the call of God, a story 
of which the point has been disclosed in the action of God in the incarnation of 
the Word in Jesus. It is this which gives us the clue for the interpretation of the 
whole story. I suggest (and it would need a long essay to justify this) that this 
way of understanding the truth is alone capable of withstanding the attack of the 
post-modernists and deconstructionists on the possibility of any such thing as 
truth. 57 
3.3 Is Newbigin a `postmodern' thinker? 
How then do we assess the extent to which Newbigin may be regarded as 
a 'postmodern' thinker? To a greater or lesser degree, any estimate of what is 
and what is not `postmodern' carries a large measure of subjectivity. What is 
`postmodern" to one analyst is not to another, depending upon the nature of the 
criteria set forward. So, for example, George Lindbeck is considered 
Newbigin 1991 d: 3. 
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`postmodern" by some, '8 whilst he is considered `ultra-modern", or even 
premodern' by others. ý9 Similarly, a writer like Alasdair Maclntyre is 
considered to be a representative of `"benign" postmodernism' by John 
Milbank, 60 or as providing an example of `postmodern ethics' by Murphy and 
McClendon6' (in both cases because of his commitment to a `communitarian' 
understanding of morality as the only viable framework for understanding the 
nature and function of rational discourse). Other writers - such as David Lyon - 
consider Mac Intyre to be an example of `pre-modernity' because of his appeal to 
an Aristotelian notion of rationality. 62 
Inevitably also, different writers can simultaneously be considered from 
different perspectives and judged accordingly. The two perceptions of MacIntyre 
as being in some senses `postmodern' and in others `premodern', for example, 
may be argued to be equally defensible from his writings, but this observation 
does not necessarily mean that there is a fundamental internal contradiction when 
his work is viewed in an overall perspective. 63 In this sense, writers like 
Maclntyre could be regarded as both `postmodern' and `premodern' depending 
upon the trajectory taken. 64 
58 E. g.. Murphy and McClendon (Murphy and McClendon 1989: 207) consider him 'through 
and through postnmodern'. 
Tilley for example (Tilley 1995: 106) argues that he is 'premodern' rather than 'postmodern' 
because he is still committed to a realist notion of truth. 
60 Milbank 1990b: 326. 
61 Murphy and McClendon 1989: 203: it is postmodern in the degree that his theoretical work 
transcends the individualism of the modern period without falling back into premodern 
modes of thought'. 
62 Lyon 1994: 82 (or Tilley. as above). Lyon places Macintyre in the same category as 
Milbank, only with Augustine substituted for Aristotle. 
See e. g., the discussion of his work in Middleton and Walsh 1995b: 66f.. 
6' Or perhaps better, he sees the only way through the impasse of the postmodern tendency 
towards nihilism is by recovering a premodern narrative discourse of rationality. See further, 
chapter 4. 
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3.3.1 Towards some definitions 
Notwithstanding the multi-faceted nature of this type of analysis (perhaps 
itself inevitable within the contemporary scene), and alongside it the inevitability 
of some measure of subjectivity, we shall follow the framework of Nancey 
Murphy and James McClendon in assessing Newbigin"s work. 6 In their article 
`Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies', they develop what they 
describe as a `three-dimensional conceptual "space"' for mapping `modern' 
thought, and then proceed to 'define postmodern thought negatively by 
describing its departure from modern conceptual "space" defined by these three 
axes. '66 
(i) Modernity 
The style of thought characterized as `modern' is defined by Murphy and 
McClendon along three `tracks' or `axes' an `epistemological axis, a linguistic 
axis, and a metaphysical axis'. 67 These three axes in turn represent `three central 
philosophical theses that have dominated modern thought. '68 These they describe 
as follows: 
The first is epistemological foundationalism the view that knowledge can be 
justified only by finding indubitable `foundational' beliefs upon which it is 
constructed. The second is the representational-expressivist theory of language - 
the view that language must gain its primary meaning by representing the objects 
or facts to which it refers, otherwise it merely expresses the attitudes of the 
speaker.... The third pillar of modern thought is atomism or reductionism - an 
attempt to understand reality by reducing it to its smallest parts. Here we find 
the modern approach to ethics and political philosophy, which sees the 
Murphy and McClendon 1989. 
`'`' Murphy and McClendon 1989: 191. 
`'' Murphy and McClendon 1989: 191. 
`'R Murphy and McClendon 1989: 19?. 
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individual as prior to the community, and the community as merely a collection 
of like individuals, a mass. " 
Epistemological. fotendalionalism 
The roots of `epistemological foundational ism' are traced back through 
the Vienna Circle of the logical positivists to David Hume and the British 
empiricists, and finally to Rene Descartes. However, whilst foundationalism on a 
Cartesian basis implies the possibility of epistemological certainty, it also 
involves the counter image of 'doubt' and a resulting scepticism - particularly 
when the search for certainty breaks down. At the positive end of this axis 
therefore lies an `optimistic' brand of foundationalism (represented by Descartes 
himself) and at the other end a more pessimistic `scepticism' (represented - 
though not without qualification by David Hume). 
Represen/ational-expressivist theories of language 
The second axis of modernity defined by Murphy and McClendon is 
based upon its presupposition that the meaning of language is determined by its 
ability to `represent' the external objects to which it refers. 70 However, not all 
language could however be understood in this sense. Ethical statements for 
example do not `refer' directly to external objects. but rather express the 
emotions' or `attitudes' of their adherents. As a result of this, `expressivisf 
theories of language were also developed to make sense of this further dimension. 
`i° Murphy and McClendon 1989: 192. 
70 Murphy and McClendon 1989: 193f.. 
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These differing approaches to the understanding of language were not as 
polar in their relationship as the `optimistic' and `pessimistic' dimensions of the 
`epistemological' axis. Nonetheless, Murphy and McClendon argue that they are 
related in the sense that, the importance attached to the expressivist theory will 
vary according to one's optimism regarding the ability of the representational 
theory to account for all significant discourse. '71 Descartes represented the early 
form of `representationalism' with Locke and Hume (followed in some respects 
by Bertrand Russell and the `early' Wittgenstein) in a more centralist position - 
straddling both the `representational' and `expressivist' understandings, whilst 
the moral philosopher C. L. Stevenson represented a purer `expressivist' position. 
Individualist-collectivist theories of reality 
The third axis is described by Murphy and McClendon as `individualist- 
collectivist". At its heart, they argue, the Enlightenment project tended towards 
an `atomism or reductionism' by its `attempt to understand reality by reducing it 
to its smallest parts'. 72 This was largely because its primary thinkers sought to 
relocate the locus of authority within the individual, rather than in the external 
authority of the Church or State. As a result of this relocation, the newer 
understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community - in 
the areas of modern ethics and political philosophy for example - `sees the 
individual as prior to the community. and the community as merely a collection 
of like individuals. a mass. '7 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 194. 
2 Murphy and McClendon 1989: 193. 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 192. 
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The roots of this radical form of `individualism' are once more traced 
back to Descartes, whose successors (like Thomas Hobbes) understood the 
individual' as the primary category, and the 'group' or `society' as simply a 
collection or gathering of such individuals. At the other end of this axis stands 
the `collectivist' view (pre-eminently represented in the modern era by Karl 
Marx) who viewed ideas such as `class" or `nation' as the primary social 
category, and therefore as logically prior to any understanding of the individual. 
In concluding this part of their analysis, Murphy and McClendon argue 
that these three `axes' - functioning within the extremes of `foundationalism' and 
`scepticism' in epistemology, 'representationalism' and `expressivism' in 
linguistics, and `individualism" and 'collectivism' in the social sciences - are 
related to one another and define ... a three-dimensional space 
in which modern 
thinkers can be located. ' 74 
(ii) Postmodernity 
On this basis, Murphy and McClendon propose to define as `postmodern', 
any mode of thought that departs from the three modern axes described above 
without reverting to premodern categories. ' 75 
Epistemology 
In terms of epistemology, for example, they argue that the `postmodern' 
reaction can most characteristically be seen in the account of knowledge set out 
74 Murphy and McClendon 1989: 198. 
'' Murphy and McClendon 1989: 199. 
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by Willard Quine, which represents a rejection of earlier forms of 
`foundational ism'. They quote from his Two Dogmas of'Experience (1951) as 
follows: 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters 
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of 
pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience 
only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of 
force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at 
the periphery occasions adjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values 
have to be redistributed over some statements. Re-evaluation of some 
statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical 
interconnections - the logical laws being in turn simply certain further elements '6 of the field. 
In this understandin, an epistemic `system' is self-contained and self- Z7, 
coherent, conditioning the thought patterns and perceptions of its inhabitants. 
When fresh experience at the periphery leads to the formulation of new beliefs, 
the coherence of the `interior of the field' of knowledge may need to be re- 
evaluated and re-adjusted to incorporate the new idea. Consequently, as Murphy 
and McClendon put it: `Postmodern epistemology moves toward a new form of 
pragmatism in attempting to answer the question "Why this network (this 
rearrangement) rather than another? " 77 In this way of thinking, the manner in 
which `facts" are understood is determined by the systems of belief which operate 
within the particular communities concerned. There is no way of extracting them 
from this framework, nor of analysing them outside of the communities in which 
they are upheld. 78 
In a parallel manner, the work of Thomas Kuhn in the philosophy of 
science established the notion that scientific 'facts' are in reality `theory-laden'. 
"' Quoted in Murphy and McClendon 1989: 200. 
-77 Murphy and McClendon 1989: 200. 
79 Cf. our parallel discussion in chapter 1 in relation to h, yotard. 
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and are integrally related to the 'belief systems of the communities out of which 
they emerge. 79 Like Quine, he believed that science is intra-systemically 
`holistic' in the sense that its 'knowledge' (i. e., the sum total of beliefs held 
within its `community') is itself a 'fabric' whose contours are established by the 
assumptions held within the scientific community as a whole. But he built on the 
insights of Quine by his particular interest in what happens when wholesale 
revolutions take place in a community's `fabric' of knowledge. At these 
moments of crisis, when an existing `paradigm' of thought is no longer found to 
be adequate to the challenges it faces, he argued that a `paradigm shift' results 
and a new `paradigm' begins to take its place. 
80 
What is intrinsic to the epistemology of postmodernity therefore is that 
understandings about the `locus' and 'provenance' of knowledge have shifted, 
with older `realist' approaches being replaced by more `localised" conceptions. 
In these. the frameworks of belief inherent within different traditions are 
determinative of what is believed to be true within the community in question. 
Language 
Moving to the connected field of `language', Murphy and McClendon 
illustrate the shift from modernity to postmodernity by contrasting the earlier 
Cf. Kuhn 1970c. Kuhn's thought and its influence on Newbigin is explored in greater detail 
in chapter 4. 
SO E. g., Kuhn I970c: esp. 92-1 10. See e. g., 92: 'Political revolutions are inaugurated by a 
growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing 
institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they 
have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a 
growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, 
that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of 
nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. ' See his references to the 
work of Quine in Kuhn 1970c: vi, 202. 
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work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (in which he attempted to develop a more fully 
`referential' understanding of language) with his later work in the late 1930s and 
1940s. His work in this latter period (along with the speech-act theories of 
J. L. Austin) effectively revolutionised linguistic theory. As a result Murphy and 
McClendon argue that: 
Heretofore, reference had been seen as the key to meaning; from this point on it 
is used of language in discourse. Heretofore the proposition, the bare assertion 
of a fact, had been the paradigm for all language, from this point on, the multiple 
uses of language and its many complex relations to the world, to the speakers, 
and to hearers came to be appreciated. 8' 
In this newer framework, the understanding of language is broadened 
from a purely `representational' basis, and begins to take account of the social 
context in which words are used. Wittgenstein developed this understanding and 
(in contrast to his earlier work) focussed on the idea of languages as being 
themselves `forms of life'. His conception of `language games' explored the 
notion that there is a plurality of ways in which language itself relates to the 
world. `Thanks to Wittgenstein and Austin", write Murphy and McClendon, the 
attempt to understand meaning solely in terms of its representational force has 
generally been abandoned.. 82 In a post-Wittgensteinian world, they conclude 
that: 
... one's point of attack in understanding an age will no longer be the study of its ideas (as it was for Hegel), but the study of grammar - not, say, English 
grammar, but the way in which crucial words such as `knowledge', 'true', `God', 
etc. fit into typical language games. 83 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 201. 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 202. 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 202. 
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Social science 
Finally, turning to the social sciences, Murphy and McClendon argue that 
postmodernity tends to move away from `individualist' notions of morality 
towards what they call a collectivist `corporate metaphysics'. They take Alasdair 
Maclntyre's work as an example of an approach that takes seriously `an 
understanding of corporate life' as the only basis for illuminating notions of 
morality such as `virtue's`' It is in the social realm, rather than in an emphasis 
upon the individual that an understanding of morality has to be focussed. It is 
the traditions of family, profession, tribe, or nation, that determine one's starting 
point in life', and - as a result - it is these that `must be taken into account in 
determining what is or is not virtuous. ' 8' Hence, in a postmodern framework, the 
individual is not logically prior to the community, but is shaped by the role he or 
she performs within the ongoing history of a communal tradition. Maclntyre's 
views therefore `turn away' from the `individualist-collectivist' axis of 
modernity, in the threefold sense that: the individual is not thought to be prior to 
the community; the older polarisation between individual and collective good is 
done away with, and the `generic' understanding of society is abandoned in 
favour of the approach which evaluates the contribution of individuals to the 
collective good. 
3.3.2 Some preliminary observations 
As has already been pointed out, other perspectives and approaches may 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 203F.. 
Murphy and McClendon 1989: 203 (emphasis original). 
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be offered in parallel to those of Murphy and McClendon, but theirs nonetheless 
provides a useful 'grid' with which to analyse Newbigin's work. 96 In the light of 
this framework, therefore, we may now make some preliminary observations 
about Newbigin's `positioning' with respect to both `modern" and `postmodern' 
assumptions. 
(i) Epistemology and the quest for certainty 
In the terms of Murphy and McClendon's definitions, Newbigin's 
approach to the question of epistemology would have to be reckoned as at least 
radically subversive of the `modern' paradigm. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, he repeatedly rejects the Enlightenment framework set out by Descartes 
that sought to provide a certain starting point for knowledge. On one occasion he 
even refers to the new Cartesian starting point' as `a small-scale repetition of the 
Fall'(! ) 97 His indebtedness to Polanyi is nowhere more in evidence than in this 
subversion. From his first reference to the work of the Hungarian philosopher in 
Honest Religion for Secular Man, 88 Newbigin repeatedly eschews a Cartesian 
confidence in the possibility of epistemological `certainty' on Enlightenment 
grounds, and argues instead that knowledge is always furthered in a `fiduciary' 
and communitarian context. In an article explaining how he came to write The 
Other Side of 1984 he acknowledges this debt to Polanyi in the following words: 
86 For more general analyses of the cultural transition between modernity and postmodernity 
and its implications for theological reflection. cf. Allen 1989: 1-19: Bosch 1995: 
Brueggemann 1993: 1-25: Grenz 1995. Griffin 1988. Groothuis 1999: Hille 2000: Lints 
1993; Middleton and Walsh 1995b: Miller 1989: Mohler 1995; Oden 1995. Reader 1997: 
Stiver 1994 and 1995: Tilley 1995. Vanhoozer 1998b and Ward 1997. 
8' Newbi-in 1991 f: 27, adding that he hopes that this view is not overdramatizing'! 
Sy Newbigin 1966: 80ff.. 
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He showed how all true knowledge has both a subjective and an objective pole. 
that faith - so far from being an inferior substitute for knowledge - is the 
precondition of all knowing. ' 89 
But does this therefore make Newbigin a `postmodern' epistemologist? 
We shall explore this issue in more detail below, but here suggest that two 
trajectories on his thought are significant at this level. In the first place, his 
acceptance of the idea (in a manner akin to that of Quine) that ideas and facts are 
part and parcel of the traditions in which they are found is certainly an concession 
to postmodern assumptions about the theory of knowledge. This sets him 
inevitably outside the mainstream of Enlightenment thought and within a line of 
thinking that is potentially `perspectivist' and `relativist'. That Newbigin seeks 
to defend himself against these potential accusations - as we have seen - does not 
negate the fact that in adopting the kind of terminology that Murphy and 
McClendon describe as `holist' (i. e., that knowledge is locally embodied) 
Newbigin must be viewed as at least `moderately" postmodern. 
Accordingly, Douglas Groothuis comments, `Like postmodernists, 
Newbigin emphasizes the dominance of perspectives and interpretations over 
verifiable facts. ' 90 Or, stating the `perspectivist' case from a slightly different 
angle. Harold Netland argues that Newbigin makes `unnecessary concessions to 
fideism'. "l For, by `simply appealing to what is held to be the self-certifying 
nature of one's own faith commitments as the proper criterion by which to 
evaluate other perspectives"" Newbigin"s approach is inadequate for settling the 
99 Newbigin 1985c: 8. 
90 Groothuis 2000: 154. 
91 Netland 1991: 178 
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question of truth. -92 Both writers argue therefore that Newbigin departs 
decisively from what they see as *foundational ist' epistemological premises. 93 
It is clear from observations like these that Newbigin explicitly rejects the 
`modernist' approach to epistemology. but it is also clear that he does not want be 
considered fully `postmodern' either: at least not in the radical sense of writers 
like Foucault who argue that `perspectivisrn' is all there is. For despite his 
attachment to what might be described as a `perspectivist" approach to the 
understanding of knowledge, he is equally clear at various points that such 
`perspectivism' - though real - is not the `final' reality. There is in the revelation 
of Scripture a revelation of the `true' story that transcends individual viewpoints: 
that as he puts it in Jesus the whole meaning of the story is disclosed' . 
94 In 
the light of this, he continues: `... everything else, including all the axioms and 
presuppositions and models developed in all the cultures of humanity, are 
relativized ... 
'ýý This distinction will not satisfy classical foundationalists, who 
will claim that Newbigin is not one of their number, but it nonetheless represents 
Newbigin's own rebuttal of the radical relativist charges, and means that he 
cannot be considered as one of the more radical proponents of postmodern 
epistemology. 
Netland 1991: 179. 
Comments like these (both from evan-, =elical writers) may reflect the fact that much 
conservative evangelicalism (especially in the United States) is itself so embedded in an 
'Enlightenment' methodology (characterised by a Cartesian commitment to propositional 
truth and to an evidentialist strategy of apologetics), that it is prone to be immediately 
suspicious of someone like Newbigin. 
94 Newbi-in 1995c: 88. 
', Newbigin 1995c: 88. 
169 
(ii) Language and `truth' 
A similar conclusion must be drawn in relation to Newbigin's 
understanding of `language". There are two aspects to this judgement, both of 
which owe their inspiration to Polanyi. 
On the one hand, Newbigin's disavowal of the Enlightenment notion of 
`facts' is developed in parallel to his very early view that to speak of God as an 
`external object' is to misconstrue his personal nature. `Christian statements 
about God' he wrote hack in 1966 (after his first encounter with Polanyi's 
Personal Knoivledge) are not comparable with the statements we make about 
objects in the world of things or of ideas, statements, that is to say, about objects 
which we can grasp, manipulate, and even attempt to control' . 
96 As a result of 
this he says that: The language in which a lover addresses his beloved... is not 
the language of scientific observation. " 97 Statements like these immediately serve 
to distance Newbigin from a `formal" agreement with the more scientific 
Enlightenment notions of 'representation'. Personal relationships - the only 
proper context in which to speak of God - will not allow such an understanding. 
In this sense Newbigin clearly breaks away from the `modern' axis. 
Nonetheless, his indebtedness to Polanyi enables him to construe as 
properly objective the language of `religious' knowledge that the Enlightenment 
project had effectively suhjectivised. In his 1995 book Proper Confidence, for 
example. he states that though a supposed `certainty' about faith is impossible, he 
had written the book to assure his readers about the possibility of confident 
`" Newbi-in 1966: 58-9. 
Newbigin 1966: 59. 
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knowledge of God'. " The defence of this confidence is characteristically 
developed in specific relation to Polanyi's conception of `personal knowledge'. 99 
However, it is easier to draw out Newbigin's inherent `sympathies' with 
certain postmodern convictions than it is to identify him wholeheartedly with 
specific postmodern perspectives. For example, in rejecting the Enlightenment 
notion that the `referentiality' of language can only be understood in relation to 
`objects' or `facts', Newbigin moves strictly outside the `modern' paradigm. But 
unlike many postmoderns he still insists on the `referentiality" of religious 
language nonetheless. To speak of God is not in his vocabulary merely the 
expression of a personal opinion. 
The second aspect of Newbigin's material is that his more specific 
discussions of the nature of language are also developed along Polanyian lines. 
For example, he follows Polanyi in advocating not only that traditions are passed 
on via the medium of language, 10° but also that language is therefore to some 
extent `constrained', or 'boundaried' by the tradition in which it is used. As 
examples of this latter dimension one could quote his statements that, `the full 
sense of the word depends on the culture in which the language has been 
shaped'; '()' or We can only use them as part of a language which is shaped by 
the experience of a whole people. ' 1 02 
As with the previous aspect, therefore, it emerges that Newbigin's 
'positioning' is difficult to categorise with clarity. On the one hand he adheres 
98 Newbiuin 1995d: 39. 
Newbigin 1995d: 39f.. For similar discussions. Cf. I994d: 68-9: I996c: 20ff.. 
10° See further our earlier discussion of Newbigin on this issue in sections 2.2.1 (i), 2.3.3 and 
3.2.2. 
'°' Newbigin 1989f: 29-30. 
10' Newbigin 1989f: 34. Cf. also Newbigin 1990s: 6: Newbigin 199If: 46: Newbiain 1995d: 49- 
51. 
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to some extent to the Wittgensteinian view about the boundaried nature of 
language. On the other, he clearly does not consider these language boundaries 
to be 'final'. 103 If he did. his calls to proclaim Christian truth to the world would 
be a contradiction in terms. 
(iii) `Collectivism' and the social location of truth 
Newbigin's approaches to the questions of `epistemology' and `language' 
cohere in further statements of his which fall broadly within the third `axis', 
relating to the role of communities in the corporate development of 
understandings of `truth" and -morality. 
We quoted earlier, for example, his statement that: `There is no exercise 
of human reason that is not socially embodied, rooted in a tradition that is carried 
by a language. ' 104 Here he links together convictions about the social 
embodiment of knowledge, the `embeddedness' of that knowledge in traditions 
that nurture it, and the understanding that `language' is the `carrier' which 
expresses this knowledge and passes it on from generation to generation. These 
ideas again find their roots in Michael Polanyi's thinking - which Newbigin 
Though he is in some sympathy with Wittgenstein's views at this point, Newbigin himself 
never refers to him specifically, deriving his convictions from Polanyi. For the connections 
between Polanvi and Wittgenstein. see Daly 1968. 
104 Newbigin 1992h: 187. 
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alludes to in his 1966 book, Honest Religion for Secular Man, 
'()' and picks up 
again in The Gospel in a Pluralist Culture at the end of the 1980s. 
106 
Newbigin is firmly committed therefore to the view that there is no such 
thing as a `view from nowhere'. 107 All expressions of ethics and morality have a 
'context'. There are no universal, abstract norms for human morality or 
behaviour that are not dependent upon the context of the communities within 
which they were developed and in which they gain coherence and meaning. 
From this perspective, Newbigin is firmly within the `postmodern' axis described 
above by Murphy and McClendon - particularly in relation to his following of 
Maclntyre. It was Polanyi who undoubtedly opened him up to these insights, and 
it was Maclntyre who helps him to develop them. The question as to whether 
they help or hinder his missionary objectives will be discussed when we analyse 
Maclntyre's influence below. 108 
(iv) Newbigin's `self-positioning' 
In terms of Newbigin's self-positioning with regard to postmodernity, we 
would argue therefore that his attitude towards it is one of `qualified' acceptance. 
Its assumptions are never taken onboard uncritically by him. Statements such as. 
10 Newbigin 1966: 81 (in the context of a discussion that is expressly indebted to Polanyi): 'One 
cannot even speak a sentence without accepting provisionally the framework of thought 
which this language expresses and which is itself the result of the particular history of the 
people who speak it. ' Cf. Polanyi 1958: 112: 'In learning to speak, every child accepts a 
culture constructed on the premises of the traditional interpretation of the universe, rooted in 
the idiom of the group to which it was born, and every intellectual effort of the educated 
mind will be made within this frame of reference. ' 
Newbigin 1989f: 53, or 82: 'No reasoning is possible except by the use of language, and 
language expresses the way in which a particular body of human beings has learned to grasp 
and cope with the world. ' These ideas are also linked in Newbigin's later interaction with 
Alasdair Maclntyre which we discuss below. 
107 A phrase popularised by the title to Thomas Nagel's book (Nagel 1986). 
ýýýs Section 3.4.1 (ii). 
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`... at this point Christians are on the side of the post-modernists', 
1°9 `In this I 
am wholly with the post-modernists', 
110 `Ironically the post-modernists could be 
our allies in protesting against the rationalist 
III impasse' II or `Since the article ... 
represents a post-modernist perspective, there is no point in pursuing this 
particular issue. 112 all clearly suggest that whilst he is willing to go along with 
some central postmodern postulates, he nonetheless distances himself from the 
logical implications and more radical conclusions of postmodernity at certain key 
points. 
These `cut-off points can be illustrated by returning to the key debate 
about `radical pluralism" discussed earlier. Here, although he concedesto the 
postmodern position about the cultural embodiment of knowledge, he is at the 
same time insistent that to accept this position is not to go the whole way with the 
more radical postmodernists. 
This can be shown quite clearly, for example, in the article in which he 
replies to the critique made by Elaine Graham and Heather Walton of the Gospel 
and Our Culture movement. ' 13 Here Newbigin clearly and specifically draws 
back from this more radical `postmodern' position. Graham and Walton accuse 
him of narrowing the focus of the Enlightenment by describing its effects in 
purely epistemological terms. They argue instead that the revolution in 
knowledge that it brought about was driven by wider cultural factors (embodied 
by the Industrial Revolution as a whole) rather than simply by certain `esoteric' 
109 Newbigin 1991d: 3. 
1 10 Newbigin I992d: 2. 
... Newbigin 1992k: 23. 
Newbi-in 1992d: 3. 
Newbigin I992d, responding to Graham and Walton 1991. Cf. Reader 1993 for a response to 
both articles. 
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philosophical concerns about the nature of `truth' and the status of' knowledge". 
In other words, from their perspective, the Enlightenment was in more general 
terms `culturally - rather than simply `philosophically' - 
driven. 114 At one point 
in his reply, Newbigin significantly accuses Graham and Walton of getting `very 
near to suggesting' not only that 'all human rational discourse is socially and 
historically embodied' (which he agrees with), but also that therefore 'human 
reasoning is simply a product of social or economic forces' (which he rejects). 
11 
He continues: 
When they say that the Enlightenment was not primarily an epistemological 
movement, but the work of social forces such as the industrial revolution, they 
come near to making dialogue pointless, since if truth-claims are sociologically 
determined then dialogue is pointless and the only reality is power. 'I 
Newbigin's point about the location of knowledge is significant precisely 
because it highlights the distinction that he draws between his acceptance of the 
fact that `a11 human rational discourse is socially and historically embodied' (a 
postmodern position), but his rejection of the logical conclusion of this position: 
that `human reasoning is simply a product of social or economic forces"' 
7 (a 
radical postmodern position). 
For Newbigin therefore, whilst the `traditions of rationality' may be seen 
as systems of thinking and acting that are dependent upon the particular cultures 
in which they operate. `rationality as such is a human faculty that transcends 
whatever cultural form it takes. This `rationality' is integrally connected for 
114 Graham and Walton 1991: 2-3. Though they do not specifically acknowledge this. their 
analysis is much indebted to Lyotard's views on the revolution in the field of'knowledgge' in 
the wake of the transformations brought about by the phenomena of postindustrialism and 
postmodernism. 
Newbigin 1992k: 2. 
1" Newbigin 1992k: 2. 
" Newbi<gin 1992k: 2. 
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Newbigin with the human search for `truth', and its employment is entirely 
proper when pursued responsibly. As he puts it in a 1992 paper, `There is no 
supracultural truth. But this does not mean that there is no such thing as truth. It 
does not mean that we abandon the claim to know the truth. ' 
118 This view about 
the nature of things is seen as entirely compatible with an understanding and 
acceptance of cultural 'pluralism' if that pluralism is one in which such honest 
and responsible searching can take place. As he explains: 
The acceptance of this fact of plurality must not be confused with acceptance 
of the ideology of pluralism if that means the abandonment of the human 
responsibility to seek and know the truth. There is a proper kind of pluralism 
which affirms the freedom of people to seek for truth without being coerced, 
although this freedom is empty unless it is combined with a sense of 
responsibility to a cultural tradition. But a pluralism which simply abandons the 
struggle to distinguish truth from falsehood can only lead to the kind of society 
to which we are sadly becoming accustomed in the `developed' world -a society 
which loses any sense of meaning and therefore can find no higher goal than the 
multiplication of amusements. ' 19 
If Newbigin's self-positioning in relation to postmodernity is therefore 
best described as one of 'qualified' acceptance, a second observation is that (as 
with his responses to `modernity') they reveal Newbigin's method as one which 
is consciously pursued as being independent of prevailing cultural trends. It is 
intriguing that someone who argues for the cultural embodiment of knowledge, 
can so easily disengage himself for the purposes of cultural critique(! ). This 
highlights a tension between the -objective' and 'subjective' poles of his cultural 
1 18 Newbiýgin 1992f: 202. 
11' Newbigin I 993f: 240. It remains a central tension in Newbigin's thought as to quite what is 
understood by the idea of'rationality' if this is to be distinguished from the kind of reasoning 
that Newbigin rejects as Enlightenment 'rationalism'. For example, how is this 'rationality' 
to be employed by an individual without sonne element of judgement taking place between 
rival religious notions of'truth' and 'error'? On what basis such 'judgements' are to be made 
is not clear. Ultimately, they appear to force Newbigin into a 'fideist' position from which, 
on the basis of his arguments. it is difficult for him to escape. We shall explore this in greater 
depth in the following chapter. 
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approach to mission to which we will return. On the other hand, it is indicative 
of his approach as a whole that he so consciously attempts his critique from a 
basis that is ultimately thought to be independent of culture (i. e., that of the 
gospel). As a result, though the trajectory of his critique of postmodernity may 
differ from his response to modernity, one could argue that its fundamental 
method of approach does not. 
This observation leads naturally to the need for an examination of the 
roots of the arguments which he deploys in a postmodern context, to which we 
now turn. 
3.4 Newbigin and postmodernity: the roots of engagement 
When one traces the origins of Newbigin's interaction with the 
`postmodern' challenge, it becomes clear that his reasoning is not newly `minted' 
as a result of an engagement with the challenges of postmodernity alone, but 
represents the development of arguments that he had previously deployed in the 
context of `modernity'. We shall now set out to explore this derivation - 
particularly in relation to the `social and historical embodiment' of knowledge - 
before returning to and concluding our assessment of Newbigin's contribution to 
a `postmodern' missiology. 
The fact that his willingness to accede - at least to some extent - to the 
`postmodern" position about the cultural embodiment of knowledge can be shown 
to be nothing `new' in Newbigin's thought. In his reply to Graham and Walton's 
critique of the Gospel anti Our C'idlanre movement. for example. we noted 
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Newbigin's insistence that his arguments at this level were not newly formulated, 
but rather had always represented his position. Here he writes: 
I thought that I had always made it clear that I accept the big element of truth in 
this. It has been one of my ºnain, too often repeated, affirmations that the idea of 
a disembodied rationality is an illusion; that all human rational discourse is 
socially and historically embodied. In this I am wholly with the 
post-modernists. 
We will now proceed to examine the origin of this idea with special 
reference to the work of Peter Berger and Alasdair Maclntyre. This discussion 
relates to the ongoing development of the thesis at three levels. 
At a first level, it expands our analysis in chapter 2 about Newbigin's 
fundamental indebtedness to Polanyi's thought. It shows how Polanyi's material 
about the role of the community in the acquisition and passing on of knowledge 
via language and tradition - which were already in place when Newbigin came to 
write Honest Religion for Secular Man in 1966 - are now broadened in scope. 
Newbigin incorporates from the field of the `sociology of knowledge' Peter 
Berger's notion that it is the 'plausibility structures' operating within a culture 
that determine what is perceived to be `true' within that culture. In addition, from 
his interaction with Alasdair Maclntyre, Newbigin expands the discussion of the 
way in which the 'rationalities' which are embodied within historical traditions 
can be said to contribute to the development of those traditions. as well as to 
interact with rationalities of rival traditions. 
At a second level. closely connected with the first, our discussion 
'10 Newbigin 1992d: 2. Even by the original publication of The Open Secret in 1978, his 
rejection of such neutral vantage point is referred to as a 'wearisome reiteration' (Newbigin 
I 978b: 190). In this context, cf. also. 1969: 71: 'there is no standpoint which is above all 
particular standpoints. A man can only see things from where he is' (also 32): and I977b: 8: 
'we have no standpoint which is above all standpoints. ' 
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demonstrates that the contours of the theoretical stream into which both Berger 
and Maclntyre contribute insights had already been established by Newbigin's 
prior concession to vital elements in the Polanyi thesis. On purely historical 
grounds, Newbigin's formal interaction with Polanyi pre-dates his reading of 
either Berger or Maclntyre by nearly twenty years. 121 But conceptually also, it is 
a Polanyian framework that provides the structure into which Newbigin 
incorporates the insights of both writers. In the case of Maclntyre, for example, 
Newbigin specifically acknowledges this when he explicitly grounds his 
discussion of MacIntyre"s work in The Gospel in a Pluralist Culture 
122 in a 
previous discussion of Polanyi's view of the way in which the `tradition of 
rationality' operates within the scientific community. 123 By doing so, he shows 
that what he learns from MacIntyre is in line with - and builds upon -a basic 
Polanyian structure that is already in place. Therefore, nothing in Newbigin's 
writings which is specifically derived from Maclntyre can be shown to take him 
in a direction not already suggested by Polanyi. 
A similar case can also be made for the theoretical relationship between 
Polanyi and Berger in Newbigin's thought. This is seen especially in the way in 
which Newbigin uses Berger's concept of `plausibility structures'. More will be 
said about this in the following chapter where we will suggest that Newbigin's 
prior reading of Polanyi has influenced his explicitly `philosophical' 
His first mention of Berger is in 1983b: 12: and of Maclntyre is in I986b: 26, following 
Newbigin's reading of. -Ifier Finne. 
122 Newbi-in 1989f: 55-65. 
Newbigin 1989f: 43-48. Also 53. where, in the introduction to his specific interaction with 
Macintyre. Newbigin links this discussion with Polanyian themes that had come earlier 
('What was said in the previous chapter about the role of tradition in science helps us to 
recognize that all use of reasoning depends on and is embodied in a tradition'). 
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interpretation of what for Berger was originally an essentially sociological 
term. 124 
At a third level, our discussion of both Berger and Maclntyre contributes 
to the ongoing argument of the present chapter both by enabling us to examine 
the inherent strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions as Newbigin 
adopts and develops them, and also by helping to determine the extent to which 
Newbigin by his interaction with their respective arguments may be said to be 
anticipating and addressing the postmodern transition. 
3.4.1 Berger and `plausibility structures' 
It is clear from Newbigin's publications that Peter Berger's writings 
became familiar to him in the early 1980s. Berger is first quoted (twice) in 
1983,125 but by the publication of Foolishness to the Greeks in 1986, the study of 
his `sociology of knowledge' had clearly made an impression on Newbigin. Here 
he argues. for example, that: 
Contemporary exponents of the sociology of knowledge have made us 
familiar with the fact that our sense of what is real is, to a large extent, a function 
of the society in which we live. It is almost impossible for an individual to deny 
steadily the reality of things that society regards as real, or to affirm the reality of 
things that society regards as illusions. The plausibility structures that largely 
control our perception of what is the case are socially produced. 126 
Newbigin adopts and uses Berger"s notion of `plausibility structures", but 
actually claims to go a step further than Berger in his analysis and application of 
I2 See below, section 4.2.2. 
Newbigin 1983b: 12, and 1983a: 12 (footnote 28). 
126 Newbigin I986b: 54. For later references to this central insight of Berger (and to Newbigin's 
adoption of it), see e. g.. 1989f: 64: I993a: 90: 1994d: 80: and I996c, 51. 
180 
them. Berger, he argues, develops the notion that the plausibility of beliefs 
within Western culture has entirely broken down, and that as a result of this there 
is no `plausibility structure' operating within contemporary Western culture. As 
a consequence. people are - by obligation -choosers' of what and what not to 
believe, and are inevitably pluralist in their assumptions about the nature of 
`reality as a result. His claim argues Newbigin - is that as a result of this, they 
make such choices in a kind of `plausibility' vacuum. 127 Newbigin for his part 
accepts the basic premise that in modern Western culture there has been a 
breakdown of plausibility, but in Foolishness to the Greeks he takes Berger's 
analysis a stage further by applying it to Berger's position itself. He writes 
accordingly: 
My point here is simply this: while Berger correctly shows how the traditional 
plausibility structures are dissolved by contact with this modern worldview, and 
while lie correctly reminds us that the prevalence and power of this world-view 
gives no , round for believing it to be true, lie does not seem to allow for the fact 
that it is itself a plausibility structure and functions as such. It is not that there is 
no socially accepted plausibility structure and thus we make our own choices. 
This is the ruling plausibility structure, and we make our choices within its 
parameters. 128 
As a consequence of this. Newbigin concludes that Berger's own adoption 
of what he describes as an `inductive' approach to the reaffirmation of religious 
belief in the wake of modernity is itself dictated by the reigning `plausibility 
structure' that militates against the acceptance of any culturally-transcendent 
form of truth. `Berger"s inductive method of dealing with the phenomenon of 
See Newbi-in l986b: 10-20 for Newbigin's analysis of Berger's position - as set out in 
Berger 1980. 
Newbigin 1986b: 13-14 (emphasis orig ). ýinal 
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religion', he writes accordingly, is itself part of this plausibility structure. ' 
129 Or, 
writing the following year, he argues that within Western culture: 
... the operative principle 
is pluralism, respect for the freedom of each person to 
choose the values that he or she will live by. Here, plainly, is the real 
plausibility structure which controls our culture and within which Berger himself 
operates, and which he takes for granted. His choice of the inductive method for 
dealing with religious truth-claims belongs to this plausibility structure. 
130 
Newbigin's interaction with Berger's work is complex, on the one hand 
accepting and adopting his insights into the nature of plausibility, whilst on the 
other, seeming to suggest that the rigorous adoption of Berger's method leads to 
an endless relativity. As a result, conclusions about Newbigin's own views are 
inevitably tied to questions about the extent to which he is following Berger at 
this point, and therefore the nature of the inter-relationship of ideas between the 
two needs to be explored in more detail. This work needs to be done. for 
example, before drawing the possible conclusion that Newbigin is `reductionist' 
in his epistemology insofar as he is understood to be. following Berger. 
The first step in unravelling this relationship is to determine exactly what 
Berger himself means by his use of the concept of `plausibility' in relationship to 
the idea of verification. Analysis of this is complex because Berger"s relationship 
with his own work is itself complicated. Some argue that Berger's approach 
leads him inevitably to a reductionist position with regard to the possibility of 
'truth'. Robert Wuthnow, for instance, argues that because Berger suggests that 
the `reality' of religion must be explained in terms of the social conditions within 
which it arises. there remains an inevitable tendency in his writing towards an 
Newbigin 1986b: 14. 
Newbigin 1987a: 359. See also his comments in 1988b: 3 1: and his parallel deconstruction 
of the historical-critical method in 1995d: 84. 
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epistemological reductionism. He argues that those who reject Berger's 
`functionalist' understanding of religion and who want to argue for a more 
`substantivist' position (that religion is an autonomous cultural system `shaped 
strictly by its own inner structure and meanings"), will `inevitably charge that the 
idea of plausibility structures opens the door for a type of sociological 
reductionism which explains away the reality of religion by attributing it to social 
conditions. ' 131 tie concludes that, `There is some basis for this charge, given the 
fact that Berger seems to treat plausibility structures as somehow prior to, or 
more basic than. the religious beliefs they make plausible. ' 13` 
Some of Berger's writing does indeed seem to suggest this. He states, for 
example, in his 1970 book A Rumour ofAngels, that `Sociology ... raises the 
vertigo of relativity to its most furious pitch. posing a challenge to theological 
thought with unprecedented sharpness. ' 133 Moreover, in The Social Reality of 
Religion, published at around the same time, he argues that: 
... sociological theory must, 
by its own logic, view religion as a human 
projection, and by the same logic can have nothing to say about the possibility 
that this projection may refer to something other than the being of its 
projector. "' 
This clearly sounds the kind of language that is in tune with postmodern 
assumptions about the social location of knowledge. By implication then, if one 
adopts the view that Newbigin is following Berger in his understanding of 
`plausibility' (and therefore of verification), then Newbigin himself must 
logically be associated with the same conclusions. In relation, therefore, to his 
I'll Wuthnow 1986: 136. 
Wuthnow 1986: 136. Cf. also Wuthnow 1992: 9-35 for a fuller analysis of Berger's work. 
Bergger 1970: 47. 
ý'ý Bergger 1969: 180-1. 
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deployment of Berger's arguments in a postmodern context, this would place 
Newbigin firmly in the `perspectivist' camp - making the assumption that truth 
has no reference or legitimation outside the `plausibility structures" that enable 
inhabitants to perceive certain things to be `true' for them. 
However, Berger's own position needs to be carefully construed before 
conclusions may be drawn about his `followers'. To state our own conclusions at 
the outset, we shall argue that Berger himself does not ultimately adopt a fully 
`perspectivist' position and neither does Ncwbigin by following him. We shall 
construct the further argument that this presents holh writers with problems in the 
area of legitimation, and that the resulting tensions in Newbigin's thought may 
ultimately be said to mirror those of Berger. 
Firstly, as far as Berger himself is concerned, it is clear that the concept of 
`plausibility structures' is meant to function as an 'analytical' rather than as an 
evaluative' tool. That is to say, as a `sociologist of knowledge' he uses it to 
analyse social systems of thought and belief along with the processes by which 
they are held. But he does not use it as an evaluative tool which aims to draw 
conclusions about the ultimate truthfulness of the beliefs thus analysed. In 
discussing the limits of the sociological approach he states, for example, that: 
The most important limit is that any question about the ultimate truth or error of 
the theological positions under consideration must be rigidly excluded from the 
analysis. When it comes to such questions of truth or error, the most that 
sociology can do is to make one aware of the sociohistorical relativity of one's 
own cognitive presuppositions ... 
1', 
A crucial distinction therefore is made by Berger between `reality' 
understood as `fact' or 'truth', and 'reality' understood as `those things perceived 
I" Berger 1979: 223. 
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by the man in the street'. In his view, the investigation of the former is properly 
only the domain of the philosopher (or theologian). whilst the investigation of the 
latter is properly the domain of the sociologist. Berger's analysis of the social 
structures of belief as a sociologist is therefore distinct from any evaluation he 
(or others) might make with regard to whether or not they are ultimately `true'. 136 
Such judgements, he argues, would require a different disciplinary approach. 
Nevertheless, he insists that the sociological approach is a useful one on its own 
grounds, and that the `dynamics' of the idea of `plausibility structures' `pertains 
irrespective of whether, by some outsider observer's criteria of validity, the 
notions thus made plausible are true or false. ' 137 To argue, therefore, that Berger 
is `reductionist' in the application of the idea of `plausibility structures' is to 
misappropriate his own intentions as a `sociologist of knowledge' and to apply 
criteria that he himself has already excluded. 138 On this basis, the concept of 
plausibility structures' was never intended to provide answers to questions about 
ultimate `truthfulness'. 
In seeking now to understand Nev. 'bigin 's use of Berger's concept of 
`plausibility structures', two points need to be explored. In the first place, his 
contention that Berger himself is operating within a powerful `plausibility 
1 36 See Berger's crucial distinction between these terms in Berger and Luckmann 1967: 13f.. Cf 
also his later statement that: 'sociology and theology are two distinct disciplines, with 
severely discrete relevance structures. Sociology has no choice but to bracket the ontological 
status of religious affirmations, all of which. insofar as they are properly religious, are 
beyond the range of empirical availability. Theology ... makes no sense whatever unless 
these brackets are removed' (Berger and Kellner 1982: 90, emphasis original). 
Berger 1970: 52. 
38 Berger himself defends the position - described as 'dual citizenship' which holds together 
in one person both a 'sociological' approach to the study of religion, and at the same time an 
active personal faith (e. (-,., Bergger and Kellner 1982: 87 in the context of 85ff. ). For a 
discussion of this 'dual-citizenship' approach. cf. Ahern 1999. For a defence of Berger 
against the charge of reductionism, cf. Guinness 2000: 34f., or Groothuis 2000: 101, who in 
assessing Berger's 'sociology of knowledge', states that: 'Many postmodernists take insights 
from this field of study and combine it with a worldview that renders truth impossible. 
However, this is not justified on the basis of the discipline itself ..... 
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structure' that he doesn't acknowledge highlights a tension within Berger's 
thought itself, and shows that Newbigin is aware of its implications. It is the 
tension between the `localised' nature of plausibility and the possibility that this 
can be 'transcended" in some way. Berger himself appears both to be aware of 
this tension, yet remains unaffected by it in practice. On the one hand he makes 
it clear in Rumour of Angels that though the tendency within the discipline of the 
`sociology of knowledge' is to end up relativizing everything in sight, he himself 
argues (in a chapter entitled `Relativizing the Relativizers' 13`9) that the process by 
which this happens may itself be relativized. One (perhaps literally) redeeming 
feature of sociological perspective'. he writes, is that relativizing analysis, in 
being pushed to its final consequence, bends back upon itself. The relativizers 
are relativized, the debunkers are debunked - indeed, relativization itself is 
somehow liquidated. " 140 Berger shows therefore that he is aware at one level of 
the relativizing nature of his own methodology, and of the potential weakness 
that accrues to his overall position. 
But does this commitment erase the possibility for Berger of any `supra- 
cultural' judgements in religious matters? Apparently not. Towards the end of 
The Heretical Imperative, he makes the retrospective comment that `... none of 
the foregoing was based on a Christian faith commitment'. ' 41 But he continues 
by stating that: `In conclusion, however. it may be appropriate to give up this, as 
it were, theoretical asceticism and to make some observations from an explicitly 
Christian standpoint. ' 141 The resulting 'standpoint" emerges as the conviction for 
" Berger 1970: 43-65. 
140 Berger 1970: 59. 
141 Berger 1980: 181. 
112 Berger 1980: 181. 
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Berger that it is the core contents of the Christian message' that `provide the 
fullest and most adequate interpretation of one's own experience of God, world. 
and self. ' He goes on to state that `Christian faith here means to express the 
conviction that the universe ultimately makes sense in the light of Sinai and 
Calvary. ' 143 
Here then is Berger's `theological' perspective set alongside the 
`sociological'. They are two different approaches to the question of 
epistemology. But the question remains as to whether his theoretical framework 
does not create an unresolved tension between them. For how is it possible to 
transcend the `relativized' culture of which one is a part, in order to make the 
judgement that Christian faith is truer than - say - Muslim or Hindu faith? 
Berger's answer in The Heretical Imperative is that this comparative analysis can 
only be done on the basis of a culturally-transcendent `rationality', a process 
which he describes in the following words: the only way of beginning to tell 
"true" from ``false" religious experience is to weigh the insights purporting to 
come from the experience on the scale of reason. "44 This, he insists, is not the 
stance of Enlightenment rationalism with regard to religion' for the `core of the 
religious phenomenon ... 
is beyond all rationality. ' He continues: 
But, inadequate as this may be for the deeply rooted human urge for `infallible 
credentials' in this area, nothing better can be suggested than sober rational 
assessment in the matter of finding criteria for distinguishing `true' religious 
experience from its flawed imitations. ' 
With this in mind, there are two points to be made about Newbigin's 
14 13, Berger 1980: 182. 
144 Berger 1980: 148. 
14, Bergger 1980: 148. For a negative discussion of Berger's position see e. g., Gaede 1986: for a 
more positive assessment. cf. Ahern 1999: esp. 91ff.. 
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observation - referred to above - that Berger's method needs to 
be applied to 
Berger himself. Firstly, it shows that he is aware of this central tension in 
Berger 's thought between the acceptance that `plausibility' is localised (and that 
therefore everything can be relativized), and the argument that there is in 
existence a `transcending rationality' that somehow operates above these 
constraints. 
But, secondly, the crucial point of this whole discussion is that Newbigin 
is not so aware that his own methodology is open to the same critique as the one 
he applies to Berger. As a result, in parallel to Berger, his own use of the concept 
of `plausibility structures' must be said ultimately to mirror Berger's distinctions 
between `sociological' and `theological' approaches to `truth'. Like Berger, 
Newbigin wants to defend both the essentially `localised' nature of plausibility, 
but at the same time he seeks to defend the notion that there is a `rationality' that 
transcends this context. Like Berger, therefore, he distinguishes observations 
about the localised nature of knowledge from any attempt to argue either that all 
methods which enquire after `truth' are thereby also relativized, or that the 
truthfulness of `beliefs' thus sustained is also relative. For Newbigin also then, 
there is a vital sense in which human reasoning transcends the local situation. 
But whereas Berger"s appeal at this point is to an `inductive' approach to 
the possibility of religious faith (entailing what he describes as a rational 
`contestation" between the different religions of the world' 46'), Newbigin's appeal 
in this context is to the pre-eminence of the Biblical story over all others. In his 
article 1992 article `Way Out West', for example, he states accordingly that: 
146 For Berger's discussion of this idea, cf. Berger 1980: 157-189. 
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Ironically the post-modernists could be our allies in protesting against the 
rationalist impasse. I say that it is an impasse because the rationalists insist that 
everything must be in the form of a timeless statement. But whenever they set 
themselves to formulate such a statement, it only becomes evident that such a 
statement is itself a product of the times. So where is the eternal? I see an 
alternative in the narrative, the gospel story. There is the story which conveys 
eternal truth. I think we must regain a proper appreciation for the truth that can 
be conveyed in story. 14' 
But the sane tension applies here as it does to Berger"s thesis. On the one 
hand there is commitment to the localised nature of both the exercise of human 
rationality, and also to the cultural embodiment of the structures and systems that 
make beliefs possible. On the other hand, there is the commitment to an idea of 
`truth' - and its accessibility - that transcends this localised context. The key 
question remains for Newbigin (as it does for Berger): how is it possible to verify 
that the claim to know the kind of `truth' which transcends cultural locality is not 
itself a manifestation of another form of `localised' knowledge? The answer 
suggested by both writers boils down in the end to some form of `rationality' 
exercised by responsible human beings. But the tension for both is that the 
exercise of this `faculty' may itself be relativised. Where then does this leave 
religious faith? 
(i) Conclusions 
Newbigin's use of Berger's notion of `plausibility' therefore is intriguing. 
14' Newbigin 1992k: 23. Cf. also 1992h: 187: 'There is no exercise of human reason that is not 
socially embodied, rooted in a tradition that is carried by a language. The gospel is not a 
statement of eternal truths in the style of mathematics: it is the story of what God has done. It 
is contested in the name of other stories. We have no suprahistorical standpoint from which 
we can demonstrate with any kind of infallibility that it. and not others, is the true story. Our 
role is more humble. We stand anion g all other human beings with their different stories to 
bear witness to what God has done. We do so because we have been laid hold of and 
commissioned to do so. Our telling of the story is an act of gratitude and faithfulness towards 
God. ' 
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In relation to the questions of modernity. it enables him to `relativize' the notion 
that there exists some independent and neutral standpoint from which to judge 
between the concepts of `truth' and 'error". As we move into a postmodern 
environment, this approach now additionally enables him to undercut the 
potential challenge that the truth of the Christian message is being predicated on 
the basis of older Enlightenment notions about the supremacy and primacy of 
'reason'. Moreover, his defence that he is committed to a `story' rather than to 
some `neutral', `external' standpoint, means that his position is already broadly 
`acceptable' amongst postmoderns who emphasise the importance of `narrative' 
traditions. This appears to be an 'accident' of method in the sense that Newbigin 
encounters the postmodern challenge with this argument already in place. 
Nonetheless, it is a strategy well-suited to the postmodern environment. He does 
not have to defend Christianity from an Enlightenment standpoint - however 
modified is its structure. Instead, within a `plurality of stories', he is able to 
engage immediately at the level of his own commitment to a `(S)tory'. 
Yet if this apologetic engagement is apposite in a postmodern context, the 
questions that have been raised concerning its theoretical underpinning remain 
pertinent. There are two dimensions to these questions. On the one hand, in 
appearing to argue at times for the existence of some form of supracultural 
`rationality", it remains unclear without further elucidation how Newbigin really 
does escape from what he calls the `rationalist impasse'. 148 Is the basis upon 
which he defends the `truthfulness' of the Christian story over other stories 
ultimately a neutral Enlightenment one? If not, how would its claims be 
ý48 Newbigin 1992k: 23. 
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accessible to outsiders? If on the other hand his methodology does escape from 
the `impasse" - as he claims it does will not the form of this escape inevitably 
make him a fideist? For if he is not standing on grounds that can be defended 
rationally, how can he counter the accusation that the grounds on which he does 
stand cannot be defended from the sceptical viewpoint of unbelievers? 
3.4.2 Maclntyre and the cultural discourses of rationality 
With these questions in mind we move now to a discussion of Newbigin's 
interaction with the work of Alasdair Maclntyre. The significance of this for our 
discussion of Newbigin in the context of postmodernity is twofold. 
Firstly. in view of our analysis of Berger's work above, Maclntyre's 
discussion of the nature of `traditions'. and his engagement with the related 
concepts of `rationality", `translatability' and `commensurability" are of key 
importance to Newbigin, and may help to clarify some of the questions we raised 
in the previous section. Clearly, the question about whether the Church (as itself 
a `tradition of rationality') is able to engage in dialogue with `competing 
rationalities" is a critical one for Newbigin particularly in the light of his 
agreement with MacIntyre that neutral Enlightenment viewpoints are to be 
49 
rejected. 1 
'-'`' For the agreement of the two on this point, see Newbigin 1989f: 82, where he refers in 
general terms to Machntyre 1988. ('... as Alasdair Macintyre has shown.... it is an illusion 
to suppose that there is available to us some kind of pure rationality existing in a disembodied 
state and therefore capable of passing judgment on all the various ways of grasping truth 
developed in particular socially embodied traditions of rational discourse'). For Maclntyre's 
own formulation (which Newbigin may have had in mind), cf. Maclntyre 1988: 367: 'it is an 
illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground, some locus for rationality as 
such, which can afford rational resources sufficient for enquiry independent of all traditions. 
Those who have maintained otherwise either have covertly been adopting the standpoint of a 
tradition and deceiving themselves and perhaps others into supposing that theirs was just such 
a neutral standing , round or else have simply been in error'. 
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Secondly. Murphy and McClendon have concluded that by departing 
from the 'individualist'/'collectivist' axis of modernity both in his development 
of what they call a `corporate metaphysics', and also by his commitment to a 
late- Wittgensteini an' understanding of the function of language - MacIntyre 
shows himself in certain ways to be a characteristically `postmodern' thinker. 150 
The degree to which Newbigin agrees with him in these matters is therefore 
clearly significant in our ongoing analysis of the extent to which Newbigin may 
be said to be anticipating and addressing the postmodern situation. 
Maclntyre's 1981 book After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory 15 1 had 
been influential in buttressing Newbigin's arguments from the mid-eighties about 
the distinction between `facts' and `values', and had helped him to show that a 
post-Enlightenment basis for ethics and morality could only be found in a 
tradition of morality that had already existed well before the Enlightenment. 12 
For the Enlightenment's rationalist foundations could never sustain conceptions 
of morality for the simple reason that they could neither explain the move from 
is' to `ought', nor could they articulate how the notion of `value' could have any 
meaning outside of an older and more traditional framework of moral behaviour. 
Newbigin had used these observations to reinforce his central Polanyian 
contention that the Enlightenment vision had now reached a point of terminal 
decay. But he also quotes with approval MacIntyre's proposal that the way out of 
the crisis posed by the oncoming of what he calls the new dark ages' lies in the 
10 Murphy and McClendon 1989: 203-4. 
"[ Maclntvre 1981. Newbigin himself used the ls` edition ofAfler" I'irtue and in those instances 
where I discuss his specific interaction with Macintyre. I shall refer to this edition. Later I 
refer to the 2°(I edition, where a concluding, chapter has been added. 
152 Newbigin I 986b: 36. referring to Maclntyre 1981: 35-59. See also the influence of 
Maclntyre in this context at: Newbigin 1986b: 26,75-7.1987a: 360-2,1989g: 12: 1989f: 
58f.: 1990s: 2-3: 1991c: 3: 1994a: 126: 1995d: 55-6. 
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sustaining of communities that are grounded in the `moral life' . 
153 In the past. 
MacIntyre argues. the `barbarians' of the dark ages were at the door' of society. 
But in the present era, however, they are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they 
have already been governing us for quite some time. ''` Moreover, Newbigin 
records Maclntyre's warning that, it is our lack of consciousness of this that 
constitutes part of our predicament. ' 155 In responding empathetically to this 
thesis, Newbigin asks: 
If that is true, as I think it is, we must ask what the conditions are for the 
recovery by the church of its proper distinction from, and its proper 
responsibility for, this secular culture that we have shared so comfortably and so 
long with what Maclntyre would call the barbarians. ýý6 
Maclntyre's sequel to After Virtue (entitled Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? ) was published in 1988 and had been read carefully by Newbigin 
prior to his Alexander Robertson Lectures in Glasgow in the same year. It was 
these lectures that were subsequently published as The Gospel in a Pluralist 
Society in 1989. x'7 Here Newbigin specifically engages with MacIntyre's 
understanding of the `social' and `tradition-based' aspects of knowledge that are 
15' Maclntyre 1981: 244-5, quoted in Newbigin 1986b: 134. Maclntyre's full sentence reads: 
'What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which 
civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which 
are already upon us' (1981: 245). 
15 Maclntyre 1981: 245. 
"' Maclntyre 1981: 245. Newbigin misquotes Macintyre slightly by omitting the words `part 
of. 
''" Newbigin 1986b: 134. Though Newbigin occasionally states that Macintyre is recalling the 
time of Augustine in these discussions (e. g.. 1986b: 133, where he states that Maclntyre 
'invokes the memory of that moment to illuminate our situation'. Also: 1991 f: 15,18), 
Maclntyre does not actually refer to Augustine at this point (nor in the book as a whole in this 
context). Newbigin appears to be reading an Augustinian understanding into Maclntyre's 
material via his reading of Polanyi who makes the similar point (cf. Polanyi 1958: 266-7). 
For Newbigin's own view of the parallels between Augustine's time and the present 
(referring directly to Polanvi). cf. 1983b: 23-5,63; 1986b: 102-5: 1991f. I5ff.; I995c: 26-9. 
We explore this in greater detail in the following chapter. 
'" For Newbigin's acknowledgement of indebtedness to Maclntyre's book cf. Newbigin 1989f: 
x, 55.82. For further references to this. cf. 1989i: 50; 1990m: 142: and 1990n: 141. 
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so central to Maclntyre's understanding of what he calls 'competing 
rationalities' .Iý8 
What is new following this reading is the development of a discussion 
about the possibility of dialogue between differing traditions. This is integrally 
connected to our preceding examination of Berger in the sense that once one has 
accepted the localised nature of knowledge, it becomes very difficult to envisage 
how any form of `dialogue' can take place with rival 'traditions'. But whereas 
Berger is more interested in the differing perspectives that the separate disciplines 
of sociology and theology may be said to bring to an evaluation of truth claims, 
Maclntyre concentrates more exclusively on the possibility of dialogue. 
Newbigin's thesis in responding to Berger was to uphold the truth-bearing nature 
of `stories', and in particular the ultimate truth-claim of the Christian `story'. In 
his interaction with MacIntyre on the other hand, the point under discussion is the 
mode of rationality whereby dialogue between `rival" traditions becomes 
possible. This is a crucial issue for Newbigin (no less than for Maclntyre) if their 
positions are not to slip back into relativism. 
Maclntyre, for his part, develops the case that within the context of post- 
Enlightenment thought. two responses have been made to the question of how to 
judge between `rival' rationalities. Firstly. `relativists' have argued that any one 
tradition of rationality has as much right to claim our allegiance as any other, and 
therefore no one tradition can claim a pre-eminence. 1'9 Secondly, 'perspectivists' 
have argued that since the claim to truthfulness arises from within the context of 
purliculur systems of thought and rationality, no one system can claim to tell any 
' Maclntyre 1988: 1 ff.. In referring to Macintyre's thesis I shall use Newbigin's phrase 
'traditions of rationality' (see e. g.. Newbi-in 1989f: 55-56.65: 1989i: 50). 
"' Maclntyre 1988: 35?. 
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other system what is right and what is not right with regard to notions either of 
behaviour, or of moral justification. ' 60 Both positions, however, are - according 
to Maclntyre - `fundamentally misconceived and misdirected'. 
161 He writes 
accordingly that: 
While the thinkers of the Enlightenment insisted upon a particular type of view 
of truth and rationality, one in which truth is guaranteed by rational method and 
rational method appeals to principles undeniable by any fully reflective rational 
person, the protagonists of post- EnIightenment relativism and perspectivism 
claim that if the Enlightenment conceptions of truth and rationality cannot be 
sustained, theirs is the only possible alternative. 1 2 
Both these responses represent for Maclntyre what he calls the `inverted 
mirror image' of Enlightenment thinking. 163 However, by responding in these 
ways, Maclntyre argues that what neither side is able to recognize is what he calls 
the `kind of rationality possessed by traditions. ' 164 He therefore writes as 
follows: 
What I have to do, then, is to provide an account of the rationality 
presupposed by and implicit in the practice of those enquiry-bearing traditions 
with whose history I have been concerned which will be adequate to meet the 
challenges posed by relativism and perspectivism. M 
If such an account of rationality cannot be found, then the question about 
transcending the limitations of tradition-bound concepts of rationality would 
remain unanswered, and the existing alternatives of relativism and/or 
perspectivism would have to prevail. 
1 60 1988: 352. 
161 Maclntyre 1988: 353. 
162 Maclntyre 1988: 353. 
16" Maclntyre 1988: 353. 
16 Maclntyre 1988: 353. 
165 Maclntyre 1988: 354. 
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Maclntyre proceeds therefore to explore the basis upon which 
understanding between rival traditions can take place. It is commonly assumed. 
he argues, that where understanding exists between two traditions, it must be the 
case that they share standards of rational evaluation, such that the issues dividing 
them must in broad outline, if not in detail, be capable of being brought to 
resolution. ' 166 This would amount to the existence of `commensurability' 
between the two traditions. 167 But in reality, he argues, the situation is far more 
complex than this. For `rationalities' are themselves embedded within existing 
structures of language and usage which are built upon tradition. By using these. 
each community sets itself to resolve those questions which are raised within the 
course of its own historical development. '68 Dialogue between different 
traditions cannot therefore begin until there is an appreciation that this sort of 
evolution and development is intra-systemically unique to those rationalities and 
makes understanding between them problematic. 
At this point though. Maclntyre urges that instead of falling back into 
either the `relativist' or the `perspectivist' position, it is still possible for 
traditions to engage in a meaningful dialogue. Indeed, it is because of this 
possibility that both the `relativist" and `perspectivist' challenges can be 
circumvented: the `relativist' precisely because such dialogue can be shown to be 
real; the `perspectivist' because from within traditions coherent claims to `truth' 
"'` Maclntvre 1988: 370. 
1" Maclntyre 1988: 370. For shorter summary definitions of Macintyre's terms 
'commensurability' and 'translatability' see 1990: 4-5: for his earlier view. cf. 1977: esp. 
463 ff.. 
Maclntyre 1988: 37 1-2: 'Every tradition is embodied in some particular set of utterances and 
actions and thereby in all the particularities of some specific language and culture. The 
invention, elaboration. and modification of the concepts through which both those who found 
and those who inherit a tradition understand it are inescapably concepts which have been 
framed in one language rather than another. ' 
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can properly and rightly be made. As he puts it in a concluding statement to the 
book: The rival claims to truth of contending traditions of enquiry depend for 
their vindication upon the adequacy and the explanatory power of the histories 
which the resources of each of those traditions in conflict enable their adherents 
to write. ' 169 
Newbigin's main engagement with MacIntyre's ideas occurs in an 
extended passage in The Gospel in a Pluralist Culture170 in which, like 
Maclntyre. Newbigin's concern is to respond to the challenge of relativism. He 
commences by saying that in this interaction, he follows Maclntyre's thesis only 
in part'. 17 ' Newbigin doesn't specifically elucidate the points at which he parts 
company with Maclntyre, but a study of what follows makes this more or less 
clear. What is significant is that in this engagement, Newbigin accompanies 
Maclntyre in thinking about the mode of rationality that makes dialogue possible. 
Note for example his language. A society's `rationality' he argues, is part of and 
is embodied in the total life of a community. It responds to the new experiences 
which that community is having - whether these come from outside or from 
within. ' 172 As a result, he concludes: 'The tradition of thought is not a 
disembodied ghost which has a life apart from the total life of the society which 
carries this tradition. ' 173 The similarity of this language to the thought of 
Maclntyre had already been made possible by Newbigin's concession to Polanyi's 
thesis about the tradition-bearing functions of language and knowledge. It also 
has `perspectivist' and `relativist' overtones characteristic of many postmodern 
1611 Maclntvre 1988: 403. 
170 Newbiain 1989f: 55ff. in the context of 52-65. 
171 Newbigin 1989f: 55. 
172 Newbigin 1989f: 54. 
17' Newbigin 1989f: 54. 
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writers. Newbigin is aware of the problems that may be associated with it when 
he states that: 
If all rationality is the exercise of the reasoning powers of a particular 
community, responding to particular historical happenings and using a particular 
language; if there is no such thing as a supracultural rationality which can judge 
between rival forms of rational discourse, do we then have to surrender the quest 
for truth? Is there no truth which is true for all, but only `truth-as-it-appears-to- 
us-in-our-culture'? ' 
As a result of his engagement with Maclntyre. Newbigin"s thesis takes the 
form of three lines of response to the charge of `relativism'. The first of these, in 
agreement with Maclntyre, is his argument that every tradition is continually 
evolving in its understanding of the nature of truth. Sometimes such a process 
reaches a crisis point in which the older formulations are no longer adequate to 
meet the questions being raised. In this context. the tradition potentially faces a 
epistemological `crisis'. Self-contradictions may begin to emerge as experiences 
are encountered which cannot be understood in terms of existing ways of thought. 
Newbigin continues: 
At this point another, rival tradition of rationality appears on the scene - perhaps 
one that was always present but muted by the success of the reigning tradition, 
perhaps a new arrival. It confronts the reigning tradition with a radical 
challenge. It offers another way of seeing things, another vision of the shape of 
things and of the human story, a paradigm shift. Some, perhaps many, adherents 
of the old tradition find the new one more adequate to the realities they face, and 
are converted to the new view. 175 
What happens at this juncture amounts to a resolution of the 
'epistemological crisis' by the adoption of the other `rival" tradition of rationality. 
What this shows, argues Newbigin, is that `while all exercise of rationality is 
Newbigin 1989f: 55. 
Newbigin 1989f: 55. 
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within a social tradition, the tradition is not ultimate; it is subject to the test of 
adequacy to the realities which it seeks to grasp. ' 176 As a result, he argues. whilst 
it is the case that `truth' can only be grasped from within a tradition, nonetheless 
`traditions can be and are judged adequate or inadequate in respect of their 
perceived capacity to lead their adherents into the truth. ' 177 Here he is in broad 
agreement with MacIntyre, '79 and follows in the tradition of Thomas Kuhn with 
respect to `paradigm shifts'. 179 
In a second line of response, again closely following Maclntyre. 
Newbigin argues that language is so crucial to the understanding of the 
development of traditions that adherents of one tradition can only seriously 
challenge those of another once the language of the rival system has been learnt 
and mastered. Only once a person has thoroughly mastered this second language 
(so that it becomes in Maclntyre's phrase a `second first language' 190 ), can a real 
understanding be said to exist between them, and a comparison of rival 
conceptions of truth be undertaken. When this happens, writes Newbigin. the 
two traditions of rationality are compared with one another in respect of their 
adequacy to the realities with which all human beings have to deal. "' gI He 
continues that: `Although the two ways of reasoning are not mutually translatable 
except to a limited degree, that does not mean that they cannot be compared in 
Newbigin 1989f: 55. Note the Polanyian language both here and in the following quotations 
with regard to the category of 'adequacy' in connection with the verification of truth. 
177 
Newbioin 1989f: 55. 
Cf. e. ýt.. Maclntvre 1988: 36 1-4: also Maclntvre 1977. 
Kuhn 1970c, e. g.: 92.112.150. Resemblance with Polanvi's discussions of 'conversion' are 
also apparent (cf. e. g.. Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 180). See further our own discussion of 
Kuhn and Polany i in chapter 4. 
Maclntvre 1988: 387. 
ýsý Newbigin 1989f: 56. 
199 
respect of their adequacy to enable human beings to know and cope with 
reality. ' 
1 92 
Familiar questions arise at this point. Is the comparative judgement about 
this 'adequacy to cope' supracultural, or does it function from within the 
parameters of an individual tradition? As before, Newbigin's argument could 
signify that the `conversion' is undergone on the basis of an analysis whose 
rationality lies outside the context of tradition, or it could signify that the rational 
and analytical process - though involving a real transfer of allegiance between 
traditions - is still carried out from within the rational constraints provided by one 
of the two traditions, and does not function outside of them. For the purposes of 
our wider analysis, one could label the first `modern' and the second a 
postmodern' approach to the problem. 
As a third line of response to the charge of relativism, Newbigin argues 
that since the relativist who claims that all rationality is `embodied in a social 
tradition', is himself arguing from within a `tradition', his own position 
constitutes a contradiction of the view about relativism being advocated. In 
Berger's phrase. the `relativizers are relativised'. 183 That there is believed to be 
such a neutral position - argues Newbigin - is of course a hallmark of modernity. 
It is exhibited in the way in which the Enlightenment tradition itself tends to 
`assimilate' and 'incorporate' other traditions into its own worldview - even 
when there is no real understanding of them. Here again he is following 
Maclntyre*s point that, This belief in its ability to understand everything from 
X82 Newbi-in I989f: 56. 
Berger 1970: 59. 
200 
human culture and history, no matter how apparently alien, is itself one of the 
defining beliefs of the culture of modernity. ' 184 
Newbigin's conclusion to these lines of response is as follows: 
For a person who dwells in the contemporary cosmopolitan culture, shaped by 
the reigning dichotomy between `facts' and `beliefs, ' it will be natural to 
relativize all the differing belief systems. And when, in this culture, `reason' is 
set against the specific, historically shaped tradition of Christian belief, it is 
obvious that what is happening is that the `plausibility structure' is performing 
its normal function. The Christian, on the other hand, will relativize the reigning 
plausibility structure in the light of the gospel. There is no disembodied 'reason' 
which can act as impartial umpire between the rival claims. '8 
The `reasoning' adopted here by the Christian is therefore not to be set 
against the `tradition' out of which it has arisen. It does not exist independently. 
Rather, like other 'traditions of rationality' it is subject to the events and ideas 
within Christian history that have shaped it. So he writes that: 
The reasoning which forms the texture of Christian theology arises out of the 
historical happenings which form the subject matter of the biblical record. It is 
the activity of a specific community among other human communities namely 
that community which continually seeks to understand and cope with all 
experience in the light of what was disclosed to those who were participants in 
or witnesses of these happenings. 186 
In closing his discussion of Maclntyre's work, Newbigin draws the 
conclusion that the key element in the successful confrontation with relativism is 
that the Christian learns both the language of contemporary society, and also the 
language of the Biblical tradition. When both languages are mastered, `one 
learns to live so fully within both traditions that the debate between them is 
'84 Maclntyre 1988: 385. 
l8' Newbigin 1989f: 57. 
196 Newbigin 1989f: 57-8. 
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internalized'. 187 The implications drawn by Newbigin from his application of 
Maclntyre's notion of 'language-inhabitation' are two-fold. The first is that: 
As a Christian I seek so to live within the biblical tradition, using its language as 
my language, its models as the models through which I make sense of 
experience, its story as the clue to my story, that I help to strengthen and carry 
forward this tradition of rational/ty. 
"' 
Like MacIntyre, Newbigin here draws the conclusion that the primary 
effect of this dialogue will be on the inhabited tradition itself -a point to which 
we shall shortly return. But Newbigin proceeds to the further conclusion that 
when the language of the Bible is `internalized', and 'my own participation in the 
Christian tradition is healthy and vigorous, both in thought and in practice', and 
when the language of the rival tradition (embodied in this case by secular 
Western culture) is also 'internalized', then: 
... I shall 
be equipped for the external dialogue with the other tradition. There 
is no external criterion above us both to which I and my opposite number can 
appeal for a decision. The immediate outcome is a matter of the comparative 
vigor and integrity of the two traditions; the ultimate outcome is at the end when 
the one who alone is judge suns up and gives the verdict. ' 89 
(i) Conclusions 
What then are we to make of Newbigin's interaction with Maclntyre? 
Firstly. there are two substantial similarities between them. 
187 Newbigin 1989f: 65. 
iss Newbigin 1989f: 65 (emphasis added). 
189 Newbigin 1989f: 65 (emphasis added). 
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Similarities 
In the first place, it is clear that though he states at the outset that he is 
following Maclntyre's argument only in part', 190 it is nonetheless clear that the 
main contours of Newbigin's response to relativism in the light of his reading of 
Maclntyre are those of substantive agreement. Newbigin's conclusion (like that 
of Maclntyre) is that the answer to the relativist position is to be found in a return 
to a conviction that rationalities are embodied within tradi/ions. and to an 
articulation of truth from within such traditions. His statement, therefore, that: 
`there is no such thing as a supracultural rationality which can judge between 
rival forms of rational discourse" 191 is finally `resolved' by his articulation of a 
belief in its intr"a-cultural operation. 
Secondly, in the light of this discussion, the questions also raised in 
respect of Berger remain unresolved. For having posed the question at the outset 
of his discussion of MacIntyre's work in the following terms: is there no truth 
which is true for all, but only 'truth-as-it-appears-to-us-in-our-culture"? ' 192 it is 
not clear that Newbigin has actually answered it other than intra-systemically. 
There remains therefore a real tension in Newbigin's thought at this point which 
never really resolves itself. One senses at times that he is wanting to say more 
than his presuppositional framework will allow. For example, when he says on 
the one hand that `all exercise of rationality is within a social tradition, ' but on 
the other that this `tradition is not ultimate, it is subject to the test of adequacy to 
the realities which it seeks to grasp". 193 he appears to be going beyond 
Newbi<-in 1989f: 55. 
1W Newbi<zin 1989f: 55. 
'92 Newbi-in 19891: 55. 
1W Newbi-in 1989f: 55. 
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Maclntyre's formulation, and yet does not fully articulate the sense in which he 
means this. For how is `adequacy' in this context to be judged if not by some 
`exterior' warrant? If by this is meant the authority of the Bible, how is this to be 
perceived as an `exterior' authority to one who doesn't believe? If on the other 
hand, it refers to an adequacy for practical living, how may one person's 
judgement of such adequacy be distinguished from another's (or one culture's 
from another's)? Are we not back in a relativist quagmire? 
Furthermore, as a development of this second broad conclusion, we may 
state that the seriousness of Newbigin's final `resting place' is more critical for 
him than it is for Macintyr"e. Here we pick up Newbigin's reference to his 
`partial' following of Machltyre, and suggest that by it he refers to what might be 
described as their respective `ultimate commitments. There are three related 
dimensions to this. We shall explore these at this point before returning to a 
final, more general, conclusion about Newbigin's interaction with Maclntyre. 
Differ°ences 
Firstly, and most obviously. Newbigin and Maclntyre may be said to have 
differing formal objectives. MacIntyre's project is an attempt to redefine 
morality in terms of what for him is the greatest tradition of all - that of Aristotle. 
He writes accordingly: 
My own conclusion is very clear. It is that on the one hand we still, in spite of 
the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack any 
coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view; 
and that, on the other hand, the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a wav 
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that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and 
corn niitments. 
1 4 
His aim therefore is to restore the `Aristotelian tradition' as the best 
context for contemporary reflection about the primacy of what he calls `virtue'. 
He seeks to do this by showing that it is the most successful tradition in terms of 
its own endeavours. 19i At one level therefore his programme can be said to be an 
attempt to respond to the present relativism by a return to the past. 196 Newbigin 
on the other hand rejects the return to some `pre"-modernity as impossible, 
although he is aware that his own views might suggest that he thinks that it is» 7 
Instead, what he advocates is a refusal to 'accept the idea that there is no third 
possibility between some sort of theocracy, perhaps a return to an idealized 
picture of medieval Christendom, on the one hand, and agnostic pluralism on the 
other. ' 198 What he urges is an appeal to the living tradition of Christianity, 
inaugurated in the past but still active in the present. Formally, therefore 
Maclntyre's project is Aristotelian whereas Newbigin's is specifically Christian. 
A second difference in their `ultimate commitments' is integrally related 
1' Maclntyre 1981: 241. Or (in the postscript to the Second Edition of After Virtue): `lt scarcely 
needs repeating that it is the central thesis of After Virtue that the Aristotelian moral tradition 
is the best example we possess of a tradition whose adherents are rationally entitled to a high 
measure of confidence in its epistemological and moral resources' Maclntyre 1985: 277. 
195 Maclntyre 1981: 111: 'If a premodern view of morals and politics is to be vindicated against 
modernity, it will be in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all' (emphasis original). 
"` This would appear to be supported, for example, by his statement (Maclntyre 1981: 111) that: 
'either one must follow through the aspirations and the collapse of the different versions of 
the Enlightenment project until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the 
Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that the Enlightenment project was not only 
mistaken, but should never have been commenced in the first place. There is no third 
alternative. .. .' 
For the view that Maclntyre is advocating a return to pre-modernity, see 
Lyon 1994: 82-3. 
19" Cf. e. g., Newbigin 1983b: 63: 'We can learn from the past but we can never return to it. We 
must exclude any kind of nostalgia for Christendom or for a pre-technological innocence. ' 
For similar statements, cf. Newbigin 1988g: 151: 1988c: 167.170,173,1 989a: 2,1991 f: 68, 
84-5: 1992d: 3: 1995a: 3. For the roots of this argument see also 1966: 124ff. 
198 Newbigin 1991f. 59. 
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to the first. When Newbigin refers to debates in which the two traditions of 
rationality are compared with one another in respect of their adequacy to the 
realities with which all human beings have to deal'. 199 it is clear that rather 
different realities are being envisaged by him than by Maclntyre. Whereas 
Newbigin's `realities' are eternal and spiritual. Maclntyre in the parallel context 
is more `modest' in arguing that what the exercise of rationality is designed to 
promote is the quest for 'the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and 
the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand 
what more and what else the good life for man is. '200 
Whilst both writers appeal to tradition-based notions of rationality, 
therefore, Newbigin is much more `missionary-minded" in his understanding of 
the Scriptural tradition than Maclntyre is of the Aristotelian. After all, for 
Newbigin the authority of the Scriptural tradition is construed as the framework 
within which all other traditions are necessarily relativised, whereas for 
Maclntyre the Aristotelian framework is much more modestly set forward. 
Although he himself favours this particular embodiment of rationality, it is the 
proper exercise of rationality itself that is more important to him, rather than the 
specific embodiment of Aristotle's ethics in individual traditions. This becomes 
clear in the closing pages of Maclntyre's book where he writes that: 
There is a way of developing the argument of this book further which would be 
Aristotelian, but antagonistic to both Augustine and Hume: a way which would 
1'9 Newbigin 1989f: 56. 
200 Maclntyre 1981: 204. There is evidence of movement on Maclntyre's part from a more 
secularised viewpoint to a position more sympathetic to Christian faith. Cf. his early remarks 
in 1967 (e. g.. 57: 'The greatest contemporary moral achievement is the creation of the type of 
community where shared ends and needs make possible the growth of a common life and a 
common commitment. which ecni be expressed in a common language. But religious forms 
provide us with no guidance here'), with his later affirmations (e. g., of Jane Austen in the 
context of her Christian faith (1981: 170ff. ). or his more general comments about the loss of 
virtue which has resulted from Christianity's cultural demise (1981: 235-6)). 
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be Augustinian, necessitating a rejection of both Aristotle and Hume; a way 
which would be Thomist, synthesizing Aristotle and Augustine in a manner 
inimical to both Aristotelian anti-Augustinians and Augustinian 
anti-Aristotelians, let alone to Hume; ... 
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As a result, there is a greater `openness' in Maclntyre's work towards a 
number of different possible outcomes to the project he initiates, than there is in 
Newbigin's. Consequently. the idea that the Scriptural tradition reveals ultimate 
truth' is much more pronounced in Newbigin's work than it is in the parallel 
notion that the exercise of Aristotelian `rationality' reveals `truth' in MacIntyre's 
thinking. 202 
A third difference is that Maclntyre's work is ultimately more concerned 
with the development of individual traditions from the viewpoint of their own 
self understanding (albeit through dialogue with others) than it is with the 
possible `conversion' of other viewpoints. In this sense, MacIntyre"s thesis has 
to do with the way in which individual traditions can be taken forward in their 
understanding of their own success in meeting the goals which - by the exercise 
of rationality - they set themselves. Dialogue with other `rival' traditions is 
interpreted as a means whereby this development and progress by a particular 
tradition can be taken forward, but such development is viewed primarily in 
relation to the questioning tradition itself. In this sense we might call 
101 Maclntyre 1988: 401. 
202 The nearest Maclntyre gets to this understanding is in Maclntyre 1988: 363-4. where he 
argues that To have passed through an epistemological crisis successfully enables the 
adherents of a tradition of enquiry to rewrite its history in a more insightful way. ' This 
provides a way of'identifying more accurately that structure of justification which underpins 
whatever claims to truth are made within it'. This 'concept of truth, ' he goes on 'is timeless. 
To claim that some thesis is true is not only to claim for all possible times and places that it 
cannot be shown to fail to correspond to reality in the sense of "correspond" elucidated 
earlier but also that the mind which expresses its thought in that thesis is in fact adequate to 
its object. The implications of this claim made in this way from within a tradition are 
precisely what enable us to show how the relativist challenge is misconceived. ' 
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MacIntyre's understanding of dialogue as predominantly 'reflective' or `reactive' 
in its aims. Its intention is that the tradition that originates the dialogue may itself 
make progress. 
In this context - notwithstanding his discussions of `epistein ological 
crises' - his interest is not really in what Newbigin calls a missionary encounter: 
that is, of one tradition seeking to persuade another of the `truth' enshrined within 
its own narrative. Even MacIntyre's discussion of `crisis' in this context emerges 
as rather exceptional and unusual. Moreover. the discussion at these points is 
seen once more from the perspective of the `self-understanding' of the tradition 
undergoing change, rather than from the perspective of the tradition deemed to be 
rationally superior. 203 Newbigin on the other hand is much more interested in 
missionary dialogue. To be sure - as we saw in chapter 2- the Christian 
tradition must be prepared to change in dialogue with other `rival' traditions of 
belief. Nonetheless, his objective is much more openly `proclamatory' and 
`persuasional'. He believes that the gospel is the truth, rather than simply one 
truth amongst a number. 
The vital problem for Newbigin in following Maclntyre therefore is that 
the problem of apologetic `locality' is emphasised and highlighted. For all the 
protestations to the contrary there doesn't seem to be any way out of the potential 
dilemma arising out of the pcn°ticularity of traditions, and Newbigin's agreement 
with MacIntyre serves to highlight this. Whichever way the case is constructed, 
the reliance upon the argument about the `traditions of rationality' inevitably 
raises once more the question whether to speak of `ultimate' realities from within 
2(3 See e. g., Maclntyre 1988: 361-364.387-8. Cf. also Maclntvre 1977: esp. 455. 
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such a localised tradition can ever be said to refer to anything more than a 
localised form of `truth'. 
A final conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis fits into the 
wider discussion of this chapter. It is that Newbigin's concurrence with 
Maclntyre's thesis serves to emphasize the fact that to the degree to which 
Maclntyre's ideas about the social location of truth make him `postmodern' in 
outlook, the same epithet must also be ascribed to Newbigin. 204 That this 
position raises potential problems for him as a missionary apologist is a 
suggestion we have already begun to explore. But this depends upon the starting 
point from which the judgement is made. From a `classical' foundationalist 
viewpoint, Newbigin is always going to be viewed as either a `relativist' or a 
`perspectivist'. From a `post-foundationalist' perspective, however, Newbigin's 
tactic is disarming, and potentially powerful. The fact that he had come to this 
position before his specific engagement with `postmodernity' is a measure of the 
seriousness with which his missionary strategy needs to be taken in a postmodern 
setting. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In concluding this discussion about Newbigin's contribution in a 
postmodern context a number of points have emerged. Two in particular may be 
highlighted at this juncture. 
'04 See e. g.. the 'postmodern' comments about Macintyre in Hauerwas 1991: 13 and 106: 
Middleton and Walsh 1995b: 66f.: Milbank 1990b: 326: Murphy and McClendon 1989: 203: 
Stiver 1994: 98: and van den Toren 1993: 52f.. 
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Firstly, we have seen that Newbigin's own views about postmodernity 
show that he understands it primarily in epistemological terms. This tends to 
highlight the fact that in responding to this challenge his own proposals about the 
`universality' of Christian truth could be interpreted as those of a modernist 
`having a go' at the `postmoderns'. However, we have established that his 
credentials need a much more serious analysis than this. His prior concession to 
Polanyi's thinking at critical points had already made his outlook sympathetic to 
certain critical postmodern assumptions. Moreover we saw, for example, that in 
setting his thought against the paradigm set out by Murphy and McClendon, the 
central themes in Newbigin's thought position him strictly outside a `modernist' 
framework. This includes his repeated rejection of the Enlightenment 
epistemological paradigm, his commitment to the `localised' view of the way in 
which knowledge is formulated and passed on. and to the primary role of 
language in this development and transmission. Though we have seen that these 
elements do not themselves locate Newbigin in a postmodern framework. they do 
not allow an interpretation of him that sees him simply as a modernist attacking 
postmodernity. 
Secondly. however. our analysis of his method has shown that it does not 
'fit" easily within either a 'modern' or a `postmodern' framework. This reflects 
Newbigin's own modus operandi which tends either to distance or attach itself to 
particular cultural assumptions in order to engage in a broader critique. There is 
an important sense therefore in which his method is culturally independent in 
respect to both `modernity' and `postmodernity', able to distance itself from ho/h 
at certain key points. This is further emphasised by our conclusion that his 
methodology undergoes no significant changes in its methods and 
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presuppositions as it begins to engage post modernity. His specific engagement 
with MacIntyre, for example, took place before he had begun specifically to 
address the question of `postmodernity'. On this basis, it is possible to take one 
of two positions. One can either argue that Newbigin interacts with 
postmodernity with the tools already in his armoury because he does not fully 
understand the novelty of its challenge. Or one can argue that he does understand 
the central questions posed by postmodernity and that his pre-existing Polanyian 
approach is consciously deployed to address them at certain crucial points. Our 
analysis fits better with the second option. 
3.5.1 Newbigin: a `postmodern' before postmodernity arrived? 
One can argue on the basis of these conclusions that Newbigin's 
programme is one that engages much more constructively with the postmodern 
context than many would allow. Indeed, our analysis of his engagement with 
MacIntyre in particular has shown that inasmuch as his missionary agenda is to 
be taken seriously. it has to be taken seriously in a `postmodern' context at least 
as much as in a `modern' one. This is primarily in our view because the means 
whereby he mounts his response to the postmodern challenge can be shown to 
have already adopted positions that make such a response both sustainable and 
engaging to postmodern thinking. 
There are three aspects to this `sustainability'. The first is the fact that 
with most postnnoderns he has already rejected the notion of an overarching 
Enlightenment" standpoint by which to judge between different standpoints. As 
he engages with the challenges of postmodernity, this enables him to undercut the 
challenge that Christian faith is ultimately in harness with certain powerful 
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Enlightenment notions about the supremacy and primacy of Reason. As we have 
shown, the fact that he doesn't have to defend Christianity from this standpoint 
(however `modified' is its structure) means that his apologetic is able to begin its 
work much `further down the line' than some `modernist' approaches that are 
more concerned with establishing prior foundationalist criteria with which to 
judge competing truth claims. 
Secondly, and closely allied to this, is his appeal to the gospel as a `story' 
rather than as a set of `doctrines" or as a propositional 'system'. As he repeatedly 
insists, the dogma, the thing given for our acceptance in faith, is not a set of 
timeless propositions: it is a story. '205 The older `orthodoxy' (particularly 
amongst evangelicals) was often - and still is to a significant extent - to `share 
the gospel' as a systematic framework of belief or as a set of doctrinal `points' 
abstracted from the wider biblical narrative, rather than as the narrative or story 
itseIf. `06 That this newer appeal to the gospel as `story' has become the `vogue" 
in positioning Christian faith in a postmodern context207 should not detract from 
the fact that Newbigin was doing it long before postmodernity came into focus as 
a cultural phenomenon. 208 Newbigin's apologetic can therefore be said to have 
already taken onboard the power of `narrative' to convey truth over against an 
205 E. g., Newbigin 1989f: 12. 
206 One thinks of'tracts' like 'Bridge to Life' (The Navigators, 1985), or 'Knowing God 
Personally' (Campus Crusade, 1985). 
20 See e. g., Clark 1993: Hauerwas 1991: 52: Lindbeck 1997: 432f.; Middleton and Walsh 
1995b: 63-79: Sims 1995: 332ff.; Werpehowski 1986: 301. See also in a broader context, 
Carson 1996: 141-367, who commends the preaching of'the Bible's plot-line' in the face of 
widespread biblical illiteracy (esp. 194). 
208 For Newbigin's early understanding of evangelism as 'telling the story' cf. e. g., 1958: 22, or 
1961: 90: 'There is and there can be no substitute for telling the good news. Evangelism, the 
activity of telling men in words of mouth or pen the story of Jesus, is a necessary and 
indispensable manifestation of the new reality in action. ' More recently, cf. 1978b: 91 ff. and 
the two brief articles (I 990a and 19901). Most recently, see 1999 as an example of his 
method in practice. See also his repeated emphasis on the gospel as being 'narrative' in 
structure (e. g., 1982c: 25-26: 1986b: 59: 1989f: 99-100: l 992a: I: l 992c: l; 1992k: 23: 
1995c: 81: 1995d: 52-54. 
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older insistence, for example, upon notions of the referentiality of the biblical text 
to `ideas' and 'concepts'. 209 Newbigin's `narrative' approach is similar in its 
central emphasis to that of Hans Frei in arguing, as Newbigin puts it, that the 
Bible, taken as a whole, fitly renders God, who is not merely the correlate or 
referent of universal natural religious experience but is the author and sustainer of 
all things. ' 210 
In addition, we have also seen that part of Newbigin's response to the 
postmodern challenge about `power' is to insist that the biblical story itself 
revolves around a suffering and dying saviour. This enables him to hold together 
a commitment to the gospel story as `metanarrative' as well as an emphasis upon 
`publishing' it evangelistically, in the knowledge that the claims of the story itself 
undercut the postmodern challenge about `power'. Once more, Newbigin was 
doing this before other writers began to advocate the value and appropriateness of 
such strategies amongst postmoderns. `11 Moreover. Newbigin's pre-existing 
commitment to an understanding of evangelism as `telling the story' had already 
placed him in a position that made this connection a natural progression, rather 
than a change of tactic. 212 
Thirdly, as we explored in the last chapter, Newbigin's Polanyian 
understanding of the Church - as an indwelt hermeneutic of the gospel - long 
209 E. g., Groothuis 1999: or Henry 1987. (Cf. the discussion of Henry's position in Clark 1993: 
508ff.: McGrath 1996: 166-179 [esp. 170-73]: and Groothuis 2000: 1 16ff.. ) 
110 Newbigin 1986b: 59. He quotes Frei (Frei 1974) both here and at 1995d: 72. For a 
discussion of the influence of Frei in post-Enlightenment approaches to the Bible see Gunton 
1985: 1 11-132, also, for a critical engagement cf. Watson 1994 (esp. 19-77), and 
Brue(-, gemann 1993. For his influence on sonne forms of postmodern apologetics, cf. e. g.. 
Clark 1993. and Sims 1995. 
21 1 Cf. e. g., Middleton and Walsh 1995a. 
212 Compare in this context. Middleton and Walsh's change of strategy in favour of a more 
'narrative' approach in their engagement with 'postmodernity' (Middleton and Walsh 
1995b), as compared to their engagement with 'modernity' (Middleton and Walsh 1984). 
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predated the onset of postmodernity. As such it anticipated the current re- 
emphasis upon an `integrated" understanding of congregational evangelism in 
which verbal witness and corporate holiness are held together. This integrated 
and vital connection between belief and demonstration has now become common 
amongst apologists seeking to engage with postmoderns - perhaps because their 
own traditions had managed effectively to divorce the two. 213 Again, Newbigin's 
own methodology is one that had already perceived this vital connection and had 
expressed its necessity not only as an apologetic expedient, but as a challenge - 
first and foremost - to the authenticity of the Church. 
In these ways then, Newbigin can rightly be considered a `postmodern' 
before postmodernity `arrived'. Where he cannot be regarded as one, is in his 
view that agreement with the localised nature of knowledge does not preclude a 
more robust and universal notion of truth that is deemed ultimately to transcend 
the local context. Here Newbigin parts company with other contemporary writers 
like Lindbeck, Hauerwas or Milbank in insisting on the view that this 
'universality' demands both evangelistic dialogue and proclamation. But 
whether this quest is legitimately grounded in a philosophical (or theological) 
context which escapes the charge of fideism is a question that Newbigin, in our 
analysis, never quite answers. 
For 'conservative' advocates of this integration as a necessity amongst postmoderns, cf. 
Hollinger 1995: Vanhoozer 1993: 27, and 1998b: 12-13. For a similar emphasis as a 
response to postmodernity from a more 'liberal' perspective see Hauerwas 1991: 152: or 
Lindbeck 1984: 36, who argues that the story 'gains power and meaning insofar as it is 
embodied in the total gestalt of community life and action'. (Cf. Lindbeck 1989b. ) 
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Chapter Four 
Towards a Critique of Newbigin's Mission Agenda 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to mount a critique of Newbigin's 
agenda from the point of view of the analysis undertaken in chapter 2 and 
developed in chapter 3. 
In chapter 2 we established that Polanyi is the hermeneutical `key' to 
Newbigin's missiology. Not only was he instrumental in providing the 
epistemological framework within which Newbigin articulates his own approach 
to religious knowing, but he also provided him with the cultural insights with 
which to theorise about the demise of the `Enlightenment project' and to identify 
the need for a new epistemological `starting point' for Western culture. Also in 
chapter 2, we established how Polanyi's `post-critical' appraisal of the notion of 
`personal knowledge' provided Newbigin with the conceptual tools with which to 
reconstruct a fresh epistemological and ecclesiological approach to contemporary 
missiology. 
We built on this analysis in chapter 3 by exploring the effects of 
Newbigin's indebtedness to Polanyi in relation to an examination of his 
credentials as a "postmodern" thinker. In this context, we pointed out that 
Newbigin's discussions of Peter Berger's `plausibility structures" and Alasdair 
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Maclntyre's `traditions of rationality' fitted into a structure of thought already 
supplied by Polanyi and helped as a result to contribute to the postmodern 
dimensions of Newbigin's thinking. 
In the present chapter we will build once more on the analysis of 
chapter 2 in order to explore the wider ramifications of Polanyi's insights for 
Newbigin's missiology. Firstly, we will examine the effect that Polanyi's 
influence has upon Newbigin's 'cultural' critique. Secondly. we will scrutinize 
in more detail both the strengths and weaknesses of Polanyi's methodology in 
terms of its specific appropriateness for a missiologist like Newbigin. Thirdly. 
we will assess Polanyi's influence upon Newbigin's reconstruction of the task of 
apologetics, both in its individual and corporate (or `public') contexts. This 
enquiry. whilst drawing its own independent conclusions, will also connect with 
the material in the previous chapter by expanding and elucidating the discussion 
about the aspects of 'tension" within Newbigin's thought which emerged there. 
4.2 Newbigin, Polanyi and the `epistemological' critique of culture 
We begin with an investigation of the effects that Polanyi's influence has 
upon Newbigin's analysis of culture, and in order to understand this it will be 
necessary briefly to outline Newbigin's broader approach to cross-cultural 
mission. 
The foundational framework for Newbigin's cross-cultural model of 
mission had originally been developed in the I'` edition of his missiological 
treatise, The Open Secret: Sketches. fr a Missionary Theology, and in the article 
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`Christ and the Cultures', both of which were published in 1978. ' It was 
developed in The Open Secret in terms of a `three-cornered relationship'. In one 
corner is what Newbigin calls the `traditional" or `local" culture (i. e., the 
`receptor' culture to which the missionary goes). At a second corner is the 
inherited `culture" of the missionaries (which Newbigin also describes as the 
`invading culture'), whilst at the third corner is the Bible. 2 For the sake of 
consistency in our discussion, we will label these corners as the `receptor', the 
`missionary', and the `revelation' corners. The ensuing interplay between these 
various elements within the triangle results in what Newbigin describes as `a 
complex and unpredictable evolution both in the culture of the receptor 
community and in that of the missionary. '3 
The description of this `triangular' model of missionary engagement in 
The Open Secret was published some four years after Newbigin's return from 
India, but it is understandably informed by his many years of experience there. 4 
The understanding of the -triangular' model, however, undergoes a significant 
development in the 1980s which may be said increasingly to be reflected in his 
Newbigin 1978b and 1978a. The Open Secret was republished as Newbigin 1995c with a 
few minor changes. 
2 Whilst the identity of the corners is clear, Newbigin is not consistent in the terms he uses to 
define them. In one place he describes them as 'the traditional culture, the "Christianity" of 
the missionary, and the Bible' (1978b: 165), whereas elsewhere he refers to them as `the local 
culture, the invading culture, and the Bible' (1978b: 166: and also I 978a: 4). For a helpful 
diagram that elucidates Newbigin's material, see Hunsberger 1998a: 238. 
Newbigin 1978b: 165. 
E. g., in relation to the 'cross-cultural' importation of the gospel into an Indian setting and its 
impact upon that cultural setting (I978b: 20-21,73-78,96.98-99,170-171,200 etc. ). On the 
origin of the book, he comments in the 'Preface' that: 'The original germ of what is here 
presented was embodied in a pamphlet ... published at the time of the integration of the International Missionary Council with the World Council of Churches' (1978b: vii-viii). The 
pamphlet referred to (Newbigin 1963) was entitled The Relevance of Triniiai'ian Doc/r'inefi»' 
To-&i y'. s. fission. It was republished in the States in 1964 with the title Trinitarian Faith 
and To-dai"s h ission (the actual title referred to in Newbigin's 'Preface'). He continues: 
'The invitation to teach at the Selly Oak Colleges has provided me with a welcome 
opportunity to develop these thoughts' (viii). Cf. also his comments about the book's origin 
in 19938: 229. 
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later missiology. This change occurs as a result of the way in which the 
`receptor' and 'missionary' corners are now seen to be posing questions of one 
another that had not previously been faced. 
Whereas beforehand, these two `corners' had been perceived - in 
Newbigin's own thinking as much as in the reflections of others - as being 
geographically removed from one another (with missionaries physically leaving 
one culture in order to go to another), now on his return to Britain - he begins 
to perceive them as being `fused' within the same geographical location: in this 
case that of Western culture. Western `missionaries' were thus being challenged 
to reach the culture of which they themselves were a part. As he puts it, the 
`supremely critical dialogue" which the Church must engage in is one with the 
culture which took its shape at the Enlightenment and with which the European 
churches have lived in an illegitimate syncretism ever since. " It is the 
implication of this shift in perspective - already noted in our discussion of 
Newbigin's conception of 'dialogue' in chapter 2- which now increasingly 
begins to characterize Newbigin's later thought. 
In this context, it can be further argued that the reason for this `conflation' 
is the introduction of Polanyi's epistemological paradigm of `crisis" and 
`opportunity' which serves to provide the `umbrella" framework under which the 
three corners are now understood to function. This `conflation' is the new feature 
in Newbigin"s later missionary thought, and its constitutive elements can be 
expressed as follows. Firstly. the need for epistemological renewal emerges as 
the urgent need of the culture of the West (the 'receptor" corner). Secondly. the 
Newbi(-, in 1983b: 31. in the context of 28-32. Also. 1986b: 2-3. 
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recovery of a confidence in the authority of 'revelational' epistemology 
represents the most pressing need of the contemporary Church (the `missionary' 
corner). Thirdly, biblical revelation represents for Newbigin the only source of a 
`true' epistemology in its fullest sense (the `revelation' corner). Thus all three 
`corners' of Newbigin's later missiological approach are redefined within an 
epistemological paradigm. 
This reformulation of the triangular model of relationships within 
Polanyi's epistemological framework of `crisis' and `opportunity' - though 
brilliant in its conception - nonetheless leads to three `tendencies' in Newbigin"s 
missiology, each of which is problematic. 
4.2.1 The `homogenising' tendency 
The first tendency of Newbigin's reformulation is that it tends to 
conceptualise the three `elements' at the corners of the triangle as ideally 
`homogenous' entities. We will look in more detail at the effects of this tendency 
on Newbigin's appraisal of secular culture (the `receptor' corner) in the next two 
main sections, and so will confine our remarks in this section to its effects upon 
his approach to ecclesiology and biblical authority (the `missionary' and 
'revelation' corners). 
With regard to ecclesiology, Newbigin"s `missionary' conception of the 
Church can only `work" as part of the solution to the epistemological crisis on the 
basis that it functions as an `homogenous' tradition. In other words. it has to 
demonstrate and incarnate a unified conviction about the quest for religious truth 
if it is to be effective in modelling Newbigin's new cultural `starting point'. The 
comparisons Newbigin repeatedly draws between this understanding of the 
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Church and Polanyi's image of the `Republic of Science' tend to emphasise this 
idealistic conception, implying a commitment to united goals within a generally 
unified tradition. However, this ecclesiological `idealism' emerges as a critical 
tension within Newbigin's programme, because such a renewal depends upon the 
Church's return to a 'revelational orthodoxy'. 
Newbigin's repeated appeals to `fundamentalists' at one end of the 
theological spectrum and to `liberals' at the other amply demonstrate his 
awareness that the `ecclesia' is in reality very f it from manifesting such 
`homogenous' unity with regard to the authority of revelation. It is for this 
reason that Newbigin devotes a good deal of space in his later writings attempting 
to chart a `middle' course between the two. He critiques the `liberals' for their 
accommodation to the cultural assumptions of modernity expressed in the 
historical-critical method' on the one hand, and the `fundamentalists' for their 
desire for `certainty' (which is but another aspect of the same cultural 
accommodation) on the other. ' 
But the resolution of the debates between the two views represent for 
Newbigin not simply a question of achieving some sort of ecumenical `unity'. It 
is also a matter of missionary effectiveness. This is why he insisted so strongly at 
the first `Gospel and Our Culture' conference in 1991 that: `without a credible, 
intellectually coherent statement of the sense in which the Bible is authoritative 
for us it will be very difficult for us to challenge the assumptions of the culture in 
which we live. "7 There can be little doubt that Newbigin"s lifelong commitment 
to the ecumenical cause is at this point put to its sternist challenge. for the 
Note the emphasis Newbigin places upon this in e. g., I988f: 192: 1988c: 164-5: 1988e: 104: 
1989f: 24,38: 1989h: 101: 1990s: 7-8: 1991 f: 46.49,59,66.87: 1991 c: 9. 
Newbigin 1990s: S. 
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prospects of achieving such an epistemological `synergy' amongst Christians 
across the denominations remain far from optimistic. 8 
Newbigin's analysis is also potentially problematic when viewed from the 
perspective of the `revelation' corner of the missiological triangle. For here, the 
epistemological paradigm tends to `homogenise' his conceptions about biblical 
authority as well. This is implicitly connected to the 'idealistic' understanding of 
the Church discussed above and represents - in effect - its mirror image. For 
Newbigin's emphasis upon the narrative `tradition' of the Bible as being the 
`pattern" or `blueprint' for Christian authenticity tends to suggest that it is 
because of its own broadly agreed authoritative structure that it is able in turn to 
produce in the Church the homogeneity of ecclesiological expression which he so 
strongly desires. 
Newbigin's use of Lindbeck's notion of revelation as a `lens' through 
which Christians are to view the world tends to underline this homogenous 
conception by implying that the Bible is interpreted in a monochrome and 
uniform way by Christians rather than in a manner which is both culturally and 
individually diverse. In this context, Terrence Tilley's critique of Lindbeck could 
as well be applied to Newbigin, when he writes that the problem to be resolved 
is: 
how participants in a religious tradition, such as Western Christianity, 
characterized diachronically by internal pluralism and instantiated 
synchronically in different social locations (where semiotic systems which they 
do not determine are the 'native language'), can all be said to share a cultural 
For Newbigin's early ecumenical commitment, see e. r.. 1953: esp. 87-100: also 1955. For 
his more recent affirmations of an ecumenical perspective, cf. I976a: 1977e: I980a: I 982a: 
I984b: l985b: I985a: I994c. (For his perspective on the ecumenical movement more 
generally. see the pair of articles in The Internajional Review of Mission (1981 a and 1981 b). 
One is a reprint of a 1962 article. the other his later reflections upon developments since that 
time. ) See also Wainwright 2000: 81-134 for an analysis of Newbi(in as 'Ecumenical 
Advocate'. 
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and linguistic framework despite the pluralism internal to the traditions and their 
widely varying social locations. 9 
Tilley concludes by stating that `Lindbeck's view presumes a normality, a 
stability, of a religious framework, independent of its actual instantiations in 
multiple cultural contexts. ' 10 The same could be said of Newbigin's approach. 
We return in the next section to consider the effects of `homogeneity' 
upon the third corner of the triangle (the `receptor' corner) as it is more 
appropriate to the discussion of 'faith" at this later stage in the argument. 
4.2.2 The `philosophical' tendency 
Having looked at the tendency of Newbigin's material to `homogenise' its 
conception of both the `missionary' and `revelation' corners of the missiological 
triangle, we proceed now to a discussion of a second more general `tendency' 
that Polanyi's influence has upon Newbigin's thought. This is that it is prone to 
accentuate a philosophical approach both to the analysis of culture and also to the 
subsequent reconstruction of mission. 
This can be seen, for example, by briefly revisiting the analysis of the 
previous chapter in which we discussed Newbigin's use of Berger's concept of 
`plausibility structures'. For whereas Berger understands and utilises the concept 
from within a `sociology of knowledge" approach to the relationship between 
culture and religious faith. Newbigin re-deploys it on the supposition that it is 
essentially a philosophical term. This effectively leads to a reconstruction of 
Berger" s term. 
Tilley 1989: 96 (emphasis original). 
ýu Tilley 1989: 96. 
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Berger himself developed the idea of `plausibility structures' as a way of 
explicating particular aspects of the culture of modernity - not least its ability to 
sustain the `plausibility' of religious faith. In this context, he writes in Facing up 
to Modernity, that 'plausibility structures' are to be interpreted as `infrastructures 
of confirmatory social interaction'. '' He continues: 
The social infrastructure of a particular ideational complex, along with various 
concomitant maintenance procedures, practical as well as theoretical, constitute 
its plausibility structure, that is, set the conditions within which the ideas in 
question have a chance of remaining plausible. " 
`Put simply, ' he says. the plausibility structure is to be understood as a collection 
of people, procedures, and mental processes geared to the task of keeping a 
specific definition of reality going. ' 13 
By emphasising the different `facets' within this overall conception of 
`plausibility structures", it is clear that Berger himself views the `intellectual' 
dimension as but one component within a wider social and cultural infrastructure, 
in which both `overt' and `subconscious' elements play their part. Within this 
context, the philosophical perspective has its place to be sure, but the concept as a 
whole is in no way confined to an exclusively intellectual dimension. Newbigin 
on the other hand tends to interpret the concept of `plausibility structures' in a 
primarily philosophical sense. understanding it to refer more narrowly to a 
`mindset" or mental outlook which is dominated by an Enlightenment 
Ber(-Yer 1979: 215. 
Berger 1979: 215. 
Berger 1979: 216. For further definition. cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967: 174: Berger 1969: 
45.126ff: Berger 1970: 50-52: Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974: 21,75,167: Berger 1980: 
19: Berger and Kellner 1982: 63. 
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epistemology. It is exemplified, for example, by its relativising of notions of 
`truth' and its distinction between `facts' and 'values". 14 
Newbigin's tendency to turn Berger's term into a more exclusively 
intellectual' and `philosophical' category is nicely illustrated by the way in 
which he `inverts' Berger's own position on the relativity of modern society 
which we discussed in the previous chapter. By his adoption of an 'inductive' 
approach to the relativity of contemporary culture, Newbigin argues that Berger's 
approach is itself a plausibility structure and functions as such. ''' He continues: 
it is not that there is no socially accepted plausibility structure and thus we make 
our own choices. This is the ruling plausibility structure. and we make our 
choices within its parameters. ' 16 
Moreover, it is in the very operation of this kind of specifically 
philosophical analysis that the Enlightenment's `plausibility structure' is said 
later by Newbigin to be `performing its normal function. ' 17 The resulting `slant' 
to Berger"s term is summed up in Newbigin's use of phrases like, the plausibility 
structure of the modern scientific world-view'. is or The modern scientific 
world-view functions as a plausibility structure. ' 19 Newbigin underlines this 
understanding when in a 1988 interview he was asked to define what he meant by 
the term. He replied: `I think it is the belief that the scientific method - which 
has been so enormously fruitful for human life - is the only reliable way of 
understanding the total human situation. '20 
14 E. g., Newbiý, gin 1986b: 14.17: 1987a: 359,361: 1989f: 17: 1990c: 337. 
Newbi2in 1986b: 14. 
"' Newbigin 1986b: 14 (emphasis original), in the context of 10-17. 
17 Newbib=in 1989f: 57. 
Newbi<gin 1986b: 15. 
Newbigin 1986b: 54. 
ý0 Newbigin 1988b: 32. 
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As we have shown, Newbigin's philosophical `leaning' is given a 
functional and theoretic underpinning by his reading of Michael Polanyi. That 
this reading should now inform his discussions of Berger is not therefore entirely 
surprising. Nor is it surprising that the effect of this philosophical emphasis is 
further to accentuate the epistemological bias to Newbigin's work on cultural 
transition, rather than to lead him to analyse other aspects of cultural change. 
This in turn implies three things about the concept of `culture". 
To begin with, it suggests that philosophers and thinkers are more 
significant in moulding cultural change than other social `indicators' or cultural 
`carriers'. It is an approach which will always tend to accentuate what Andrew 
Walker describes as the `trickle down' model of cultural transition in which the 
mass of society is influenced first and foremost by the cultural elites at the top' 
who `dominate and determine cultural values, which in turn sprinkle down, 
spraying like water from a shower head on the classes below. 21 Whilst this may 
have been a fair conclusion to draw in the era of `classical modernity'. Walker 
argues that it is no longer true. Instead, he comments that: 
... 
in late modernity, with the plethora of interest groups, cultural heterogeneity, 
and the deregulated mass media, cultural transmission needs to be understood in 
terms of the seepage from below, sprinkling from above, and jets from the side. 
We need a model that is more like ajacuzzi than a shower. " 
But in addition. Newbigin's `epistemological' bias also implies that most 
people respond to cultural questions in a philosophical and intellectualised way 
rather than by means of a wide range of concomitant reactions (including 
emotions. intuitions. prejudices. social conditionings and so forth). Whilst the 
Walker 1996: 155. 
Walker 1996: 157. 
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intellectual approach may reflect Newbigin's own highly-developed critical 
faculties, most commentators would argue that this is exceptional rather than 
normative. 23 To this extent, Newbigin is susceptible to the `elitist' critique, that 
though the 'epistemological' element is certainly one part of the missiological 
equation, it is not the only one. His reading of Berger not only slants the 
discussion in this direction, but prevents him from a consideration of other factors 
which might have resulted from a more detailed and wide-ranging interaction 
with the work of Berger, or of other sociologists of religion. 24 
Finally, therefore, our analysis of the 'philosophical" tendency is 
inherently connected to the preceding discussion of `homogeneity' in Newbigin's 
thought. For by presenting a somewhat monochrome tendency of Western 
culture to `philosophize" about questions of plausibility, Newbigin suggests that 
his approach to `culture" - as well as `Church' and `revelation' - is also being 
viewed in homogenous rather than pluralistic terms. 
4.2.3 The `faith-orientation' tendency 
The third general effect of Polanyi's influence upon Newbigin's critique 
of culture, is that it undergirds his discussions of the dialogue between `Church' 
and `culture' with the assumption that overt `faith commitments' are being 
exercised on both sides. Here our discussion reconnects with the earlier analysis 
of Newbigin's triangular model and investigates the specific effect that Polanyi's 
epistemological emphasis has upon the `receptor culture' corner of the triangle. 
2 Note Berger's contrast between the 'few intellectuals and other marginal individuals' on the 
one hand and the 'broad masses of entire societies' on the other (Berger 1969: 125). 
24 One thinks. for example. of the work of Os Guinness (e. ýg.. 1981). Andrew Walker (1996). or 
James Hunter (1983 and 1987) who all lean more heavily on Berger's insights. 
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Once again we may illustrate this effect with reference to Newbigin's use of 
Berger's `plausibility structures'. For the result of Newbigin's employment of 
this term is not only that it becomes more philosophically axiomatic and 
formalised (in contrast to the influence on its conception of the more informal 
and subconscious `social infrastructures' which Berger originally had in mind), 
but also that it now comes to express the dimension of a culture's `faith- 
commitments' on the basis of which it holds its beliefs to be plausible. 
This connection is derived from Newbigin's incorporation of Polanyi's 
idea about `fiduciary' frameworks, and is applied to the competing `plausibility 
structures' represented within Western culture itself - the rationalist thought- 
world of the Enlightenment on the one hand (the reigning plausibility structure'), 
and the competing framework of the Church's belief (the `alternative plausibility 
structure') on the other. 2 That both groups represent conflicting ideologies is 
immediately apparent throughout Newbigin's discussions. But it also becomes 
clear that both positions are understood to reflect the `faith" foundations on which 
they are built. 
In relation to the Church we saw in chapter 2 that Newbigin makes 
specific use of Polanyi's concept of `indwelling' to link the ideas of `faith 
commitments' and `plausibility structures'. He uses this to articulate the idea that 
the Church is called to `indwell' the framework of beliefs inherent within the 
Bible's narrative. This `indwelling', he argues, represents the `alternative 
plausibility structure' to that of contemporary culture - an alternative from which 
25 For the former, e. g., Newbigin 1989f: 8,10,53,95,97; 1991 f: 28: 1995d: 101. For the latter, 
e. g., 1989f: 228. 
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the `reigning plausibility structure' of contemporary society can alone be 
challenged. 26 
But from an analysis of the way in which these `structures' of thought are 
understood by Newbigin to relate to one another, it becomes apparent that he 
envisages the conversation between them as a dialogue between competing `faith' 
commitments. As he puts it: `... what people fail to see, of course ... 
is that 
every plausibility structure rests upon faith commitments'. '? We began to 
explore Newbigin's development of this idea in chapter 2 in relation to Polanyi's 
conception of `heuristic passion'. It emerges from this that Newbigin has a 
developed notion of the way in which this `faith' component is understood to 
express itself culturally. So far as the Church is concerned, of course, the 
understanding that a `faith commitment' is intrinsic to its `indwelling' of the 
Bible's story is both natural and understandable. It is after all the `community of 
faith'. But as far as the secular culture of the West is concerned, to what extent is 
an expression of its own `faith" (in the `reigning plausibility structure') to any 
degree the corollary? 
The origins of this approach, we suggest, lie in Newbigin's transfer of the 
assumptions he makes in relation to his understanding of inter-religious dialogue 
(to which his time in India had made him accustomed) to the Church-culture 
dialogue in post-Enlightenment West. In India his apologetic strategies were 
wont to be concerned with groups of people who explicitly expressed religious 
belief- Christians on the one hand. and (predominantly) Hindus on the other. In 
the ensuing dialogue, a starting point of overt 'faith' could be assumed on both 
26 E. g., Newbigin I989f: 98-100, leading to 228. 
'7 Newbi«in 1988b: 31 (emphasis added). 
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sides with all that this entailed in terms of the presuppositions involved. On his 
return to England, however, a `transfer' of faith-commitments appears to take 
place in Newbigin's thinking. 
In this process, an `equivalent" to the faith-commitment undergirding 
Hindu culture is now understood to undergird the philosophical outlook of 
Western culture as a whole. The kind of vocabulary he uses is significant" 
particularly in passages where he speaks of his rejection of the `secularisation' 
thesis he had himself adopted in the 1960s. We noted in the `Introduction' to the 
thesis his use of the word `pagan' (rather than `secular") to sum up the 
implications of his new approach to the ideological presuppositions undergirding 
Western culture. He wrote in 1993, for example, that: `Like others I had been 
accustomed ... to speak of 
England as a secular society'. But he continues: 
I have now come to realize that I was the easy victim of an illusion fron which 
ºny reading of the Gospels should have saved me. No room remains empty for 
long. If God is driven out, the gods come trooping in. England is a pagan 
society and the development of a truly missionary encounter with this very tough 
form of paganism is the greatest intellectual and practical task facing the 
Church. 28 
Statements like these appear to assume what amounts to an explicit 
commitment of `faith' on the part of non-believing society in the whole way of 
Newbigin I993g: 235-6 (emphasis added). Cf. also 1988b: 3I, where Newbigin comments in 
an interview that on returning to England, `... it didn't take long to discover that we are 
really not in a secular society but in a pagan society - not a society which has no gods. but a 
society which has false gods. I came to feel that more and more. ' It was by the mid-seventies 
that Newbigin had become aware of his own misplaced confidence in the idea that the global 
secularisation of the 1960s represented the 'key' moment that would bring human societies to 
face God in a new and critical moment of decision. For this original optimism, see esp. 1966: 
27-30.36-7.76 (where he follows the insights of van Leeuwen 1964). Here he had written: 
'My question is whether the truly secular spirit can be sustained if it loses contact with 
that ... reality transcending every 
human tradition and every earthly society, a God who is 
for man against all the powers' (37, emphasis added). For further examples of his later more 
realistic response to the 'secularisation' thesis, cf. 1974a: 15-16,19: 1981 a: 248-9: 1990d: 
149: 1993f: 230-1. 
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thinking that undergirds its life. But the degree to which such faith is either 
`overt' or `explicit' is highly questionable. It is certainly not equivalent to 
Christian `faith', and even though it may exist in some intellectual pockets of 
society it is certainly neither uniform nor universal. From a Christian point of 
view the perception that the secular culture of the West is based to some extent 
upon such `fiduciary' foundations may be helpful in terms of the Christian's 
approach to unbelievers. But Newbigin's conception of `dialogue' - as we saw 
in chapter 2- involves the consciousness on both sides that such fiduciary 
commitments are being brought out into the open for discussion. 
His articulation of the 'dialogue' involved between competing `faith- 
commitments' therefore involves the open statement of the presuppositional 
belief structures upon which the convictions of either side are put forward. If his 
experience in India predisposed him to an understanding of evangelism which 
had this sort of `dialogue" at its heart (i. e.. that between two overt faith positions), 
it is not altogether clear to what extent this is a useful approach to the question of 
dialogue with the deeply ingrained unbelief of contemporary Western culture. 
We return to this theme in the following sections. 
As a final comment on these observations, it should also be noted that in 
relation to our ongoing discussion of Newbigin's use of Berger's conception of 
plausibility structures', the present analysis suggests a further `stretching' of 
Berger"s idea at a theoretical level. For whereas Berger originally used the term 
to refer to the conditions which contribute to the initial possibility of belief. 
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Newbigin uses it by contrast to refer to the structure of belief itself (as inhabited 
by the Church or by Western culture). 29 The supporting `substructure' of belief 
(as envisaged by Berger) therefore becomes the belief structure itself in 
Newbigin's writing. Berger himself could not have made this move - not least 
because he was ultimately rather pessimistic about the churches' collective ability 
to sustain (or even to contribute to) the structure of plausibility needed for the 
survival of faith. He writes accordingly, that: By the very nature of their social 
character as voluntary associations "located" primarily in the private 
sphere.... churches can only augment the strength and durability of the required 
plausibility structures to a limited extent. ' 30 
This further reinforces the view that Newbigin's interpretation of 
`plausibility structures' needs to be distinguished from Berger's if it is to rightly 
understood. For inasmuch as Newbigin's appropriation of it in relation to the 
Church can be said to carry a `sociological' dimension, this is better understood 
as deriving from Polanyi's approach to `fiduciary' frameworks than it is to 
Berger's original conception of them as `infrastructures of confirmatory social 
interaction'. 31 This conclusion would tie in with our previous observations about 
Newbigin's work with regard to the influence of Berger and Polanyi: that his 
deployment of Berger"s ideas is better interpreted in Polanyian terms than vice 
versa. 
29 See the discussion in Williams 1993: 18-19. For a more favourable interpretation, cf. 
Ramachandra 1996: 153-167. 
Berger 1969: 133-4: also. Berger. Berger and Kellner 1974: 167f.. 
Bergger 1979: 21 . 
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4.3 Newbigin, Polanyi and `missionary' theology 
We turn now to an analysis of the impact of Polanyi's thought on 
Newbigin from the point of view of Polanyi's methodological assumptions. This 
approach to the critique of Newbigin's writing accepts his appropriation of the 
Polanyi thesis on its own philosophical and epistemological terms, and seeks to 
explore the extent to which it contributes to Newbigin's proposals about mission. 
The thesis has already supported the view that Polanyi's writings provide 
constructive material for Newbigin's approach. For example, we have seen that 
his deconstruction of the Enlightenment notion of `objectivity' - by pointing out 
the inescapably `fiduciary' element in the process of all knowing - provides an 
effective and powerful argument against the purely Cartesian approach to 
knowing that Newbigin sets out to counter. Polanyi's approach reconstructs such 
knowledge in more personalist and subjective terms. and thereby undercuts the 
central rationalist contention that only scientific knowledge can be accepted as 
properly `objective'. Moreover, we have seen that Polanyi's reaffirmation of the 
`subjectivity' of scientific enquiry potentially helps Newbigin to undercut the 
Enlightenment case - mounted on Cartesian foundations - against the supposed 
subjectivity of Christian faith. 
Polanyi's intention. however, is never specifically to apply this insight to 
the notion of religious knowing, although he is nonetheless conscious of the 
wider benefits not least to religious belief - that will accrue should the 
Enlightenment emphasis upon a narrow `scientism"3' be reconstructed along the 
lines he suggests. In this context. he is confident that once the Enlightenment 
32 Polanyi's word (Polanyi 1967: 196). 
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shackles of a dominant Cartesian epistemology have been removed (along with 
what he calls its `absurd vision of the universe'33), there will once more `open up 
instead a meaningful world which could resound to religion. ' 34 Within the 
context of such a reconstruction, Polanyi is able therefore to defend the notion of 
religious knowing as a form of knowledge which - by its deployment of 
`personal participation and imagination' - has as much integrity in its creation of 
`meaning' and its relationship to `reality' as that of scientific knowledge. 1' 
In these respects, therefore. Polanyi's insights serve constructively to fuel 
Newbigin's basic line of argument about the crisis facing Western culture. In the 
context of the defence of the notion of religious faith in a post-Enlightenment 
world, this is a bold and creative move with real potential. After all, a purely 
Cartesian epistemology had always struggled to accommodate the possibility of 
religious faith (and could certainly never validate it). As a result, within the 
resulting polarity that was established between `faith' (viewed solely as personal 
preference) and `reason' (viewed as the only foundation for objective 
judgements), the defence of Christian claims has always had to wrestle one way 
or another with the central dilemma that this distinction had established. 
In the debates that have emerged. a central question has been whether the 
Church should take sides with the dominant cultural trend and seek to make 
Christianity `believable' within the rationalist mindset of post-Enlightenment 
West, or whether it should stress the 'revealed' nature of the message and 
Polanyi 1966: 92. 
Polanyi 1966: 92. 
E. g., Polanyi and Prosch 197: 65: 'lf... personal participation and imagination are 
essentially involved in science as well as in the humanities, meanings created in the sciences 
stand in no more favored relation to reality than do meanings created in the arts, in moral 
judgments, and in religion' (emphasis original). 
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therefore reject any `common" ground that culture might have provided. It was 
Basil Mitchell who wrote the following words about the apologist's dilemma in 
coming to terms with these `rival' claims: 
We may picture the modern theologian's predicament as that of navigating a 
river. The pilot is endeavouring to steer his vessel successfully down to the open 
sea while keeping his cargo of traditional Christian doctrine so far as possible 
intact; at the same time avoiding the shoals which infest the channel. Shall lie 
make for the right, rationalist, bank of the stream and adopt an apologetic which 
draws freely on metaphysical arguments and historical evidence; or shall he 
make for the left, fideist bank and put his trust entirely in faith and subjective 
commitment'i 
At one level, Newbigin's appropriation of Polanyi's epistemological 
framework effectively nuances both these approaches by stressing `personal' and 
`tacit' indwelling as the key to any kind of knowledge - both scientific and 
religious. On closer inspection, however, Polanyi's approach to epistemology 
yields rather more mixed results when it is applied by writers like Newbigin 
specifically to the reconstruction of a post-Enlightenment missiology. 
In this context, we shall argue that whilst Polanyi is useful to Newbigin in 
the deconstruction of a false Enlightenment objectivity, he is less helpful in the 
reconstruction of an alternative approach. There are three main reasons for this: 
the first has to do with Polanyi's presuppositional methodology, the second with 
his usefulness to the reconstruction of a specifically missionary theology, and the 
third with his contribution to Newbigin"s views on `commensurability" and 
`conversion'. In a fourth section we will expand this latter discussion to 
incorporate the related influence of Thomas Kuhn's work on `paradigm shifts'. 
and in a final section we draw attention to tensions and questions which have 
3' Mitchell 1994: 73-3. 
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arisen in the previous sections. 
4.3.1 Polanyi and `method' 
Polanyi's usefulness in the task of reconstructing theology method in a 
post-Enlightenment context has been extensive. 
37 Indeed, Avery Dulles 
commented in his 1984 article, `Faith, Church, and God: Insights from Michael 
Polanyi', that: `A thoroughgoing renewal of theology along the lines indicated by 
Polanyi could profitably engage the joint efforts of many theologians for a 
considerable span of years. '38 But apart from Newbigin, the most comprehensive 
and systematic use of his ideas thus far has been made by the Scottish systematic 
theologian, Thomas F. Torrance. 39 The fact that Torrance is first and foremost a 
systematician, whilst Newbigin is primarily a missiologist, itself raises important 
questions about the `manner' in which Polanyi's framework has been applied to 
the task of theology. In particular, a comparison between the use of Polanyi's 
ideas by the two writers highlights the issue of the relative value of his work to 
the differing `branches' or `disciplines' of the theological enterprise. This 
important question has received no sustained treatment in discussions about 
In terms of longer works, see: Crewdson 1994; Gelwick (1965 and 1970); Gunton 1985: Paul 
1987: Scott 1996 (= reprint of Scott 1985). Cf. also a number of articles suggesting 
connections between Polanyi's ideas and the task of theology: Brownhill 1968; Dulles 1984; 
Gelwick 1982: Gill 1978: Hall 1982: Keiser 1987; Langford (1966 and 1968); Manno 1974: 
Prosch 1982: Scott 1970: Thorson (1981 and 1987): Ward 1998. 
's Dulles 1984: 550. 
See in particular: Torrance 1969: 92f.. 1 15f.. 122f., etc.: and Torrance 1973 in which the 
'formal' structure of theological enquiry is developed in parallel to Polanyi's development of 
the structure of scientific enquiry. See also Torrance's introduction to the volume of essays 
he edited on various aspects of the thought of Polanyi and their relationship to theological 
reflection (Torrance 1980). For a full-scale treatment of Torrance's use of Polanyi, cf. 
Weightman 1994. See also the briefer discussion in McGrath 1999: 228-233. 
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Newbigin -a fact that is surprising, given the pervasiveness of Polanyi's 
influence upon him. 
Before discussing Polanyi's appropriateness to Newbigin's specifically 
missionary theology, two more general aspects of Polanyi's 'method' and their 
broader relevance for theology call for attention. The first of these relates to his 
concept of `heuristic passion' discussed in chapter 2. The second is the manner 
in which Polanyi"s method effectively severs the connection between `faith" and 
`history'. 
With regard to first of these. we noted in chapter 2 the fact that the 
framework within which the activity of exploration and integration operates is 
envisaged by Polanyi as being `evolutionary'. As lie puts it in his 1961 article 
`Faith and Reason': 
Knowing, as a dynamic force of comprehension, uncovers at each step a new 
hidden meaning. It reveals a universe of comprehensive entities which represent 
the meaning of their largely unspecifiable particulars. A universe constructed as 
an ascending hierarchy of meaning and excellence is very different from the 
picture of a chance collocation of atoms to which the examination of the 
universe by explicit modes of inference leads us. The vision of such a hierarchy 
inevitably sweeps on to envisage the meaning of the universe as a whole. Thus 
40 natural knowing expands continuously into knowledge of the supernatural_ 
From statements such as these it becomes clear that religious knowledge 
for Polanyi can be seen to represent the furthest possibility of heuristic and 
exploratory activity, the summit as it were of human endeavour. As a result 
of this, the process by which this goal is reached is appropriately described by 
verbs that involve the distinctive human activities of exploration and discovery. 
Thus, the vocabulary of `probing'. `intuiting", 'indwelling' and so forth are 
40 Polanyi 1961: 246: cf. also 1964: 83-4 for his earliest reference to the possibility of religious 
knowledge in an evolutionary context (the book was originally published in 1946). 
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commonly used by him. 41 But the point to note here is that such verbs describe 
an essentially human activity - an intellectual probing towards the fullest 
integrations of reality. As a result, they refer to concepts which - when 
transferred into a theological framework - are much more generally suited to a 
`liberal' mindset within which the human element of `searching' in the progress 
of faith is prominent. It is not therefore surprising that Paul Tillich is the 
theologian with whom Polanyi feels most at hone. He comments for example in 
Personal Knowledge that: 
Although I should not venture to declare that my argument in the present 
section agrees entirely with the views of any one theological writer, I find my 
own conception of the scope and method of a progressive Protestant theology 
confirmed by many passages in the writings of Paul Tillich. 42 
This observation in itself raises serious questions about the natural 
suitability of a writer like Polanyi to the theology of Torrance or Newbigin, given 
that their respective intentions are so differently conceived. For example, whilst 
for Polanyi the notion of religious knowing is - as it were - the furthest 
projection of human discovery, for Torrance and Newbigin, it functions by 
contrast as its a priori. Similarly, whereas for Polanyi. the notion of religious 
knowledge is properly `subjective' in being primarily a human activity, for 
Torrance and Newbigin such knowledge is given by means of `revelation°. 
Hence, it does not derive from a human `probing' at all. but rather as a result of a 
divine disclosure to human beings. Human agency is not involved in the active 
41 E. g.. Polanyi 1958: 55-56.59.64.130-1,212,321: 1959: 78-80: 1961: 242,245: 1964: 40: 
1966: 17-18: 1968: 404ff.: 1975: 44,60.96.140-1.145. etc.. 
4' Polanvi 1958: 283 (note I ). See also Polanyi 1961: 243. As an example of a theological 
appropriation of Polanyi's scheme from a more 'liberal' perspective than, say, that of 
Torrance. cf. Manno 1974. 
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sense of `doing' or `searching', but in the passive sense of `receiving", `hearing 
or `being given understanding'. This being the case, a reconstruction of 'faith' on 
Polanyian terms is limited in its scope for theologians like Torrance and 
Newbigin whose presuppositions demand a radical revision of the `direction' or 
`flow' of Polanyi's methodology. Of course, neither Torrance nor Newbigin 
transfers Polanyi's `liberal' agenda into their respective theologies, but both do 
make extensive use of Polanyi's specific vocabulary and phraseology, thus 
creating a tension between the conception of the supernatural as the final `reality' 
sought (as in Polanyi's thought) and of supernatural revelation as that which is 
initially given (as in the work of Torrance and Newbigin). 43 We shall return to 
some further ramifications of this point shortly. 
A second more `general" aspect of Polanyi's method which calls for 
attention at this point is the way in which he effectively severs any necessary 
connection between `faith' and 'history'. 44 For him, the `truthfulness' of the 
Christian `story' is not dependent upon whether or not certain historical events 
actually took place. but rather upon its `believability" as a conceptual scheme 
which is able to provide an `integrating meaning' to the deepest yearnings or 
intuitions of the human psyche. This point emerges most clearly in Polanyi's last 
book Meaning (published in 1975) in which his understanding of `religion' is 
most fully developed. Here, in an analysis of the Christian framework of 
doctrines and beliefs such as the `Fall". `Redemption'. or the `ultimate victory 
through Christ'. he writes that: 
Paradoxically therefore, at one level. both Newbigin and Torrance develop theologies which 
specifically refute Polanyi's approach. 
4' No doubt. this is one of the reasons why he finds the 'progressive Protestant' theology of 
Paul Tillich so congenial (see Polanyi 1958: 283: note I). 
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None of these beliefs makes any literal sense. They can be destroyed as easily 
as the actuality of Polonius' death upon the stage, should anyone attempt to 
defend its reality in the world of facts. Both are works of the imagination, 
accepted by us as meaningful integrations of quite incompatible clues that move 
us deeply and help us to pull the scattered droplets of our lives together into a 
single sea of sublime meaning. 45 
They are essentially `myths', he argues, which some are `ready to accept 
- even if in fact they are actual impossibilities. " 
46 He proceeds to state that 
though the `contents' of these biblical narratives may seem 'completely 
implausible to us', yet they still carry what he describes as `a meaning expressing 
the whole significance of life and the universe in genuine and universal feeling 
terms. Then we can say: It does not matter. If not this story exactly, then 
something like this is somehow true ... 
'47 
Remarks like these owe much to Polanyi's use of Mircea Eliade's work 
on mythology. 48 As a result of his interaction with this work, Polanyi comes to 
similar conclusions to Eliade with regard to the evaluation of claims about 
religious knowledge. For just as Eliade interprets the `truth' of myths in the 
sense that they are to be understood essentially as `projections' of the human 
imagination, so Polanyi similarly envisages religious experience in terms of its 
ability to transport the believer outside of what he describes as `secular time'49 
(involving its `temporal frame", '() or the disjointed "dailiness" of our lives''') 
and into an abstracted 'out-of-this-world' arena (which he calls - following 
4` Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 157. 
46 Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 158. 
' Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 159 (emphasis original). 
48 Eliade 1961. Cf. especially chapter 8 of Polanyi and Prosch 1975 (`The Structure of Myth', 
120-131) in which he specifically discusses pertinent aspects of Eliade's work. 
Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 159. 
'O Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 154. 
'I Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 156. 
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Eliade - the `Great Time' 
52). It is in this sphere that the intimations of religion 
make ultimate sense. 
In addition to this, Polanyi also makes a formal distinction between the 
kind of `integrations' that human knowing makes possible in the scientific realm, 
and those that can be made in the religious environment. The former he describes 
as `self-centred' integrations, in the sense that they are made 'from the self as a 
center ... to the object of our focal attention. ' 
54 The latter he calls `self-giving' 
integrations, in which not only the symbol becomes integrated but the self also 
becomes integrated as it is carried away by the symbol or given to it. '" The 
former are integrated back `into' the self, whereas in the latter, the individual is 
`carried away' by the object of attention. This distinction between `self-centered' 
and `self-giving' integrations itself raises the question of the extent to which 
Polanyi is able to view religious knowledge as in any sense `objective'. This is 
an issue which he addresses in the conclusion to his discussion about religious 
knowing. Here he writes: 
Let us ask ... what sort of possibility the sacred myths that 
inform religious 
rites must have in order to gain our acceptance. We see at once that their 
possibility cannot lie in our regarding their accounts of events as factually true in 
the sense of day-to-day possibilities. That is, their possibility cannot lie in our 
conceiving the events as they represent them as actually having occurred in 
secular time - at least not us such events as these would occur in secular time - 
because their very detachment rests upon their events being understood as 
having occurred rather in that `Great Time" - that out-of-this-world time - that 
Eliade speaks of., 6 
The point to notice here is the distinction that Polanyi makes between the 
Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 152,153.154.156, quoting from Eliade 1961: 59. 
See the whole section in Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 149-160. 
Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 71 (emphasis original). 
Polanvi and Prosch 1975: 75 (emphasis original). 
Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 158-9 (emphasis original). 
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temporal spheres in which `faith' and `history' are seen to operate. It emerges 
that the reality or coherence of faith has no necessary causal connection with 
historical events. Rather it is a projection of the human imagination in which the 
truthfulness' of religious statements is abstracted from the everyday reality of 
concrete and historical affairs. In this connection. Polanyi's biographer Harry 
Prosch comments that: `[Polanyi] really had a difficult time understanding a 
belief in the factual reality of the supernatural in religion as anything more than 
magic or superstition. ''? 
These observations carry weight for any methodology that relies heavily 
upon Polanyi's conceptual scheme, and yet particularly for any that aim (as 
Newbigin's does) to maintain a more theologically orthodox and `conservative' 
stance. In this context the adoption by Newbigin of the obverse of Polanyi"s 
argument about the `subjectivity' of scientific knowledge (i. e., that religious 
knowing is correspondingly `objective') is not supported by Polanyi's 
conclusions, and depends upon an understanding of the `unified' nature of the 
reality in which both are said to operate. 
This tension in Polanyi's thought-world is often misunderstood or passed 
over altogether. As Ronald Hall has argued, it paradoxically reveals a more overt 
drift in Polanyi's later thinking towards the very positivistic distinctions that in 
his earlier books he had specifically set out to undermine: distinctions between a 
`scientific' knowledge on the one hand that is open to experimentation and 
empirical verification (and which is therefore `objective" in the traditional sense 
of the word), and `artistic" or 'religious' knowledge on the other which is much 
,' Prosch 1986: 255. See also the discussions in Haddox 1982. and Hall 1982. 
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more subjective and is not open to the same tests. 'x Indeed, Harry Prosch has 
argued convincingly that this tension is already apparent in his earlier book, 
Personal Knotit,, ledge. '9 This suggests that even within Polanyi's own conceptual 
scheme there remains a distinction between the comparative modes of 
verification relevant to scientific knowledge on the one hand, and those relevant 
to artistic or religious knowledge on the other. 
This in turn raises more general questions about the transfer of a 
Polanyian `framework" into the theological schemes of writers like Torrance and 
Newbigin. Avery Dulles. in the article referred to above. shrewdly comments 
that: If I am not mistaken, Polanyi's value for theology lies less in what he 
explicitly stated about theological questions than in the transfer value of what he 
had to say about science. '60 The transfer of both he seems to imply involves 
potential problems. 
Certainly, the `broadest' transference is to be seen in the work of 
Torrance, where one does sometimes get the impression that Polanyi's views 
about religion are being treated as the logical epistemological corollary of his 
views about science, rather than as an accurate reflection of Polanyi's actual 
stated opinions. Polanyi's material, in this `reading", is presented as much more 
fully in support of Torrance's positions than Polanyi himself would have allowed, 
and does not take sufficient cognisance of Polanyi's divergent views on the 
`s Hall 1982: esp. 14-15. 
59 See Prosch 1986: esp. 249ff., and the references to Personal Knowledge cited there. Cf. also 
Weightman 1994: 61 (note 42), where Weightman refers to an unpublished typescript of a 
conversation between Polanyi and Tillich in 1963 in which Polanyi refers to the concept of 
religion as an extension of the transnatural existence possessed by the arts' (foreshadowing 
much of the discussion in his later book, Meaning). 
`10 Dulles 1984: 550. 
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relationship between the conception of religious knowledge on the one hand and 
that of scientific knowledge on the other. 61 
But to interpret Polanyi's meaning in this way. is to some significant 
degree to reinterprel his basic framework, transferring what he says about 
science and applying it to what Torrance (and Newbigin) want to say about 
theology. 62 "Their work in this context might best be described therefore as a 
theological appropriation of what Polanyi says about science. What it is not is a 
reading of what Polanyi actually says about theology. For Polanyi, the notion of 
a `transcendent being' revealing himself within history is never even a possibility 
in his framework of thought, let alone the starting point for such a framework. 
So far as Polanyi's scheme of thought itself is concerned, this `disparity' 
between the comparative modes of `scientific' and `religious' verification does 
not present a major problem. For though he periodically makes statements that 
appear to support a religious and/or theological outlook. 63 it is clear that this was 
not his main objective, nor - for that matter - that he was a Christian believer 
himself. 64 The weight of his own interest lay more generally in de-throning the 
61 See, for example. the `Christianising' of Polanyi's material in Torrance 1973: 164, where 
Torrance infers that Polanyi's references to 'indwelling' recall Jesus' speaking about `mutual 
indwelling' in John 14. Polanyi's views are then taken and incorporated by Torrance in a 
manner that suggests that Polanyi is in agreement with his wider understanding of theological 
science. For a similar critique of Torrance's use of Polanyi, cf. Prosch 1986: esp. 235-257, 
and, more generally, Weightman 1994. For a treatment more sympathetic to the 
convergences between the two, see McGrath 1999: esp. 228-233. 
6' Interestingly, though Newbigin refers to Torrance three times in his writings (Newbigin 
1976a: 288 - as part of a Festschrift for Torrance: 1989f: 29: and I995d: 74), this is never in 
direct relation to discussions of Polanyi. Nevertheless, there is a marked similarity in their 
appropriations. Where they differ is in Newbigin's more direct appropriation of Polanyi's 
cultural analysis discussed in chapter 2. 
Alongside the above reference to his agreement with Tillich. Polanyi's 'theological' and 
religious' contributions would include his approval of Augustine (discussed in more detail 
below), and the following passages: Polanyi 1964 (orig. 1946): 83-4 : 1958: 279-298: 1961: 
237-247: 1966: 92: 1975: 149-160.179-181. 
64 Cf. the conclusions of Terence Kennedy in Prosch 1986: 256: 'Honesty demands that we 
acknowledge that Polanyi was not religiously committed nor did he have religious faith as 
this is understood in Christian theology. ' Cf. also Prosch 1982: esp. 46-48, for his reply to 
(Note continued on next page. ) 
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dominant Enlightenment paradigm of knowledge than in specifically en-throning 
the possibility of any particular `brand' of religious knowledge - particularly of a 
'revelatory' type. 
4.3.2 Polanyi and the reconstruction of `missionary' theology 
These observations about Polanyi's methodological presuppositions have 
serious implications for the interpretation of Newbigin's work. At this point. 
however, we will draw an important distinction between Newbigin and Torrance. 
Hitherto in our discussion. we have discussed Torrance and Newbigin in the same 
context as examples of theologians (both within the `reformed tradition') who 
have made use of Polanyi's ideas. But, whereas Torrance is a theologian who 
utilises Polanyi in the reconstruction of theology from a `systematic' point of 
view, Newbigin is overtly a `missiologist'. We shall now develop the case that 
whilst in certain respects Polanyi is well-suited to the systematic enterprise, his 
use in an overtly missiological context is more problematic. 
From a systematic point of view, insofar as theology seeks more 
coherently to define its own nature and to understand its own methodology. 
Polanyi's insights to some extent can be seen to be both beneficial and creative. 
Indeed - as Torrance himself amply demonstrates - the application of Polanyi's 
approach promises to bring a greater coherence to the field of theological enquiry 
than was ever possible within a purely positivist approach which tended, for 
example, to distinguish and then atomise the different aspects of theological 
Gelwick 1982, who takes a different view. It is noteworthy that Newbi-in was himself 
agnostic about Polanyi's personal faith (cf. his specific comment in 1985c: 8. also the 
comments in 1996a: iv-v). 
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enquiry. 65 But reflection on the observations already made about Polanyi's 
method lead us to the conclusion that Polanyi's thought-world is far more 
conducive to this type of `intra-systemic' analysis (that is. of describing Christian 
belief in terms of its self-understanding), than it is to the discussion of `extra- 
systemic' strategies (such as the apologetic engagement with those who are 
outsiders to the Christian faith). 
We will now argue that this is a crucial issue for Newbigin. To put this in 
more specifically apologetic terms, the following analysis will explore two 
connected theses. Firstly. it will contend that inasmuch as Polanyi"s insights 
have value, they are likely to be more effective at persuading those who are 
committed to an objectivist view of the scientific method that the scientific 
discipline itself is more `subjective' and `fiduciary' than was supposed. than it 
will be at persuading sceptics about religion that Christian faith is more 
`objective' than was thought to be the case. Secondly, we will argue that 
inasmuch as Polanyi's work has value for a missiologist like Newbigin. this value 
is to be seen more exclusively in its potential ability to make Christians more 
confident about their own existing faith rather than in its potential `persuasional' 
power as far as drawing non-believers to an initial confession of faith is 
concerned. In other words its value will be `intra-systemic' rather than `extra- 
systemic'. From a strictly `missiological' point of view, therefore, we will argue 
that the value of Polanyi's apologetic is somewhat limited. 
This conclusion arises primarily from the fact that within Polanyi's 
thought-world, the process of 'intuition' whereby frameworks and integrations 
are identified in the field of 'reality', necessarily works on the prior assumption 
E. g.. Torrance 1973: esp. 162-3 
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that there is a `reality' on which these human `intuitions' or `hunches' have to 
work. This fact is predicated by Polanyi upon the unitary nature of the world and 
its openness to discovery. 66 His programme proceeds on the understanding that 
the furtherance of knowledge results from the indwelling of personal (and 
fiduciary) intuitions about this `reality' and the subsequent integration of such 
insights into a wider framework of understanding. From these assumptions, the 
`knower' advances in knowledge. and is led to deeper apprehensions of truth. 
In a 1967 article, Polanyi sets out to explain `how the actual process of 
discovery is performed. 67 Here he writes that: 
To see a good problem is to see something hidden and yet accessible. This is 
done by integrating some raw experiences into clues pointing to a possible gap in 
our knowledge. To undertake a problem is to commit one-self to the belief that 
you can fill in this gap and make thereby a new contact with reality. Such a 
commitment must be passionate; a problem which does not worry us, that does 
not excite us, is not a problem; it does not exist. Evidence is cast up only by a 
surmise filled with its own particular hope and fervently bent on fulfilling this 
hope. Without such passionate cojumitmeut no supporting evidence will emerge, 
nor failure to find such evidence he felt: no conclusions will he drawn and tested 
c' no quest will lake place. 8 
The process of discovery therefore is predicated upon a pre-existing and 
passionate commitment to the likelihood of an `integration of knowledge' that 
such an investigation will bring. Polanyi assumes of course that scientists already 
possess this `hunger' for knowledge. otherwise they would not presumably have 
become scientists in the first place. Indeed, Polanyi writes elsewhere that, no 
one can become a scientist unless he presumes that the scientific doctrine and 
method are fundamentally sound and that their ultimate premisses can be 
`'`' Polanyi 1958: e. g., 161-2. 
6- Polanyi 1967: 195. 
69 Polanyi 1967: 195 (emphasis added). 
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unquestioningly accepted. '69 Interestingly, he then adds that, 'We have here an 
instance of the process described epigrammatically by the Christian Church 
Fathers in the words: fides quaerens intellectum, faith in search of 
understanding. ' 70 
But - by its very presuppositions - this exposition 
does not actually 
explain how an initial 'conversion' to the love of science takes place. Such a 
beginning is assumed as a `given' as his reference to the Church Fathers implies, 
It begins with `faith', and from this basis - seeks further understanding. As 
Polanyi himself states in a 1948 article, `scepticism cannot in itself discover 
anything new. It can release our powers of discovery, but these powers must 
always spring from belief. '71 Moreover, when Polanyi specifically discusses 
these ideas in the context of religious faith, the same presupposition about a pre- 
existing commitment to the existence of the `reality' for which one probes 
becomes apparent. So for example in his book Science, Faith and Society, after 
describing many forms of the exploratory process that he describes as `guessing 
right', he states that: 'Among these I would include also the prayerful search for 
God. '72 He proceeds to illustrate this with the example of Augustine's `long 
labours to achieve faith in Christianity' 
73 and concludes with the significant 
statement that: `All these processes of creative guesswork have in common that 
69 Polanyi 1964: 45: also 15, where he comments significantly: 'Since an art cannot be precisely 
defined, it can be transmitted only by examples of the practice which embodies it. ' 
70 Polanyi 1964: 45 (emphasis original). We shall return to the significance of this statement 
later in the thesis. 
71 Polanyi 1948: 100. 
72 Polanyi 1964: 34. 
, Polanvi 1964: 35. 
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they are guided by the urge to make contact with a reality, which is felt /o he 
there already to start with, waiting to be apprehended. '74 
But the transfer of this conception - with its understanding of a pre- 
existing commitment to the existence of the `reality" for which one probes - is 
much more problematic when applied missiologically. For, in this framework, 
what is to be made of the reality of religious `unbelief - especially when it 
manifests an inherent scepticism that there is anything to discover? How 
therefore does one interest an unbeliever in the claims of Christianity when there 
exists no `passionate' intuition on which to build in the first place? Here the 
distinctions between Torrance and Newbigin become more acute. Systematicians 
like Torrance can afford to be reticent or even silent about this question (simply 
because there may be felt to be no need to discuss such matters in the context of a 
systematic presentation of Christian belief from the point of view of its self- 
understanding). They are able therefore to assume a starting point of faith (just as 
Polanyi assumes a pre-existing intuition) and to proceed on this basis towards a 
descriptive analysis of the theological enterprise from a Christian point of view. 
Indeed, Torrance - significantly from the point of view of the present discussion 
- calls his resulting articulation of theology a `theological science'. 
75 Both he 
and Polanyi (in their respective fields) proceed from the assumption that the 
enquirer is for want of a better expression - `already a believer". and all the 
concepts that are subsequently utilised in the process of describing the path to 
deeper knowledge are able to assume such an outlook as their foundational 
Polanyi 1964: 35 (emphasis added). 




But these assumptions are more problematic for Newbigin because his 
theology does not set out to be systematic" in the sense that Torrance's does, but 
is intended to be primarily missiological in its engagement with contemporary 
Western culture. It cannot therefore assume a starting point of faith, but must 
grapple instead with the fact that for many people there simply is none. It is 
striking therefore that Polanyi's vocabulary pervades the discussions at the points 
where Newbigin himself articulates the process of discovery. In The Gospel in a 
Pluralist Society, for example, he is characteristically indebted to Polanyi"s basic 
framework of knowledge when he writes as follows: 
There is surely always more truth to be discovered. That this is so is one of the 
things that lie at the heart of life - even of the life of animals and birds. The 
curiosity which is always seeking to discover more seems to be one of the 
necessary conditions of life. But seeking is only serious if the seeker is following 
some clue, has some intuition of what it is that he seeks, and is willing to commit 
hinnself or herself to following that clue, that intuition. Merely wandering 
around in a clue-less twilight is not seeking. The relativism which is not willing 
to speak about truth but only about `what is true for me' is an evasion of the 
serious business of living. It is the mark of a tragic loss of nerve in our 
" contemporary culture. It is a preliminary symptom of death. 
When he returns to this theme later on, in the course of a discussion about 
the process of scientific discovery, his language is reminiscent of the way in 
which he has already described the discovery of truth more generally. 
Newbigin's repetition of Polanyian ideas at this point serves to underline the fact 
that his articulation of the process of spiritual discovery corresponds with his 
In this context we agree with Thomas Lan-ford's comment (Langford 1966: 50) that for 
Polanyi. 'there is no theologia irregenitorum (theology of the unregenerate). ' What we do 
have, he argues. is 'a confessional base for religious assertion, but it is a base that is 
advantaged by its self-awareness. ' 
77 Newbigin 1989f: 22 (emphasis added). 
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understanding of scientific discovery, and that both are reliant upon a Polanyian 
framework. At this later point, he writes: 
There are no logical rules by which one can learn how to make new 
discoveries.... It has much more to do with intuition and imagination - the 
intuition that there is a problem waiting to be tackled, a configuration of things 
waiting to be discerned, an orderliness not yet manifest but hidden and waiting 
to be discovered. And it is a matter of personal judgment between alternative 
possibilities for experiment and research, personal judgment also in 
distinguishing between a meaningful pattern and a set of random events. 's 
Polanyian language therefore pervades not only Newbigin's approach to 
scientific discovery, but also provides the means whereby he understands and 
describes the process of `spiritual' discovery as well. It too is couched in 
Polanyi's terms of a pre-existing `interest" or curiosity, to which the process of 
heuristic discovery will subsequently give meaning. This, as we have seen, 
provides potentially fruitful material in a more systematic presentation of 
Christian doctrine, but the specific issue for Newbigin is whether it helps him to 
develop a more specifically `missionary' theology. 
For Newbigin's reconstruction of a missiological engagement with 
contemporary culture, therefore, the specific issues surrounding the initial point 
of `conversion' - along with the more general question of the role of apologetics 
in this context present themselves as being potentially problematic. 
Furthermore, these questions are particularly relevant for Newbigin because his 
project is not narrowly conceived as a defence of why some people (and not 
others) come to faith. If this were the case, the Polanyian conception of an initial 
`intuitive" interest might have supported and informed his analysis. But 
Newhigin's project is specifically intended to do much more than this. It is 
79 Newbigin 1989f. 44. 
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nothing less than a plea for what he calls `a genuinely missionary encounter with 
post- Enlightenment culture'. 79 
In this context, the questions raised by our analysis become acute. How 
does the Church engage with the outsider where there is no pre-existing interest? 
How can the gospel be accepted as 'public truth' where there is no `public" 
willingness or hunger to investigate what that truth might mean? Whether 
Newbigin is able to move beyond this Polanyian framework in his understanding 
of these issues is crucial if his Christian engagement with non-Christian culture is 
to carry weight. 
4.3.3 Polanyi on `conversion' and religious language 
These central tensions are given further emphasis in our view by the 
similarity of Newbigin's exposition to that of Polanyi with regard to the 
understanding of the concept of -conversion' and the accompanying approach to 
the question of language. In order to develop this discussion, we will first 
examine Polanyi's own views and draw implications for Newbigin's programme. 
Then in the following section we will incorporate into the ongoing argument a 
discussion of `paradigm shifts' in the writings of Thomas Kuhn. Not only are 
Polanyi"s views very similar to those of Kuhn, but - more pertinently - Newbigin 
himself is explicitly indebted to Kuhns work in his discussions about conversion. 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the extent to which Newbigin is able 
to circumvent the questions raised with regard to the 'entry' point of `outsiders' 
to the community of faith. 
'`' Newbi<--in 1983b: 31. 
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With regard to the concept of `conversion' (in both religious and non- 
religious contexts), Polanyi writes as follows in his book Meaning: 
It seems clear that we do not become converted - whether to a political party, a 
philosophy, or a religion - by having the truth of what we 
become converted to 
demonstrated to us in a wholly logical or objective way. Rather, what happens 
when we become converted is that we see at some point that the particular party 
or religion or epistemology or world view (or even scientific theory) in front of 
us holds possibilities for the attainment of richer meanings than the one we have 
been getting along with. At that moment we are converted, whether we have 
ever willed it or not, ... 
"0 
`Conversion' in this context involves the transfer of allegiance from an assent to 
one set of attitudes and beliefs to another. But this `transfer' is not the result of 
argument or debate: it is not `logical' in this sense. In Polanyi's understanding, 
`conversion' involves a `switch' of allegiance. It involves a change of 
perspective, but with no strict conceptual `bridge' between one way of viewing 
things and the other. As a result, the practice of verbal argument and debate by 
adherents of a particular paradigm cannot - by its very nature - result in the 
persuasion of those who are presently outside that conceptual framework. 
Referring to attempts to persuade others of a new idea in science', for example, 
Polanyi writes that we cannot convince others by formal argument, for so long 
as we argue within their framework we can never induce them to abandon it. '81 
As a result of this: 
The two conflicting systems of thought are separated by a logical gap. in the 
same sense as a problem is separated from the discovery which solves the 
problem. Formal operations relying on one framework of interpretation cannot 82 demonstrate a proposition to persons who rely on another framework. 
SO Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 180 (emphasis original). 
Polanyi 1958: 151. 
Polanyi 1958: 151 (emphasis original). 
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This conclusion is given further emphasis by Polanyi's views about the 
nature of language. For example, in continuing the quotation cited above, he 
states that in the realm of science the advocates of a new idea, may not even 
succeed in getting a hearing [from their opponents] ... since they must 
first teach 
them a new language, and no one can learn a new language unless he first trusts 
that it means something. '83 Hence the barriers to understanding are enshrined in 
the need to learn the language system of a different tradition. 84 The other 
tradition must in some sense be 'entered' before an understanding of its thought- 
world is acquired. 
This conception of the contingency of language is applied first and 
foremost by Polanyi to debates about the appropriation of new ideas within the 
scientific field. But it is also carried over into his wider discussions - including 
his analysis of the way in which 'religious' vocabulary operates. In this context, 
language again sets its own circumscribing and regulative parameters, with the 
result that the understanding of its grammar is reached only through a 
participation in religious worship, whose practice it reflects. 95 Consequently he 
writes that, Only a Christian who stands in the service of his faith can understand 
Christian theology and only he can enter into the religious meaning of the 
Bible. 86 Hence, to transfer Polanyi's understanding into a missiological context 
would imply that a `grounding" in the vocabulary of Christian faith is needed 
before an outsider can adopt a meaningful appropriation of Christian belief. But 
"' Polanvi 1958: 151. 
84 Polanvi rarely mentions the work of Wittgenstein, but his views at this point are very similar. 
See e. Z... Daly 
1968. 
Polanvi 1958: 281. 
86 Polanvi 1958: 281 
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this grounding is by its very nature inseparable from the community of faith 
within which such language is used and articulated. 
97 
In terms of the apologetic appropriation of these central Polanyian 
insights, therefore, they can be said to be more conducive to those strategies 
which seek to develop the idea of the Church in its corporate witness as the 
primary means whereby outsiders come to faith, than they will be to the more 
specific strategies of verbal apologetics and persuasion which are carried out in 
the more `public' interface between faith and unbelief. The need for this 
ecclesiological perspective, of course, is not to be denied. It is not surprisingly a 
dominant theme within Newbigin's own writings - particularly in relation to his 
affirmation that if people are to become Christians in our day, they will do so 
because of the witness of the local congregation as the `hermeneutic of the 
gospel'. 88 Perhaps, particularly in a postmodern environment, the need for a 
demonstration of the gospel is as important in engaging non-Christians as is the 
articulation of that Gospel via the spoken word. But the point here is whether 
Polanyi's insights will help to take the task of apologetics further than this. In 
terms of Newbigin's missiological `positioning' it is a question of whether 
See e. g., Polanyi 1958: 28] : `... theology pursued as an axiomatization of the Christian faith 
has an important analytic task. Though its results can be understood only by practising 
Christians. it can greatly help them to understand what they are practising. ' The parallels 
with Lindbeck's 'intra-textual' approach at this point are very striking. For a further 
discussion of Polanyi's view of conversion, cf. Barr 1980: Keiser 1987 (who discusses the 
connections with Augustine): and more generally, Dulles 1984. Significantly, Barr's 
discussion of the application of Polanyi's insights to a Christian understanding of conversion 
is developed along lines that highlight the problems we are raising. For example, he seeks to 
apply Polanyi's understanding of 'conversion' to both 'gradual' and 'sudden' understandings, 
and proceeds to use Paul's experience as an example of the latter (61 ff. ). However, the role 
of 'religious tradition' in Paul's pre-conversion life (what Polanyi would call his 
'apprenticeship' within Judaism) would strongly suggest that his was not actually a 'sudden' 
conversion at all. His apprehension of the identity of Jesus was certainly 'new', but he was 
not 'suddenly' converted from a context of 'no faith' into a context of 'faith'. 
S8 E. -.. Newbiuin 1980c: 12,26.37: 1987b: 4-5: 1988c: 175: 1989f: 222ff.: I990c: 339: 1995c: 
150. 
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Polanyi's insights enable Newbigin to move out of the `territory' occupied by 
writers like Stanley Hauerwas, George Lindbeck or John Milbank, for whom the 
concept of the Church as `community' is equally important, and for whom the 
`indwelling' of the narrative, rather than reliance upon apologetic 
`methodologies' constitutes the substance of its `witness'. 
The foregoing discussion therefore highlights both the strength and the 
weakness of Polanyi's thought for a missiologist like Newbigin. On the one hand 
we have seen that it contributes admirably to the `intra-systemic' task of 
explicating the process of theological self-definition and discovery. Newbigin is 
indebted to Polanyi at this level, developing his insights in terms of the Christian 
community's `indwelling' of the Bible, 89 his articulation of a `provisional" and 
progressive view of Christian discipleship which leads to fresh discoveries and 
integrations, " and his challenge to the Church to be increasingly a community in 
which the gospel is truly incarnated. 91 All this is productive and powerful - both 
in galvanising faith and in giving confidence to hesitant Christians that they can 
hold onto their faith with integrity. 
On the other hand, by its lack of a 'theology of unbelief, it accentuates 
for Newbigin the need to develop a more coherent apologetic, particularly in the 
context of a `post-Christian' West in which both apathy and scepticism are so 
prevalent. In his indebtedness to Polanyi. therefore. Newbigin's apologetic is 
inevitably less developed than it might be in terms of what we might call its 
'proactive" or 'engaging' aspects. For at the point of interface between unbelief 
and faith. apart from relatively few references to 'telling the story'. there is 
89 E. g.. Newbi=gin 1988e: 106; 1989g: 6.1989f: 98: 1995d: 47. 
90 E. -.. Newbi-in 1989f: 35: 1991f: 53: 1993b: 346.1995d: 43. 
91 E. g.. Newbigin 1983b: 23: 1985c: 8: 1986b: 124ff.: 1989f: 96,99,140.1994b. 
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remarkably little specific exposition of what it might mean to articulate the good 
news verbally to a non-believing culture. 
4.3.4 Thomas Kuhn and `paradigm shifts' 
We now move to a consideration of Newbigin's attraction to the work of 
Thomas Kuhn. This is partly because Kuhn's work is similar in its conclusions to 
certain aspects of Polanyi's, 992 but partly also because it is in his references to 
Kuhn that Newbigin reveals himself most clearly as a believer in aspects of the 
`incommensurability' of traditions. 
Kuhn's reconstruction of the way in which revolutions take place within 
the scientific community have been immensely influential in the field of the 
philosophy of science. 93 His use of the concept of `paradigm shifts' to explain 
how a crisis within one paradigm of knowledge is replaced by another has been 
`'' Maclntyre. for example. argues that Kuhn is indebted to Polanyi for his basic insight into the 
nature of paradigms: namely, that traditions of enquiry are basically unitary and self- 
contained (Maclntyre 1977). Moreover, he argues that Kuhn has developed his ideas from 
Polanyi, but that he `nowhere acknowledges any such debt' (1977: 465). This is not true, for 
Kuhn pays tribute to Polanyi in Kuhn 1970c: 44, and refers to Polanyi's examples, in Kuhn 
1977: 262. Most significantly, he acknowledges Polanyi's work in the reported discussion 
following a paper given by Kuhn in Oxford in 1961 at which Polanyi was present, (Kuhn 
1963). It was here that Kuhn had introduced the term 'paradigm', commenting (following 
Polanyi's favourable reaction to the paper) that: `though I have only recently recognized it as 
such, Mr. Polanyi himself has provided the most extensive and developed discussion I know 
of the aspect of science which led me to my apparently strange usage'. In terms of the 
concept of 'incommensurability' (a tern also invented by Kuhn) the two writers are certainly 
in broad agreement (cf. e. g.. Polanvi 1964: 66-7, for his views about the 'incommens- 
urability' of the religious and scientific worlds). For a discussion of the differences between 
them, see Poirier 1989, who argues that whereas Kuhn is fundamentally 'relativist' and 
'subjective' in his approach to the possibility of 'truth', Polanvi (though not a 'neutralist') is 
certainly an 'objectivist' - 'in the manner in which the word was understood prior to the rise 
of positivist thinking in the field of epistemological studies' (276). (Continued on next page) 
Whilst this contrast holds in relation to the two writers' views about science, Poirier's 
conclusions need to be nuanced in relation to Polanyi's views about religious knowledge. 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
93 For an overview of this use. see Gutting 1980. 
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used extensively in a number of disciplines. not least theology. 
94 More 
particularly. for our purposes, it is repeatedly referred to by Newbigin in terms of 
its distinct parallels with the notion of `conversion'. 
9' In the discussion that 
follows, we will examine Newbigin's use of Kuhn's concept of `paradigm shifts' 
as it appears in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as this is the only 
work of Kuhn's that Newbigin refers to. 96 
Kuhn makes a fundamental distinction between what he calls `normal' 
and `revolutionary' science. By 'normal science', Kuhn signifies `research 
firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that 
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the 
foundation for its further practice. '97 At points of crisis in the continuing 
viability of this older framework, however, a new paradigm may emerge which 
provokes a `revolution'. He writes accordingly that: 
... scientific revolutions are 
inaugurated by a growing sense, again often 
restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing 
paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of 
nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. 98 
9' See the symposium collected in Küng and Tracy 1989. Kong's own primary application of 
the idea is to an understanding of the different historical epochs of Christianity and its 
contemporary implications (cf. Kling and Tracy 1989: 3-33,212-219; and Kling 1991: 122- 
129). His approach has influenced David Bosch's appraisal of mission (Bosch 1991). See 
esp. 183-189 for Bosch's methodological indebtedness to Kong. 
`'5, E. g., Newbigin I 986b: 62: `The boundary between (the secular) community and the society 
for which the Bible is not determinative is marked by the paradigm shift that is traditionally 
called conversion'. and 64: 'This will be not only a conversion of the will and the feelings but 
a conversion of the mind -a "paradigm shift" that leads to a new vision of how things are 
Cf. also, 1979b: 302-4.306: 1979a: 209: 1983b: 31: 1984a: 15: 1988e: 108: 1989f: 44: 
1993a: 91: 1994d: 81: 1996c: 53. 
96 Newbigin makes eleven references in all to Kuhn's book (all to the 1970 2"d edition). That 
Kuhn subsequently modified his views in the light of later criticism is significant for a study 
of Kuhn, but not of Newbigin. For such revisions, see e. g., Kuhn 1970b, and 1977 (esp. 293- 
339). 
97 Kuhn 1970c: 10. 
`» Kuhn 1970c: 92. 
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What emerges from Kuhn's discussion is an image of science as being 
`holistic" in the sense that `facts' are both theory-laden and community- 
dependent, and that competing scientific `paradigms' are either accepted or 
rejected as `wholes'. 99 When a new paradigm is entered, it is not as a result of a 
step-by-step process of reason and logic, regulated by an independent use of 
authority to which both traditions might submit. It is rather by a shift of 
perspective that is similar to what might be described as a `conversion' 
experience. '()() With respect. therefore, to the way in which different groups of 
scientists (inhabiting different conceptual paradigms) will always tend to see 
matters from their own distinctive perspectives, Kuhn states that: 
... 
before they can hope to communicate fully, one group or the other must 
experience the conversion that we have been calling a paradigm shift. Just 
because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between 
competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and 
neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once (though not 
necessarily in an instant) or not at all. 101 
Part of the reason for this is Kuhn's commitment to the view that 
traditions, when they change in their conceptual framework, display no inherent 
continuity with the paradigms that preceded them. As a consequence of this. he 
says that: 
... at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, 
the 
scientist's perception of his environment must be re-educated in some familiar 
situations he must learn to see a new gestalt. After he has done so the world of 
his research will seem. here and there, incommensurable with the one he had 
inhabited before. 1 " 
99 See e. g., Kuhn 1970c: 170 for his resulting views about the nature of 'truth' ('We 
may ... 
have to relinquish the notion. explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry 
scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth'). 
100 Kuhn I970c: 150.150: The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion 
experience that cannot be forced. ' 
101 Kuhn I970c: 150. 
"'' Kuhn 1970c: 112. 
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At such points (when `normal science' is interrupted by a crisis which 
leads to 'revolution'). the basis upon which the switch to the new paradigm is 
made is not that of logical inference, nor that of the normal process of 
experimentation which might lead to a more natural evolution towards a change 
of perspective, but rather a sociological or psychological switch of allegiance. 
When such a decision is taken, Kuhn argues, it cannot be made on the basis of the 
existing evidence. Rather, it can only be made on faith. ' 
103 `Faith' in this 
context is the `faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large 
problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a 
few. ' 104 
There are many Polanyian connections here - not least in the way in 
which Kuhn's view of the new paradigm is expressed in terms of its potential 
ability to produce better future integrations of truth. But, more importantly for 
our purposes, Kuhn's work finds central resonances in Newbigin's writing. 
Critical here are Newbigin's references to Kuhn's notion of scientific `paradigm 
shifts' to make what is - in effect -a similar point about the `incommens- 
urability' between pre-Christian and post-Christian thinking. `There is', he 
argues - referring to Kuhn. no logical process by which Newtonian physics can 
accommodate the theories of Einstein. There is a leap, a conversion, a "paradigm 
shift-. '10' He goes on: 
From a perspective outside the Christian faith, on the other hand, the gospel is 
and remains incomprehensible ... I 
do not believe that this element of scandal 
can be eliminated from the faithful communication of the gospel. This is not a 
love of irrationality for its own sake. It is not to echo Tertullian's `Credo quia 
absurdum ess'. It is to recognise that a wider rationality which can justify the 
10' Kuhn 1970c: 158. 
104 Kuhn 1970c: 158. 
10' Newbi-in 1979a: 209. 
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ways of God to man is not obtainable except on the other side of that radical 
change of perspective which has traditionally been called conversion. 
106 
Two comments are in order here. Firstly, Newbigin agrees with Kuhn 
that `conversion' from one paradigm to another is not the result of a logical step- 
by-step progression from the one position to the other. As Kuhn shows, ' he 
argues, 
no over-arching logical system can justify the switch from one vision to the 
other; it is a conversion to a different way of seeing things which always needs 
new language. The only test is adequacy to the reality which is to be understood 
and coped with. 1 " 
There exists therefore a radical discontinuity between the two paradigms, 
he argues, which necessitates the language of `conversion' rather than that of 
'demonstration', 108 and which requires a new language' so that the fresh 
paradigm may be articulated. 109 The reason for this is that `(t)he new paradigm 
cannot demonstrate its "reasonableness" on the terms of the old. ' 10 Or again, `In 
every culture the Christian vision of how things are calls for a conversion and for 
the use of new language, none of which can be shown to be deducible from the 
reigning plausibility structure. '"' The arena of faith for Newbigin, therefore, is 
fundamentally incommensurable with that of unbelief when viewed from the 
perspective of the non-believer. 
But alongside this agreement, there is secondly -a point of 
106 Newbigin 1979a: 209. 
1°' Newbigin 1994d: 81. Cf. also: Newbigin 1993a: 91: 1996c: 53. 
108 E. -.. Newbi-in 1984a: 15. 
109 Newbi, -, 
in I 994d: 81: 'As Kuhn shows, no over-arching logical system can justify the switch 
from one vision to the other: it is a conversion to a different way of seeing things which 
always needs new language. ' Also 1993a: 91-92: 1996c: 53. 
1 10 Newbigin 1994d: 81. 
... Newbiýgin 1994d: 81. 
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disagreement between Newbigin and Kuhn. For whereas Kuhn is more sceptical 
about the question of whether from the newer vantage point, one can see points of 
rational continuity when looking back at the past, Newbigin parts company with 
him at this point. Though he agrees with Kuhn in rejecting the idea that there is 
any sense of rational continuity between unbelief and belief he is much more 
prepared to argue for what we might call a `continuity with hindsight'. This 
understanding is first introduced in Newbigin's 1979 article The Centrality of 
Jesus for History' (quoted above) but becomes clearest in passages in his book 
Foolishness to the Greeks where he explores the relationship between faith and 
rationality in some detail. At one point in his discussion of Kuhn for example. he 
writes: 
My point here is simply this: while there is radical discontinuity in the sense that 
the new theory is not reached by any process of logical reasoning from the old, 
there is also a continuity in the sense that the old can he rationally understood 
from the point of view of the new.... Thus, to recognize a radical discontinuity 
between the old and the new is not to surrender to irrationality. Seen from one 
side there is only a chasm; seen from the other there is a bridge. 
112 
From the vantage point of faith. therefore, the steps by which one arrived 
at the initial point of belief become clearer, but this only becomes a possibility 
once the 'arena' of faith has been entered. Thus, Newbigin's views about 
conversion find parallels with Kuhn's views about `paradigm shifts', but a 
distinction emerges in that Newbigin is not as thorough-going in his views about 
the incommensurability of paradigms as is Kuhn. Rationality for him works 
Newbigin l986b: 52 (emphasis added). Cf. also the statements (in Newbigin 1979a: 208) 
that: it is necessary and proper to speak of a radical discontinuity between that perspective in 
which Jesus is perceived as enemy and that in which he is perceived as Lord': and. in 
discussing the 'continuity' of the of God disciples' faith between their pre- and post- 
resurrection experience. that: 'Certainly there is a continuity, but it is a continuity perceived 
from the new perspective and not otherwise. ' 
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`backwards' (from the vantage point of faith) rather than `forwards' (from the 
vantage point of unbelief). 
Crucially, this concept of- continuity in hindsight' is developed by 
Newbigin as his defence against the claim that such talk of faith is `irrational". 
For, in contrast to the former way of `seeing' things, faith offers what he calls 'a 
wider and more inclusive rationality than the older one could. ' 
1 13 Similarly, in a 
passage in which he refers to the vantage point of faith as that other way', he 
writes: 
The Christian claim is that, though that other way of understanding the world 
can in no way be reached by any logical step from the axioms of this one, 
nevertheless that other way does offer a wider rationality that embraces and does 
not contradict the rationality of this. ] 14 
In a later summary statement, he expresses this same thought in the following 
way: `There is an asymmetry in this relationship, as between the paradigms of 
science, but not a total discontinuity. From one side the other looks quite 
irrational, but from the other side there is a rationality that embraces both. "" 
Despite Newbigin's claim that his modified Kuhnian view constitutes a 
defence against the charge of irrationality, therefore, it is important to note that 
this defence (once more) only works from the vantage point of faith. It does not 
help to construct a bridge from the realm of unbelief, for it cannot envisage one. 
From this vantage point he says. `there is only a chasm". 116 
At the point of initial engagement with unbelief therefore Newbigin 
appeals to the idea that it is the acceptance of the priority of `revelation' which 
' Newbigin 1986b: 53. 
1" Newbigin 1986b: 54. 
Newbigin 1986b: 63. 
1 16 Newbigin I986b: 52. 
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constitutes the starting point for discovery. Notice, for example, the very specific 
language he uses when he writes that: 
The twin dogmas oflncarnation and Trinity thus form the starting point for a 
way of understanding reality as a whole, a way that leads out into a wider and 
more inclusive rationality than the real but limited rationality of the reductionist 
views that try to explain the whole of reality in terms of the natural sciences 
from physics to biology, a wider rationality that in no way negates but 
acknowledges and includes these other kinds of explanations as proper and 
necessary at their respective levels. ' 17 
Once more, we return to the apologetic problems that arise out of a strong 
sense of the incommensurability of the domains of 'faith' and 'unbelief. 
In conclusion. therefore, it is hard to see how Newbigin can be anything 
other than a fideist. given the fact that his only defence against `irrationality' is an 
argument that only works with the hindsight of faith; particularly when the 
prerequisites for faith and understanding according to Newbigin are the `dogmas' 
of Incarnation and Trinity which no pre-Christian `rationality' could hope to 
comprehend. 
4.3.5 Tensions and questions 
A number of tensions therefore arise within Newbigin's views about the 
ideas of `paradigm shifts', `incommensurability', and `conversion' which are 
heightened by the tendency to polarise the respective modalities of `faith" and 
`rationality". Two particular points may be noted at this point. 
In the first place. Newbigin's use of the term 'paradigm shift" to refer to 
'conversion' from unbelief to belief can be said to imply a stronger sense of 
1" Newbigin I 986b: 90 (emphasis added). 
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`incommensurability' than was intended by Kuhn himself. Critics of his 
Structure of Scienti/1c Revolutions thought Kuhn was denying the `rational' 
element in the process of change and was arguing that decisions about paradigms 
were based purely upon sociological and psychological factors rather than those 
of `logic' and `reason'. One of his foremost critics, Imre Lakatos, argued that for 
Kuhn there are no super-paradigmatic standards', and that therefore `(t)here are 
no rational standards for their comparison'. He concluded that: `... in Kuhn 's 
view scientific revolution is irrational, a mailer for mob psychologry'. 
119 
As a result of this sort of critique, Kuhn was later to modify his views 
somewhat - or at least to reformulate the way in which he had earlier expressed 
his convictions. On the one hand, he `categorically' rejected the charges of 
irrationalism', `relativism" or `mob rule', arguing that: 
To say that, in matters of theory-choice, the force of logic and observation 
cannot in principle be compelling is neither to discard logic and observation nor 
to suggest that there are not good reasons for favouring one theory over 
another. 
On the other hand, he did admit that his previous work might well have 
caused this misunderstanding and contributed to a stronger interpretation than 
was intended. 120 
It was a weakness of nay Scientific Revolutions that it could only name, not 
analyse, the phenomenon it repeatedly referred to as `partial communication'. 
But partial communication was never ... `complete 
[mutual] incomprehen- 
sion".... It named a problem to be worked on, not elevated to inscrutability. '2' 
Lakatos 1970: 178 (emphasis original). 
Kuhn 1970b: 234. 
110 Kuhn 1970b: 259-60. 
Kuhn 1970b: 250. Kuhn is quoting here from an article by Stephen Toulmin (Toulmin 1970: 
43), and adds the word 'mutual' to clarify Toulmin's point. 
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In subsequently reconstructing what he meant by `partial communication'. 
Kuhn effectively affirmed the `rationality' of aspects of theory choice along the 
lines of their agreement with notions of `accuracy', `consistency', `scope'. 
-simplicity', and `fruitfulness'. 122 To this extent, therefore, Kuhn admits that his 
original formulations were somewhat imprecise, and actually envisaged a more 
'logical' and `rational' element in the process of `paradigm choice' than they had 
appeared to suggest. 23 
Our point here is that whatever development and reconstruction may be 
apparent in Kuhn's own later work, it is the original `hard' interpretation of 
commensurability that is reflected in Newbigin's discussions. In the light of this 
analysis. one wonders whether a greater measure of openness to the question of 
the role of rationality in `conversion' might not have benefited Newbigin's 
discussions, opening up - as they do - the question of whether the 
commensurability he envisages in hindsight' (between the rationality of faith 
and unbelief) could not also in some measure be seen to work the other way 
around. 
Secondly, in addition to the philosophical problems associated with an 
over-definite distinction between competing paradigms. there are also historical 
dimensions which likewise suggest that a less `rigid' approach to the progression 
between one paradigm and another is a more accurate reflection of reality. 
Alasdair Maclntyre's response to Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions for example. led him to a more nuanced conclusion than Newbigin 
122 Kuhn 1977: 321-2. 
See the article by Masterman (1970). who notes twenty-one different ways in which Kuhn 
uses the term 'paradigm' in Kuhn I 970c: also Kuhn's response (1977: 293-319). In this 
context, see also the discussion of the 'objective' and 'subjective' elements in Kuhn's theory 
choice in Lamb 1989: 67ff.. 
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about the nature of such paradigm shifts. In a 1977 article, Maclntyre argued that 
the supposed incommensurability between succeeding traditions can be shown to 
rest on less watertight foundations than is often supposed. In the first place, he 
demonstrates from the case of Rene Descartes himself that whilst Descartes 
believed himself to be operating within an `epistemological vacuum' when he 
arrived at his formula Cogito ergo sum, in reality he was working within the 
context of what Machltyre calls a `narrative history', in which inherent 
contingencies and continuities between present and past were taken for granted 
and remained continuously in operation. As a result - though Descartes chose 
not to acknowledge the fact - his `discoveries' were not made in the kind of 
vacuum that he supposed, but depended upon the history of the tradition (both in 
terms of thought and language) of which he was himself an integral part. 124 
Maclntyre argues that precisely these elements of ongoing biographical 
experience were highly significant in bringing him to the conclusions for which 
he was to become famous. 
The resulting thrust of Maclntyre's article is that Thomas Kuhn himself 
came to conceptualise the nature of scientific revolutions in much the same way 
as Descartes conceived the resolution of his own epistemological crisis. Both 
thought that such revolutions take place in an epistemological and cultural 
vacuum: everything being brought to a crisis in which a new resolution is 
achieved which has no inherent connection with that which went before. In this 
process - as Maclntyre describes it: 'Everything is put in question 
simultaneously. There is no rational continuity between the situation at the time 
124 Maclntyre 1977: esp. 455-8. 
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immediately preceding the crisis and any situation following it. ' 25 But 
Maclntyre argues that this is a fallacy. Descartes did not achieve `total' doubt in 
the sense that all other facets of experience were eliminated, but was dependent 
upon the tradition of which he was a part in the very process of articulating those 
doubts. Likewise, he argues, Kuhn is wrong to argue for the `total' collapse of 
paradigms. On the contrary: 
Just as Descartes's account of his own epistemological crisis was only possible 
by reason of Descartes's ability to recount his own history, indeed to live his life 
as a narrative about to be cast into a history - an ability which Descartes himself 
could not recognise without falsifying his own account of epistemological crises 
- so Kuhn ... recount(s) the 
history of epistemological crises as moments of 
almost total discontinuity without noticing the historical continuity which makes 
their own intelligible narratives possible. '2' 
By way of contrast, argues Maclntyre, 'What is carried over from one paradigm 
to another are epistemological ideals and a correlative understanding of what 
constitutes the progress of a single intellectual life. ''27 
In a similar way to that of Kuhn, Newbigin's approach also effectively 
undervalues the continuity between successive historical paradigms. As we have 
seen, in the context of his discussions about conversion this means that any 
explanation of the `rationality' of faith can only be mounted on the basis that it is 
a `rationality' that is fundamentally distinct from the kind of `rationality' that 
preceded it. In effect, this move further distances the operating sphere of `faith' 
from that of `reason" in Newbigin"s thought. 
Maclntyre 1977: 466. 
126 Maclntyre 1977: 467-8. 
ýý' Maclntyre 1977: 467. 
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4.4 Newbigin, Polanyi and the reconstruction of apologetics 
We have been developing the argument that Newbigin's indebtedness to a 
Polanyian framework effectively limits the apologetic avenues down which he 
can proceed. More specifically. we have argued that the adoption of such a 
framework tends to set up obstacles in the way of constructing an engaging 
apologetic in a secularised context other than by means of some form of 
`fideism'. It is to a more specific consideration of Newbigin's apologetic 
strategies therefore that we now turn. We shall first examine their 
presuppositional foundations. and then proceed to a critical examination of 
Newbigin's specific proposal that the gospel represents `public truth'. 
4.4.1 Apologetic foundations 
Newbigin's understanding of the nature of apologetics is determined by 
the principles which have been explored hitherto. His exposition of the 
contemporary cultural malaise has clearly laid the blame firmly within the 
'Cartesian' camp. As a result. he says, we live in a culture that seeks `indubitable 
certainties upon which could be founded a structure of knowledge formulated 
with the clarity of mathematics. ' 128 Accordingly, the Church finds itself in a 
dilemma. Does it seek to commend its message on the basis of the surrounding 
culture's assumptions (its `reigning plausibility structure'), or does it seek some 
other way? In his subsequent reconstruction of the apologetic enterprise, it is not 
surprising to find Newbigin commending some other way' as a direct rebuttal of 
ýý Newbigin 1988c: 159. 
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the former path. In this context he argues that: 
The typical apologetic for Christianity in our Western culture has been one that 
attempts to `explain' it in the terms of our culture, to show that it is `reasonable" 
in terms of our ultimate beliefs about how things really are. 1,9 
But this concession to a `Cartesianism' which has sought to commend the 
gospel in terms of its inherent `reasonableness' has plagued the Church for too 
long, argues Newbigin. 130 1 le traces its methodological approach back to the 
impact of the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and 
the attempt by Descartes to bolster and defend the Christian faith against the 
growing scepticism of the times. 131 But further back than this, he compares it 
with the work of Thomas Aquinas and his attempt in the Summa Theologica to 
offer proofs for the existence of God which rested on grounds of reason rather 
than those of revelation. `Consider what Aquinas does', he argues: 
In the first part of his great work he sets out to demonstrate by rational proofs the 
existence of God, and he does so without reference to Jesus Christ. Then in the 
third part lie says that we know God through Jesus Christ. I realize, of course, 
that Aquinas is more nuanced than that, but we see in Aquinas what a great shift 
has occurred from Augustine's 'I believe in order to know' to Aristotelian 
philosophy, which is not dependent on faith. This I believe has been the fatal 
flaw of apologetics in the last 300 years. ' 32 
Newbigin's response to this appraisal leads him to an exposition of the 
nature of apologetics that is specifically grounded in the revelation of the gospel 
itself rather than in the supposedly `independent' authority of reason as envisaged 
by Aquinas. This move serves to underline the contrast between the gospel as 
129 Newbigin 1986b: 21-2. 
E. g., Newbigin 1988c: 164: 1995d: 93f.. 
Newbigin 1992k: 22. For a wider discussion of the background to Descartes' work in the 
theological and social chaos of the Thirty Years' War, see e. g., Toulmin 1990: 70-71. 
122 Newbigin 1992k: 22. 
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`revelation' and the question of its accessibility via the operation of human 
reason. There are two dimensions to this articulation. 
Firstly, Newbigin argues that the gospel is itself to be understood as 
inherently un-reasonable. After all, when the message about a `universal' gospel 
is said to revolve around a man crucified on a cross. it is clearly the case that: `No 
amount of brilliant argument can make it sound reasonable to the inhabitants of 
the reigning plausibility structure. ' 33 In his 1995 book Proper C'onfidence, he 
writes in a similar vein: 
The affirmation that the One by whom and through whom and for whom all 
creation exists is to be identified with a man who was crucified and rose bodily 
from the dead cannot possibly be accommodated within any plausibility 
structure except one of which it is the cornerstone. ' 4 
Secondly, therefore, he argues that revelation must itself constitute the 
foundation of any theological and apologetic construction, rather than take the 
form of a later `conclusion' reached by some other route. The resulting 
affirmation of the revelation of the gospel as the only conceivable `a priori' 
represents for Newbigin both a thorough reversal of the Enlightenment project's 
cultural displacement of revelation by reason, and constitutes - to his way of 
thinking - an appropriate and proper outworking of Augustine's alternative 
methodological approach that posits 'faith' as the prerequisite to 
`understanding". 3 
This `revelational' methodology is supported by Newbigin at various 
points in his writings in terms of a `defence'. a `confession", and an `outworking'. 
1" Newbigin 1989f: 232. 
1'4 Newbigin 1995d: 93. 
E. g., Newbi(-, in 1983b: 23-4.63: 1988e: 103,1989f: 48: 1990s: 6: 1994d: 69,84. 
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Firstly, the methodological `defence' takes the form of an argument that 
no sufficient grounds can be found for defending the gospel except those offered 
by the gospel itself: As he puts it: `Every claim to show grounds for believing the 
gospel which lie outside the gospel itself can be shown to rest ultimately on faith- 
commitments which can be questioned. ' 136 In other words, whenever the gospel 
is defended on grounds of its supposedly inherent `reasonableness', the prior 
faith-commitment being exhibited by such a belief is that of `Enlightenment' 
rationalism rather than that of biblical faith. Indeed, as he puts it in Proper 
Confidence: To look outside of the gospel for a starting point for the 
demonstration of the reasonableness of the gospel is itself a contradiction of the 
gospel, for it implies that we look for the logos elsewhere than in Jesus. " 137 
Secondly, as a result of this fact, the only possible `defence" of the faith 
that Newbigin brings forward in the arena of apologetics is simply the 
articulation of a personal faith formulated in the language of `confession'. So he 
writes: 
I am - in Pascal's famous phrase - wagering my life on the faith that Jesus is the 
ultimate authority. My answer is a confession: I believe. It is a personal 
commitment to a faith that cannot be demonstrated on grounds established from 
the point of view of another commitment. 1318 
After all. he argues.. we are dealing not with impersonal statements which 
can be reasoned and investigated. Rather. we are dealing with a personal God 
who reveals himself in personal encounter to those who listen to Him. So he 
writes in The Gospel in a Pluralist Society that: 
Newbigin 1993f: 236. 
Newbigin 1995d: 94. 
ý'ý Newbigin 1995c: 15. 
271 
That truly personal knowledge only becomes a possibility when I abandon the 
sovereign claim of autonomous reason, the claim to know the other person 
without that person's self-communication in speech and act and gesture; when 
am ready to stop m_y investigations and listen, to be addressed, to be called in 
question, to be summoned to an adventure of trust. 139 
At the heart of the apologetic task therefore. he argues. is the obligation to speak 
not on the basis of some external `rational' authority which seeks to establish the 
truth of the gospel from outside of itsel f, but rather on the basis of the gospel's 
own framework of divine self-revelation. 
This leads him thirdly to make points about the practical `outworking' of 
apologetics. Frustratingly, Newbigin never develops the practical aspects of his 
programme in any great detail, preferring rather to lay out the presuppositional 
framework. Nonetheless the parameters within which such applications are to be 
made are more or less clear. For example. we quoted earlier his statement in 
Proper Confidence that to seek for a `starting point' for apologetics on any other 
grounds than those of revelation `implies that we look for the logos elsewhere 
than in Jesus. " 140 Directly following this statement, Newbigin concludes as 
follows: 
The obvious implication of this argument, therefore, is that the proper form of 
apologetics is the preaching of the gospel itself and the demonstration - which is 
not merely or primarily a matter of words - that it does provide the best 
foundation for a way of grasping and dealing with the mystery of our existence 
in this universe. "' 
Given the supporting structure examined in the previous sections, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Newbigin's primary apologetic strategy is to rely upon 
what he terms as `demonstration' (the congregation as the `hermeneutic' of the 
Newbigin 1989f: 61-2. 
Newbiýin 1995d: 94. 
14 1 Newbi<gin 1995d: 94. 
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gospel) rather than specific verbal `argument'; nor is it surprising that the 'verbal" 
content of apologetics - so far as it is envisaged is described by him as 
142 `preaching". 
Two further points may also be made. Firstly, the `demonstrative' 
dimension can be traced once more to the Polanyian notion of `heuristic passion', 
in which an idea's truthfulness is `demonstrated' by its ability to deal with reality 
in terms of future `integrations" of this reality, rather than by a specific verbal 
engagement at the point of dispute. In this sense the context of `proof - 
inasmuch as it exists in Newbigin's thought - functions in a future dimension 
rather than a present one. He argues quite specifically for example. in a response 
to Marius Felderhof s critique of The Other Side of'1984, that it is his 
understanding of Polanyi that has led him to this conviction. Felderhof, he 
argues, `tries to equate Polanyi's "fiduciary framework" with Wolterstorffs 
"ultimate certitudes", but this is totally to misunderstand Polanyi'. 143 By 
contrast, Newbigin insists that: 
[Polanyi's] 'fiduciary framework' is not an ultimate certitude, but a necessary 
starting point for exploration. Ultimate certitude is an eschatological concept! 
Hence the necessary character of real dialogue which involves precisely the kind 
of ambiguity for which Marius faults me. The idea that there can be some kind 
of knowledge which finally overcomes the divisions between human beings this 
side of the End is a utopian illusion which I do not share. 144 
Secondly. significant in this context is the emerging influence of Barth's 
theology upon Newbigin"s ideas which becomes clearest in his discussions of 
112 Cf. also. Newbi, -, 
in 1986b: 128.1989f: 158-9: 1993f: 243; 1995c: 150. Though he does not 
quote it directly. Newbiain would Undoubtedly have agreed with Alasdair Maclntyre's early 
statement. that: 'Belief cannot reason with unbelief: it can only preach to it' (Maclntyre 1957: 
211). 
`' Newbigin 1985d: 34. 
144 Newbi-in 1985d: 34. 
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apologetics. 145 Whilst Barth"s influence is not nearly as pervasive as Polanyi's. it 
nonetheless can be seen to coalesce with a Polanyian concept of `fiduciary 
commitments' as understood by Newbigin, and emerges in Newbigin's thought in 
two ways. 
In the first place, Newbigin begins from the mid-1980s to express more 
forcefully his own rejection of the value of what he calls `natural theology' in the 
apologetic enterprise. This phrase first appears in his 1986 book Foolishness to 
the Greeks146 and is specifically connected to Barth's theology in The Gospel in a 
Pluralist Society. Here Newbigin argues that: `Natural theology ... 
is in no way 
a step on the way toward the theology which takes God's self-revelation as its 
starting point. It is more likely, in fact, to lead in the opposite direction. ' 147 He 
continues by quoting Barth's discussion of the `self-revelation' of God as the sole 
145 Newbigin's earliest contact with Barth's writings came whilst he was a theological student at 
Cambridge in the 1930s, when he found his material on the atonement `incomprehensible' 
(Newbigin 1993g: 29). Hereafter, his views about the Swiss theologian became more 
favourable. Ile first met him personally in Holland in August 1948 when both were 
preparing for the Amsterdam conference of that year (1993g: 109: `It was a brief meeting and 
I had not yet learned to appreciate either Barth or this theology as I was to do later'). He later 
heard him address the Amsterdam assembly itself, and thought he was `magnificent' (1993g: 
110). Then in the 1950s he shared membership with Barth of a WCC preparatory group for 
its Second World Assembly (19938: 123ff. ), and had a further meeting with him in 
Strasbourg in 1960 (1993g: 164). These contacts paved the way for a more favourable 
reaction to his writings in the coming years (note e. g., his approval of Barth's attack on 
'religion' in 1966: 9-10), and for his eventual reading of the Church Dogmatics in the 
summer months of 1974 following his journey back from India (1993g: 228-9). Here he 
writes: 'For the three summer months we lived in beloved Edinburgh and there was leisure 
for reading. I decided to do what I had not previously attempted: to read the whole of Barth's 
Dogmatics. It was an immensely rewarding experience. Barth condensed and Barth quoted I 
had found totally unimpressive. But the real Barth, and especially the famous small-print 
notes. was enthralling. It was a needed preparation for the much more difficult missionary 
experience which (as I did not then realize) lay ahead. ' 
146 Newbigin 1986b: 88 ('it would also be idle to suppose that we could come to the knowledge 
of a supernatural personal reality by induction from all the data of our natural experience... 
Natural theology ends here: another kind of enterprise begins, and another kind of language 
has to be used - the language of testimony'). 147 Newbiýgin 1989f: 61-2. Note too in this context his discussions of Barth's view of'reli<gion' 
as unbelief (I 982c: 13: 1988h: 327: 1989b: 329). 
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means whereby humanity can come to know God. 148 Furthermore, in a 1994 
essay Newbigin writes of the absurdity of the approach to the knowledge of the 
divine which says in effect: 
If God really exists, is there not something ridiculous about one of God's 
creatures saying to him, 'I can demonstrate your existence without relying on 
what you tell me about yourself'? And is it not even more absurd for this 
creature to regard his own alleged proofs as the necessary basis for his attention 
to the divine revelation? Yet how otherwise can we regard the long tradition of 
`natural theology' seen as the necessary prolegomena for the study of God's 
self-revelation in Christ as witnessed in scripture? 141) 
He later concludes that, 'In this context one can understand Barth's passionate 
attack on natural theology. ' 150 
Secondly, in connection with this rejection of `natural theology' is 
Newbigin's sympathy for Barth's views about revelation as the only 
presupposition of faith. ''' The attractiveness of Barth's views at this point for 
Newbigin becomes more apparent from the late 1970s, 152 particularly in terms of 
148 Barth 1960: 399. Hunsberger's discussion of the relationship between the theology of Barth 
and Newbigin needs reassessment at this point. His statement, for example, that 'Newbigin's 
allowance that there is a kind of continuity between the religious life of the world's peoples 
and the revelation in Jesus Christ moves in a direction which Barth could not' needs careful 
weighing. Whilst Newbigin does attack Barth's views about the `historicality' of religious 
experience in his earlier work (so Hunsberger 1998a: 212), his later work (after reading the 
Dogmatics in 1974) is characterised by a much more positive appreciation of Barth. After 
this time, the phrase 'natural theology' appears some forty-five times in Newbigin's work, 
and in all of these instances it carries a negative connotation (see esp. 1994d (largely 
reproduced as 1996c): and 1995d: e. g., 100 where he describes his own position as one that 
'will be criticized by natural theology'). It appears that Newbigin's reaction against the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment led him in a more Barthian direction than was the case 
before 1974. In the light of this later material, Hunsberger's conclusion that Barth's response 
('Nein! ') to Brunner (Barth and Brunner 1946) 'rules out his companionship with Newbigin's 
approach' needs to be revised. To be sure, we have brought out Newbigin's view that 
commensurability works 'in hindsight', but in the terms that Barth sets out (that there is no 
possibility of moving from 'natural theology' to revelation). Newbigin would have been in 
complete agreement with him. 
14' Newbi-in 1994d: 62. 
Newbigin 1994d: 67. 
;, Newbigin approvingly uses the phrase 'the very word of the living God" to describe Barth's 
position on revelation (I992g: 78). 
15, E. g. " 
Newbi-in 1979b: 304-7: 1979a: 201-2: 1980c: 3.6: 1982c: 13: 1989f: 62: 1992k: 22-3: 
1994d: 66.86: 1996c: 14. 
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Barth's emphasis upon the Christological focus of such revelation. This can be 
illustrated, for example, by quoting from two 1979 articles which were sparked 
by the controversy surrounding the publication of The Myth of'God Incarnate. 1i3 
In the first article, in which Newbigin responds to the debate about the 
nature of epistemological `starting points' that the book had provoked in English 
theology, he argues that: 
Either one can take the general religious experience of mankind as the clue for 
our understanding of the human situation, and then seek categories with which to 
fit Jesus into this understanding; or one can take Jesus as the absolutely crucial 
and determinative clue for all understanding and then try to understand the rest 
of human experience from this centre. This, of course, is the issue which Karl 
Barth pressed relentlessly in all his writing. 'ý1 
In the second article (a contribution to the follow-up volume to the 
original collection of essays), Newbigin proceeds to defend Barth's statement that 
the theologian `must answer directly and without qualification, without being 
ashamed of his naivety, that Jesus Christ is the one and entire truth through which 
he is shown how to think and speak. ' 55 One suspects that when Newbigin 
commented in his autobiography that his reading of Barth's Dogmatics in the 
summer of 1974 was 'a needed preparation for the much more difficult 
missionary experience which ... 
lay ahead, ' 156 it was in the theological defence 
of the notion of God's self-revelation in Christ as an a priori that Barth's 
theology was most helpful to him. ' 57 
'" Hick 1977. 
Newbigin 1979b: 303-4. 
Newbigin 1979a: 201. quoting Busch 1976: 435. (Busch is quoting from Barth's article. 
'Philosophie und Theolo(lie', in G. Huber (ed. ), Philosophie und Christliche Exi. sten_: 
Festschrift für Heinrich Barth. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn. 1960: 93f.. ) For Newbi-in's 
further commendations of Barth's position on this point cf.. 1989f: 62,74.98: 1992k: 22-23: 
1996c: 14. 
° Newbicin 1993-: 229. 
15' See e. g., Newbigin 1992k: 23. 
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4.4.2 Apologetics and `public truth' 
Hitherto, we have explored the apologetic dimensions of Newbigin's 
thought in relation to its foundational principles. We now turn to an examination 
of his statements about the gospel as `public truth'. Here the questions about 
-apologetic engagement' raised before in relation to Polanyi. Kuhn (and Barth for 
that matter) become acute. Whereas, for example, Polanyi's `theology' could - 
in terms of his own descriptions of it - be labelled as `escapist' in its departure 
from the `real" world of politics and human affairs, ' Newbigin's intended thrust 
is wholly 'engaging' whether in its affirmation of the gospel as `public truth', 
or in his hope for a `Christian society'. or in his affirmation that Christianity is a 
religion for the marketplace" .19 But 
in order for this approach to be 
apologetically coherent, Newbigin has to escape the challenge that his method 
too involves a `leap' of faith before the new paradigm of rationality can take 
effect. He has to show that Christian faith is defensible in the `public' square in a 
way that properly engages secular objections and questions. The reason for the 
tension that Polanyi's framework (confirmed by Kuhn) creates for Newbigin is 
that no criteria can be put forward whereby the disinterested outsider or secular 
opponent can recognise (and therefore `own") the `public' truthfulness of the 
gospel in any terms other than those defined by a preceding belief in the gospel 
itself. 160 Newbigin is reticent in setting any such criteria forward, but it is not 
altogether clear how he could set any criteria given the premises upon which he 
159 See above. section 4.3.1. Ronald Hall argues that the logical conclusion to be drawn from 
Polanyi's theory of religion in its integration of religious meaning as the projections of the 
human imagination is that it 'tends to turn religion into an abstraction' (Hall 1982: 16). 
I'' See the titles ofNewbi-in 199Ia ('Christianity as Public Truth'). Newbigin 1995b ('A 
Christian Society? '), or Newbigin 1990n ('Religion for the Marketplace'). 
160 Cf. e. g.. Newbigin 1995d: 94: also 1996b: 7. 
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builds his framework. 
Attention has been drawn by others to the problems relating to the 
viability of this concept within Newbigin's overall perspective, 161 but the roots of 
this tension have not before been traced to Newbigin's indebtedness to the work 
Polanyi and Kuhn. As will be evident from the discussion thus far, it is the 
structure of thought inherent in this material that leads inevitably to the impasse. 
We shall therefore explore some central dimensions of this difficulty as it applies 
to Newbigin's statements about Christian faith in the public sphere. 
Newbigin first introduces the concept of `public truth' in his book The 
Other Side of 1984 in the context of a discussion of Polanyi's arguments in 
favour of what the latter calls a `post-critical' philosophy. Here Newbigin writes 
that: 
... 
if the immense achievements of autonomous reason seem to have produced a 
world which is at best meaningless and at worst full of demons, then it could be 
that Polanyi is right, that we shall not find renewal within the framework of the 
assumptions which the Enlightenment held to be `self-evident', that there is 
needed a radical conversion, a new starting point which begins as an act of trust 
in divine grace as something simply given to be received in faith and 
gratitude. 
162 
We note immediately that what Newbigin refers to as a new starting 
point' is firmly contrasted with what is culturally acceptable as `public truth' 
Newbigin proceeds to describe this contrast in terms of post-Enlightenment 
culture"s approach to the question of Christian faith. `Our culture', he argues. 
has acknowledged and protected the right of individuals to hold this faith as a 
private option. But it has drawn a sharp distinction between this private option 
E. g.. Thomas 1984: 319f.: Solomon 1985: Williams 1993: Netland 1994: Hoedemaker 1998: 
43 ff.. 
162 Newbigin 1983b: 25. 
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and the principles which govern public life. ' He continues (using the actual 
phrase `public truth" for the first time): 
These principles belong to the realm of 'public truth', that is to say to the area 
which is governed by the truths which are either held to be self-evident or can be 
shown to be true to any person who is willing to consider all the evidence»' 
We shall return to this significant statement in due course, but continue 
for the moment to follow Newbigin's argument to its conclusion. He continues 
characteristically by critiquing the Enlightenment's supposed objectivity. After 
all, post-Enlightenment culture has itself accepted the `truth' of certain ideas 
which are not strictly self-evident. He cites as examples the belief in the idea that 
human reason and conscience are autonomous; the belief that everyone has the 
right to `happiness' (and that the nation-State should secure these rights); and - 
most significantly - the belief that modern science is the only means of 
comprehending the world in which we live. 164 These are ideas - he argues - that 
have been held in faith'. Newbigin's point is that the beliefs that Christians hold 
- which within a post-Enlightenment culture have been restricted to the `private' 
sphere of home and family - must now be brought into the public domain and 
offered as the foundation for the renewal of our culture. He describes this central 
proposal in the following terms: 
What is now being proposed is that not just in the private world but also in the 
public world another model for understanding is needed; that this in turn requires 
the acknowledgment that our most fundamental beliefs cannot be demonstrated 
but are held by faith; that it is the responsibility of the Church to offer this new 
model for Understanding as the basis for a radical renewal of our culture; and 
that without such radical renewal our culture has no future. This is - if one may 
put it very sharply - an invitation to recover a proper acknowledgment of the 
role of dogma. 1`" 
Newbi<gin 1983b: 26. 
164 Newbigin 1983b: 26-7. 
"'ý Newbigin 1983b: 27. 
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In these passages. the main lines of Newbigin's understanding of the 
concept of `public truth' are set out. Firstly, the connection that Newbigin draws 
between acceptance of the new cultural `starting point' and the need for `faith' 
(or `trust') is very close. What this connection suggests is that his understanding 
of what would be involved in the `conversion' of our culture is logically 
consistent with his understanding of what is involved in conversion at the 
individual level. In a parallel manner therefore, his argument is that if post- 
Enlightenment culture is to begin to build from this new `starting point", then it 
must acknowledge the acceptance of this starting point as an act of trust in 
divine grace as something simply given to be received in faith and gratitude. ' 166 
Similarly, just as in the personal sphere, entry into the realm of faith involves the 
acceptance of what he describes as, The twin dogmas of Incarnation and 
Trinity', 167 so also in the realm of public affairs the affirmation of this new start 
is dependent upon the acceptance of certain `dogmatic' presuppositions. As he 
puts it, this constitutes in effect, an invitation to recover a proper 
acknowledgment of the role of dogma. " 168 
The central problem with Newbigin's material at this point is that he 
never explicates nor defends a philosophical justification for the notion of `public 
truth". The result is that it is never quite clear as to what precisely he means by it. 
We shall therefore proceed first by giving an overview of the usage of the phrase 
`public truth" in Newbigin's writings, and proceed to identify a central tension 
within it. We shall then return to the material in The Other Side of 198- in order 
to trace the `fault-lines' of this tension. Finally, we shall draw some conclusions 
166 Newbi<gin 1983b: 25. 
'' E. g.. Newbigin 1986b: 90 (also 103.133). Cf. also 1983b: 63. 
16X Newbigin 1983b: 27. 
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about the implications of these observations for Newbigin's thought more 
generally. 
(i) The meaning of `public truth' 
Newbigin employs the term `public truth' a total of 126 times in his 
writings, introducing it in the passage quoted above from his 1983 book The 
Other Side of'1984. An examination of these instances shows that there are three 
broad categories in which he uses the phrase. 
`Epistemological' 
Firstly, he uses the concept of `public truth" in the context of his ongoing 
`epistemological' discussions which highlight the contrast within Western culture 
between the general acceptance of certain `facts' as `public truth' on the one 
hand, and a general dismissal of the gospel as simply `private opinion" on the 
other. This deployment, which is his most common usage»9 frequently occurs in 
contexts in which Newbigin develops the familiar argument - discussed in 
chapter 2- about the post-Enlightenment dichotomy between `facts' and 
`values'. '7° This appeal (addressed to society at large) therefore calls attention to 
what he perceives to be an epistemological inconsistency, and advocates the 
acknowledgement of the gospel as `public truth'. As such it serves to underline 
169 This usage occurs fifty-six times in all: 1983b: 26: 1985f: 176 (x3). 177: 1986b: 38 (x2): 
1987d: 124 (x2): 1988g: 152 (x2): 1988f: 193: 1988c: 166 (x2). 173: 1988e: 101,103 (x2). 
105: 1989a: 2: 1989g: 3 (x2): 1989f: 4,5,23,24.35,40.223: 1990s: 7: 1990m: 139 (x2): 
1991 f. 5.12,13,24,53: 1992b: 2 (x2): 1992e: I (x2): 1994a: 128: 1995d: 37 (x2), 38 (x2): 
1995d: 50: 1997c: 3: 1997d: 5 (x2): 1998: 138: 1998: 141,142 (x3). 151. 
E. g., his assertion that, 'statements about human life being governed by the DNA molecule 
are facts, part of public truth. But statements about the purpose of human life beint to glorify 
God and enjoy him forever are not facts: they are private opinion' Newbigin 1988e: 103. 
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his argument that such an epistemological dichotomy must be a false one, 
needing to be `publicly' reformulated more satisfactorily so that the epistemic 
truth-status of religious faith can again be recognised. 
The `status' of the resulting truth claims is not directly defined in relation 
to those of science in the public sphere. But occasionally in contrasting these two 
perspectives, Newbigin does appear to advance the logic of the contrast by 
advocating that the gospel should be accepted as `public truth" in a sense strictly 
analogous to the way in which `facts' are acknowledged. In other words, the 
gospel's truth claims rank alongside scientific statements and ought to be 
acknowledged in the same way. So, for example, in The Gospel in a Pluralist 
Society he refers to the public estimation of theologians in the following manner: 
A very large section of society simply dismisses the statements of theologians as 
expressions of personal opinion - opinion which they are entitled to hold but 
which does not rank as public truth, as factual knowledge in the sense that the 
statements of physicists do. '7' 
This broad appeal for an epistemological consistency within Western 
culture, and his consequent plea for the `public' consideration of religious truth 
claims, is set alongside two further uses. 
Dialogical' 
The second use of the concept of 'public truth' arises out of the first. 
Here, the conviction that the gospel is true is expanded by Newbigin's 
commitment to the 'dialogical' aspect of faith. and his use of the phrase 'public 
truth' in this further context. One can illustrate this from his 1992 `Conference 
ý'ý Newbigin 1989f: 40. Also 1988.;: 152. 
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Call' paper issued prior to the Swanwick `Gospel and Our Culture' conference of 
July that year. Here, Newbigin argues for the `public truth' of the gospel in the 
sense that it must be presented in the public realm for the purpose of `dialogue'. 
In this context, the assertion that it is `public' is to be distinguished from any 
suggestion that it becomes a dominating ideology. Rather, it is to be set forward 
in the public arena as a 'conversation partner' with other ideologies in the realm 
of public affairs. He writes accordingly that: 
To affirm the Gospel as public truth is not to assert dominance but to invite 
dialogue. The announcement of things which have happened is not the fruit of 
dialogue but its starting point, for the meaning and implications of what is 
announced have to be learned in dialogue. For news of things that have 
happened we depend upon competent witness. Dialogue is not a substitute for 
reliable information. The first responsibility of the Church is to give faithful 
witness to the things that have happened. But this must lead on to dialogue, for 
the witnessing community does not know in advance what the message will 
entail, what will be the consequences of its acceptance in the several areas of 
human life. 172 
The results of such engagement may as yet be unclear, argues Newbigin, 
but these will become apparent in due course as the gospel is publicly shared and 
debated. In this context (in line with Polanyi once more). Christian faith is seen 
as 'open-ended', searching for the kind of resolutions and integrations that it will 
produce amongst its adherents as they `dialogue' - not only amongst themselves 
but also with others who are seeking to grapple with the issues raised in the wider 
context of society and culture. At these points, the word `public' describes the 
social context in which Christian truth-claims are seen to operate. being 
contrasted hereby with its frequent confinement to the `private" world. In 
17 Newbigin 1992b: 2. This paper is reprinted in almost identical form as 1992e). Cf. also e. ýg.. 
1989f: 50. 
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addition it underlines on the other the fact that the gospel by its very nature as 
truth - is to he set in the public arena in order to engage other viewpoints. 
1 73 
'Foundational' 
Alongside these `epistemological' and `dialogical' perspectives, however, 
a much more `foundational' meaning is also apparent within Newbigin"s writings 
which sits in critical tension with them. In this third sense, the gospel is 
presented as `public truth' not in the sense that it ought to be considered as on a 
par with scientific truth, nor simply as a `dialogue partner' with rival viewpoints, 
but as the presuppositional basis upon which every cultural ideology will 
ultimately be judged. In these places the language used suggests not so much that 
the gospel maintains its `truthfulness' in the public sphere amongst other 
ideologies, but the more radical contention that the gospel is itself the `public 
truth' upon which all public life must properly be founded. Here, therefore, the 
use of the adjective `public' means something like `ultimate', `final', or 
`decisive'. 
This perspective is usually developed by Newbigin within a more 
explicitly theological paradigm (using the religious language of eschatology 
appropriate to it). So, for example, Newbigin can state that: we proclaim [the 
gospel] as public truth in the sense that it is the truth by which all other claims to 
truth will finally be judged. ' 174 Or elsewhere he can describe the gospel as 
`public truth in the sense that it is the touchstone by which all other claims for 
E. g., Newbi-in 1989f: -50: 
1991 b: 9: 1992a: 2: 1992b: 2 (x2): 1992e: I (x2). Cf. our 
discussion of this aspect of, ' in chapter 2, and section 4.2.3 of the present chapter. 
ýýý Newbi, -, 
in 1987d: 131. 
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truth have to be judged'. '75 Or finally, he can write that the the Church is the 
body entrusted with the responsibility of bearing witness to the fact that the one 
whom Jesus called Father is the Lord and will be the judge of all without 
exception. This is public truth. ' 176 
This theological paradigm is consequently developed by Newbigin in two 
directions. In the first of these, it is used in contexts where he specifically 
addresses the Church. For example, on occasions it is used as a `wake up call' to 
the Church to recover her `public' role. 177 The Church, he writes, has to claim 
the high ground of public truth', if she is to be faithful to a message which 
concerns the kingdom of God, his rule over all things and all peoples. ' 178 She 
must `affirm as public truth the real nature and destiny of man, that human life is 
to be lived in and for the love of God and the love of the neighbour whom God 
gives as his representative in every situation. ' 179 This is usually expressed in 
terms that imply a general obligation upon Christians to engage with other 
viewpoints in the public arena, but it is also sometimes expressed in more 
specifically `evangelistic" terms. So, for example, he can write that: 
Specifically, as the command of Jesus tells us, [the gospel] is to be made known 
to all the nations, to all human communities of whatever race or creed or 
culture. It is public truth. We commend it to all people in the hope that, by the 
witness of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of others, it will come to be seen by them 
for themselves as the truth. 's0 
"' Newbitin 1995a: 10. 
171, Newbicin 1992b: 2 (also 1992e: 2). Other examples of this usage include: I987d: 131; 
1992b: 1.2: 1992e: I (x2): 1997d: 8: 1998: 153. Cf. also 1989f: 48; 1995a: 10; 1998: 140, 
where the 'foundation' idea is applied in a more general philosophical sense. 
1'' E. g., Newbi, -, in 1985f: 180: 1986b: 115.117,1988g: 153 (x2): 1988c: 162.163,166: 1989d: 
2: 1989c: 2: 1989f: 222 (x3): 1992h: 188; 1995d: 39 (x2); 1997d: 8: 1998: 150. 
179 Newbi<n 1989f: 222. 
"`' Newbigin 1985f: 180. Cf. also, 1986b: 1 17: 1988g: 153: 1989d: 2. 
190 Newbigin 1989f: 50. 
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Similarly he asks elsewhere: `What would be required of a Church which 
acknowledged the obligation to seek here in Britain for a Christian society? " His 
response is that one of the requisites for this is that the Church becomes an 
evangelising community. ' 181 He continues that: 
This is not just to take the obvious point that if the Gospel is truth it is public 
truth - which everyone ought to know and believe. It is to make the further and 
distinct point that the Gospel is only known to be true when it is experienced as 
the liberating power that it is. Evangelisation is the antidote to domestication. " 
But the term is also applied in this `foundational' sense specifically to the 
wider `public' and cultural realm of politics and economics. In this setting (in 
tension with the previous notion of `dialogue) the -public truth" of the gospel is 
now said to be the framework of ideas that is specifically to 'govern' public life. 
Accordingly he can write, for example. that: 
At the heart of modernity is the assertion that human reason, apart from divine 
revelation, is capable of finding the truth and coping with the world. The 
contrary affirmation, namely that God has in fact revealed his nature and 
purpose, is tolerated as a private opinion but not if it is offered as public truth to 
govern the public worlds of education, politics, business, culture. 18 
A commitment to the gospel in these terms is not simply an adherence to 
one ideology amongst many, nor - as Newbigin puts it elsewhere - as an 
invitation to a private and personal decision' but rather as public truth which 
ought to be acknowledged as true for the whole of the life of society. ' 184 The 
contrasting application of the term in both `dialogical' and `foundational' senses 
inevitably creates a resulting ambiguity at the heart of Newbigin"s articulation of 
... Newbi2in 1995a: 10. 
Newbigin 1995a: 10. Cf. also. 1991f: 2: 1995a: 10. 
Newbizin 1991b: 7. 
194 Newbigin 1991f: 2. Cf. also. 1988g: 152: 1989f: 222.1991a: 2: 1991f: 2 (x2): 1991b: 7. 
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`public truth' to which we will shortly return. 
Summary 
From the foregoing analysis, it becomes apparent that Newbigin uses the 
phrase `public truth' in a variety of interrelated, but distinct, ways - and with 
differing audiences in mind. 18ý In this context we have distinguished three 
different patterns of use which have been described as `epistemological'. 
`dialogical' and `foundational'. 
Two comments are in order. Firstly, analysis of the `grounds' on which 
he appeals to these different audiences reveals interesting insights. On the one 
hand his appeal to the Church functions unsurprisingly on the basis of warrants 
that are grounded in the authority of revelation. Similarly, his appeal for 
`dialogue' takes revealed truth as the basis for such conversation. On the other 
hand his more general defence of the view that Christian faith is to be seen to be 
on a par with scientific `truth" - at least in a culture which has understood the true 
nature of `knowing' - assumes an appeal to a common, wider, rationality than 
one based entirely or exclusively upon the presuppositions of Christian faith. 
Secondly, it is when we move to a comparison between his second and 
third categories (`dialogical' and 'foundational') that there emerges a deeper 
15 The three categories 'epistemological'. 'dialogical' and 'foundational' cover 100 of the total 
of 126 occurrences of the phrase 'public truth' in Newbigin's writings. Of the remaining 
twenty-six uses, eleven refer to particular (put less precise) dimensions of the 'dialogical' 
category (either as distinguishing 'publicness' from an implied 'return to Christendom'. cf. 
I 988c: 170: l992b: 1.2: 1992e: I (x2): 1997d: 1: or as distinguishing the meaning of the 
phrase from one that suggests that its 'publicness' cannot be contested, cf. I 987d: 13 I: 
1988g: 151 (x4)). The remaining fifteen occur in contexts that are either introductory to 
more specific discussions (1988-: 151.1988e: 106: 19898: 6: 1989f: 223: 1991 f: I: 1992b: 
(x2): 1995d: 47), or are altogether more generalised (1988g: 152: 19898: 11: 1991 a: I (x2): 
1991d: 2: 1992k: 24: 1993g: 254: 1998: 162). 
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tension in Newbigin's material. This appears in our juxtaposition of his 
dialogical' and `foundational' categories. For if the conception of `dialogue 
entails an understanding of `public' that simply refers to the operating sphere in 
which Christian dialogue with others is to take place, the more `foundational' 
expressions in Newbigin's material appear to contradict this. In this sense the 
'public' truth of the gospel is a `given': the a priori upon which alone true 
knowledge is possible. In this context, the connotation of the word `public' is to 
be sharply distinguished from both `epistemological' and `dialogical' uses. There 
a wider rationality was assumed: here, revelation is essential. 
(ii) The role of `dogma' 
We have identified the potential conflict between Newbigin's advocacy of 
a `confessional' approach to the foundations of cultural renewal, and his appeal to 
a wider rationality which need not accept such a starting point. We shall now 
take the discussion forward by returning to our examination of The Other Side of 
1984 in an attempt to trace the `fault-line' of this tension. We shall argue that 
this derives once more from Newbigin's appropriation of Polanyi's framework, 
and more specifically that it arises from the way in which Newbigin `overlays' 
Polanyi's thought with a very explicit understanding of `revelation' that is foreign 
to Polanyi's scheme. 
The key point in this context is to compare the way in which Newbigin 
and Polanyi use the term 'dogma'. In order to develop this point. we shall return 
to our discussion of Newbigin"s statement in The Other Side of 1981 that the 
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`new start' he is advocating for Western culture involves what he describes as an 
invitation to recover a proper acknowledgment of the role of dogma. "1 6 
In the light of the foregoing analysis. this statement inevitably lends itself 
to a measure of potential ambiguity. Does it imply - as some of his critics have 
argued - that Newbigin's contention that the gospel is 'public truth' involves a 
necessary return to a kind of Constantinian State in which Christianity is the 
dominating ideology? 187 Newbigin himself is repeatedly careful to reject such a 
conclusion. He argues that what he means by `dogma' in the `public' arena is not 
that the Christian faith should provide the necessary foundation for all social 
activity. This would imply that the State - thus founded - would be obliged to 
repress every view to the contrary. Rather, Newbigin explains that what he 
means is something rather more modest. It is that the Church (the 'community 
entrusted with a "fiduciary framework"" supplied by the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ 198) must now engage in a necessary dialogue with other `fiduciary 
frameworks' that are in competition in the public sphere. What Newbigin's 
project aims to establish, therefore, is a recognition in the public arena of the fact 
that what Polanyi says about knowledge is fundamentally correct: that all 
knowledge is held a-critically, and that it includes an inescapable element of 
`faith'. As a consequence of this, Christians - no less than others - should not be 
ashamed that they hold their beliefs in this way. 
So far_ these ideas are essentially in agreement with those of Polanyi. But 
Newbigin's thought. whilst indebted to Polanyi's basic insights, now takes a 
crucial turn in the way in which he understands the word `dogma'. At a 
"6 Newbigin I983b: _7. '"' E., -,.. Graham and Walton 1991: 5: Stowe 1988: 199. '.. Newbigin I983b: 3 I. 
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superficial level, both Newbigin and Polanyi appear to use both the noun `dogma 
and the adjective `dogmatic' in similar ways. For example, Newbigin's own use 
of the noun in the quotation above comes in the course of a lengthy passage in 
which Polanyi's thought-world is prominent. 189 He also quotes the latter's 
reference to the advantages of `dogmatic orthodoxy" 190 from a passage in 
Personal Knowledge in which Polanyi describes the grounds of his `post-critical 
philosophy' as - in a foundational respect an invitation to dogmatism'. 
191 
Furthermore, both writers at this juncture accord a positive sense to the notion of 
`dogma'. 192 But it is important to note, nonetheless, that Newbigin's usage 
invests Polanyi's concept with additional meaning. 
The crucial difference is that whereas Polanyi uses the concept of 
`dogma' in an essentially non-religious context. Newbigin not only brings it into 
the religious sphere, but invests it with specifically Christian, and even 
'confessional' content. The suggestion that Polanyi is not doing this may appear 
to be a somewhat surprising observation given his frequent references to 
Augustine as the quintessential paradigm for his own proposals. The reader may 
naturally assume therefore that Polanyi is talking in religious terms, and that 
Newbigin's use of his ideas is strictly parallel. Yet a closer reading of Polanyi 
reveals that this is not the case. True, Augustine functions for him as the `model' 
epistemologist because of the fiduciary element that is integral to his concept of 
knowledge. but the word 'fiduciary' in this context is not applied specifically by 
189 Newbigin 1983b: 20-30. in which Newbigin develops some basic Polanyian insights. quoting 
him at length five times, and referring to him by name eight times. 
'`>o Newbigin I 983b: 25-6. 
191 Polanvi 1958: 268. 
192 E. g.. Polanyi 1966: 83. For Polanyi. 'dogma' in this sense carries the positive connotation of 
the free use of fiduciary exploration in contrast to its opposite: an imposition of authority 
from outside. For the dangers of the latter, cf. Polanyi 1964: 59. or 1969: 26-7. 
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Polanyi to Christian faith as such, but to the epistemological exercise of `faith' in 
more general terms. It functions for Polanyi in a strictly analogous fashion 
therefore to his understanding of `a-critical' knowing and connotes the fiduciary 
content of all knowing. As a result. Augustine's epistemology represents for 
Polanyi the way that proper thinking is to function, because at its heart is the 
exercise of `faith', which for Augustine -just happens to be Christian faith. 
Even Augustine's phrase nisi credideritis, non intelligitis (`unless you believe, 
you will not understand') is quoted by Polanyi not so much as a way of 
advocating his specifically Christian faith, but as an example of the proper and 
appropriate character of epistemology in more general terms. 193 Understood in 
this way, Augustine becomes for Polanyi a model of properly 'a-critical' 
thinking, and therefore of `post-critical' philosophy. As a result, Polanyi is not 
setting out to mount a defence of Christian epistemology in particular (and by no 
means has he in mind the defence of some form of `Constantinianism'). 
Newbigin, however, adopts Polanyi's basic framework but now sets it in a 
rather different context. For him, the references to the Augustinian synthesis of 
`faith' and `knowledge' are meant to be taken much more fully and specifically 
as an affirmation of their implied Christian content. 194 Note for example in the 
'9' E. g., Polanyi 1958: 266. 
19' E. g., Newbigin 1983b: 63; 1986b: 102ff., 133; 1991f. l ff.. Newbigin is fond of attributing 
the phrase credo ut intelligain to Augustine (e. g., 1986b: 102; 1988c: 161; 1993b: 340; 
1994d: 61; 1996c: 3). However, to my knowledge the phrase does not occur in Augustine's 
writings, but was made famous much later by Anseim of Canterbury (to whom Newbigin 
rightly attributes it in 1966: 84, and 1989g: 4). Newbigin's first mistaken attribution of the 
phrase to Augustine is in 1986b: 102 where lie cites Polanyi 1958: 266ff.. Polanyi, however. 
never quotes Augustine to this effect. preferring instead to quote his genuine statement nisi 
credideriti. s, non intelligitis (cf. 1958: 266,267: and 1966: 61 - from Augustine's De lihero 
arbitrio. Bk. I para. 4). The actual phrase credo ut intelligum comes from the conclusion of 
chapter I of Anselm's Proslogion (Neque enim yuaero inielligere zrt credmn, sed credo ut 
intelligain. Vain et hoc credo: quicz 'nisi credidero. non intelligarn '- 'For I do not seek to 
understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand. For I believe even this: 
that "unless I believe, I shall not understand"*). The quotation is from Augustine's translation 
of Isaiah 7: 9. 
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passage of The Other Side (#' 1984 quoted above the way in which Polanyi's use 
of the Augustinian synthesis is transposed by Newbigin into a different (now 
specifically `Christian') framework of understanding. Here Newbigin offers his 
own interpretation of Augustine's relevance (still couched, however, in Polanyian 
terms). He writes accordingly that: 
What Augustine offered was a `post-critical philosophy' in the sense that it 
began with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and claimed that the acceptance 
by faith of this revelation provided the starting point for the endless enterprise of 
understanding. The revelation furnished a new framework for grasping and 
coping with experience. " 
As a consequence of this `transference". the use of Polanyi's word `dogma' by 
Newbigin is set within a new `confessional' framework which is alien to 
Polanyi's original framework. 196 
We have been arguing hitherto that Polanyi's framework hinders 
Newbigin from developing a coherent apologetic strategy in the individual 
sphere, and here we find the corollary of this in the `public' realm. The 
difference between Polanyi and Newbigin at this level is centred not least upon 
their respective goals. In Polanyi's framework, on the one hand, there is a 
genuine openness to a wide range of possible future `integrations' and fresh 
`truths' which will inevitably emerge from a common commitment to the 
potentialities of `fiduciary knowing'. These possibilities are not `boundaried' in 
the sense that they are being restricted by Polanyi to a particular `confessional' 
19` Newbi,, in 1983b: 24. 
196 See e. g., Newbigin 1988c: 162: 1989f: 5ff.. 12: 1990q: 2: 1991f: 76ff., esp. 79: The Church 
must affirm the truth of the gospel, the fact of the sovereignty of Christ as sole Lord and 
Savior: and the Trinitarian faith, the given starting point, the 
dogma which must shape all our 
thinking and revising. To affirm this in season and out of season. whether they hear or refuse 
to hear, ... ': also, 
1993b: 347.1995c: 154. 
292 
system, but are given a much greater measure of freedom within a more generally 
`libertarian' field. 
For Newbigin on the other hand, the scope of the epistemological project 
is not as `open'. He takes over the Polanyian notions of `discovery' and 
`intuition' but undergirds them with the much tighter epistemological 
presupposition of Christian faith. Moreover, the manner in which this is 
developed emphasises the exclusivity of revelation as the a priori of faith. 
197 As 
a result, a `confessional' framework forms the necessary starting point for the 
further discovery of truth and for progress in the field of knowing. Whilst 
therefore there is a real measure of openness in the use of the term `dogma' by 
Polanyi, for Newbigin this is not so. For all the talk of `dialogue' the objective is 
not as openly conceived for Newbigin, nor can it be given that the possible 
outcomes are necessarily limited by an outlook which `takes as its starting point 
and as its permanent criterion of truth the self-revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ. ' 198 
4.5 Conclusions 
We are now in a position to draw the various strands of this discussion 
together. This can be done in relation to the two central and interrelated 
questions that have emerged during the analysis. In the first place, to what extent 
10' The influence of Barth is clearest in Newbigin's thought at this point. 
Newbigin 1989f: 87-88. Elsewhere, Newbigin uses words like 'primary' and 'irreplaceable' 
to describe his fiduciary starting point (1981 c: 359). Cf. also I 989f: II: 1991 c: 6; I993f: 
228-9; 1995c: 85. The seriousness of his conviction about the rejection of such a 
'revelational' starting point is expressed, for example, in the following statements: that 'it is 
the responsibility of the Church to offer this new model for understanding as the basis for a 
radical renewal of our culture', and that 'without such radical renewal our culture has no 
future' (I 983b: 27). 
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- or in what sense - do Newbigin's proposals amount to a 
`public' theology? 
And, secondly, to what extent is Newbigin's theology consequently to be 
interpreted as `fideist'? 
4.5.1 In what sense is Newbigin's theology `public'? 
The analysis of Newbigin's 'position' can usefully be elucidated in 
relation to the distinctions in the differing notions of `public' theology made by 
William Placher in a 1985 article entitled, `Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies 
and the Public Character of Theology'. 199 Here he notes that the understanding 
of `public' theology can be viewed in two different ways. Firstly, theology can 
be understood as `public' in the sense that it `appeals to warrants available to any 
intelligent, reasonable, responsible person'. On the other hand, theology can be 
understood as `public' in a second sense which, whilst denying the existence of 
any common ground between faith and unbelief, nonetheless `understands [it] as 
fundamentally a public, communal activity, not a matter of the individual's 
experience.. 200 
Placher associates the `revisionist" theology of David Tracy and the 
'Chicago' school with the first position, arguing that it `views with suspicion the 
appeal to warrants available only to Christians. ' 
201 In this context, 'common' 
grounds must be established for any possible dialogue between theology and 
social life. Tracy argues therefore that: The theologian should argue the case 
(pro or con) on strictly public grounds that are open to all rational persons', 
202 
' Placher 1985. Cf. also Placher 1989: 154-74. 
20" Placher 1985: 407. 
'01 Placher 1985: 407. 
202 E. u., Tracy 1981a: 64. 
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and defends the view that: `Personal faith or beliefs may not serve as warrants or 
support for publicly defended claims to truth. '203 As a consequence of statements 
such as these, Placher views the `revisionist' theology of the Chicago School as 
`fully "public" in the first sense. ' 204 It sets out to make its apologetic appeal upon 
grounds of legitimation that are fully `public' in the sense that they are open and 
potentially accessible to all - believer and sceptic alike. 
The alternative approach, suggests Placher, is represented by the 
`postliberal' theology of the `Yale' school - exemplified by Hans Frei and 
George Lindbeck. Its theology is understood to be `public* in the sense that it is 
represents the outworking of a living tradition in the `public" (as opposed to 
`private') realm of everyday affairs. But it repudiates the `publicness' of the 
Chicago School in that it does not seek to engage other points of view on grounds 
either of a supposed common rationality, or on the basis of any other supposed 
form of external warrant. As Placher puts it, for the postliberal neither doctrine 
nor Scripture functions to express some universal dimension of experience 
against which it can be measured. 20' Placher proceeds to argue that this does not 
necessarily amount to a `Wittgensteinian' form of `fideism', in which belief in a 
radical incommensurability prevents dialogue with other traditions, or in which 
each tradition can only be understood and justified solely in terms of the form of 
life of which it is a part. '206 However, our analysis in chapter 1 led to the 
conclusion that in the case of `postliberals' like George Lindbeck and Stanley 
Hauerwas, this does in fact tend to be the case. As a result, both writers are more 
'° E.,,.. Tracy and Cobb 1983: 9. 
204 Placher 1985: 408. 
20' Placher 1985: 408. 
206 Placher 1985: 408 (emphasis added). 
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internally focussed upon the authenticity of the Christian community itself, than 
externally concerned about the possible engagement of its truth-claims with 
outsiders. 
On the basis of Placher"s distinction, our analysis of Newbigin's 'public 
truth' material has shown that he is problematically caught between these two 
conceptions of the term `public". The weight of Newbigin's arguments militate 
against the view that his position could be considered `public' in a `revisionist' 
sense. His repeated dismissal of the so-called neutral `Archirnedean' vantage 
point, along with his firm alliance with Polanyi in rejecting the Enlightenment's 
foundationalist elevation of reason, along with his increasing unease with the 
notion of `natural theology' would serve to confirm this conclusion. 
In addition, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the only specific 
`warrant' or `foundation' for `publicly defended claims to truth' apparent within 
Newbigin's writings is ultimately that of `personal faith': either expressed as 
being legitimated in the name of Jesus', 207 or on the basis of a personal call from 
God to `bear witness'. 208 At these points therefore, Newbigin shows himself to 
be positioned squarely within Placher's `Yale' camp. 
The meaning of the word `public' in this context is that Christianity is 
indeed to be lived out in the `public' square, but its `publicness' does not entail a 
commitment to external legitimating warrants on the basis of which rival views 
can be critiqued. Inherent within this is the agreement with Berger's reaction 
against the `privatising' tendency of Christianity under modernity209 but also an 
acknowledgement - in agreement with Maclntyre. Frei and Lindbeck - that with 
20- E. g., Newbigin l977c: 214.1978b: 16.20ff.. (also 1995c: 15.19.28): 1989f: 6.1993a: 96. 
°8 E.,,.. Newbi<rin 1978b: 17 (also 1995c: I5): 1989f: 61-2: 1993f: 237: 1995c: 15, etc.. 
109 E. -.. Newbigin 1986b: 145.1987a: 368: 1988d: 41: 1989g: 1I. 
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the passing of modernity, traditions can only speak out of their own narrative 
histories, without the recourse to the kinds of external warrants that modernity 
seemed to offer. However, our analysis has also shown that there are other 
occasions in which the meaning Newbigin attaches to the phrase `public truth' 
appears to depart from the apologetic confines of a pure `narrativalism' and 
suggests that he is rather more in sympathy with the more robustly engaging 
publicness' associated with the Chicago school than his own stated 
presuppositions would allow. 
The question that persists in relation to Newbigin"s work therefore is 
whether his sympathy with the `narratival' approaches of Frei and Lindbeck can 
ever escape the apologetic limitations of the `self-descriptive' style that narrative 
theology tends to favour. Can it ever be anything other than the re-telling of the 
Christian story amongst other stories without recourse to external warrants or 
legitimations? Our analysis has shown that Newbigin's dogmatic assumptions 
and methodology suggest that it cannot. Inasmuch as his apologetic can be 
shown to engage with other viewpoints. we have seen that it does so only with a 
future orientation whose 'proof is eschatologically revealed, rather than 
presently manifested. Echoes of a more `modernist' view of legitimation at 
various points in his work therefore betray a critical confusion at the heart of 
Newbigin's material, as a result of which we are never left entirely clear what he 
means by `public'. 
4.5.2 In what sense is Newbigin's theology 'fideist'? 
As with the distinctions necessary for an understanding of how the epithet 
'public' is to be understood in relation to Newbigin's work. further definition 
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must also be given to the related concept of `fideism'. In this context Terrence 
Tilley's article `Incommensurability, Intratextuality, and Fideism'210 provides a 
helpful framework within which we may now approach the question of 
Newbigin's 'positioning'. Like Placher, Tilley develops the discussion with 
reference to both `revisionist" and `post-liberal" perspectives represented by the 
`Chicago' and 'Yale' schools. 211 In a similar manner to Placher, Tilley argues 
that the `Yale' school's 
... refusal to 
find an extra-textual foundation for, or provide a `reasonable' 
prolegomenon to, theology has led revisionist and liberal theologians to accuse 
the post-liberals of fideism. Such a charge seems to presume that all 
non-foundationalist theologies must be fideistic simply because they reject 
`foundationalism'. Given this presumption, any `intratextual' approach is 
fideistic. - - 
Tilley explores this assumption, and concludes by making a distinction 
between what he terms a 'foundational ist fideism' on the one hand, and a 
'relativist fideism' on the other. The first approach is presented as an alternative 
foundationalism to that of 'classic theological rationalism', and Tilley argues that 
it provides a similar response to the sceptic who attacks the rationality of 
theological or religious discourse. 213 He continues: 
Classic fideists agree with the formal strategy of classic rationalists: both 
respond to skepticism by constructing a foundation. They differ both in the 
materials they use to construct their foundations and in whether people get 
access to that foundation basically through reason or faith. 214 
210 Tilley 1989. 
I have followed Tilley's spelling of'post-liberal' in the present discussion (as opposed to 
Placher's 'postliberal'). 
Tilley 1989: 87. 
21 Tilley 1989: 88: 'Foundationalist fideism ... attempts to provide a 
foundation for theology in 
divine revelation or the gift of faith. ' 
214 Tilley 1989: 88. 
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As a result, he argues that, `What we usually call "fideism" would better 
be labelled faith-foundationalism; what we usually call "foundationalism" or 
"rationalism" is more properly called reason-foundational 215 In other words, 
the nature of the foundation may differ in each case, but both adopt a foundation 
and articulate the means by which such foundations are accessible (by faith or by 
reason). 
In contrast to this `faith-foundational ist' form of fideism is the more 
radical form adopted by `post-liberals': an approach that Tilley describes as 
`relativist fideism". As faith-foundationalists are fideistic in a foundationalist 
epistemological context, so faith-relativists are fideistic in a relativist context. 
Relativist fideists refuse to agree even to engage in conversation with those who 
don't accept their faith commitments. ' 216 Here, the assumptions made by 
post-liberals are 'anti -foundationalist' in the sense that they reject both `faith" and 
`reason" forms of foundationalism. arguing that the grounds for either imply that 
there is an agreement about the foundations upon which an argument about 
`difference' can take place. By contrast, post-liberals recognize that `acceptance 
and belief come before questioning and doubt', and that therefore there is a self- 
referentiality to the tradition out of which they speak. 2 17 
Thus two distinct forms of fideism are identified by Tilley, to be 
distinguished on the one hand by the foundationalist or non-foundationalist 
assumptions that they adopt. and on the other by the degree to which the views 
'" Tilley 1989: 88. 
'1` Tilley 1989: 88. 
217 Tilley 1989: 88. 
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thus founded are considered to be commensurable with the positions of others 
who disagree with them. 218 
In drawing conclusions about Newbigin's `fideism'. it is certainly the case 
that Newbigin himself repeatedly rejects the label on the basis that he considers it 
to be an inappropriate way of describing his position. 219 Moreover, the logic of 
his Polanyian premises leads him to the view that actually all viewpoints are to a 
degree `fideistic' in the sense that all are founded upon faith-commitments 
whether these are spoken or not. 220 In addition, we have shown that his repeated 
advocacy of the need for `dialogue' is itself constructed precisely in order to 
counteract what he sees as the more radical forms of `relativist fideism' - 
positions which do not allow either criticism or argument. Given our conclusions 
about the basis upon which such debate may be seen to take place, one must 
conclude that Newbigin is to be positioned within Tilley's 'faith-foundationalist' 
category; in other words, that he cannot ultimately escape the fideist charge but 
that his fideism is of the `foundationalist' rather than the `relativist' variety. 
In conclusion therefore, there remains a critical tension in the concept of 
`public truth' - along with its `fideist' implications - as used in Newbigin's 
writings. At one level, this might be interpreted as a tension between 
`postmodern' and `modern' perspectives in which the acknowledgement that 
Christianity must now appeal from within the rationality of its own narrative sits 
in tension with a lingering sympathy for the availability of some form of external 
Plantinga (1983) constructs a similar distinction between 'moderate' and 'extreme' fideism. 
Plantinga refers to his own position as within the former category (89-91). 
21) See. for example. the discussions in Newbi2in 199 If. 28-30: 1992k: 22: 1993b: 348-9: 1993f: 
236: 1994d: 69-70: 1996c: 20ff.. 
In this sense his defence against the charge ends up by subverting it! E. g., his rebuttal of the 
critique along these lines in 1996c: 20-21. 
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warrant characteristic of an older cultural worldview. But we have shown that 
the dilemma is deeper than this. As with other central concerns within 
Newbigin's writings, we have concluded that the major component in the 
confusion at the heart of his `public truth' agenda is the importation of Polanyi"s 
notion of `dogma' into the equation. 
Once more therefore, we can defend the argument that Newbigin's 
framework owes rather too much to Polanyi than is beneficial. For in addition to the 
fact that he consistently adopts Polanyi's language and thought-forms to express his 
own approach to epistemology, he now overlays these with a Polanyian notion of 
`dogma' which he reinterprets in terms of a revelational a priori. 
This importation serves severely to limit Newbigin's options. In the first 
place, it makes it very difficult for him to articulate a form of apologetic that he is 
obliged to develop if he is to be true to his desire to appeal to a wider culture. But 
secondly, his insistence both that 'dogma' should function as the foundation for a 
new cultural starting point' and that this `dogma" is by its very nature 
acknowledgeable only on the basis of faith, represents a problematic foundation for 
contemporary public life. This is particularly the case when it is recognised that the 
machinery and ministrations of our political and social institutions is largely (and 
increasingly) exercised without reference to any kind of Christian belief at all. 
Moreover, in adopting this position, Newbigin is insistent that he repudiates 
both a 'modernist' perception of 'public' truth on the one hand, and a return to an 
older form `Christendom' on the other. It is difficult to determine where this 
material leaves him other than in some other form of contemporary `theocracy' 
whose presuppositional basis is firmly rooted in the directive authority of divine 
'revelation'. For what else could the fabric of a 'renewed' culture look like if the 
Church were to be successful in fulfilling her obligation to 'offer this new model' 
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(the acknowledgement by faith of the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation as 
the foundation for knowing) as the basis for a radical renewal of our culture'? `'' 
Newbigin himself comes closest to accepting this sort of theocratic 
conclusion in a 1995 public lecture at King's College, London entitled 'Can a 
Modern Society be Christian? "2" in which he outlines in skeletal form the 
dimensions of a form of benign theocracy where both dissent is allowed and dialogue 
is encouraged. Though the lecture does not give room for a sustained development 
of these ideas, his attempt to distinguish this form of theocracy from what might be 
considered to be a 'Christianised' form of an Islamic state remains undeveloped and 
inherently problematic - not least in terms of how questions of public dissent would 
he handled. 223 One can only conclude that in the current climate, the implications of 
such a theocratic vision - with its likely connotations in the public mind of both 
fundamentalism and militancy - remain somewhat troubling as the proffered 
foundations for public life. 
22 1 Newbigin 1983b: 27. 
222 Newbigin 1995a. 
223 See the brief discussion at various points in the lecture (Newbigin I995a: passim). One suspects 
that though Newbigin understandably advocates Christian truth over against Islam as the only true 
foundation for society, he has an ongoing sympathy for Muslims in their attempt to counter the 
secularism of liberal democracies at the political level, and in their refusal to allow personal faith 
to become privatised (cf. e. g.: 1985d: 33: `I think that the Muslim community in Britain will have 
an important role in questioning the assumptions of our society on the basis of a living faith in 
God'; 1990j: 1: 'Christians must welcome the challenge which Muslims bring to our belief system 
and begin to recognize how much dogma is built into our accepted public doctrine'; 1991b: 8: `the 
Muslim challenge will compel Christians to question the privatization of their faith and ... the idea that public life is an arena from which the truth-claims of the gospel are excluded'). 
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Conclusion 
Retrospect and Prospect 
5.1 Introduction 
We are now in a position to draw the threads of the thesis together and 
suggest both implications and possibilities. We noted at the outset that the 
cultural context in which Newbigin wrote following his return from India in 1974 
has been characterised by the cultural transition from `modernity' to 
`postnlodernity . Yet 
it is neither clear that such a transition is complete, nor is it 
clear what are the directions in which such a transition may be leading. The 
conclusions of Middleton and Walsh still appear to hold good six years on, that 
whilst there is a general agreement that `modernity is bankrupt, it is not at all 
clear that it has been superseded or replaced. " They continue: We live in a time 
of cultural transition, where we are experiencing the continuance even the 
heightening - of central features of modernity, side-by-side with genuinely novel, 
postmodern elements. ' I This analysis makes the tasks of mission and apologetics 
more challenging, but it also means that the assessment of a writer like Newbigin 
needs to take into account the multi-dimensional nature of the transition so far as 
the continuing value of his contribution to the task of mission is concerned. 
Middleton and Walsh 1995b: dl. 
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In part one of this final chapter, therefore, we will develop conclusions 
about Newbigin's contribution in the context of cultural change, synthesising and 
developing the conclusions reached in the course of the foregoing chapters. Then 
in part two, we shall conclude the thesis by suggesting some lines upon which 
missiological reflection is now needed in the light of Newbigin's contribution. 
5.2 Retrospect: Summary of thesis 
The central argument of the thesis has been that Newbigin's missiology 
cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation of the extent of his debt 
to the thinking of Michael Polanyi. Though reference has frequently been made 
to Polanyi's influence by other scholars, the thesis has sought to offer the fullest 
examination of this influence so far, constructing both a reappraisal of 
Newbigin's thought in the light of this influence, as well as drawing the 
implications that arise from it. The heart of this argument was put forward in 
chapter 2. where our analysis concluded that Polanyi's book Personal Knowledge 
has critically influenced Newbigin's thinking in three ways. 
Firstly, in terms of cultural analysis, it was argued that during the mid to 
late-seventies Newbigin adopted Polanyi's diagnosis that the Enlightenment 
movement was itself on the point of exhaustion, and that a new starting point for 
the renewal of Western culture was now urgently required. As a result of this, we 
argued that a central element of Newbigin's programme is his transfer of 
Polanyi's epistemological correlates of cultural crisis and cultural opportunity 
into a missiological context. Secondly. Polanyi's approach to epistemology - 
which had originally been incorporated into Newbigin's thinking in the mid- 
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1960s was now taken up with renewed vigour from the late seventies as a 
central constituent of Newbigin's fresh engagement with the culture of 
'modernity' and had resulted in a more `aggressive" apologetic strategy in 
relation to the supposed pre-eminence of Enlightenment reason. Thirdly, we 
argued that it is not simply in the `deconstructive' dimensions of Polanyi's 
thought that Newbigin's debt to him is to be identified. It is also clearly evident 
in the reconstruction of Newbigin's missionary programme, which is best 
understood as the transposition of Polanyi's framework into a theological and 
ecclesiological context. 
We have further argued that the examination of Newbigin's programme 
within this `Polanyian' framework reveals both strengths and weaknesses within 
his overall approach to mission strategy, whilst at the same time bringing to light 
hitherto unexplored aspects of his contribution to missiology - not least in the 
context of the cultural transition to postmodernity. In what follows, we will 
summarise the effects and implications of this indebtedness in relation to the 
three critical points of Polanyi's influence referred to above: the interpretation of 
the cultural `turning point', the critique of Enlightenment reason, and the 
resulting reconstruction of missiology. 
5.2.1 The cultural `turning point' 
From the point of view of missiological and cultural analysis it can be 
argued that Newbigin's adoption of Polanyi's cultural diagnosis helped to 
establish him as one of the first missiologists to identify and describe the crisis of 
modernity to which the Church in the West had to respond if she was to come to 
terms with the implications of its demise. Newbigin"s discovery of Polanyi"s 
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cultural diagnosis coincided with his own sense of `culture shock' as a returning 
missionary. enabling him to grasp in a fresh and vital way a framework within 
which to approach the question of mission to the West. In this sense Newbigin 
the missiologist should be given credit for his anticipation of many of the central 
themes within the wider philosophical and cultural critique of 'modernity". For 
example, Bauman's `summing up' of one of the major elements within the 
`postmodern' critique could be a description of Newbigin's own material: It is 
the modern artifice that has been dismantled; the modern conceit of meaning- 
legislating reason that has been exposed, condemned and put to shame. It is that 
artifice and that reason, the reason of the artifice, that stands accused in the court 
of postmodernity. '2 
The `freshness" of Newbigin"s analysis so far as the churches were 
concerned is clear for example from the initial responses to the publication of The 
Other Side of'1984 in the mid-eighties. Newbigin himself was taken aback by the 
response. He wrote in his autobiography: 
The BCC's publishing department thought that it would be risky to print more 
than 500 copies, but it was taken up by the World Council of Churches and 
quickly sold 20,000.1 was quite astonished at the volume and range of 
correspondence that descended on me. Clearly the questions had touched a 
nerve, even if answers were still to be found. I was moved by letters from lay 
people who told me that it had illuminated their situation. A lawyer told me that 
he felt as if the sun had risen and he could see the landscape. 
He added: `Ever since then I have puzzled about the fact that such a brief, 
hastily written paper could have such a reception'. 4 Elsewhere, he described the 
Bauman 1992: x. 
Newbizin 1993i: 252. 
Newbiýin 19938: 253. 
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book as `a small blast not of the trumpet but of the tin whistle', ' and insisted that 
it `contained nothing new or revolutionary'. 6 
However, in a collection of responses published in the Journal of the Selly 
Oak Colleges in Birmingham, one reviewer commented that it was a book whose 
'cultural analysis, diagnosis, and prescription' came across as `bold and breath- 
taking in its scope', ' whilst another. Dan Beeby, stated significantly that this was 
a critique that Newbigin `perhaps ... 
helped start', adding: 
... 
he has formulated clearly some of the questions which have hovered over 
many minds. Straws in the wind have been brought into one compact rick. He 
has systematized for many of us the gropings and half answers that were already 
ours and we are grateful. x 
Beeby later commented in a `tribute' to Newbigin that although Newbigin 
himself did not feel that he had said anything `new" in the book. others `disagreed 
strongly' with this estimate. 9 
Newbigin was clearly surprised by the overwhelmingly positive nature of 
the response, and later acknowledged that its impetus was instrumental in 
`pitchforking' him into `thinking further about this subject. ' 10 If Newbigin's 
analysis in this regard has by now become well-known and oft-repeated. the force 
of its initial impact upon the Church should not be forgotten in any analysis of his 
achievement. 
As part of our own analysis moreover, a major conclusion of the thesis 
has been that Newbigin"s indebtedness to Polanyi has the effect not only of 
Newbiý(in 1994b: 69. 
Newbigin 1993«: 256. 
Felderhof 1985: 17. 
Beeby 1985: 13. 
Beebe 1998: 9. 
10 Newbigin 1992k: 22. 
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bringing him into line with central postmodern `critiques" of modernity, but of 
establishing the contemporary relevance of its conclusions. For though mounted 
primarily as a response to the 'modernist' challenge, the effects of Polanyi's 
thought upon Newbigin"s reconstruction have helped to establish the credentials 
of his missiology as viably `postmodern' in its own right. Whilst the value of 
Polanyi's `subjective'/'objective' apologetic may have lost some of its `edge' in a 
more postmodern milieu, the dimensions of Polanyi's thought which anticipated 
the postmodern `turn' may in Newbigin's thought now be said to have come into 
their own. Amongst these we have numbered Polanyi's adherence to the late- 
Wittgensteinian notion of the communal `rationality of traditions'. and the 
embeddedness of language within such traditions, along with the resulting 
conclusions about the `incommensurability' of their rival claims to truth. 
If the adoption of these theoretical constructs means on the one hand that 
Newbigin ends up by adopting a `fideistic' position in relation to the construction 
of apologetics, it nonetheless means that his missiology carries the necessary 
qualifications to be taken seriously in a postmodern milieu. Indeed, an important 
conclusion of the thesis has been that his work not only `anticipated' some of the 
major `postmodern' questions before these were seriously being addressed by 
other missiologists, but that it had already begun to articulate ecclesial and 
apologetic responses to them. Amongst these, we have noted his insistence that 
to bear witness to the gospel is to speak out of a `tradition', that to do so involves 
the obligation to allow the tradition to sustain its own viability without recourse 
to exterior warrants. and that such viability is inextricably tied to the authenticity 
of the community 'carrying' and bearing witness to such traditions. Newbigin's 
resulting missiology can therefore be said not only to maintain a place of 
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importance for reflection and study in the context of cultural change, but also to 
contribute much that is of value in such a context. As yet, very little attention has 
been paid to this aspect of Newbigin's work. 
'' Indeed, if Newbigin's missiology 
has reason to be taken seriously, the thesis has established that its merits in the 
milieu of postmodernity are as great if not greater than was the case under 
modernity. 
But alongside the more positive aspects that accrue from Newbigin's 
deployment of Polanyi's cultural diagnosis, the thesis has also drawn attention to 
a more negative implication that has not hitherto been explored. This arises from 
the way in which Polanyi's analysis of the 'crisis'/'opportunity" framework 
provoked by the demise of the dominant Enlightenment epistemology is 
transferred by Newbigin into a missiological context. Here, the thesis has shown 
that the adoption of Polanyi"s framework has the effect of `homogenising' the 
diverse cultural and ecclesiological `factors' that Newbigin himself had - in 
earlier discussions of the interplay between culture and gospel - described in 
more `pluralistic' dimensions. As a result of this we have argued that Newbigin's 
approach to contemporary cross-cultural mission in the West is characterised by 
some critical and unresolved tensions. 
If the diagnosis of the effects of Polanyi's thought on Newbigin's 
theoretical approach at this level is correct, the recent study by Hunsberger needs 
at this point to be revised. Its sub-title (`Lesslie Newbigin's theology of cultural 
plurality') rightly articulates his innovative contribution to the pioneering cultural 
work of Niebuhr and Tillich. '2 However, Hunsberger's central conviction that 
Though see now the brief article by Hunsberger (I998c). 
Hunsber-er 1998a: 3-44. 
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Newbigin's work highlights the fact that `issues of missionary approach 
regarding human cultures are and must be theological; and that issues of a 
theological approach to human cultures must account for and respond to the 
inherent plurality of those multiple cultures", 13 is not as persuasive in Newbigin's 
later work as I-lunsberger makes out. 
What has emerged from our enquiry is that although this 'plurality' is 
reflected in Newbigin's work as the interplay of cultural entities, these are seen to 
function at a theoretical and idealistic level - in which the cultural elements in the 
interplay are viewed increasingly as unified `entities'. As a result his later work 
fails to do justice to the more variegated and diffused nature of the interplay 
between 'gospel' and `culture' at the level of both cultural and ecclesiological 
realities. 
A more nuanced - and realistic - approach to the question of `plurality' 
would have to contend with the plural nature of the Church itself (not least in its 
more or less `semiotic" relationship with Scripture) as well as with the deeply 
pluralised nature of Western society. if it is to provide an adequate foundation 
upon which to develop a contemporary missiology. This modification to the 
nature of the relationships in Newbigin's `triangular' pattern of missiological 
reflection (what we have called its `homogenising' tendency) has been shown by 
the thesis to be the result of Polanyi's over-influential epistemological framework 
and its consequent effects upon the `receptor", `missionary'. and `Bible' corners 
of the triangle. As a result of our findings. therefore, it is possible to conclude 
I' Hunsberger 1998a: 7. 
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that Newbigin's later missiology becomes in fact less `pluralised' in its 
missiological approach than some of his earlier work. 14 
5.2.2 The critique of Enlightenment reason 
The second major area in which Polanyi's thinking has influenced 
Newbigin's agenda is in his adoption of Polanyi's critique of the Enlightenment's 
'foundational ist" commitment to `reason' as exemplified supremely within the 
natural and mathematical sciences. The thesis has drawn out the implications of 
this adoption in a variety of ways. 
In positive terms, the critique helped Newbigin to contribute an intelligent 
and coherent apologetic in the face of the 'objectivist" dismissal of religious faith 
and the cultural `privatisation" of religion. In the context of late modernity, this 
critique was especially acute, both at a philosophical and a more popularly 
apologetic level, attacking as it did the 'subjective'/'objective' dualism within 
which the Enlightenment project sought to establish the validity of certain truth 
claims, whilst at the same time decisively excluded others. 
Moreover, in addition to the value of this critique as an apologetic device, 
Newbigin's work had (and continues to have) a wider impact. If one of the 
effects of modernity was to produce what Berger called 'a weakening of the 
plausibility of religious perceptions of reality' in society in general» the 
14 In this context. Wainwright's comment (2000: 192) that The pattern of The Open Secret 
constituted the stable background for what Lesslie Newbigin continued to think, speak, and 
write on missiological matters in the 1980s and I990s'. whilst right in referring to the 
'Christocentric trinitarianism' which continued to inform Newbigin's work, nonetheless (like 
Hunsberger's analysis) takes no cognisance of the effects of Polanyi's thought on Newbigin's 
theoretical framework at this level. 
Berg=er 1979: 110. 
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inevitable knock-on effect of this was to weaken the `plausibility' of the Church's 
witness in the face of what was perceived to be a cultural dismissal of its ongoing 
validity. In this context. one of Newbigin's greatest contributions has been to 
undergird Christian witness with a confidence that otherwise many believers 
might have lacked. At the denominational level, the emergence of Newbigin's 
work in the early 1980s was influential in helping white mainline churches to 
recover a greater confidence in the authority of the gospel in the light of both the 
secular strategies of the sixties and the Myth of God Debate of the seventies. '6 
At a more personal level, the words of Marius Felderhof, written after the 
publication of The Other Side o/'/ 984, are indicative of Newbigin's influence 
upon individual believers. The chief value of his book', he wrote. is to dispel 
the sense of insecurity or inferiority that some Christians may feel in having a 
faith-commitment, because he demonstrates to them that everyone necessarily has 
such faith-commitments. ' 17 It can be argued in this context, that Newbigin's 
apologetic has continued to contribute to the task of undergirding Christian 
witness with a greater confidence than otherwise it might have had. 
The contemporary transition to an increasingly `postmodern' milieu must 
inevitably lead to a reassessment of the value of this particular apologetic 
approach in terms of the ongoing viability of its theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings. For whereas modernity might have been described as more 
'monolithic' in its central philosophical convictions, postmodernity is by its very 
nature more `diffused', dismissing overarching ideologies, and favouring by 
Note Ramachandra's comment quoted in the Introduction that Newbi(lin's, 'galvanising 
summons to a slumbering, divided and tragically compromised church in the West invites 
comparison with the challenge of the early Barth' Ramachandra 1996: 144. 
ý' Felderhof 1985: 20. 
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contrast the more localised and subjective aspects of existence. As a result, an 
apologetic approach which set out to subvert one of modernity's most cherished 
beliefs (a strategy that Polanyi himself described as `rattling all the skeletons in 
the cupboard of the current scientific outlook"18) is likely to fare less well in a 
postmodern context in which the quest for philosophical `objectivity' has been 
effectively abandoned and replaced by a `laissez-faire' pluralism. Nonetheless, 
in the light of Middleton and Walsh's comment that the cultural transition is 
neither `clean' nor complete, and their suggestion that many `modernist" elements 
persist within the broad `postmodern' stream. one can argue that the continuation 
of this kind of `Polanyian' apologetic may still find a place - if not a pre-eminent 
one - alongside other strategies. 
By the same token, even under modernity. Newbigin's reliance upon 
Polanyi"s critique of reason was seen to exhibit a theoretical weakness when re- 
deployed in the context of apologetics. For, whilst acknowledging the benefits of 
its `deconstructive' dimension, the thesis has argued that the attempt to employ at 
the same time the `mirror image' of the argument (i. e., that because scientific 
truth is less `objective' than commonly thought, so - correspondingly - Christian 
faith is more `objective') is far less persuasive. We have argued that Polanyi's 
own interest in this possibility was never as committed as some of his followers 
have made out (or at least, that it is not committed to this possibility on the same 
terms - or with the same weight - as its argument about the de-throning of 
Enlightenment reason). Inasmuch as Polanyi does entertain the possibility of 
religious faith, it is conceived - most particularly in his last book Meaning - as a 
Polanyi 1958: 18. 
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projection of the human imagination rather than as something that can be said to 
be `rational' in the way that Enlightenment science was `rational'. 
As a result of this analysis. we have argued that the value of Polanyi's 
material at a strictly apologetic level is limited. It will perhaps continue - even 
under postmodern conditions - to be effective at moving old-style `positivists' 
from an objective view of the scientific method to a more `personalist' and 
`subjective' one, but it will struggle on its own terms to influence the committed 
religious sceptic towards a greater degree of openness to the possible objeclihity 
of religious belief. 
In terms of its `theoretical' substructure, the effects of the Polanyian 
critique of reason have also been shown to raise further critical questions for 
Newbigin's programme. In part these are due to the effects of cultural transition. 
If `modernity' needed critique at the level of its philosophical reliance upon what 
Bauman calls the `modern conceit of meaning-legislating reason', 19 then the 
general agreement that the `modern' paradigm has in critical ways been 
superseded leaves one asking what value is left in the `older' critique when 
viewed from within the newer cultural paradigm. Whatever gains may be 
attributed to Newbigin's adoption of this Polanyian critique of the Enlightenment 
and its subsequent plea for an epistemological vision which takes seriously the 
fiduciary character of all knowing, the thesis has underlined the fact that the 
challenge remains to re-establish the validity of the Christian story in the 
contemporary context. Ironically, in the light of the postmodern emphasis upon 
'locality". Newbigin"s sustained critique of modernity's metanarrative of `reason' 
19 Bauman 1993: x. 
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- designed as it was to re-establish the legitimacy of Christian faith - can 
actually be said to have heightened the need for him to do so. As Philip Sampson 
comments: 
... 
Christian critiques of modernity, in successfully uncovering the antinomies 
inherent in modern grand narratives, may reinforce postmodern `incredulity' 
towards any grand narrative and become but another story in postmodernity's 
conflicting field of stories, with no more priority than any other. 20 
Newbigin's central advocacy of the epistemological primacy of the 
biblical narrative as the locus for meaningful truth represents a bold move in its 
anticipatory acceptance of the narratival framework often advocated by 
postmoderns. Nonetheless, we have shown that this advocacy comes with a 
price, for it revolves around a core tendency to polarise the modalities of `reason' 
and `faith'. This polarity derives in the main from a sharply drawn contrast 
between the notion of `faith' (conceived as religious commitment) and `reason' 
(conceived in the 'foundational ist' terms of Enlightenment epistemology). Such 
a distinction tends to affect both the way in which each modality is viewed by 
Newbigin, as well as the manner in which the possibility of their interaction is 
discussed. 
As a result, we have shown that the claims of Newbigin's proposals - 
particularly in his discussions of `public' truth- remain confused and finally 
ineffective because their appeal to the rationality of the Christian story in the 
public sphere is always prefaced by the need for faith in both the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. As a result. the two modalities are left too distantly related to each 
other. or are too sharply contrasted. We have argued once more that it is his 
10 Sampson 1994: 38. His comment is generalised, and does not relate specifically to 
Newbiýjin's work. 
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following of Polanyi's framework of thought that has contributed most to this 
`impasse'. 
So far as Newbigin"s programme itself is concerned, one might conclude 
that if he had openly accepted that his proposals were essentially `fideistic' in the 
`Yale" sense outlined in the previous chapter. his position would be less liable to 
the critique that the thesis has mounted. As it stands, however, two problems 
have been identified. Firstly, that Newbigin needs to demonstrate more 
coherently (by a more sustained development of his methodology and examples 
of its application) how his `public' proposals could be defended, given that they 
are put forward -with universal intent" as being a true account of reality which 
all people ought to accept". 21 Secondly, for lack of this development we are left 
with a confusing articulation in which Newbigin shifts his emphasis between a 
view of Christian truth on the one hand which appears to be `public' simply by 
virtue of its ceasing to be `private' (but which doesn't necessarily claim a public 
pre-eminence), or - on the other hand - of a more fundamentalist view of `public' 
truth in which this `faith-foundational ism" is not only envisaged as being true for 
the individual believer, but true also for the body politic as a whole. 
Leaving aside for a moment this harder-line interpretation on `public' 
truth outlined above, and assuming that Newbigin's `fideism' is intended in a 
more moderate manner, the evaluation of Newbigin's work will ultimately 
depend upon the presuppositional perspectives adopted. Those who recoil from 
the conclusion that Newbigin's programme ends up inescapably in the `Yale' 
camp of the `post-liberals' will argue that what his method lacks is a more 
21 Newbiý-, in 1989f: 48. 
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nuanced exposition of `rationality' - taking into account the different `modes' 
within which it may be said to operate. What such an approach requires, they 
will argue, is a more developed articulation of how `faith' is related to human 
rationality; and an exploration of how an understanding of this relationship might 
be developed in a way that need not compromise the primacy of revelation. 22 
On the other hand, those who are pleased to see the demise of 
Enlightenment `foundational ism' in its epistemological form will welcome 
Newbigin's moderately-interpreted `faith-foundationalism'. They will argue that 
this was always the case, and that Newbigin has rightly drawn our attention back 
to the proper grounds of Christian confidence and witness which have been 
obscured by an over-optimistic view of Enlightenment rationalism. They may 
argue too that his proposals have particular relevance within a `postmodern' field, 
because the older foundationalism has been so profoundly dismantled. If 
warrants are required in this newer context, they are to be found in the self- 
authenticating power of the gospel itself, rather than in any which are supposedly 
exterior and `neutral'. 
5.2.3 The reconstruction of missiology 
The third major impact of Polanyi's thinking has been upon Newbigin's 
reconstruction of missiology. The dimensions of this reconstruction can be 
viewed in both ecclesiological and apologetic terms. 
Whilst Polanyi's thought has been shown to have decisively influenced 
22 See for example the apologetic discussions in Clark 1993; Placher 1989: van den Toren 1993; 
Stiver (1994 and 1995); Werpehowski 1986: or the hermeneutical work of Vanhoozer I998a: 
e. g., 287-8. 
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Newbigin's cultural analysis and the development of an Enlightenment 
apologetic, the thesis has also shown that it has critically shaped his 
ecclesiological response. Indeed it is in the conception of the local congregation 
as the `hermeneutic of the gospel' that Polanyi's thought is perhaps most 
constructively and creatively deployed. 
Here, the thesis has established that the background to this idea lies in the 
fusion of Polanyi's concepts of `tacit' knowledge and personal `indwelling', 
enabling him to combine the corporate witness of the local believing community 
with the need for ongoing discipleship and faith. It represents perhaps 
Newbigin's most constructive contribution to the Church's ongoing life, creating 
an intrinsic and necessary connection between the concept of evangelism and 
witness as a `function' of the Church's activity with the notion of witness as an 
integral part of a proper ecclesiological `ontology'. Under modernity, this 
emphasis had value in countering the prevailing notions of witness and 
evangelism as individualistic concepts, or simply as the `activity' of a fringe 
element of the community of faith, rather than as something in which the whole 
church was (and inescapably is) involved. Under postmodern conditions, in 
which terms like `authenticity' have come to the fore by their emphasis upon the 
need for `word' and `life' to be integrated, Newbigin's synthesis continues to 
carry weight. 
On the other hand, the thesis has also established that if Polanyi's 
contribution to Newbigin"s thought effectively 'furnishes' it at various levels 
with postmodern credentials. the corollary of this in the apologetic realm is that it 
tends to confirm the fact that the Church"s emerging witness is effectively 
circumscribed by its own tradition. In addition to this the imposition of Polanyi"s 
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(and Kuhn's) notions about the limits of `commensurability' tend further to 
emphasise the `boundaried' nature of that witness. 
Characteristic therefore of Newbigin's thought as it emerges in a 
postmodern framework is the fact that it is effectively `locked' into that tradition, 
with rational commensurability working only with the benefit of post-conversion 
`hindsight'. Newbigin's interaction with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, we 
have argued, serves further to confirm this dimension, and reinforces the view 
that the genuine `bilingualism' that is required by Newbigin in order to engage 
effectively with the contemporary mindset (by its need to be thoroughly `versed' 
in the language of the Christian tradition and the language of Western culture) 
makes the task of apologetics very difficult, and requires a `linguistic' skill that is 
rare indeed. Lindbeck's words, quoted in chapter 1 in relation to the perceived 
limitations of his own `intra-textual' approach to missiology turn out to be 
apposite in Newbigin's case also. In speaking about inter-religious conversation, 
Lindbeck writes that: 
... genuine bilingualism (not to mention mastery of many religious languages) is so rare and difficult as to leave basically intact the barrier to extramural 
communication posed by untranslatability in religious matters. Those for whom 
conversation is the key to solving interreligious problems are likely to be 
disappointed. '' 
The fact that Lindbeck's own conclusions about the possibility of 
apologetics are largely negative puts the onus on Newbigin to do more than he 
does to surmount these methodological difficulties - particularly as his 
articulation of the problems and possibilities is remarkably similar at many points 
Lindbeck 1997: 427. He adds. The gravest objection to the approach we are adopting is that 
it makes interreligious dialogue more difficult. Conversation between religions is pluralized 
when they are seen as mutually untranslatable' (426-7). 
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to that of Lindbeck. As we have argued, the effects of the transition to 
postmodernity are more pronounced for Newbigin in this respect than was the 
case under modernity. For whereas under modernity, the `apologetic 
atmosphere' might be said to have favoured a discussion about the comparative 
advantages of one `metanarrative' over another (with Christianity being 
considered on occasion as at least one `possibility'), the more commonly 
accepted conviction about the inherent `locality' of narratives under 
postmodernity tends to heighten in Newbigin's proposals the 'boundaried' nature 
of Christian witness. Ironically in relation to his own cause therefore Newbigin 
turns out to be more `accommodating' to the postmodern transition than he 
evidently would have wished. 
5.2.4 Conclusions 
Our survey in this concluding chapter has been constructed around the 
main contention of the thesis as a whole: that Newbigin's writings have been 
profoundly influenced by the cultural and philosophical work of Michael Polanyi. 
The degree to which this is the case contributes in our opinion both to the 
resulting achievements of Newbigin's work, but also to its shortfalls. At its best, 
it engages and probes the cultural and missiological potential within both a 
modern and a postmodern milieu, provoking both agreement and further thought 
in equal measure. But at other points. the expectation that Newbigin is breaking 
into new ground is tempered in our view by the imprecision of the theoretical 
underpinnings on which lie builds, and a consequent confusion in the terms that 
he espouses. 
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Perhaps also, Newbigin's indebtedness to Polanyi means that as a result 
his work as a whole is very difficult to categorise or systematize. It includes 
much cultural critique of course - mainly of modernity, but also of significant 
aspects of the transition to postmodernity as well. But Newbigin was never 
purely a cultural commentator, nor did he set out to be. He was - as he said at the 
outset of Foolishness to the Greeks - primarily a `foreign missionary' who was 
setting out to ask the question, 'What would be involved in a missionary 
encounter between the gospel and this whole way of perceiving, thinking, and 
living that we call "modern Western culture"? '24 Cultural analysis therefore was 
always for Newbigin the prolegomenon to the wider task of mission. 
If one addresses the issue of whether Newbigin's contribution to 
missiology adds up to a coherent missionary `programme', therefore, one is left 
with a sense that it is somehow `disjointed. There are significant dimensions to 
his contribution of course - as we have shown. These would include his fusing 
of the `functional' and 'ontological' aspects of evangelism in the concept of the 
local congregation as the 'hermeneutic of the gospel'; his espousal of `story' as 
the proper witness of a confessional community; and his recall of Christians to an 
`indwelling' of this story as the proper foundation for mission. But these 
elements are not `systematized' by Newbigin himself, nor in some cases is 
sufficient practical application offered within his writings which would enable a 
structurally formal `programme' to be articulated. As a result, the conclusion to 
be drawn in our view is that Newbigin's work is not best considered as a new 
missiological `programme" as such. Rather it represents a `rallying call" to a 
Newbi<gin 1986b: 1. 
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dispirited Church to return to the gospel as the root of her confidence. If 
coherence is sought in the Newbigin corpus as a whole, it is at this level. 
If one of the characteristics of Newbigin's work therefore is that whilst 
raising questions about theory and praxis, it doesn't necessarily supply definitive 
or systematic answers, it remains to ask where the focus of missiological thinking 
should be located in a `post-Newbigin' age. It is to this question that we now 
turn in conclusion. 
5.3 Prospect: Newbigin and the future of mission 
In a 1994 article, James Davison Hunter sketched the contours of the 
missiological challenge raised by the previous era of 'modernity'. 25 The 
paradox is clear', he writes: 
Christian faith is `traditional' (that is, historically-rooted and continuous, 
enchanted and exclusivist) if it is anything at all; modernity is, by definition, 
post-traditional, secular and exclusivist. How is it possible for faith to survive 
against the world-disaffirming realities of modernity? 26 
In response, he describes what he defines as three `ideal-typical' 
possibilities for a community of faith in its response to such a secularised culture: 
`withdrawal', `accommodation' and `resistance'. 27 
By `withdrawal', he means to indicate the kind of approach in which 
`faith withdraws from any conscious interaction with the modern world', and 
illustrates it with reference to groups such as the Amish, or to some of the more 
Hunter 1994. 
26 Hunter 1994: 22. 
27 Hunter 1994: 22-23. See his development of this analysis in Hunter 1983: 11-19, and 1987. 
(Berger employs a similar categorisation in his framework of 'deductive', `reductive' and 
'inductive' responses to modernity (Ber(yer 1980: 66-156). ) 
322 
traditional and `closed' Brethren denominations. On the other hand, by 
`accommodation" he refers to the attitude in which `faith consciously embraces 
the cognitive and normative assumptions of the modern world, baptizing, as it 
were, the ideas and values of modern times with the waters of religious 
tradition. '28 As a result of this `cognitive bargaining', 29 the gospel is moulded 
into a construct which is often powerless to challenge the surrounding culture for 
the reason that is unable to maintain a proper sense of `otherness'. Instead, what 
emerges is `a more secular/this-worldly orientation deprived of the mysterious 
and supernatural. 30 Finally, by `resistance", Hunter refers to that reactive 
response in which `faith chooses to engage the modern world but to resist its 
secularizing effects in the effort to preserve its orthodoxy. ' 31 As the prime 
example of this he chooses the `fundamentalist' movements. He develops the 
discussion of these responses by showing how each is the result of an intricate 
relationship with culture and the tradition, involving elements of 
`accommodation' as well as `resistance'. 
Hunter's categorisations maintain their usefulness as a means of 
comparison and analysis in relation to the Church's more contemporary challenge 
- not now to the `acids' of modernity (to use Walter Lippmann's phrase), but to 
the 'fragmentary and the chaotic currents' of postmodernity (to use David 
Harvey's). 32 The thesis has shown that this cultural transition leads to an even 
greater mix of possible responses, because in contrast to the relatively more 
Hunter 1994: 22. 
A phrase he uses elsewhere (e. g.. Hunter 1983: 15) to describe this process. (It is a term 
borrowed - though unacknowledged - from Berger (cf. Berger 1980: 101). ) 
10 Hunter 1994: 23. 
Hunter 1994: 23. 
32 Harvey 1990: 44. 
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steady and unified phenomenon of `modernity', the inherent `flux' of the 
postmodern context is less easy to identify - and indeed to respond to. Perhaps 
understandably in this context, questions of `presupposition', `method' and 
`philosophical approach' become prominent in theological discussions of 
postmodernity as much as the more specific discussions about practical tactics 
and strategies, both personal and ecclesia1.33 
One of the interesting points to emerge from the reappraisal of Hunter's 
categories in a `postmodern' context is that the characteristic of `withdrawal' 
becomes more prominent in mainstream theological (and missiological) 
discussions and responses, particularly amongst those who have taken the 
`linguistic' turn pioneered by Wittgenstein and therefore stressed the rediscovery 
of the 'narrative' dimensions of the Christian tradition. 
Stanley Hauerwas's specific defence of what amounts to a programme of 
`withdrawal', for example, is that it represents for him the only means of 
maintaining and re-establishing the distinctiveness of the Christian tradition in 
contemporary terms. In relating this kind of response to Hunter's other 
categories, such `withdrawal' can be explained both as an aspect of cultural 
'accommodation' (because of its acceptance of `locality'), but also at the same 
time as a strategy of `resistance'. In Hauerwas's work, therefore, the three 
categories of response `coalesce' in the transition to `postmodernity' to a greater 
degree than under modernity, with the category of `withdrawal' becoming more 
prominent. 
See e. g., the emphasis on 'method' in Phillips and Okholm 1995 (on apologetics); Dockery 
1995 and Burnham 1989 (on theological method), and most recently - from an evangelical 
stance - Stackhouse 2000. 
324 
Hauerwas would be joined by others such as Lindbeck or Milbank in 
arguing that the `survival' of the tradition is best served by self-description and 
inner strengthening, and by elements of a consequent `withdrawal'. Sometimes 
such strategies are grandiose in their aims. John Milbank's project, for example, 
represents a concerted attempt to re-establish - in his words - `the possibility of 
theology as a meta discourse'. 34 Such a response acknowledges the fact that the 
Church lives on foundations that are quite separate from those that support 
secular society. The predication of the Christian narrative as the narrative into 
which all other narratives are now to be read is designed primarily to preserve the 
Christian tradition. As such it serves both as a strategy of `survival' and also as 
one of `resistance. As he puts it: if my Christian perspective is persuasive, then 
this should be a persuasion intrinsic to the Christian logos itself, not the 
apologetic mediation of a universal human reason. ... "3' 
But the question that emerges from Hunter's categorisations is whether 
the critique of the Enlightenment which took the narrative and linguistic `turn' 
(pioneered by Wittgenstein and followed later by Lindbeck, Hauerwas or 
Milbank - and by Newbigin himself) can now be shown to be `public' in the way 
that Newbigin himself clearly intends. Does `resistance' - in Hunter's sense of 
attempting to engage the modern world but to resist its secularizing effects' - 
necessarily involve `withdrawal"? This we suggest is the key question for the 
Church raised by the Newbigin writings. 
Milbank"s recapitulation of theology as a `meta discourse' is the most 
daring attempt to redefine the Christian tradition in a postmodern context, but is 
Milbank 1990b: 1. 
Milbank I990b: I. 
325 
still essentially `self-referential' in the sense that its relationship to the modern 
world is one of `absorption' rather than `address'. Culture is `read back' into the 
Christian narrative rather than addressed by that narrative. That this may 
represent an attractive strategy from the viewpoint of the Christian community 
itself should not cloud the fact that it is a very `modern' response to a postmodern 
dilemma. The `metanarrative' lives on, and Christians are its representatives. 
But part of the challenge facing the Church is that her `narrative' can no longer 
command the position of authority that it once held. As Jeffrey Stout puts it: 
The time is past when theology can reign as queen of the sciences, putting each 
other voice in the conversation in its place and articulating, with a conviction 
approaching certainty, the presuppositions all share. For if all voices indeed 
share some presuppositions, they would not nowadays be theological. The 
existence of a specific sort of God is no longer taken for granted on all sides. 
The language spoken in the public arena, while compatible with belief in God, 
does not presuppose it. In that arena, a hearing for theological ideas must be 
won, if they are to get a hearing at all. '`' 
The thesis has demonstrated that Newbigin's position in this context has 
emerged as one of tension, on the one hand appearing at times to ground the 
nature of public debate in a prior acceptance of certain `dogmas' (thus tending 
like Milbank towards an `exclusivising' of the theological narrative), whilst on 
the other insisting that this narrative is `public' truth in a wider and more 
secularly appreciable sense. In terms of his philosophical presuppositions 
Newbigin aligns himself with Hauerwas and Lindbeck, whilst in terms of his 
theological sympathies he sides most closely Barth. But with regard to his 
ultimate objectives. he differs from all three. For unlike them, Newbigin's 
primary aim was always to communicate the gospel to the contemporary culture. 
However. without the necessary articulation of how this strategy might be 
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pursued in the secular sphere on `public' grounds, Newbigin's methodology 
remains in danger of being viewed as a further example of `withdrawal'. 
But need this be the case? Is this the only position tenable in a 
postmodern environment? Some recent voices have demurred from this 
conclusion. Dan Stiver refers for example to the dilemma facing Christian 
apologists. 
For the most part religion has been on the defensive against the hegemony of 
science. One strategy was to make religion measure up to the standards of 
reason. Interestingly this was the dominant strategy of both liberalism and 
fundamentalism.... The only other strategy was to recognize that faith did not 
resemble reason and to concede the field of reason to philosophy and science. 
Since science had the prestige, the result for religion has been increasing 
marginalization. In the modern world, faith has been caught in an apologetic 
catch-22: either try to meet the standards of reason and lose its soul or preserve 
its soul but lose its credibility. ' 
Perhaps it is at this point that Newbigin's programme offers so much but 
delivers comparatively little. For the either/or contrast between Enlightenment 
reason and biblical faith that centrally characterises his work is finally unable to 
reformulate the relationship between the two in a way that acknowledges the 
changed environment of postmodernity. Attention therefore to Foucault's 
comment that in a postmodern context, attention must be given to the role of 
reason rather to its dismissal is now urgently required by the Church. 38 
Stout 1988: 165. 
'' Stiver 1994: 89. 
'(1)f philosophy was a function within critical thought, it is precisely to accept this sort of 
spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its 
indispensability, and at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers' (undated interview ['Space, 
Knowledge, and Power'] in Rabinow 1984: 249). 
327 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion then, Newbigin's work must inevitably be seen in both its 
positive and negative aspects. In its positive contribution, Hunsberger's 
comment is apt. In its revisioning of the missionary task, he writes, `Here is a 
vision and perspective with the power to sustain a transforming way of life for 
churches of all sorts. ' 39 
If our analysis has been a `critical' one, its criticisms have been offered in 
the spirit of great respect and personal admiration for a missionary theologian. 
Newbigin's voice has been both prophetic, and energising. God knows that the 
Church has needed both, and will continue to do so. But perhaps our critical 
appreciation of Newbigin's work does mean that his ongoing contribution to the 
Church is less as a definitive `cultural analyst' or even as a `programmatic 
missiologist'. We suggest that it will be rather as what we might term a 
missionary exemplar'. His value to the Church will not be so much in the 
definitiveness of the answers and insights that he contributed (though there is 
much in this writing that is deeply significant and suggestive). It will be rather 
that he sets a godly example of someone clearly and deeply motivated by the 
gospel who faced up to issues of pressing importance for the Church, and who 
was willing even late in life - to expend his energies grappling with the 
profound and complex issues facing contemporary culture and Christian witness. 
If there are others who will take on his mantle in fresh and creative ways. his 
example will not have been in vain. 
Hunsberýger 1998a: 278. 
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His visionary work therefore remains unfinished and carries within its 
methodology both the promise of advance but also the threat of retreat. The 
words of Philip Sampson - though not specifically referring to Newbigin's 
writings - may be used as a fitting summary both of his work, and of its 
prospects. 
The debate over postmodernity provides an opportunity for presenting the 
gospel as the only foundation adequate to support the grand narratives which 
modernity took for granted. But to do so, we must become engaged with the 
world at all levels. The greatest irony would be for Christians uncritically to join 
the assault on a dying modernity only to find ourselves as but one story among 
many, unintentionally reinforcing the irrationalism of postmodernity. 40 
40 Sampson 1994: 49-50. 
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